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
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° A SHORT HISTORY
OF
GREECE

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P R E F A C E

THIS short History of Greece is intended for younger students before they reach the standard of such books as Smith's or Oman's Histories. My aim has been to give a plain straightforward and continuous narrative of the career of the chief States which made up the Greek race ; and at the same time to point out the principles underlying their various lines of conduct and the general course of Greek history, especially as regards the eventual loss of national freedom ; so that the learner, while having plenty of facts to form a solid foundation for his knowledge, may at the same time be gradually led on to acquire some grasp of the history as a whole, and obtain some insight into the manner in which the various events all contributed to the general result. The wars and battles have perhaps been described at rather greater length than is usual in elementary histories ; my object has been to increase their interest by making the reasons for the various operations and their results more intelligible. Maps have been added to explain the more important operations, and in a few cases battle plans : for these I do not claim any originality, having simply followed standard histories and atlases. Other maps have been inserted to bring out the importance of points in the

history, which might be difficult to grasp in the mass of detail of an ordinary atlas; they are however intended to supplement, not supersede, the use of the atlas.

As regards the difficult question of the spelling of Greek names, I have generally retained the conventional Latinised forms, somewhat against my own natural inclination, in deference to what I believe to be the opinion of the great majority of teachers. I have, however, kept the diphthong *ei* in most of the names in which it occurs, instead of the Latin transliteration 'i,' which seems to me in some cases to destroy the significance of a name by obliterating its derivation.

Two chapters on Greek writers and Greek life, which did not form part of my original scheme, have been inserted in deference to an expressed wish: in writing them I have relied chiefly on Professor Mahaffy's excellent *History of Classical Greek Literature*, and Professor Becker's well-known *Charicles*.

In conclusion, I have to express my grateful thanks to Dr. Evelyn Abbott for kindly looking over the proofs, and to my friend and colleague, Mr. Herbert Awdry, for valuable suggestions and assistance.

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	The Ancient Greeks,	1
II.	Greece,	7
III.	The Religion of the Greeks,	16
IV.	The Prehistoric Times,	23
V.	The Dorians,	33
VI.	The Peloponnese and Sparta,	38
VII.	The Colonies,	48
VIII.	The Tyrants, B.C. 700-500,	56
IX.	Early History of Athens : Solon,	62
X.	„ „ Tyranny of Peisistratus and Reforms of Cleisthenes,	71
XI.	The Persians and the Ionic Revolt,	81
XII.	The Persian Invasions : Marathon,	91
XIII.	„ „ Thermopylæ and Salamis,	100
XIV.	„ „ Plataea and Mycale,	116
XV.	The Confederacy of Delos,	125
XVI.	The Reforms of Pericles,	135
XVII.	The Land Empire of Athens,	142
XVIII.	Athens loses her Land Empire : Thirty Years' Peace,	150
XIX.	Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War : Death of Pericles,	158
XX.	Peloponnesian War—continued,	167

CHAP.	PAGE
XXI. Peloponnesian War (<i>continued</i>): Peace of Nicias,	174
XXII. After the Peace of Nicias. The Argive League,	185
XXIII. The Expedition against Syracuse,	189
XXIV. Ruin of the Expedition against Syracuse (B.C. 413),	198
XXIV. Renewal of the Peloponnesian War: The Four Hundred at Athens,	206
XXVI. The Peloponnesian War (<i>continued</i>): Naval Victories of Athens,	215
XXVII. The Fall of Athens.—End of the Peloponnesian War,	221
XXVIII. The Spartan Supremacy.—The Thirty at Athens,	229
XXIX. The Ten Thousand.—Xenophon and Socrates,	235
XXX. Persian War.—Sparta loses her Naval Empire,	241
XXXI. The Corinthian War.—Peace of Antalcidas,	249
XXXII. Seizure of the Cadmea.—The Bœotian War,	258
XXXIII. Battle of Leuctra: The Theban Supremacy,	268
XXXIV. Battle of Mantinea: End of the Theban Supremacy,	278
XXXV. Philip of Macedon,	283
XXXVI. Philip and Greece: The Second Sacred War,	289
XXXVII. Third Sacred War: Chæroneia: End of Greek Freedom,	297

CONTENTS

vii

CHAP.	PAGE
XXXVIII. Alexander the Great : Overthrow of the Persian Empire,	308
XXXIX. Conquest of the East : Death of Alexander,	318
XL. Greece during Alexander's Reign : The Lamian War,	326
XLI. The Successors of Alexander,	330
XLII. The Achæan and Ætolian Leagues and Conquest of Greece by the Romans,	338
XLIII. Sicily and the West,	346
XLIV. The Literature of the Greeks,	356
XLV. The Private Life at Athens,	369
XLVI. Conclusion,	378
INDEX,	382

LIST OF MAPS

The States of Greece,	8
The Islands of the Ægean,	14
The Migrations,	35
Laconia and its Neighbours,	39
Colonies in Italy and Sicily,	50
The Nations of the East,	82
The Neighbourhood of Miletus,	89
Xerxes's March,	93
Marathon,	95
Thermopylæ and Artemisium,	105
The Pass of Thermopylæ,	107
Battle of Salamis,	112
Battle of Platæa,	118

	PAGE
Confederacy of Delos,	126
The Long Walls of Athens,	144
Bœotia and its Neighbours,	146
Coreyra,	159
Mouth of the Corinthian Gulf,	168
Pylus and Sphacteria,	175
Amphipolis,	182
Siege of Syracuse,	194
The Neighbourhood of the Hellespont,	216
Route of the Ten Thousand,	237
Isthmus of Corinth,	250
Battle of Leuctra,	269
The Cities of Arcadia,	272
Macedonia at Philip's Accession,	286
The Campaign of Chæronea,	299
Campaigns of Alexander (I.),	309
„ „ (II.),	317

CHAPTER I

THE ANCIENT GREEKS

THE three peoples of antiquity which have had the greatest influence on our modern life and civilisation are the **Jews**, the **Romans**, and the **Greeks**. To the Jews we owe our religion, to the Romans our systems of law and government, to the Greeks our art, literature, and science. It was the masterful Roman who step by step conquered what was in old days the civilised world, and gave it the blessing of firm and peaceful rule ; but, as a Roman poet tells us, 'captive Greece led captive her proud conqueror' ; the Romans had no real art or literature till the conquest of Greece revealed to them the treasures of the Greek mind. Wherever the Roman arms penetrated victoriously, the influence of Greece penetrated too ; and when the Roman Empire gradually came to its end, and the great modern nations of Europe began to rise, that influence still lived on, and in the present day its power is as great as ever.

It is not only that men regard with wonder the masterpieces of the old Greeks, the glorious Homeric poems, and the statues which our sculptors try in vain to rival ; but in almost every branch of art and thought, even where we have attained results undreamed of in old days, it was the Greek who took the first steps. Our poets, painters, dramatists, historians, and philosophers, are but carrying on the work of their Greek forerunners ; and though in the

realm of science the puny efforts of the Greek shrink into nothing beside the vast discoveries of modern times, yet it was they who first began to wonder what the world was made of and how it was made.

What, then, were the qualities which gave this little race such a vast influence over the thought of the world? It was its love of all that is beautiful, and its keen intelligence, fostered, perhaps, by the lovely country and the clear climate in which it lived. Surrounded by so much that was beautiful, they were ever trying to imitate it in their buildings and sculptures, and their minds were busy thinking over the great questions of man's life on earth and the world we live in.

But it must not be supposed that these were the qualities of all the Greeks: they belong mainly to one tribe, the **Ionian**; and among the Ionians to one state pre-eminently, **Athens**. There is little reason to doubt that the Athenians were gifted with considerably more intelligence than any European nation of the nineteenth century; and Athens, a tiny state, no bigger than one of our counties, produced more great men, whose names will never die, than England ever has done. It is to Athens that we owe the greater part of our debt to the Greeks. It was Athens that first raised Greece to the rank of a great nation; it was Athens that, when Greece had sunk to be a Roman province, still lived on as its intellectual capital, while Rome was its governing capital. It is around Athens, therefore, its successes and failures, its high qualities and shortcomings, that the interest of Greek history mainly centres.

But with all their great qualities it must be confessed that the Greeks had great defects, defects which, it will be seen from their history, prevented them from really establishing themselves as a great nation. There was a **want of solidity**, a restlessness and fickleness in their nature; moreover, like all the other great nations of antiquity, they

lacked the morality and softening influence of Christianity, which has so great an influence over our modern civilisation. There is much deplorable crime and wickedness nowadays, for human nature is weak ; and there were many great and noble lives among the ancient Greeks, but they were inclined to admire what was clever rather than what was right, and in their history we shall find every state—even Athens—guilty of selfishness, cruelty, and perfidy, especially in their party struggles.

They had also, as a nation, another great and fatal defect, their **disunion**. They were fond of **independence** ; but they did not think of being an independent *nation* : each little *city* wanted to be independent, and was jealous of the slightest interference from its neighbours. This feeling was so firmly implanted in their nature that they could never rid themselves of it, and so they never became an united nation. It is a striking fact that the Greek word for a state and a city is the same, 'polis' (πόλις). Had there been one Greek state sufficiently strong to compel the others by main force to submit to it, perhaps the history of Greece might have been different. But unfortunately there were two leading states. Athens, pre-eminent in intellect and enterprise, was well fitted to lead the Greek nation, and actually attempted the task ; but it had a rival, Sparta, the acknowledged head of Greece in military prowess. There was a long and bitter struggle between the rivals, and Athens was forced to succumb. Sparta tried to take up the task, but in vain ; in ruining Athens it had ruined the only hope of Greece.

Once indeed, under the pressure of a great danger from without, the Greeks did unite, and their union gave them the victory ; this was when the Persians tried to conquer Greece ; but even then the union was only partial, many states were lukewarm, some even joined the enemy. When, however, that danger passed away, and they imagined

that they were quite safe from foreign aggression, they gave themselves up again to their old quarrels and jealousies, and wore out their strength by continual wars. And so when the next danger came from the crafty and insidious aggressions of Philip, king of Macedonia, the Greeks, exhausted, disunited, and unsuspecting, fell an easy prey.

Such is the course of the main chapter of Greek history, and it is a very short one, lasting little more than a hundred and fifty years. (1) The **Persian wars** (B.C. 490 and 480), when the Greeks led nominally by Sparta, but really by Athens, repulsed the invaders, raised them from an insignificant collection of tribes to a great power. (2) **Athens**, owing to her success in the wars, became the head of a confederacy chiefly naval, but was attacked by the other Greeks under the leadership of Sparta, and at last, after a long and heroic struggle, was successfully overthrown (B.C. 404). (3) The Spartans, after holding the leadership for thirty years, were overthrown by the Thebans under Epaminondas (B.C. 371). (4) The ability of Epaminondas, the greatest general that Greece produced, raised **Thebes** to the leading place for ten years (B.C. 371-362). (5) Lastly comes the rise of **Macedonia** under its king Philip; and the battle of Chæronæa (B.C. 338) saw the overthrow of Greek freedom in spite of all the efforts which Athens, almost unaided, was then capable of making. Here the real history of Greece closes; it is followed by (6) the overthrow of Persia and establishment of the half-Greek Macedonian Empire by Alexander the Great, the son of Philip (B.C. 330); the break up of his Empire after his death; the feeble efforts for independence of a few Greek states, and finally the conquest of the East and of Greece by the Romans (B.C. 146).

The name Greeks which we apply to this people was one which they never used themselves. They called themselves **Hellenes** and their country **Hellas**; and the modern Greeks

still keep up the old name. It was the Romans who called them Greeks (*Græci*), because that was the name of the first inhabitants of the country with whom they came in contact, a small and quite unimportant tribe on the coast of Epirus; and as we first read about the Greeks in Roman writings, we adopted their name for them. These Greeks, though so disunited among themselves, were very proud of their nationality, and looked with great contempt on all foreigners; they called them all **barbarians**, even the Romans, but barbarians did not mean savages as it does now, but people speaking a foreign tongue, 'unintelligible people.' It is, however, difficult to draw an exact line between the Greeks and the Barbarians, the Greeks could not do it themselves; some tribes regarded themselves as Greeks, whom the Greeks considered barbarians, for instance, the Macedonians and the tribes of Epirus. On one occasion indeed, a king of Macedonia claimed to compete in the great Olympic Games as a true Greek and his claim was allowed; and the people of Epirus seem to have been to a certain extent Greeks, for the most ancient oracle of Greece, Dodōna, was in the centre of Epirus. We must suppose then that there was on the outskirts of Greece a fringe of peoples half Greek and half barbarian.

In historical times we find the Greeks divided into three branches speaking different dialects and possessing to a certain extent different characteristics; there were the **Ionians**, **Dorians**, and **Æolians**. Of these the Ionians and Dorians were the most important, and there was a sharp contrast between them. The Ionians were keen-witted and enterprising; it is from them, as has been said, that most of our debt to Greece comes, and one form of their dialect, that spoken by the Athenians, called Attic, became the ordinary literary dialect of Greece. The dialect of the Dorians was broader than that of the Ionians, they were slower and less enterprising, but generally better soldiers.

The chief Ionian state was Athens, the chief Dorian state Sparta ; the rivalry of the Ionians and Dorians, seen especially in the struggle for supremacy between Sparta and Athens, is the central fact in Greek history. The Æolians were generally inferior to the Ionians and Dorians, some of them being little better than barbarians ; the chief Æolian state was Thebes, the head of Bœotia. The other Greeks despised the Bœotians as being dull-witted and slow, but there was in their character some of that steadiness and persistence in which the Greeks were generally wanting.

CHAPTER II

GREECE

THE country inhabited by the Greeks is a peninsula about the size of Scotland. It has two strongly marked features, its **mountains** and its extraordinary extent of **coast-line** in proportion to its size. These two features had a great influence on the character of its inhabitants. The mountains cut the country up into a number of valleys forming separate states often difficult of access to one another, and so fostered that spirit of independence which has been referred to already ; while the soil was not naturally fertile enough to support the inhabitants without toil and thought, thus preventing them from losing that spirit through idleness and sloth. Secondly, owing to the indented coast-line almost every state had access to the sea ; and from the sea came their love of freedom and spirit of enterprise, and also the cool breezes which gave them a temperate climate and saved them from the enervating heat of the south.

It is interesting, too, to notice that, while the western coast of Greece is inhospitable with few harbours, the eastern coast has many bays and harbours ; for which reason the enterprise of the Greeks turned first towards the Eastern nations, the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and it was not till a late period of their history that they came in contact with the Romans, who being on the western coast of Italy naturally turned to the West.

The peninsula of Greece runs in a southerly direction

from the south-western end of the country that now forms Turkey in Europe, but was then inhabited by barbarian tribes, the Thracians to the East, and the Illyrians on the



THE STATES OF GREECE

Adriatic ; between Greece and Thrace, just at the angle where the peninsula begins, dwelt the half Greek Macedonians in a bleak, hilly country.

From the east of Macedonia a range of limestone mountains runs southwards forming the backbone of Northern Greece; this is **Mount Pindus**. Pindus throws out a number of ridges westward, forming a rugged country which obtained from the Greek colonists of the islands off its coast the name of **Epirus** (*i.e.* the mainland). The tribes dwelling in Epirus and its ancient oracle Dodona have been mentioned already. Eastwards, Pindus sends out another ridge (the Cambunian Mountains) dividing Macedonia from **Thessaly**, the first district of Greece proper, and ending near the sea in the cloud-capped peak of **Olympus**, which the Greeks looked upon as the home of their gods.

Thessaly is a broad square plain, by far the largest in Greece, its chief cities were Larissa and Pheræ; the Thessalians, who belonged to the Æolian branch, were famous horsemen, but they were behind the other Greeks in civilisation, and so played an unimportant part in their history. Along the eastern shore of Thessaly runs a ridge of mountains with two heights, Ossa and Pelion. Ossa lies just below Olympus and between them the Penæus, the chief river of Thessaly, forces its way to the sea through the lovely pass of **Tempē**, so often celebrated by the old poets. Tempē was the northern gate of Greece. South of Thessaly two other ridges, Mount Othrys and Mount Ceta, run from the southern extremity of Mount Pindus through a district occupied by unimportant tribes. The ridges of Mount Ceta come close to the sea and form the famous pass of **Thermopylæ**, the Hot Gates (*θερμός πύλη*), so called from some hot springs in the neighbourhood, the second and most important gate of Greece. In old days the pass was so narrow that there was only room for one cart to go through at a time, but now, owing to the earth brought down by the River Sperchæus, it is much wider.

South of Thermopylæ, Mount Pindus spreads out into

ranges running east and west from sea to sea, along the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth. Westward dwelt the Acarnanians and Ætolians, divided by the river Achelous, and other tribes, as backward in civilisation as the Epirots. South and east lay the divided settlements of the Locrians, and between them the Phocians, Æolian tribes of no great importance except at certain points of Greek history. Phocis contains **Mount Parnassus**, famous as the home of the muses, the goddesses of poetry; on its rugged side lay the town of **Delphi**, with an oracle sacred to the god Apollo, the greatest oracle of Greece. East of Phocis and south of the Locrians **Boeotia** stretched from sea to sea with its chief city Thebes; in its centre is the marshy lake Copais, formed by the river Cephissus which is prevented by the mountains from reaching the sea, and in the south another mountain sacred to the muses, **Mount Helicon**, a continuation of the range of Parnassus. Boeotia was an agricultural country, with a heavy and moist climate, and its people were known for their solidity, or, as their enemies called it, their stupidity; they were an important state, but did not take a leading part in Greek history till towards the end. As soldiers they were always distinguished for their stubborn valour. Eastwards the ridge of Cithæron separates Boeotia from **Attica**; on its western slopes lay the little town of **Platæa**, whose few thousand inhabitants played a part in Greek history out of all proportion to their numbers.

Of the Athenians, the inhabitants of Attica, we have already spoken as one of the two greatest Greek states: sharply contrasted as they were in character with the Boeotians, it is not surprising that there was nearly always hostility between the two neighbours. Attica consists of plain and low mountains, the end of the mountain ridge. The most famous heights are **Mount Hymettus**, renowned for its honey, and Laurium for its silver mines.

The southern half of Greece was called the Peloponnēsus, or island of Pelops, from a mythical king of that name. It owes its shape to its mountains; a little distance from the south shore of the Corinthian Gulf there runs a range corresponding to that along the north shore, from which other ranges run southwards and form the bold headlands running far out into the sea. The Peloponnesus is joined to Attica by the **Isthmus of Corinth**, a low neck of land about five miles wide, containing the two Dorian states of Megāra and Corinth, which, having a harbour on each of the gulfs east and west, was the greatest trading city of Greece. East of Corinth lay a few small Dorian states, the most important of which were Phlius and Sicyon with a harbour on the Corinthian Gulf.

South-eastwards a rugged peninsula runs out corresponding to Attica, this was the Dorian **Argolis** with its chief town Argos; it contained also Mycēnæ, where Agamemnon the mythical head king of Greece reigned, and some other cities generally independent of Argos.

Further south **Laconia** runs out into two capes, Tænarum and Malea, formed by the two mountain-ranges of Tāyġētus and Parnon; in the rich and fertile valley between them on the River Eurōtas lay **Sparta** or Lacedæmon, the home of the bravest soldiers of Greece, the greatest of the Dorian states and the rival of Athens. The barren tract of coast on the eastern slopes of Mount Parnon was called Cynūria, it originally belonged to Argos but was conquered by Sparta. West of Mount Taygetus dwelt the Dorian Messenians; they were also conquered by the Spartans, whose territory then stretched from sea to sea.

In the centre of the Peloponnesus, in the heart of its mountain-system, dwelt a number of little tribes called the **Arcadians**; secure in their mountain valleys, and cut off from intercourse with the other Greeks, they had for the most part a peaceful existence, tending their flocks, but

making little advance in civilisation till a late period in Greek history. Hence Arcadia has become a proverbial expression for a quiet pastoral life. Two cities, however, Mantinëa and Tegæa, formed an exception; lying on the borders of Argos and Sparta, on the road from Sparta to the Isthmus, they were frequently at war with those states and one another. West of Arcadia the fertile plains of Elis stretch to the sea, watered by two rivers, the Penëus (not to be confused with the river of Thessaly) rising in Mount Erymanthus, and the Alpheus which is fed by the mountain streams of Arcadia. The two largest towns in this district were Elis on the Peneus, and Pisa near the Alpheus. The Eleans conquered the Pisatans (B.C. 572), and utterly destroyed their city; the city of Elis itself was not built till after the Persian wars. The Eleans played no great part in Greek history, being practically subject to Sparta. On the narrow strip of land between the mountains and the Corinthian Gulf, lay the twelve cities of the Achæans, who formed a confederacy among themselves; they kept aloof from the struggles of the other Greeks, and only came into prominence after the great period of the national history, just before the final extinction of Greek independence.

Outside the limits of Greece proper, on the coast of Thrace, just east of Macedonia, is a district called Chalcidice, which was colonised by Ionians, and became of great importance in Greek history; it runs out into the sea in three rugged capes, Actê, Sithonia, and Pallênê, like a three-pronged fork; the headland of the easternmost of the three, Mount Athos, obtained an evil notoriety for its storms.

Besides the Gulf of Corinth, the most important gulfs and bays are the Pagasæan Gulf in Thessaly, a landlocked bay between Mount Pelion and Othrys, the Malian Gulf between Mounts Othrys and Ceta, close to Thermopylæ, the Saronic Gulf between Attica and Argolis; the Argolic, Laconian, and Messenian Gulfs, the Bay of Pylus in

Messenia, famous in Greek history, and also the scene of the sea-fight of Navarino, by which Greece was freed from the Turks (A.D. 1829), and the Ambracian Gulf between Epirus and Ætolia.

A mountainous country like Greece has naturally many islands off its coast. On the west there is only the group now known as the Ionian Islands: most of them lie off the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, among which Ithāca, the home of Odysseus (Ulysses), only claims mention, though one of the smallest. The largest and most important island, Corcȳra (now Corfu), lies apart further north off the coast of Epirus; it was a Corinthian colony, and, like its mother city, famous for its commerce. In the south, off Cape Malea, lay the Dorian island of Cythēra. On the east the long mountainous island of Eubœa extends along the coast from Thessaly to the extremity of Attica: it was inhabited by Ionians, with two cities, Chalcis and Eretria, about the centre of its inner coast. The strait between Eubœa and the mainland narrows opposite Chalcis to about fifty yards, and is there called the Eurīpus. Between Attica and Argolis in the Saronic Gulf are two islands, the Ionian Salamis close into the Attic shore, famous for the great sea-fight against the Persians, and the Dorian Ægīna, in early days a great rival of Athens. It is in the Ægean that we find the extraordinary assemblage of islands so characteristic of Greece. In number over a hundred, many mere mountain peaks rising from the sea, they form a continuous chain from the coast of Greece to the south-west corner of Asia Minor, thus enabling voyages to be made across the Ægean in days when sailors feared to be out of sight of land. These islands were mostly Ionian, but those to the south were Dorian. They were divided into two groups, a western one called the *Cyclades*, or circling islands, so called because they formed a rough circle round the little island of Delos, held sacred as the birthplace of

Apollo, and an eastern one off the Asiatic coast called the **Sporades**, or scattered islands. The most important of the Cyclādes were the Ionian Naxos and the Dorian



THE ISLANDS OF THE ÆGEAN

Melos ; of the Sporādes, the Ionian Samos, and the Dorian Cos and Rhodes, the latter a large island whose navy attained considerable celebrity in the latter days of Greek

history. Further south, stretching the whole breadth of the *Ægean*, lay the Dorian Crete, with many cities, but of little importance. In the northern part of the *Ægean* were several other islands, the most important being the Ionian Chios and the *Æolian* Lesbos, both off the Asiatic coast. Further north, off the Thracian coast, lay the Ionian island of Thasos.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS

It must not be thought from what was said in a previous chapter about the character of the Greeks that they had no religion. They believed in a Supreme Power which rules the world and the destinies of mankind, and punishes men hereafter for gross sins ; but they regarded this Power as a sort of superior human being endued with all the feelings and attributes of men, whose goodwill must be gained by continual sacrifices and festivals, and whose jealousy and wrath was easily aroused by excessive prosperity and overweening pride ; this Supreme Power also from time to time communicated to mankind advice and a knowledge of the future at certain of his shrines or *oracles* (as we call them from the Latin word).

This supreme power they worshipped under various forms and guises taken from the natural world around them : in fact, their religion was a *nature worship*. Chief of all the deities was the Sky-father, Zeus, with his wife Hera ; others were the Earth-mother, Demêter, who was also the goddess of corn ; the Sea-god, Poseidon, who was also the Earth-shaker, who shook the land with earthquakes ; the Sun-god, Phœbus Apollo, also the god of prophecy and music ; Pallas Athênê, the virgin goddess of wisdom and handicraft ; Aphrodîtê, the goddess of love ; Ares, the god of war ; the Moon-goddess Artêmis, also a great huntress ; Hephæstus, the god of fire and metal-

working ; Hermes, the messenger of the gods ; and, lastly, Dis, the gloomy king of the realms below, the regions of the dead. These were twelve greater deities, and their home was Mount Olympus, in Thessaly, whose snowy top could be seen far away on the northern border rising up amid the clouds.

But besides these gods there were other lesser deities, for the Greeks made a deity of everything in nature they saw about them : the sea was peopled with Nereïds, every stream or spring had its Naiad, every wood its Dryad, every river was a god. Then there was Pan, the god of shepherds, often represented as half a goat, with his attendant Satyrs of similar form, Dionysus or Bacchus the god of wine, worshipped in wild orgies on the hills by women called Bacchantes or Mænads, Æsculapius the god of healing, Heracles the god of strength, and many others.

Many of these deities were probably originally the special god of some particular community ; Pan was the special god of the shepherds of Arcadia ; Artemis of Ephesus ; Poseidon was worshipped specially at Corinth. Others were introduced from abroad, as Dionysus from Thrace, while Aphrodite was probably the Phœnician Astaroth. As intercourse grew between the different tribes, a knowledge of their gods spread also, and thus the number of the gods generally believed in increased ; stories arose about them, which were taken up and embellished by the singers and poets, and thus gradually the Greek mythology was formed, the most beautiful poetic mythology which the world possesses. So beautiful did it seem to the Romans when they became acquainted with the Greeks, that they took it to themselves and grafted it on to their own religion, identifying their own gods and goddesses as far as they could with the Greek ones.

Besides the gods the Greeks also worshipped great heroes, many of whom were fabled to be the sons of gods or

goddesses and after death were received in Olympus as gods. Thus Heracles was originally a hero and a son of Zeus ; and his Twelve Labours are one of the most famous Greek legends ; Achilles was the son of a sea-goddess ; and we shall read of Alexander the Great in like manner claiming to be a son of Zeus. These heroes were worshipped by the states or families who considered themselves descended from them.

The Greeks of the historical age no doubt had ceased to believe in all the wonderful legends about the gods ; in fact, in a comedy of Aristophanes publicly represented at Athens B.C. 406, we find the lesser gods Dionysus and Heracles held up to ridicule ; but the worship of the different gods and heroes was scrupulously kept up and had a real meaning. The more educated no doubt regarded them merely as symbols of the supreme power, but to the ordinary people they were something very real ; and in addition they were closely bound up with the national life. One form, in which we find this religious feeling showing itself, is the great importance that was attached to the burial of the dead ; the reason of which was that the spirit of an unburied person was believed to be unable to obtain rest in the world below. After a battle, therefore, it was the custom for the defeated party to ask leave to bury their dead under a truce ; and the asking for this burial-truce was regarded as an acknowledgment of defeat.

Besides the ordinary sacrifices and temple services, and the private hero-worship of families, there were many public festivals in honour of the gods. The most important of these were the 'Games' ; in the Homeric times we find games forming a part of the funeral rites of a hero ; and in the same way they formed part of the worship of the gods. Of the many games in Greece four grew to be of national importance, and Greeks of every state and colony flocked to them. These four were the Olympic, Pýthian, Isthmian,

and Nemean. The Olympic Games were the greatest of all ; they were held in honour of the Olympian Zeus every fifth year at Olympia on the River Alpheus in Elis ; they were originally confined to the Eleans and Pisatans, and the Eleans presided, though the Pisatans disputed their claim down to a late period in Greek History. But at an early period they had become such a national institution that it became the fashion to reckon time by Olympiads (periods of four years) ; the first Olympiad was B.C. 776, that being the first year in which regular records of the victors were kept. The original competition was the footrace ; afterwards other competitions were added from time to time, the 'Pentathlon' or 'Five Contests,' namely, running, jumping, wrestling, throwing the quoit, and throwing the javelin ; the 'Pancrattium,' boxing and wrestling together, chariot races and horse races ; but the footrace remained the chief competition and the winner of it gave his name to that year's festival. The games lasted five days ; any one who could prove himself a true Greek could compete. All that a successful competitor received was a wreath of wild olive, but he received the highest honours and often a pecuniary reward from his native city ; poems even were composed in his honour. Pindar, a great Theban poet, used to compose such poems, many of which have come down to us. Each state sent a deputation to the games and vied with one another in the magnificence of their equipment. Vast crowds from all parts of Greece came to the spectacle, merchants were there and did a busy trade ; while poets and other writers took the opportunity to recite their works.

The other games need no separate description. The Pythian were celebrated at Delphi in honour of Apollo every fourth year, the prize was a wreath of bay. The Nemean every other year in the valley of Nemea, near the town of Phlius in honour of Zeus, the prize being a wreath of parsley. The Isthmian every other year at

the Isthmus in honour of Poseidon, the prize being a wreath of pine leaves. Among other festivals in which there were competitions were the **Dionysia**, festivals at Athens in honour of the god Dionysus; at these festivals, of which there were two, there were musical and poetical competitions; by the time of the Persian wars plays were acted; each poet competing sent in four plays, and they were acted one after another in the great theatre which could hold nearly the whole male population of Athens. Such was the origin of the splendid tragedies of *Æschylus*, *Sophocles*, and *Euripides*, many of which have come down to us.

There were many other festivals without contests in every city; they consisted of processions, songs, and dancing. The greatest of these was the one held at Athens in honour of its patron goddess Athene, called the **Panathenaic Procession**, in which the Athenian knights rode in procession through the city.

Another famous Athenian festival was the **Eleusinian Mysteries**, celebrated at Eleusis (see map on p. 112), in honour of the goddess Demeter. Every true-born Athenian was obliged to be initiated into these 'mysteries,' the secret of which has never been revealed. The festival lasted nine days, and the public part of it consisted mainly of processions, one of which was from Athens to Eleusis.

It was by means of festivals like the Olympic Games that religion had the effect of uniting the Greeks together and making them feel a nation. It also united them in another way. It was the custom in the early days of Greece for a number of neighbouring little tribes to join together for the common worship of some god. Such a meeting was called an '**Amphictyony**,' or meeting of neighbours; and the members of an Amphictyony used to agree to protect the temple of their god and never to destroy any town belonging to the Amphictyony or to cut it off from water in war or peace. It is noticeable that they did not undertake not

to fight against one another. The most famous of these leagues was the one known in history as the **Amphictyonic League**. It comprised twelve tribes dwelling north of the Isthmus, including the Thessalians, Boeotians, Ionians, Dorians, and other less important tribes, and its object was to worship Apollo at Delphi. The Amphictyonic Council of two delegates from each tribe met twice every year, once at Delphi and once at Thermopylæ. In later times, when the Dorians and Ionians, as we shall see, became the two greatest tribes of Greece, the Amphictyonic League became in effect a league of all Greece.

Its meetings, however, were of little importance, and we do not hear of it except when the god of Delphi was in any way attacked. The first of these occasions was in the year B.C. 595, when the Council declared war on Cirrha, the port of Delphi, on the Corinthian Gulf, because its inhabitants levied toll on pilgrims who landed there for Delphi, and otherwise ill-treated them. The war lasted ten years, and in the end Cirrha was taken and destroyed and its territory dedicated to the god—that is, it was to remain uncultivated.

This was the **First Sacred War**. Two hundred and fifty years afterwards the Amphictyonic Council brought about another sacred war which proved the death-blow of Greek liberty, as will be described hereafter.

Perhaps the strangest feature of Greek religion was the **oracles**. There were many oracles in Greece, and the answers to inquirers were given in many different ways. At Dodona, already mentioned, it was the wind sounding through the leaves of the oak trees. But the greatest of all the oracles, and the one which we always read of the Greeks consulting in historical times, was the **oracle of Apollo at Delphi**. There, in a cave, a priestess called the Pytho was placed on a tripod over a chasm, from which rose a noxious gas. Intoxicated by the fumes, she uttered wild and incoherent cries, which the priests said they alone could comprehend,

and which they interpreted to the inquirer. Their answers were always in verse. It is strange how the oracle of Delphi succeeded in maintaining its character for being able to predict the future : there is no sign of the Greeks disbelieving its prophetic powers. The priests were doubtless shrewd men and better informed about Greece and the surrounding nations than the ordinary Greek ; they could therefore often give good advice, and if asked about the future they often answered vaguely, and sometimes, as we shall see, ambiguously. Many presents were given to the god by thankful inquirers : kings, states, and private individuals ; sometimes, too, it must be confessed, the priests were not above accepting bribes. Thus the temple, in course of time, came to contain a treasure of vast amount. These oracles, especially Delphi, being consulted by all the Greeks, were another bond of union, and we shall find them in the early times exercising no little influence on the fortunes of the different states.!

CHAPTER IV

THE PREHISTORIC TIMES

THE Greeks themselves tell us nothing of their origin ; they considered that they always dwelt in Greece, though many migrations and changes took place among the various tribes. In their legends Hellen, the supposed ancestor of the Hellenes, was the son of Deucalion and Pyrrha, the only survivors of a flood which Zeus sent to punish mankind for its wickedness. The Athenians in particular believed that, though the other Greeks had changed their abodes, they had always dwelt in Attica, and were, as they said, born from the soil, and in commemoration of this fact they used to wear golden grasshoppers in their hair.

Historians, however, long felt that there must have been some connection between the Greeks and Romans, owing to the many similarities in their language and character, and they attempted in many ways to account for the fact. But it was not till the present century that the discovery and study of Sanskrit, the ancient language of the Hindoos, preserved in their sacred books, gave the true explanation. By comparing Sanskrit with Greek, Latin, English, and other languages of Europe, living and dead, and with Zend, the ancient language of the Persians, it was discovered that most of the modern languages of Europe, Persian, Hindu, with Latin and Greek, though now so different, were all sprung from a single parent language, and that therefore all these nations were originally one nation, but so long ago

that every record of it has been utterly lost. This ancient nation, to which the name **Aryan** has been given, is generally thought to have dwelt somewhere in the central highlands of Asia, north-west of India. Thence, as the population increased, swarms wandered off, some eastward and southward, forming the Hindu, Median, Persian, and other kindred nations, others further and further westward, covering all Europe, till they were stopped by the sea ; thus the Celts settled in Gaul and Spain, and even crossed the Channel into Britain, the Italians came into Italy, the Greeks into Greece, the Teutons or Germans settled in Central Europe, whence, under the names of Goths, Franks, Vandals, Saxons, and the like, they broke out in after years and overthrew the crumbling Roman Empire, and founded the modern nations of Western Europe ; further east the Slavs settled and formed the modern Russian nation. It is probable, too, that the neighbours of the Greeks in Asia Minor and Europe were Aryans also ; but for some reason the tribes settled in Greece raised themselves to a far higher pitch of civilisation. Thus the Greeks in time came to regard themselves as a distinct and superior race, although, as has been already pointed out, no definite line can be drawn between them and those whom they called barbarians.

These Aryans were not the first inhabitants of Europe ; remains found in various parts of the continent prove the existence of an inferior race which disappeared under the gradual advance of the new settlers ; of this race some people consider the Laplander and Esquimaux to be the survivors. But it wholly disappeared in Greece and left no traces unless the buildings of huge rough-hewn stones, called Cyclopæan, found in some parts of Greece, are to be ascribed to it.

Some authorities ascribe the Cyclopean buildings to a people called the Pelasgi. Ancient Greek writers tell us

that many of the settlements in Greece were originally occupied by the Pelasgi, and there was a tradition that the Athenians were of Pelasgic as well as Ionian descent. Also these writers say that in their day there were Pelasgic cities on the outskirts of Greece, but they differ as to whether these cities were to be regarded as Greek or barbarian: however, we shall not be far wrong if we consider the Pelasgi as a ruder and less civilised branch of the Greek race.

All then that we can say with certainty about the origin of the Greeks is that at some remote period, so remote that neither history nor legend goes back to it, a race which we call Aryan gradually spread over Southern Europe, some tribes of which penetrated into the country now called Greece, most of them probably coming overland through Thrace, but some possibly across the sea from Asia Minor; which tribes in after ages gradually grew into the Greek nation. But for a long time they had no national name to distinguish them from their neighbours, for the Hellenes were only one among many tribes and dwelt in Thessaly.

These ancient Greeks were an agricultural people tilling the land in the valleys of the mountains. They early became civilised and built cities, for most of the great cities we read of in Greek history are mentioned as existing in the legends. Much of their civilisation seems to have come from abroad, especially from the **Phœnicians** and **Egyptians**.

The Phœnicians were not Aryans like the Greeks and Persians, but belonged to another race called Semitic (descendants of Shem), which included the Jews, the Chaldæans and Assyrians in Mesopotamia, and the Arabs. Their chief town was Tyre on the coast of Syria above Palestine, and they were the greatest traders of antiquity; their fleets sailed all over the Mediterranean, and in many places they founded settlements to trade with the natives; it will be remembered how King Solomon's friend Hiram,

king of Tyre, used to send a fleet every three years to Tarshish, or Tartessus, in Spain. Before the Greeks themselves took to the sea, these Phœnicians visited their coasts to trade, and, in some cases, even settled in the country. They taught the Greeks many useful arts, for in those days the Eastern nations were more advanced in civilisation. Among other arts the Phœnicians introduced writing and the alphabet; we know that the art of writing was early known in the East from the stone inscriptions now found there; and a Greek legend says that the alphabet was introduced by Cadmus who came from the East and founded the city of Thebes. So the Greeks owed a great debt to the Phœnicians.

The Egyptians too, who had already been a powerful and prosperous State for centuries, must have exercised some influence on the early Greeks. There are traces in the legends of the coming of Egyptians to Greece, and in the Egyptian records we hear of Greek traders in Egypt, probably from the islands. It seems to have been from the Egyptians that the Greek first learnt the art of sculpture, which in after years they carried to a pitch undreamt of by their teachers, producing those marvellous works of art which are still the wonder of the world.

The first real glimpse which we obtain of the ancient Greeks and their life is in the *Homeric Poems*. They consist of two *Epic Poems*, that is, songs of fighting and adventure, each in twenty-four books: the *Iliad* describing the siege of Troy or Ilium by the Greeks, and the *Odyssey* describing the ten years' adventures of Odysseus (Ulysses) when returning home to Ithaca after the taking of Troy.

The tradition is that these two poems were composed by a blind poet called Homer who lived between 1100 and 900 B.C. Seven cities, mostly on the coast of Asia Minor, claimed to be his birthplace. Some Greek writers however held that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were not

by the same author, and many modern scholars go even further. Some say that no such poet as Homer ever existed, and that the two poems are merely a collection of lays composed by different poets ; some that Homer composed an *Iliad* much shorter than the one we possess, and that other lays were afterwards added to it ; others again that Homer found the lays already existing and combined them into a poem ; but nearly all agree that the *Odyssey* had a separate origin from the *Iliad*. Where scholars differ so much among themselves it is useless to attempt to arrive at any definite conclusion as to the authorship of the poems ; but there is no doubt that whoever the author or authors were, and whatever their original form was, they were lays sung by wandering minstrels in the halls of kings and nobles, at a very early date, about 800 years before Christ, in the Ionian settlements on the Asiatic coast which will be mentioned later. It is certain that, whatever their origin was, they are the most splendid product of the Greek poetical genius, the grandest epics that the world has ever seen. Other epics were composed afterwards to complete the story, but they were all far inferior, and have fallen into oblivion.

The story of the siege of Troy is as follows. Paris, son of Priam the king of Troy (Troja or Ilium), a city in the north-western corner of Asia Minor (see p. 28), when on a visit to Greece, won the love of Helen, the most beautiful woman on earth, wife of Menelæus, king of Sparta, and persuaded her to fly with him to Troy. Thereupon Agamemnon, king of Mycænæ in Argolis, the brother of Menelaus and the most powerful of all the kings of Greece, collected a vast host from all parts of Greece and sailed against Troy. The bravest hero in the host was Achilles, chief of the tribe of Myrmidons, the son of Peleus, a Thessalian king, and the sea-goddess Thëtis. The *Iliad* opens in the tenth year of the war : the Greeks are encamped on the sea-shore before

the walls of Troy, but a quarrel arises between Achilles and Agamemnon about a beautiful captive named Briseïs, and Achilles in wrath refuses to fight any more. Then the Trojans led by Hector, the bravest of the sons of Priam, discomfit the Greeks and almost take their camp; and Achilles allows his friend Patroclus to put on his own armour and lead the Myrmidons to the rescue, but, by the aid of Apollo, Hector slays him. Then at last Achilles, to avenge his friend, comes out to fight; the Trojans all flee except Hector, and Achilles, by the aid of the goddess Athênê, slays him. The poem ends with the funerals of Patroclus and Hector.

The later epics related how Paris slew Achilles with an arrow but was himself afterwards slain; and how the Greeks, finding all their attempts unavailing, at last captured Troy by a stratagem. For they made a huge wooden horse which they filled with warriors, and left on the sea-shore while they themselves sailed away and lay hid behind a neighbouring island. The Trojans thinking the horse was an offering to the goddess Athênê, drew it into their city, and in the night the warriors came out of the horse and opened the city gates to the rest of the host which had meantime returned.

How much of this story are we to consider historically true? Dr Schliemann, the great German antiquary, did indeed find the remains of a city, though a very small one, on the site where Troy was supposed to have existed; so we may suppose that there was a city Troy which was besieged and destroyed, and the siege may have been the one described in the Homeric Poems. But the whole story is full of the marvellous, the gods and goddesses play as important a part as the heroes, and many of the heroes are sons of gods or goddesses, so that it is impossible to separate the true from the legendary. Agamemnon and Achilles, Priam and Hector may have been real people; but we cannot

regard the *Iliad* as anything more than a splendid poetical legend.

At the same time, besides their poetical charm the Homeric Poems have a great historical value, because they give us the first real glimpse of the early Greek world, of Greece in the Homeric age as it is often called, and tell us in what way the Greeks of the author's day lived.

In the first place we find a great difference between Homeric and Historic Greece: the Dorians and Ionians, the two great tribes of historical Greece are hardly ever mentioned in Homer. In those days the Dorians were an insignificant tribe dwelling in Thessaly, and Athens was an unimportant town; the great tribe then were the Achæans who held all the Peloponnese. Moreover, there was no sharp distinction between Greeks and barbarians. Homer does, indeed, describe some savage nations as barbarous speaking, but the Trojans and their allies are no more different from the Greeks in their manner of life and way of fighting than in after times one Greek state was from another. As has been mentioned already, the Greeks had then no national name such as Hellenes; Homer calls them either Achæans, because most belonged to that tribe, or Argives, as subjects of the king of Argos, or Danaans, which also meant Argives. It is plain, therefore, that the feeling of nationality and superiority to other nations only grew up gradually in the Greek mind; but why they adopted the name of the little tribe of Hellenes, in order to mark the distinction, it is difficult to say.

In the Homeric age the Greek states were ruled by **kings**: the throne was hereditary, but the people had a voice in the succession, and the fittest to lead in war, not the nearest in descent, was usually chosen to succeed. The king commanded the army in war; in the Homeric poems he is always a mighty warrior, holding his position in virtue of his military prowess; the battles con-

sist simply of the individual exploits of these heroes, who unlike the Greeks of later times fought in chariots, the rank and file of the armies playing a very unimportant part. The king was also priest, sacrificing to the gods in the name of the state, though there were other priests also in attendance on the temples; and he was judge, and administered justice to his people in the market-place according to the ordinances of Zeus, that is the simple notions of right and wrong, for of actual laws there were none. He lived a simple life, without any of the mystery and pomp that surrounded the sacred person of an Eastern monarch; and his power was not absolute, but was defined by clearly understood limits.

Next to the king came the council of the nobles or Boulē (Βουλή), whose duty it was to give him advice in matters of state and the administration of justice. In Homer, Agamemnon's council consisted of the other kings. Thirdly, there was the assembly of the people in the market-place, the Agōra (Ἀγορά), who were not allowed to speak, but could vote yes or no to the questions submitted to it by the king.

The Greeks of the Homeric age present a strange mixture of cruelty and chivalry; human life was held cheap; in war the victor invariably insulted and triumphed over his prostrate foe, and the fate of the inhabitants of a captured city was death or slavery. Piracy was considered an honourable calling. On the other hand, hospitality was always freely given to the stranger who asked for it; to slay a guest was thought a great crime, for guests were under the special protection of Zeus. Still greater crime was it to slay a relation, such an act, even if excusable, could only be expiated by exile and purification from blood-guiltiness.

The picture of family life in Homer, the affection of husband and wife, of Hector and Andromachē in the

Iliad, and of Odysseus and Penelôpè in the *Odyssey*, and the reverence of children towards their parents, is very beautiful, and hardly falls short of the Christian ideal. The home life was very simple : while the men were occupied in the fields or in affairs of state, the women were busied with household matters, and spinning and weaving ; the mistress of the house, even when a queen, sat amid her maidens superintending their labours, but, at the time of the evening meal, she came forward and took her place by her husband.

Most of the work in the houses and on the land was performed by slaves, though hired labourers are also mentioned. These slaves were either prisoners of war or persons kidnapped by roving pirates and sold into distant lands. But they were few in number and well treated, and there are many instances of affection between master and slave. Money was unknown, the usual means of exchange being cattle ; 'rich in flocks and herds' is a common epithet for a king.

The world, as described in the Homeric poems, is very small, comprising chiefly Greece and the coast of the *Ægean* ; even the west coast of Greece was but little known to the author of the *Odyssey* ; his description of Ithaca is incorrect, and in its neighbourhood he places an imaginary nation of traders called the Phæacians, thought by some to be the Corcyræans. The Phœnicians and Egyptians are described ; in the extreme south dwelt the black *Æthiopians* ; in the extreme north, which was known to be cold, the Hyperboreans, or dwellers beyond the north wind. The description of everything west of Greece is wholly imaginary and fabulous ; we read of the narrow strait, supposed to be the Strait of Messina, with the whirlpool Charybdis on one side, and the man-devouring she monster Scylla on the other ; the lawless one-eyed giant, the Cyclops ; the man-devouring nation of the Læstrygonians ;

the island of the Sirens, who enticed sailors to their shores by their singing and then devoured them ; the island of the enchantress Circē, who changed men into beasts ; of Calypso, the sea-nymph ; the Lotus-eaters, who lived on the fruit of the Lotus, which brought forgetfulness of all care and trouble ; while on the outside round the earth ran the mighty River Oceānus.

In later legends we find the knowledge of geography more extensive. The Straits of Gibraltar were known and called the Pillars of Heracles, because in his wanderings, Heracles (called by the Romans Hercūles) set up two pillars there to mark the extreme points of Europe and Africa. The water beyond the Straits was thought to be the Oceanus ; and the word Ocean thus came to be used of a large body of water as distinguished from a sea like the Mediterranean.

There is also the legend of the ship *Argo*, built and manned by Jason and his fifty hero-companions, the Argonauts (*Argo*-sailors) ; they sailed from the home of the Hellenes in Thessaly, through the Bosphōrus, represented by floating rocks which dashed together and crushed any passing ship, to the land of the Colchians, a mythical nation on the eastern shore of the Euxine (Black Sea), and brought back the Golden Fleece. This legend, too long to be narrated here, shows us that the Greeks were now acquainted with the Euxine, probably by trade.

CHAPTER V

THE DORIANS

THE Homeric age was brought to an end, and the face of Greece almost entirely changed, by the invasion and conquest of the Peloponnese by the Dorians, which took place not many years after the time usually assigned to the Trojan war, and was caused by an uprising of tribes in Northern Greece.

The Dorians, who became one of the greatest divisions of the Greek people, were originally one of several small tribes dwelling on the slopes of Mount Pindus in the country afterwards called Thessaly. Driven thence by invaders who came over the mountains from Epirus, and who gave their name, Thessalians, to the country, some of these tribes wandered away southward. One tribe made their way into Bœotia, which they conquered, and became the Bœotians; but two little towns, Platæa and Thespiæ, resisted the invaders and would not acknowledge their supremacy, a fact of great importance in the subsequent history of Greece. The Dorians founded a new settlement in a little nook of territory between Mounts Cæta and Parnassus, which ever afterwards bore the name of Doris. Here they dwelt for some time, but the land was too narrow for them. They again pushed southwards, and tried to cross the Isthmus into the Peloponnese, but the Achæans of the Peloponnese defeated them, and slew one of their leaders named Hyllus.

Undismayed by their failure, the Dorians made a second attempt. They formed an alliance with the mountaineers of *Ætolia*, and the combined forces crossed the Corinthian Gulf at its narrow entrance. Once across they slowly but steadily drove the Achæans back: the first district conquered, the plain of Elis was given to the *Ætolians*; the Dorians pressed on southwards down the west coast, and, though probably only after many years' fighting, *Messenia*, *Laconia*, and *Argolis* itself fell into their hands. Leaving *Arcadia* unmolested, owing to its rugged mountains, they carried their victorious arms up the east coast to Corinth and across the Isthmus against *Attica*, but they were defeated in a battle in which the Athenian king, *Codrus*, is said to have sacrificed his life to gain the victory for his people. The Dorian invasion had reached its limit. But the Dorians were now lords of the Peloponnese; the old supremacy of the Achæans had come to an end, and their place was taken by a ruder but sturdier tribe.

This Dorian invasion is the first historic fact of Greek history, but it is narrated by Greek writers in the form of a legend called the *Return of the Heracleids* (or descendants of *Heracles*). After the death of *Heracles*, *Eurystheus*, king of *Argos*, his rival, for whom he had been obliged to perform his famous twelve labours, tried to slay his sons, but they fled to Northern Greece. *Hyllus*, the eldest, took refuge with the Dorians, but some say with the Athenians. He and his sons made many attempts to gain the throne of *Argos*, but in vain, and *Hyllus* was killed. At last, in the fourth generation, the three brothers, *Temenus*, *Cresphontes*, and *Aristodemus*, having an *Ætolian* prince as their ally, crossed the Corinthian Gulf and conquered the Peloponnese. Elis was given to the *Ætolians*, *Argolis* to *Temenus*, as the eldest, *Messenia* to *Cresphontes*, and *Laconia* to *Aristodemus*.

The movement did not end with the conquest of the

Peloponnese ; it took a long time for the disturbance to subside. First of all, the Achæans were not all content to remain in subjection to the Dorians ; one band invaded the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, which was inhabited by Ionians ; they drove out the Ionians, and established themselves in their cities, whence the land obtained the



THE MIGRATIONS

name of Achæa. Another band determined to leave Greece altogether and seek new settlements across the *Ægæan*, for the Phœnicians, who had hitherto completely ruled the sea, had now lost much of their power. Many of the old inhabitants of Boeotia joined the movement, and some too of the dispossessed tribes of Thessaly ; and so Greek settle-

ments grew up in the island of Lesbos and the adjoining coast of Asia Minor, including the district in which Troy is supposed to have been ; these settlements were known as the *Æolian colonies*, or *Æolis*.

In the second place, the Ionians, who were driven from their homes south of the Corinthian Gulf by the Achæans, crowded into Attica in such numbers that the land could not support them ; from Attica also therefore there went out swarms of emigrants who fixed their settlements in the islands and coast south of *Æolis*, and so founded a new *Ionia*. Most of the *Cyclades* were thus occupied by the Ionians, and the northern half of the *Sporades*, including the islands of *Chios* and *Samos* ; on the Asiatic coast they founded many famous cities, *Smyrna*, *Ephesus*, *Miletus*, and others, twelve in all.

Thirdly, the Dorian invaders followed the same example and occupied the island of *Ægina*, opposite *Athens*, and then the islands and coast south of the Ionians ; but, with the exception of the islands of *Crete* and *Rhodes*, their settlements were of little importance. Thus the whole western coast of Asia Minor from the strait which we call the *Dardanelles*, but which the Greeks called the *Hellespont*, to its southern corner was fringed with Greek cities : *Æolian* in the north, *Ionian* in the centre, *Dorian* in the south.

These settlements were only founded gradually in the course of many years, and after long struggles with the natives ; but of these struggles we have but a scanty record. The natives in many cases mingled with their conquerors, and thus a new race arose, different in character to the mother-country. *Herodotus* tells us that the conquerors of *Miletus* forced the native women whose husbands and brothers they had slain to become their wives, but the women swore an oath that they would never eat with their new husbands or call them by their names.

The Asiatic Greeks grew rapidly in wealth and prosperity, outstripping even the mother-country ; for no danger as yet threatened them from the nations inland. Religious unions were formed among them, the most famous of which was on the promontory of Mycälē, near Ephesus. Here the twelve Ionian cities celebrated with pomp and splendour a festival in honour of Poseidon, god of the sea, and the place was called Pan-Ionium.

CHAPTER VI

THE PELOPONNESE AND SPARTA

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Institutions of Lycurgus,	830
First Messenian War,	743-723
Second Messenian War,	650-630
Sparta, Head of the Peloponnese, .	about 550

Chief Characters.—Lycurgus, Aristodēmus, Aristomēnes, Tyrtæus.

OF the history of the Peloponnese in the period following the Dorian invasion very little is known. The first state that became powerful was Argōlis, which gradually extended its dominion over all the cities from the Isthmus of Corinth to Cape Malea. The city of Argos itself was a Dorian settlement. Mycēnæ, the old capital of the Achæans, still survived, shorn of its ancient glories, and tributary to Argos. At Argos a long line of kings reigned, the mightiest of the kings of Greece, as Agamemnon had been in the old days : the greatest of them was Pheidon, who is said to have introduced weights and measures into Greece.

Meanwhile the Dorians of Sparta, cooped up in the narrow valley of the Eurōtas, for a long time could make but little way. A few miles to the south of their city lay the Achæan city of Amyclæ, still unconquered, which for many years was a thorn in their side ; while to the north were the mountains of Arcadia. It seemed as if Sparta must be content to take a very inferior place

among the states of the Peloponnese. But about the year 850 B.C. there arose a prince of one of the royal houses named *Lycurgus* ; he was uncle of one of the kings who was an infant, and, having been unjustly accused of aiming



LACONIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

at the throne, he was banished. Leaving Sparta, he travelled to distant countries, observing their institutions and ways of life ; he visited Crete, Egypt, and, it is even said, India. On his return he found his country still weak and torn by civil dissensions ; and having consulted the oracle of Delphi he determined to give the Spartans the institutions which he had found existing among the Dorians of Crete, who also had found themselves confronted by a large hostile population.

Such is the legendary account of the origin of the famous institutions of Sparta ; there seems no reason to doubt the

existence of a lawgiver named Lycurgus, but the Greeks themselves admitted that very little was really known about him ; and there is little doubt that he was not the originator of all that was ascribed to him. The one object of the institutions of Lycurgus was to make the Spartans **good soldiers**, able to hold their own against the Achæan foes around them. Sparta became nothing more than a huge military camp ; and every Spartan, as long as he could bear arms, was a soldier, absolutely under the orders of the government, and under strict military discipline. Every male infant when born was brought before the elders of his tribe, and, if he seemed weakly, he was exposed on Mount Taygētus ; if he passed this inspection by the elders he was left with his mother till he was seven years old. At the age of seven the boy was placed under the state instructors with the other boys of his own age. The training was most severe ; he went bare-foot and with only one garment even in winter ; his food was poor, and he was encouraged to increase it by hunting and by theft ; if caught thieving he was punished, not for dishonesty, but for want of adroitness. Once in the course of his training he underwent the ordeal of being flogged before the altar of Artemis, and a prize was given to the one who endured longest. So severe was the flogging that boys are said to have died under it. He was taught to read and write and recite war-songs ; but his time was mainly occupied in gymnastics and military exercises, and in music and choral dances ; once a year at a great festival these dances were performed in public.

At the age of twenty the Spartan became a soldier ; for his meals he joined one of the military messes (*φειδίτιον*), consisting each of fifteen members who contributed their share of the expenses ; the fare was plain, one of the dishes being the Spartan broth, the best sauce for which, as the cook told the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius, was hunger. He

still had no house of his own but was quartered in the barracks. At the age of thirty he became a full citizen. He now was allowed to live in his own house, but he still served in the army and took his meals at the military mess. Before reaching that age every Spartan was expected to marry ; for it was his duty to rear up citizens to fight for the state. But, until he was of age to have a house, he was still obliged to live in the barracks and could only visit his wife by stealth. Any Spartan who did not do his duty by marrying at the proper age was punished by special marks of dishonour.

The girls were trained like the boys, though naturally in a less severe manner, in gymnastic and athletic exercises, that they might become the mothers of good soldiers. The Spartan women were much freer in their intercourse with men, and had more influence over them, than in any other Greek state. Every Spartan mother taught her son that his duty was to fight bravely for Sparta, and to die rather than submit to defeat. 'Come back,' one is reported to have said, 'with your shield or on your shield.'

The Spartans were not allowed to trade, the only property they could possess was land. Lycurgus is said to have divided the country into lots and given one lot to each citizen. Any Spartan who could not pay his share to the mess lost his citizenship and became an 'Inferior.' There were strict laws against luxury, and no money was allowed except iron bars. The number of Spartan citizens was never more than 10,000 ; and, owing to their exclusiveness, they gradually diminished till in 300 B.C. they were only 1000 in number. Every Spartan citizen (*i.e.* those over thirty years) was a member of the Assembly or Apella. As in the Homeric Agora already described the members could only vote, not speak, and it never seems to have had much power. It met once a month. The Council or Gerousia (from γέρων, old man) consisted of twenty-eight Spartans over sixty years of age elected for life by the Apella ; it advised the kings

and prepared measures for the Apella ; at a later period it even obtained the power of setting aside unwise decisions of the Apella.

At Sparta, alone of all the Greek states, there were two kings ; the reason which Greek tradition gives of this strange fact, is that Aristodēmus the Heraclid king of Sparta left twin sons behind him, and so both were made kings. They seem, however, to have been of quite distinct families ; and some modern writers think that one family was Achæan and the other Dorian, but there is no proof of this. Their powers were equal, but in later time they became little more than generals ; and all the government of the state fell into the hands of five magistrates elected annually called Ephors (*Ἐφόροι*, i.e. overseers). But, though they lost their powers, the kings were always treated with the greatest respect.

Besides the Spartans themselves there were two other classes of inhabitants of Laconia, the *Periœci* and the *Helots*. The *Periœci* (*Περίοικοι*, dwellers around) were so called because they dwelt in the less fertile parts of Laconia round the settlement of the Spartans. They had no part in the government, but were obliged to serve in the army, which, as the number of Spartans decreased, came to be chiefly composed of *Periœci* with Spartans as officers. They possessed small farms and occupied themselves with trade and other necessary occupations forbidden to the Spartans themselves. It is generally supposed that the *Periœci* were in the main the descendants of the old Achæan inhabitants who had submitted to the Dorians.

The *Helots* were serfs belonging to the state, which assigned them to individual citizens. Each *Helot* had a piece of land from which he paid a fixed amount of produce to his master ; what was over became his own property. In war the *Helots* attended their masters as servants and also served as light troops. They were cruelly treated, and, as

in later times they became very numerous, the Spartans were always afraid of their revolting ; they, therefore, instituted a secret police called the Crypteia (Κρύπτεια ; from κρυπτός, hidden), composed of young Spartans on the point of joining the army, whose duty it was to keep watch on the Helots, and slay any particular one who seemed more than ordinarily dangerous. The origin of the Helots and of their name is obscure. They were probably conquered Achæans who were not granted such favourable terms as the Perioeci ; some writers think that they were the remains of an older race who had been serfs of the Achæans. The name was derived by the Greeks from the town Helos on the coast near the mouth of the Eurōtas, but possibly it only means prisoners (from ελεῖν, to capture).

Hardened by the institutions of Lycurgus into a strong military state, the Spartans began to make a steady advance and entered upon the career of conquest which raised them to the position of the leading state of Greece. They first of all took Amyclæ and thoroughly conquered the whole valley of the Eurotas. This seems to be the period to which the origin of the Perioeci and Helots may be assigned ; the date was about 800 B.C. Next, the Spartans directed their attacks against the Messenians, their neighbours on the west of Mount Taygētus. The Dorians who settled in Messenia finding themselves too weak to effectively crush the original inhabitants had left them a certain amount of power ; thus they became the weakest of the Dorian states, and fell before the rising power of the Spartans. There were **two Messenian Wars**, which lasted about a hundred years altogether, the first from 743 to 723 B.C., the second from about 650 to 630 B.C. The accounts of these wars which have come down to us are entirely untrustworthy ; they were written many years after the events described, and were obviously compiled from the legends of the Messenians, for they represent them as hardly ever

defeated ; whereas in both the wars they were at an early stage compelled to retire to a mountain stronghold, which shows that they were unable to face the Spartans in the open field.

- The quarrel between the Spartans and Messenians is said to have begun with the death of the Spartan king Teleclus, in a temple of Artemis on Mount Taygetus, which was common to the two states ; it was intensified by a border dispute, in which a Messenian unable to obtain redress from Sparta for the robbery of his cattle and murder of his son, slew with his own hand every Spartan he met. The Spartans then seized a Messenian frontier fort from which they ravaged the country far and wide ; the Messenians in their turn ravaged Laconia ; then two pitched battles
- were fought which are represented as indecisive, but the Messenians were so exhausted that they abandoned all the country and retired with their possessions into the mountain fortress of Ithōmē (735 B.C.). Then the oracle of Delphi told the Messenians that a royal princess must be offered up as a victim ; and Aristodēmus, a prince, slew his own daughter. This is said to have so alarmed the Spartans that for some years they refrained from war. Then there was another indecisive battle, but the Messenian king was slain, and Aristodēmus was elected in his stead. He carried on the war with vigour, both sides ravaging one another's land.

After a few years another battle was fought in which the Messenians aided by the Arcadians and Argives were victorious ; but, nevertheless, discouragement prevailed among them, their ranks were thinned by famine, and the omens were against them. Aristodēmus alarmed by a vision of his daughter, who appeared to him with her bleeding breast, slew himself on her tomb. Finally, the Messenians abandoned Ithome, which the Spartans razed to the ground. Many fled from the country, those who

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remained had to submit to the cruel terms imposed by the conquerors, among other things they were forced to pay half the produce of their lands to Sparta (B.C. 723).

Two generations after the fall of Ithome the Messenians rebelled. The hero of the second war was a prince named **Aristomēnes**, and he was aided by the Argives and the Arcadians; while the Corinthians came as allies to the Spartans. At the outset the valour and deeds of Aristomenes struck terror into the hearts of the Spartans. On one occasion he is said to have succeeded in entering Sparta itself by night, and to have fastened a shield to the temple of Athene, on which was inscribed: 'Dedicated by Aristomenes from the Spartan spoils.' The Spartans, not knowing what to do, asked advice of the Delphic oracle, and were told to ask the Athenians for a leader. The Athenians did not really wish to help them, so they sent a lame schoolmaster named **Tyrtæus**; but Tyrtæus was a poet, and wrote warlike songs which inspired the Spartans with fresh courage. In spite, however, of the songs of Tyrtæus they suffered another defeat from Aristomēnes. But soon afterwards a great battle was fought in which the general of the Arcadians was guilty of treachery, and led away his forces, so that the Messenians were utterly defeated. So great was their loss that, as in the first war, they retired into a mountain stronghold, this time named **Ira**, in the north of Messenia. Now the Spartans were again unable to capture the Messenian stronghold, and so the war dragged on. The stories of the latter years consist mainly of the wonderful exploits of Aristomenes, who continued to harass the Spartans by his raids into their territories. On one occasion he was captured by the Spartans and thrown with the other prisoners into a deep pit. He alone reached the bottom alive, and lay there for three days waiting for death to end his sufferings. But on the third day he saw a fox preying

on the dead bodies, and concluding that it must have entered by some hole, he seized it by the tail and was dragged by it in its efforts to escape to the hole through which he extricated himself and reappeared at Eira.

But, in spite of the deeds of Aristomenes, it was a hopeless struggle; the end came at last. Ira was betrayed by a Spartan deserter, and the Messenians were forced to submit. Aristomenes retired to Rhodes: many of the Messenians left their homes and settled in other Greek states; those who remained behind were reduced to the lot of Helots, and tilled their lands for their Spartan masters. Thus the Spartans conquered Messenia.

During these years the Spartans had also been trying to extend their frontiers northward and eastward. Northward lay the Arcadian state of Tegea, against which they fought for a long time unsuccessfully, suffering many defeats. In their first invasion they were so confident that they took chains with them to bind their prisoners, but they were defeated and forced to wear the chains themselves. At last, according to the story, after many years they were told by the oracle of Delphi that they would conquer Tegea if they brought to Sparta the bones of Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, which lay in a spot in Tegea, where 'two blasts of wind were forced to blow, where stroke answered to stroke, and sorrow lay upon sorrow.' After much search the bones of a hero of more than human size were found beneath a blacksmith's forge and conveyed to Sparta; then the Spartans prevailed, and Tegea made peace with Sparta, acknowledging her supremacy, and was given the honour of fighting on the left wing of the Spartan army. The peace with Tegea occurred about B.C. 550, nearly one hundred years after the conquest of Messenia.

The land on the east of Laconia was a narrow strip between the mountains and the sea called *Cynuria* belonging to Argos. It was mostly a worthless bit of

territory, but the Spartans coveted it, because its conquest would, with Messenia, give them the whole south of the Peloponnese from sea to sea. So the Spartans and Argives became enemies, and long wars were fought for the possession of Cynuria, of which very little is known. By about 700 B.C. the Spartans seem to have gained possession of it, and the Argives now fought to win it back again. After the end of the first Messenian war, the Argives won a great victory over the Spartans, which encouraged the Messenians to renew the war; but the power of Argos was declining, for Corinth and other towns were pressing her hard in the north, and she did little to help the Messenians in their last struggle. The quarrel between Sparta and Argos still went on for many years, and at last it was determined to settle the dispute by a combat of 300 champions from each side. The champions fought with the utmost valour, and by the end of the day two Argives and one Spartan, named Othryades, alone survived. The Argives imagining themselves victorious returned home, but Othryades remained and stripped the bodies of his fallen foes: both sides, therefore, claimed the victory, and, as they could not agree, a battle ensued in which the Spartans were victorious, and so retained Cynuria (about B.C. 550).

Victorious over the Messenians, Tegeans, and Argives, Sparta was now the foremost state in Greece: she had risen step by step from the weak condition in which Lycurgus found her, and, strengthened by his institutions, had proved her superiority to her neighbours, and had seized the position, formerly held by Argos, of the **head state of the Peloponnese**. This position Argos from time to time attempted to regain, but without success; she never acknowledged the supremacy of Sparta, and remained her bitter enemy to the last.

CHAPTER VII

THE COLONIES

	<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Cumae founded,	about 900 (?)
Syracuse founded,	734
Tarentum founded,	707
Coreyra founded,	705
Byzantium founded,	658
Agrigentum founded,	580
Destruction of Sybaris by Croton,	510

THE ancient Greeks were, like the Phœnicians, great colonisers. An account has already been given of the emigration to the coasts of Asia Minor in the pre-historic times following the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese ; but at a later time, beginning about 750 B.C., a second period of emigration set in, and colonies were sent out further afield to many parts of the Mediterranean. These colonies were not founded wholly as trading posts like those of the Phœnicians, nor by tribes driven out of their original settlements by invaders, as was the case with the Ionian and Æolian colonies. They were due to the restless spirit of enterprise so strong in the Greeks, to the over-pressure of population, and often to the violent party struggles by which many Greek states were torn, the two parties finding it impossible to live in concord within the same city walls.

One reason of this sudden activity of the Greeks in colonisation may be found in the fact that about this

time the power of the Phœnicians in the eastern part of the Mediterranean was declining owing to the subjugation of Tyre by Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon ; while Carthage, the chief Phœnician colony in the west, had not yet attained to the great power which it afterwards exercised. The Greeks were stepping into the place of the Phœnicians ; their sailors were voyaging further and further afield, and distant lands were becoming more and more familiar to them, with the advantages which they offered for settlement.

It is interesting to observe that from this time a fixed method of procedure prevailed among the Greeks for sending out a colony. The 'mother-city' (*μητρόπολις*), as it was called, before fixing on the locality for its colony, almost invariably asked the advice of the oracle of Delphi. Then a Founder or Oekist (*Οικίστης*) was selected from the leading men of the city to superintend the enterprise and direct the new community until a settled government was set up. Finally, after religious ceremonies to invoke the blessing of heaven on their settlement, the colonists sailed away, carrying with them some of the sacred fire from the public hearth, to preserve the old home worship in their new surroundings. The colony thus founded became entirely self-governing and independent, the only tie which bound it to the mother-city being that of religion and sentiment ; it was usual for a colony which wished itself to found another colony to send to the mother-city for the Oekist, and representatives were also sent to attend the festivals of the mother-city. But this tie was a very slight one ; the distances were so great that communication was very difficult. The colonies for the most part lived a life of their own, with little thought as to what was happening in Greece, unless it concerned their own interests. In times of danger we hear little of any aid coming to Greece from her colonies.

The position selected for a colony was usually on the coast, for the sea was the natural highway of communication. It would have, of course, a harbour of some sort, and, if possible, a hill to serve as a citadel (*Ἀκρόπολις*) for protection against the natives.

Southern Italy and Sicily were the countries chiefly colonised in the West, both about the same time. They were at that time inhabited by barbarian tribes : in Sicily



COLONIES IN ITALY AND SICILY

dwelt the Sicels and Sicāni, in Southern Italy the aboriginal inhabitants, driven thither by the Latins and their kinsmen, the Samnites and Lucanians. The Greek colonists were called Siceliots and Italiots. In Italy they stretched along the south and west coasts from Tarentum to Cumæ ; in Sicily they were along all the coasts, except at the extreme west end.

The earliest colony was *Cumæ*, on the west coast of Italy, north of the Bay of Naples. It was founded by Chalcis, in Eubœa, one of the most active colonising states, aided by settlers from the Æolian city, *Cumæ*, or *Cymē*, in Asia Minor. Tradition places its foundation before the Trojan war! Its date was certainly very early, two or three hundred years before the general tide of colonisation began; though how, at such a time, a colony came to be planted in so distant a spot, cannot, with our present knowledge, be explained.

The most important of the other colonies in Italy were *Sybāris* (B.C. 720) and *Croton* (B.C. 710), both founded by the Achæans of the Peloponnese, on the western side of the Gulf of Tarentum; *Rhegium*, on the Straits of Messina (B.C. 715), founded by Chalcis, which, having devoted one-tenth of its inhabitants to Apollo in consequence of a famine, is said to have sent them thither as settlers, together with refugees from Messenia after the first war, and *Tarentum* (B.C. 707), the best harbour in the gulf, to which it afterwards gave its name, the solitary colony sent out by Sparta. The story of this colony is as follows:—During the latter years of the First Messenian War the Spartan warriors bound themselves by an oath not to return home until the war was over; during their long absence the Spartan women contracted alliances with Perioeci and others of inferior citizenship. The offspring of these alliances, when they grew up, were not permitted by the Spartans to have the rank of citizens, whereupon they made a conspiracy to overthrow the government. The conspiracy was discovered; but the Spartans, instead of punishing the authors, sent them away with their leader as oekist, and they seized Tarentum, already a town of some size.

These colonies, in their turn, sent out others, and the number of Greek cities fringing the south-west shore of Italy, as far north as *Cumæ*, was so great that the district

received the name of Great Hellas, or, as the Romans called it, *Magna Græcia*. The natives were subdued, and the settlements grew with wonderful rapidity, far outstripping in size and prosperity their parent states in Greece. Sybāris and Croton brought many of the native tribes under their sway, and ruled large tracts of country. The walls of Croton were twelve miles in circumference, those of Sybāris six; in the religious festivals of Sybāris 500 knights, splendidly attired, used to ride in procession. But prosperity bred luxury and indulgence, especially at Sybaris, and the name Sybarite has ever since been proverbial.

In the year B.C. 510 the two cities quarrelled and went to war. Sybaris is said to have put 300,000 men into the field, Croton 100,000, numbers which must have been enormously exaggerated. The Sybarites were routed, and their city destroyed; but disunion proved fatal to the Italiot Greeks: their power and prosperity began to decline; and the Lucanians, more powerful than the natives whom they had conquered, began to push down south and attack them. Tarentum, formerly inferior to Sybaris and Croton, now became the most powerful of the Italian colonies. Owing to its unrivalled harbour, its commerce grew and flourished. It fought long wars with the Lucanians and the Samnites, and only succumbed to the irresistible power of Rome (B.C. 275).

In Sicily the most important colonies were Naxos, on the east coast, founded by Chalcis (B.C. 735); *Syracuse*, further south, founded by Corinth (B.C. 734); on the south coast. Gela, founded by the islands of Rhodes and Crete (B.C. 690), which, in its turn, founded *Agrigentum* (Greek *Akrāgas*, B.C. 580); and, on the Straits of Messina, opposite Rhegium, Zancle, founded by Chalcis and settlers from Cumæ (B.C. 728), which founded Himēra, on the north coast (B.C. 648). Zancle was afterwards seized by Rhegium and some Messenian exiles, and its name changed to Messēnē or Messana.

In Sicily, as in Italy, the natives were easily conquered, and the whole east of the island became Greek. Syracuse, with its strong position on the shore of a land-locked harbour, was the leading state, and Gela was the second, until it was eclipsed by its own colony, Agrigentum. There were, however, Phœnician colonies in the west of the island; and the great Phœnician colony in Africa, Carthage, was fast rising in power. Carthage was so near Sicily that she could bring all her forces against the Greeks; many terrible wars were fought with varying fortune; in the end both Carthaginians and Greeks fell, like the Italian colonies, before the power of Rome (B.C. 242). Thus the Sicilian colonies did not prosper so rapidly as the Italian; but they retained their power longer, and had, as we shall see, a more important influence on Greek history.

Three isolated colonies lay in other parts of the Mediterranean. The inhabitants of Phocæa on the Asiatic coast of the Ægean, driven from their homes by the rising power of the neighbouring Lydians, founded Massilia (Marseilles) in South Gaul, B.C. 600. Massilia, secure in its distant site from the interference of other nations, had a peaceful and prosperous career and founded colonies on the coast of Spain. On the coast of Africa, west of Egypt, Cyrênê was founded by the Island of Thera (B.C. 630), and in Egypt itself on the western mouth of the Nile was Naucrâtis, given to the Greeks by King Amâsis (about B.C. 570) as a trading station; it was colonised mainly by Miletus and other Asiatic cities.

We now come to the Greek colonies near home. On the the west coast of Epirus above Greece itself, Corinth founded a colony in the island of *Corcȳra* (B.C. 705), and afterwards Corinth in conjunction with *Corcȳra* founded other colonies on the islands and mainland in the neighbourhood, the most notable of which were Ambracia and Epidamnus. *Corcȳra* became one of the most famous

commercial states of antiquity, rivalling its mother-city Corinth; it was also notorious for its bad relations with its mother-city, with which it fought the first recorded sea-fight in Greek history (B.C. 664), and later for the unbridled ferocity of its political dissensions.

On the East on the borders of Macedonia and Thrace a number of colonies were founded by Chalcis, aided by Eretria, on the three-pronged peninsula, which in consequence took the name of Chalcidice. They were about thirty in number, mostly small towns, and never attained the prosperity of the Italian and Sicilian colonies. Potidæa and Olynthus were the most famous.

Eastward of Chalcidice the whole coast was fringed with colonies, including the whole circuit of the Euxine (Black Sea). Most of these came from Miletus, which is said to have founded eighty in the Euxine, including Cyzicus in the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) B.C. 756, Sinôpê (about B.C. 720) with its colony Trapezus (Trebizond) on the southern coast of the Black Sea. Megara also founded Chalcêdon (B.C. 675) and **Byzantium** (B.C. 658), the first on the south and the second on the north side of the Bosphôrus. Byzantium, owing to its magnificent harbour, became the greatest of the Eastern colonies, in later ages it was selected by the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great as the capital of the Eastern Empire and so obtained its modern name Constantinople.

The colonies in Thrace and on the Euxine never attained the prosperity and importance of those in Sicily and Italy. Owing to their situation the fortunes of those of them that were of any importance were so closely connected with the history of Greece itself that there is no need to give a separate description of them.

The fate of the original Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian settlements on the coast of Asia Minor, however, demands a particular mention. We have seen how powerful and prosperous

they were for the first centuries after their founding (p. 37). But, like the colonies of Magna Græcia, they never learnt to unite for mutual protection, for there seemed little danger of attack from the barbarians inland; secure and prosperous, they became enervated by luxury, and by marriages with the natives. But, about the year B.C. 685, a usurper named Gyges seized the throne of the neighbouring kingdom of *Lydia* the capital of which was Sardis, about sixty miles from Ephesus. He was an energetic monarch and at once set to work to enlarge his dominions by attacking the Greek cities, many of which he took. His successors continued the same policy, and the greatest and last of them, *Croesus*, who ascended the throne B.C. 560, captured Ephesus, and gradually all the cities submitted and agreed to pay tribute. Croesus was no barbarian, but an admirer of the Greeks, and under his rule they had little to complain of except the loss of independence. Besides the Greeks Croesus brought under his sway all Asia Minor west of the River Halys, and became famous for his wealth and power; but a sad fate was in store for him, a fate which had the most momentous effect on the history of the Greeks both in Asia and Greece itself. This, however, belongs to a later chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TYRANTS, B.C. 700-500

It has been already pointed out in a previous chapter that in the early days of Greek history the different states were ruled by kings. In the course of time this government by kings or 'monarchy' (*μόνος*, alone and *ἄρχω*, I rule) came to an end except in Sparta, where, as we have seen, the kings were reduced to the position of mere generals of the army, and in half-barbarian states such as Macedonia. In what particular ways monarchy came to an end in Greece we do not know, though in the case of Athens there is a legend on the subject which will be narrated in the next chapter. It seems that the Greek states were so small that they did not feel the want of a single head, and the kings were unable to maintain that state of a great court which would keep them in a position of superiority to their subjects and especially to the leading noble families; and the Greeks, with their inborn love of independence and equality, could not endure to have a single man set over them.

So by the beginning of the seventh century B.C., monarchy had died out and the government, instead of being in the hands of one man, was now in the hands of the nobles, sometimes of a single family, sometimes of the whole body. This form of government is called 'aristocracy' (*ἄριστος*, best; *κράτος*, power) or 'oligarchy' (*ὀλίγος*, few). But the change did not bring relief to

the mass of the people, who only exchanged one master for many and had more chance of fair treatment from a single king than from a combination of noble families ; for which reason it seems probable that the kings were driven out more by the nobles than the people. The people wished to get the power into their own hands ; that is, to have not an aristocracy but a '**democracy**' or government by the people (from *δημος*, the people). Thus the downfall of the kings was the beginning of **strife between the nobles and the people**, a strife that in some Greek states lasted almost to the end of Greek history, and was often fraught with the greatest bitterness and bloodshed.

It was this political strife that was the cause of many of the colonies being sent out as has been mentioned ; and it is interesting to notice that Athens, where the struggle though bitter did not go to such lengths as in some other states, sent out no colonies, and so reserved her strength for her future great career. **Athens**, as will be seen, became gradually step by step more democratic in her government, and came to be regarded as the **champion of democracy** throughout Greece, while Sparta, with its aristocratic government, was the **champion of aristocracy** ; this fact is very important to remember, for it was one of the causes of the great struggle between Athens and Sparta, which is the central point of Greek history.

Now, during the first two centuries after the expulsion of the kings, it happened in many states that some man, taking advantage of the state of political strife and unrest, succeeded in overthrowing the government and usurping supreme power. Sometimes the usurper was an ambitious member of some noble family, sometimes a man of the people, who won his position by overthrowing the oppressive rule of the nobles ; sometimes he was a mere adventurer, who hired mercenaries and seized the supreme power by force.

Such usurpers were not called by the Greeks kings, for the kings had ruled by right, but '**Tyrants**' (τύραννοι). It must be clearly understood, however, that the name did not mean what it means nowadays—that is, a cruel and oppressive ruler, but simply a man who seizes the power to which he has no right, as Cromwell did in England ; in one word, a usurper. The Greeks, except perhaps the lowest classes, hated these upstart rulers far more bitterly than the old kings ; even to slay one was held to be a glorious act ; and while many were really cruel tyrants, even the best had probably to commit occasionally harsh and unjustifiable acts in self-defence, in order to preserve their position ; hence arose the modern meaning of the word 'tyrant.'

Most of the tyrants, even the worst, promoted the wealth and prosperity of the states which they governed by their firm and energetic rule ; and, generally, they favoured arts and literature and beautified their cities with splendid buildings, with the object both of increasing their own fame and occupying the minds of their subjects. In some cases they were so successful in firmly establishing their power as to be able to hand it down to their sons ; but in no single case did a tyrant found a permanent dynasty. The result of the rule of the tyrants was more favourable to democracy than aristocracy ; for during their rule both nobles and people were kept equally in subjection, so that after their expulsion it was difficult to the nobles to claim all the power again for themselves. Sparta, with her settled government, was the chief foe of the tyrants, and was ever ready to lend her forces to aid in expelling them.

So many cities at this time fell under the sway of tyrants, not only in Greece itself, but also in the colonies where there had never been any kings, that the years from B.C. 700 to 500 have been called the **Age of the Tyrants**. But even after that time there were occasional tyrants in some of the colonies. The most famous of the tyrants was Peisisträtus

of Athens, whose career will be narrated in the next chapter ; other notable tyrants were Cleisthenes of Sicyon, Cypselus and Periander of Corinth, Polycrates of Samos, and Phalaris of Agrigentum.

Cleisthenes was the last of the longest line of tyrants that reigned in any Greek city ; for the power was first seized by his great-grandfather, Orthagoras, about B.C. 670. Sicyon contained chiefly an Ionic population, but the nobles were Dorians, and acknowledged allegiance to the great Dorian state of Argos. Orthagoras seems to have been an Ionian, and to have been supported by the Ionian lower orders against the Dorian nobles ; for which reason his family were the most popular of all the tyrants, and are said to have needed no bodyguard.

Cleisthenes became tyrant about B.C. 600. He freed his country from Argos, which at this time, as has been seen (p. 47), was declining before the rising power of Sparta ; and to weaken and degrade the Dorian nobles at Sicyon, he changed the names of the three Dorian tribes to words derived from the ass, the pig, and the boar ; he also won himself a great name in Greece by his victories in the Pythian and Olympic Games (see page 19), and by taking a prominent part in the First Sacred War (see p. 21). He died about B.C. 570, and after his death the Dorians again recovered their power in Sicyon. Cleisthenes had no son to succeed him, and only one daughter, Agaristê, about whose marriage Herodotus tells the following story :—He invited suitors from all the states of Greece to stay with him for a year, that he might select one for a son-in-law. Numbers came ; and, after considering the birth, beauty, wealth, wit, and personal prowess of all the candidates, Cleisthenes inclined towards two Athenians, Hippocleides and Megacles. At length the day of the decision arrived, and all the suitors were entertained at a splendid banquet, at which they vied with one another in music and song ;

at last Hippocleides summoned a flute-player and began to dance, and ended his performance by standing on his head. Cleisthenes in disgust exclaimed, 'You have danced away your marriage'; and Hippocleides rejoined, 'Hippocleides does not care,' which words became a proverb in Greece. But Agariste was given to Megacles, whom we shall meet again in the history of Athens.

Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, is said to have owed his names to the circumstances of his birth. His mother belonged to the noble family of the Bacchiadæ, who at that time governed Corinth, but married a man of the people. An oracle having said that her child would free Corinth from the Bacchiadæ, they sent men to kill him, but his mother hid him in a chest (κυψέλη), so his life was saved, and he was called Cypselus (Κύψελος). Whatever truth there is in the story, there is no doubt that he was a Bacchiad, and by the support of the people made himself tyrant (B.C. 655) and overthrew the Bacchiadæ. For thirty years he reigned as tyrant; he completely broke up the power of the oligarchs, and greatly increased the power and prosperity of Corinth, which had lately been worsted in a struggle with her colony, Corcyra (see p. 54). So popular was he with the people, that, like Cleisthenes, he is said to have needed no bodyguard. In B.C. 625 he died, and was succeeded by his son, **Periander**. Periander was an able and vigorous ruler; he reconquered Corcyra, and made Corinth more powerful than even under his father. But at home, if we are to believe the stories, though a great patron of art and literature, he ruled with ruthless severity, treating the people as harshly as the nobles, so that he was obliged to protect himself with a guard of foreign mercenaries, and the city swarmed with his spies. On one occasion he is said to have sent an envoy to Thrasybûlus, tyrant of Miletus, to ask how he could best secure his power. Thrasybûlus made no reply to the question, but

took the envoy a walk through a cornfield, where he knocked off with his stick the tallest ears of corn. When the envoy returned and told Periander what had happened, he understood the meaning of the advice, and carried it out by putting to death any prominent citizen who seemed dangerous.

He was equally cruel in his private life ; for he caused the death of his wife Melissa, and so incurred the hostility of his son Lycōphron, whom he sent away as tyrant to Corcyra. At the end of his life, however, he wished to secure the succession to Lycōphron and asked him to return to Corinth ; but he refused to come while his father was there : then Periander said, that if he would come to Corinth, he himself would go to Corcyra ; Lycōphron consented to this arrangement, but the Corcyræans killed him, for they dreaded the arrival of Periander. So Periander was succeeded on his death (B.C. 585) by a half nephew, who after three years was assassinated ; and the tyranny at Corinth came to an end. The oligarchs regained their power, for the cruelties of Periander had caused a revulsion of feeling ; but Corinth was never again so powerful.

CHAPTER IX

EARLY HISTORY OF ATHENS : SOLON

	<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Establishment of Archons,	683
Conspiracy of Cylon,	about 630
Draco,	624
Reforms of Solon,	594

It is strange that in the early times we hear but little of Athens. In the Homeric poems, as has been stated, the Athenians are hardly mentioned ; also in the great age of colonisation, not a single colony is recorded to have been sent out by them.

But the Athenians were intensely proud of their country ; they boasted, as has been already mentioned, that they were natives of the soil, and that their land, 'the oldest home of the ancient Ionian race' as one poet sang, had never, like the other parts of Greece, fallen under the yoke of an invader. Whatever changes of population there had been at Athens were so shrouded in the mists of antiquity as to have been quite forgotten. It was known, however, that the different little towns of Attica had in very ancient times been separate states ; the greatest of them next to Athens was Eleusis, the sacred city of the goddess Demeter, and between Athens and Eleusis there had often been war.

In time an end came to this state of things ; Attica was welded together into a single state with Athens as its capital, the other cities becoming mere country towns ;

how this was brought about we cannot say ; the legends ascribe it to the great herò-king **Theseus**, who is supposed to have lived before the Trojan war. The Athenians of old days were not sailors as in the days of Athenian greatness ; they were mainly husbandmen tilling the not very productive soil ; what it was that caused them to change their mode of life and become sailors we shall see later on. Athens itself was a walled city about four miles from the sea, clustering round the hill on which was the citadel (*Acropòlis*).

The earliest division of the people was into four tribes, into which all Ionians are said to have been divided, the names being taken originally from professions ; these were the *Hoplitès* (soldiers), *Argædeis* (artisans), *Ægicóreis* (husbandmen or shepherds), and *Geleontes*, the meaning of which is doubtful. Every true Athenian belonged by birth to one of these tribes, which were subdivided into further divisions, and had each its own worship. There was also a later division into three classes : *Eupatridæ* (nobles), *Geomōri* (husbandmen), and *Demiurgi* (artisans). The government consisted, as in other states, of a king, council, and assembly ; the council at Athens was called the **Areopāgus** because it met on the hill (*πάγος*) of *Arēs*, the god of war. The assembly of the people was called, at least in later times, the **Ecclesia** ; in these days it seems to have had no power at all. In the course of time changes were gradually made until at last the power was entirely in the hands of the people, and government was a simple democracy. The main course of these changes is easy to follow ; but owing to the disagreement of the Greek writers themselves, who wrote many years after the events which they record, it is impossible to be certain about some of the details. The first change was the one which we found occurring almost universally in Greece, the abolition of the Monarchy. One account is that when the king, *Codrus*,

was slain in repelling the Dorian invaders (see p. 34), the Athenians said that there was no one worthy to succeed him, and resolved that there should be no more kings, and elected instead an **Archon** or Ruler (from ἀρχω, I rule).¹

Whatever was the real cause of the change, the Archonship seems to have been at first held for life by a member of the family of Codrus ; many years afterwards it was limited to ten years ; then it was thrown open to all the Eupatridæ ; finally (B.C. 683), instead of one Archon holding office for ten years, **nine Archons** were established ruling for one year only. There were three chief Archons, by whom the government was chiefly carried on : the head *Archon* or Archon *Eponymus* (ὄνομα, a name), so called because he gave his name to the year, for the Athenian custom was to date the years by the Archon, as the Romans did by the Consuls ; the *King Archon* (βασιλεύς), whose duty it was to look after religious matters, for in former times the king had been the head of religion ; and the *Polemarch* (πόλεμος, war, and ἀρχω) who was commander-in-chief of the army. To these were added six inferior Archons called *Thesmothetæ*, law-givers (θεσμός, law ; τίθημι, I place), who were judges in ordinary cases. The Areopagus was composed of men who had been Archons ; it elected the Archons, superintended their administration of the state, and judged cases of homicide.

At this time all the power was in the hands of the

¹ Within the last few years a treatise on the Constitution of Athens, ascribed, but without absolute certainty, to the great philosopher Aristotle, which gives a new version of some rather important points, has been discovered in Egypt written on papyrus, and is the property of the British Museum. Scholars have not yet arrived at a definite conclusion as to the value to be attached to this treatise ; those statements only, therefore, which are not in direct contradiction to the generally received account have been followed in this history.

Eupatridæ, for they alone could be Archons; thus the Archonship and the Areopagus were entirely in their hands, and they often used their power to harshly oppress the people. There was, therefore, bitter discontent among the people who wished to obtain political rights; many of them also, tillers of the more barren parts of Attica, were in great poverty and even debt. The laws, too, were unwritten, so that the people were never sure of getting justice, as the judges being nobles could always pretend that the laws were on their side.

In the year B.C. 632, a noble named **Cylon** took advantage of this state of discontent to try to make himself 'tyrant.' He had married a daughter of Thēāgēnes, tyrant of Megara, whose example no doubt he wished to imitate, and had won great glory by a victory at the Olympic Games (B.C. 640). So having gained over some adherents and obtained soldiers from Theagenes he suddenly seized the Acropolis, but the Athenians, instead of submitting, besieged them there and reduced them to starvation. The Archon Megacles, who commanded the besiegers, promised them their lives if they would surrender, but as they were being led away slew them, some even on the steps of an altar to which they clung for protection; Cylon himself, according to one account, escaped before the surrender. Thus the first attempt to establish a tyranny at Athens failed, because the people were against it; but they were very angry with the nobles on account of the impious act of Megacles in slaying men on an altar; at last one of the nobles named **Solon** persuaded the Alcmaeonidæ, the family to which Megacles belonged, to submit to trial, and the whole family was obliged to go into banishment. Long afterwards we shall find the guilt of this act still clinging to the family and made use of by their enemies and the enemies of Athens.

An attempt was now made to put an end to the political

strife, and one of the Archons named **Draco** was ordered to draw up and publish a code of the laws, according to which the judges would be obliged to judge (B.C. 624). So severe were these laws, death being the penalty for nearly every crime, that Draco's name has become proverbial for severity, and a Greek of later time described his laws as written in blood. But Draco did not invent the laws; he merely published those already existing, and being once published they could, if necessary, be altered. So Draco did great service to Athens as the first law-giver. He is also said to have instituted a special tribunal to try cases of homicide instead of the Areopagus.

But the troubles were not over at Athens. There was a war against Megara which under its tyrant Theagenes had become very strong. The object of the war was the possession of the island of Salamis, and Theagenes doubtless was eager to avenge the fate of his son-in-law Cylon. So continually unsuccessful were the Athenians that at last they passed a law that no one should propose to recover Salamis on pain of death. But Solon, pretending to be mad, rushed into the market-place and recited a poem calling the Athenians to fresh efforts; whereupon the Athenians renewed the war and, under the leadership of Solon, took Salamis; but they lost it again and the war seemed endless. And now a vague superstitious terror seized the Athenians who believed that the guilt of the Alcmaeonidæ was still the cause of their troubles; so they asked advice of the Delphic oracle, which told them to send for Epimenides, the sage and prophet of Crete, that he might purify the city. Epimenides came and by sacrifices and other means purified the city, and also taught the Athenians to conduct the worship of the gods in a better way. Having allayed the religious excitement Epimenides went back to Crete taking no reward but a branch of the olive tree in the Acropolis sacred to Athênē.

Soon afterwards the war with Megara came to a close; both sides appealed to **Sparta** to decide the dispute, thus acknowledging her position as **the head of Greece**. Sparta decided in favour of Athens; and there is a tradition that the decision was influenced by a device of Solon, who appealed to two lines of the *Iliad*, one of which he had made up himself, describing how Ajax, king of Salamis, ranged his ships by the side of the Athenians.

The laws of Draco had not wholly succeeded in allaying the political strife. The Athenians at this time were split into three factions called the Plain-men (*Πεδεῖς*), the Shore-men (*Παράλιοι*), the Hill-men (*Διάκριοι*). The Plain-men were the wealthy nobles who held all the best land, the Hill-men were the poorest people who tilled the barren hill-sides, the Shore-men were the middle class, merchants and fishermen. The Hill-men wanted to overthrow the power of the nobles and get the government into their hands; the Shore-men also wanted to get some of the power from the nobles; but they were against the Hill-men, for they did not want revolution and anarchy.

But the most pressing danger came from the state of debt into which the poorer cultivators, the faction of the Hill-men, had fallen. Many of them owing to bad times had borrowed money from the nobles, for which they had to pay large sums as interest out of the yearly produce of their farms; some had borrowed this money on the security of their farms, others on the security of their persons; that is, if the former could not pay the interest, their creditors could take their farms, while if the latter could not do so, their creditors could sell them into slavery. Such a state of things could not be allowed to continue, and in B.C. 594 Solon, who was trusted and respected by all parties, was appointed Archon with full powers to put a stop to it by any means he chose. He decreed that all debts on land or personal freedom were cancelled; this measure was

known as the *Seisachtheia* or 'shaking off of burdens' (*σειω*, shake, and *ἄχος*, a burden); it seems to us grossly unfair, for the creditors lost all the money they had lent; but according to the story, though there was dissatisfaction at first, all classes soon had reason to be grateful to Solon. The debtors were started afresh in possession of their lands, and for the future it was forbidden to borrow money on land or personal freedom. Never afterwards was there such danger from debt at Athens.

So pleased were the Athenians with the *Seisachtheia* that they made Solon Archon again the next year, in order that he might try to put an end also to the political factions by making changes in the government. To effect this, his plan was to give some power to the people without depriving the rich and the nobles of all their influence.

He divided all the citizens, rich and poor, into four classes according to their property (perhaps these classes were already existing for military purposes). The first class were called the *Pentacosiomedimni*, five hundred-bushel men (*πεντακοσιμόδιμοι*, a bushel), they had an income equal to 500 bushels of wheat (about £20) and upwards. The second were the *Knights*, whose income lay between 300 and 500 bushels; they were so called because they could afford to keep a horse. The third, the *Zeugitæ*, yoke-of-oxen men (*zeugitai*, a yoke), whose income was from 200 to 300 bushels, sufficient for them to possess a yoke of oxen; the fourth, the *Thētæ*, whose income was below 200 bushels. In the army the first two classes formed the officers and the cavalry, the *Zeugitæ* were the heavy-armed infantry, the *Thetes* the light-armed.

In Solon's scheme *all the four classes* had votes and belonged to the *Assembly (Ecclesia)*, which now was to have real power, such as (1) electing the magistrates; (2) punishing them on their resignation if their conduct in office had been unsatisfactory; (3) generally controlling the govern-

ment; and (4) those over thirty formed a law court, afterwards called the *Heliaea*, to which people could appeal from the decisions of the Archons.

The *Ecclesia*, being composed of all the citizens, was too unwieldy and too inexperienced to be left uncontrolled, and the existing council, the *Areopagus*, was composed of nobles; so Solon made a new council called the *Boulē*, whose duty it was to prepare business for the *Ecclesia*, so that the general administration of the state was practically in its hands. It was composed of 400 members, 100 from each of the Ionic tribes (see p. 63). At the same time Solon did not abolish the *Areopagus*; he made it again the law court for cases of homicide, instead of Draco's court, and gave it general supervision over the morals and conduct of the citizens. The *Boulē* and inferior magistracies were probably open to the first three classes, the Archonship to the first only; and at the end of their year of office, all magistrates had to pass a public examination in their conduct of their office.

By this scheme Solon hoped to have given the people sufficient power to satisfy them, without depriving the wealthy and noble of their proper influence. As he distributed the power according to the wealth of the different classes his constitution is known as **Timocracy** (*τιμὴ*, rating).

Solon also made several laws relating to the conduct of the citizens, some of which repealed or softened the laws of Draco. The most interesting was a law that, in times of political dissension, any citizen who did not take one side or the other would be punished by losing his political rights: this seems to show that the three factions only comprised a small part of the people, and that there were a number of moderate men who held aloof from their disputes, who might, Solon hoped, by interfering put a stop to them.

Having completed his work, Solon caused a general amnesty, or pardon, to be proclaimed, by virtue of which the exiled Alcmaeonidæ came back to Athens ; he then left Athens for ten years in order that he might not be asked to make further changes. During this voluntary exile he visited many countries, and many legends are told about his adventures, one of which will be mentioned later.

CHAPTER X

EARLY HISTORY OF ATHENS (*continued*)

TYRANNY OF PEISISTRATUS AND REFORMS OF CLEISTHENES

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Peisistratus makes himself tyrant, . . .	560
Peisistratus succeeded by Hippias, . . .	527
Assassination of Hipparchus, . . .	514
Expulsion of Hippias, . . .	510
Reforms of Cleisthenes, . . .	510

Chief Names.—Peisistratus, Megacles, Miltiades, Hippias,
Cleomenes, Isagoras, Cleisthenes.

ON his return Solon found his hopes disappointed ; no one seemed satisfied with the new constitution, and the old faction-struggle had broken out again, owing to the ambitious schemes of some of the nobles. The Plain-men were led by Miltiades and Lycurgus, the Shore-men by Megacles, the Alcmaeonid, grandson of the suppressor of the Cylonian conspiracy, and son-in-law of Cleisth enes the tyrant of Sicyon (see p. 59), the Hill-men by a noble named **Peisistr tus**, a kinsman of Solon. Peisistratus was by far the most able and dangerous of the three. Solon saw plainly that he was scheming to make himself ‘tyrant,’ and repeatedly warned the Athenians, but in vain.

At last, one day (B.C. 560) Peisistratus drove into the market-place of Athens covered with wounds which he had inflicted on himself, and declared to the people that he

had been attacked by his political foes; thereupon the Athenians, in spite of the warning of Solon, gave him a bodyguard of fifty club-bearers, and Peisistratus employed them to seize the Acropolis, and so made himself tyrant. Megacles and Lycurgus fled from Athens, while Miltiades accepted the invitation of a tribe of the Thracian Chersonese to become their chief, and lead them against their barbarian foes. We shall hear of his family again in the history of Athens.

Solon was treated with the greatest respect by Peisistratus: one account says that he advised him in his government; other accounts say that he refused to become reconciled to him, and finding his protests unavailing retired to his country-house where he died (B.C. 558). After a short time Megacles and Lycurgus united their factions and succeeded in driving out Peisistratus. Then they began to quarrel, and Megacles made overtures to Peisistratus, promising to make him tyrant again if he would marry his daughter. Peisistratus accepted his terms, and, if we are to believe Herodotus, the following plot was contrived to bring about his return. A beautiful woman of tall stature named Phya was arrayed in armour in imitation of the goddess Athene. Peisistratus took his place beside her in a chariot and drove towards Athens, sending heralds before him who made the following proclamation: 'O Athenians, welcome home Peisistratus whom Athene herself is bringing back to her own city.' The Athenians believed the proclamation (for which, says Herodotus, they ought to be considered the simplest instead of the cleverest of mankind); and Peisistratus became tyrant a second time, and married Megacles' daughter. But he had already two grown-up sons named Hippias and Hipparchus, and they turned him against his new wife. Megacles hearing of it again joined the Plain-men, and Peisistratus was driven out a second

time. He now retired to the town of Eretria in Eubœa, and, encouraged by his son, Hippias, not to despair of returning to Athens, he busied himself strengthening his resources. He obtained money from friendly states, and so got together a force of mercenaries. After ten years he crossed over to Attica and landed at the bay of Marathon, opposite Eubœa, where he was joined by many of his old partisans. His opponents marched against him, but he surprised and routed their army, inflicting on it as little loss as possible, and established himself as tyrant more securely than ever. Megacles and the Alcmaeonidæ were again forced to go into exile.

This time Peisistratus remained in undisturbed possession of the tyranny until his death (B.C. 527) thirty years after his first usurpation, fourteen of which he had spent in exile. He used his ill-gotten power with ability and moderation, taking no vengeance upon his political opponents. He gained the goodwill of all classes of the rich by his easy familiarity, and of the poor by his liberality in helping them when in trouble; under his rule trade and agriculture flourished, and Athens became strong and respected abroad; like most tyrants, he patronised art and literature, and is said to have collected the poems of Homer into the form in which we now possess them. He does not seem to have abolished the constitution of Solon, but managed it in such a way as to keep all the important posts in the hands of his political adherents.

Peisistratus was succeeded, apparently without any show of opposition, by Hippias, who shared his power with his brother Hipparchus. At first they followed the footsteps of their father. But, in the year B.C. 514, Hipparchus grossly insulted a young man named Harmodius, who in revenge made a plot with his friend Aristogeiton to kill the two tyrants. The occasion chosen was the festival of the Panathenæa (see p. 20). Before all was ready for the deed,

the conspirators saw to their horror one of their number talking with Hippias ; thinking that he was betraying them, which was not the fact, they determined to make sure at least of Hipparchus, who was marshalling the procession in another place ; so they rushed off, and killed him. Harmodius was at once cut down by the guards, and the coolness of Hippias prevented any further outbreak. Aristogeiton was afterwards taken, and died under tortures inflicted to make him reveal the names of his accomplices. Thus Harmodius and Aristogeiton failed in their object, but their attempt paved the way for the overthrow of the tyranny, for Hippias henceforward became cruel and suspicious ; many citizens were put to death on suspicion of being in the plot, others were banished, and lost their property. So the Athenians began to hate Hippias, and longed to get rid of him.

The exiled Alcmaeonidæ, who were now led by Cleisthènes, son of Megacles, determined to take advantage of the change of feeling at Athens, and marched with an army against Hippias, but he beat them and drove them out of Attica. Then they tried another plan. Some years before, they had obtained the goodwill of the priests of Delphi by rebuilding the temple after a fire with great magnificence ; and in gratitude for this service, and also, it is said, owing to fresh presents, the priests agreed to persuade the Spartans to expel Hippias. The Spartans, as we have seen, were at the head of a confederacy in the Peloponnese, and they were now stronger than ever owing to the fall, not long before, of the tyrannies in Corinth, Sicyon, and other cities ; for the loss of the tyrants made those cities weaker, so that they were forced to become the allies of Sparta. Hippias was the only tyrant left in Greece ; and now, whatever question the Spartans asked the oracle, the answer was always the same : ‘ Athens must be freed.’

So at last they sent an army under the king Cleomènes ;

Hippias was beaten, and driven into the Acropolis, and then by a piece of luck his children were captured as they were being sent out of the country. To save their lives Hippias was forced to surrender, and retired to Asia Minor, where he will be heard of again (B.C. 510). Thus the rule of the Peisistratidæ came to an end at Athens by the intervention of the Spartans, but the Athenians in after years came to honour Harmodius and Aristogeiton as the liberators of the country; statues were erected to them and songs composed in their memory; the last four years of Hippias's rule obliterated the recollection of the good government of Peisistratus; and the memory of the tyrants at Athens was regarded with execration.

No sooner was Athens free than the political strife began again, though we do not hear any more of the old faction names. Cleisthenes was the most powerful politician, but finding himself opposed by Isagōras at the head of the nobles, he put himself at the head of the people, the old party of Peisistratus, and determined to break down the power of the nobles: in the words of Herodotus, 'he took the people into partnership.'

His first step was to substitute **ten new tribes** for the four old Ionic ones. For the nobles had still great influence in the old tribes, and a great many of the people, being more recent settlers in Attica, did not belong to them, and so had no vote in the Ecclesia. Cleisthenes divided the whole population, including the new settlers, afresh into ten tribes, named after old Attic heroes, every member of which had a vote. Each tribe consisted of ten parishes or '**demes**' (δημοί), making a hundred in all, the number being afterwards increased as the population grew; but, in order to prevent the tribes' forming factions like the Hill-men and the rest, he arranged that the demes making up any particular tribe should not be close together, but taken from different parts of Attica. Each deme elected a head-

man, and used to meet for worship and for transacting the local business; in the same way each tribe met at Athens for the worship and business of the tribe. For war, the people were marshalled by their tribes, and each tribe elected a general or 'stratēgus' (στρατηγός), who with the Polemarch (see p. 64) shared the command of the army.

The Council or Boulē was increased from 400 to 500 members, fifty being elected from each tribe, and continued its functions of preparing measures for the Ecclesia. In the Ecclesia the people were now more powerful owing to the admission of the new citizens; it was more often summoned, and took a much more prominent part in the government, while the Archons seem to have lost much of their authority during the tyranny, and now, according to some accounts, began to be elected by lot.

Finally, to prevent any one in future making himself tyrant, Cleisthenes introduced a new and strange device called 'Ostracism' (Ὀστρακισμός, from ὄστρακον, a tile). The procedure was as follows:—In times of extreme party strife a motion might be brought before the Ecclesia declaring that the state was in danger, no names being mentioned; if the motion was carried, every citizen wrote on a tile the name of the statesman whom he considered dangerous. If there were 6000 votes against any one man, he was obliged to leave Athens for ten years, that is, he was banished, but without incurring any of the disgrace of banishment or loss of property and citizenship. Ostracism was employed several times during the first half of the next century, but, as the recollection of the danger of a tyranny faded, it fell into contempt and was dropped.

Alarmed at these sweeping changes, Isagoras appealed to Sparta; and the Spartans sent one of the kings, Cleomēnes, with a small force, who ordered the Athenians to expel the accursed family of the Alcmaeonidæ to which Cleisthenes

belonged, thus using religious feeling for political ends, a favourite practice of the Spartans as we shall see in the course of the history. Cleisthenes retired from Athens in obedience to the summons ; and Isagoras, aided by Cleomenes, proceeded to establish an oligarchy by overthrowing the Council of Five Hundred, and expelling 700 families of his opponents. But the Athenians, discovering how few troops Cleomenes had, suddenly rose, and drove him and the adherents of Isagoras into the Acropolis. Being without provisions, Cleomenes agreed to depart, and took Isagoras with him, but many of his adherents were put to death. Cleisthenes was now recalled, and completed his reforms.

Thus the power of the nobles was broken, and the people were triumphant at Athens. But the danger had not passed away. Cleomenes, furious at his failure, was still bent on the restoration of Isagoras ; and the Athenians had in Thebes another bitter enemy on their very frontier. The cause of the unfriendliness between Athens and Thebes was the little town of Plataea : it has been already explained (p. 33) that Plataea refused to acknowledge the headship of Thebes in Boeotia ; and, during the tyranny of Hippias a few years before, the Plataeans had appealed to Athens for protection, which had been granted. The Thebans now saw an opportunity of taking their revenge. In these straits the Athenians, by the advice it is said of Cleisthenes, actually sent ambassadors to Sardis to ask for help from the King of Persia, who, as will be explained later, had recently conquered Asia Minor and the Greek colonies on the coast. The ambassadors were told that help would only be given if the Athenians acknowledged the supremacy of the Persians by sending earth and water, the usual token of submission. To this the ambassadors agreed, but, on their return to Athens, the Athenians rejected these terms with indignation. Of Cleisthenes no more is heard ;

possibly he lost his political influence owing to this mission to the Persians ; but the history of this period is very incomplete, so that there can be no certainty about the matter.

It was not long before the storm broke upon Athens. Cleomenes collected the army of the Spartans and allies, without, however, stating the exact object of the expedition, and, accompanied by his colleague Demarātus, crossed the Isthmus. At the same time, by arrangement, the Thebans invaded on the north-west, and also the Chalcidians of Eubœa on the north-east. The position of the Athenians seemed hopeless : they marched first against Cleomenes, who had reached Eleusis ; but before the battle was fought the Corinthians, finding that Cleomenes intended to set up Isagoras as a tyrant, and remembering their own tyrants, from whom they had lately been delivered, refused to fight against Athens, and they were supported by Demaratus. Thereupon Cleomenes was obliged to abandon his project and return to Sparta.

Then the Athenians turned fiercely on their other two foes, and showed what strength and energy their new institutions had given them. On the same day they defeated both the Thebans and Chalcidians in two separate battles. The city of Chalcis was conquered, and 4000 Athenian citizens were settled on its territory as 'cleruchs,' that is 'lot-holders' (κληροῦχοι, from κλήρος, lot ; ἔχειν, to have) : these cleruchs differed from colonists in being still full citizens of Athens.

Thus the Athenian people won their freedom against faction at home and enmity abroad, and Athens was now ready for the great career which, though she knew it not, awaited her in the near future.

So alarmed were the Spartans at the rising power of Athens that they actually resolved to restore Hippias to his tyranny. They summoned him from Persia where he

had been trying to persuade the King to help him, and a meeting of the allies was held at Sparta; but they all, especially the Corinthians, protested so strongly against the iniquitous project, that it was abandoned, as might be expected, and Hippias returned to Persia. Thus a second time the allies of Sparta saved Athens.

This was the last effort made by Sparta against Athens for the present; the enmity between the two cities now began to be overshadowed by a great danger which threatened the very existence of the Greeks as a nation: this danger was the rise of the great Asiatic Empire of the Persians; how it arose and how it came into conflict with the Greeks will be described in the next chapter. When the danger passed away we shall see that the old enmity arose again, but Sparta had then a very different Athens to deal with; it was not till a hundred years from this time that she succeeded in crushing Athens, and in doing so she unwittingly crushed the only chance the Greeks had of becoming a great and united nation.

Dates.

EARLY HISTORY BEFORE THE PERSIAN WARS.

Conquest of the Peloponnese by the Dorians	B.C.
and migrations to Asia Minor,	about 1000
Lycurgus at Sparta,	830
First Olympiad,	776
First Messenian War,	743-730
Age of the Tyrants,	700-500
Second Messenian War,	650-630
Draco at Athens,	624
Reforms of Solon at Athens,	594
Peisistratus, tyrant at Athens,	560
Sparta supreme in the Peloponnese,	550
Peisistratus succeeded by Hippias,	527
Assassination of Hipparchus,	514
Expulsion of Hippias from Athens and Reforms of Cleisthenes,	510

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

<i>The West.</i>		<i>The East.</i>	
Foundation of Rome (legendary),	B.C. 753	Overthrow of the Assyrian Empire,	B.C. 625
Expulsion of the kings from Rome,	510	The Jews carried into Captivity to Babylon, . .	586
		Babylon taken by the Persians under Cyrus, .	538
		Return of the Jews from Captivity,	536

CHAPTER XI

THE PERSIANS AND THE IONIC REVOLT

	<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Revolt of the Ionians,	500
Burning of Sardis,	499
Battle of Lade,	496

Chief Names.—Croesus, Cyrus, Darius, Miltiades, Aristagoras,
Histæus.

IT has already been narrated how the Greek settlements in Asia Minor lost their freedom owing to the rise of the powerful Lydian nation, whose king, Croesus, reigned at Sardis. But other and more formidable foes to the Greeks began about this time to appear in Asia—the famous twin nation of the Medes and Persians. To understand the rise of the Medes and Persians we must go back to the time when the great Semitic Empire of the **Assyrians**, with its capital at Nineveh on the Tigris, ruled in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates; we read in the Bible how the Assyrians conquered the different nations around them, how they carried the Israelites into captivity, and how their king, Sennacherib, was only prevented from treating Hezekiah and the Jews in a like manner by a pestilence which destroyed his army. The Assyrian Empire was then at the height of its power; but soon afterwards it was weakened by an invasion of the Scythians, fierce barbarians from the north, who were only driven away after twenty-eight years. Before Assyria could recover, it was

attacked by its subjects the **Medes** (an Aryan race dwelling east of the Tigris in the mountainous country south of the Caspian) and the **Babylonians** (a people akin to the Assyrians, whose capital, Babylon, was further south on the Euphrates). Nineveh was taken (about B.C. 625), the last king, Sardanapālus as the Greeks called him, burning his



THE NATIONS OF THE EAST

palace over his head with his wives, children, and treasures ; and the Medes and Babylonians divided the empire, the Medes taking the northern part, the Babylonians the southern, which included Egypt and Palestine. Soon afterwards the famous Nebuchadnezzar succeeded to the throne of Babylon and carried off the Jewish nation into captivity (B.C. 586).

Meanwhile the Medes had carried their victorious arms northward and westward over the mountainous tract now called Armenia, till they reached the River Halys. There

they found themselves confronted by the kingdom of Lydia, at that time under a king called Alyattes, father of Croesus. A battle was fought (B.C. 585), said to have been stopped by an eclipse of the sun ; after which, by the intervention of Nebuchadnezzar, peace was made, and the Halys was made the boundary between the Lydians and Medes.

Alyattes on his death (B.C. 560) was succeeded by his son Croesus, the first conqueror of the Greek settlements. Croesus was famous for his power and wealth, and thought himself secure in his prosperity ; there is a legend that Solon on his travels visited Sardis, and Croesus, after showing him all his treasures, asked him whom he thought the happiest man on earth. Solon, to his astonishment, did not mention his name, and when asked the reason, replied that he could not call any one happy till his death. Unfortunately, if the dates commonly given are right, Solon had returned to Athens before Croesus's accession ; and the story seems to have arisen owing to the sad change of fortune which afterwards befell Croesus. For suddenly a new and unexpected enemy appeared ; about B.C. 550 the Persians, a tribe of hardy mountaineers, kinsmen of the Medes, and forming part of their empire, who dwelt in the mountainous country south of Media, rose in revolt under a prince named **Cyrus**.

Many legends are told about the birth and boyhood of Cyrus ; his mother is said to have been the daughter of the Median king, Astyāges, and at his birth he was given to a shepherd to be exposed on the mountains, because a prophecy said that he would overthrow the Median Empire ; but his life was preserved, and in due time he fulfilled his destiny. But modern researches among the ancient cuneiform inscriptions of Babylon show that he was king of Elam, a Semitic kingdom on the lower course of the Tigris, of which Susa was the capital. How he came to lead the Persians is not known. The Median king marched against Cyrus, but was slain in battle ; the conqueror

ascended the vacant throne, and the Medes and Persians became and henceforward remained a single people. Cyrus continued his victorious career over the various nations that had formed the Median Empire ; and Croesus, becoming alarmed at his rising power, formed an alliance against him with Babylon, Egypt, and even Sparta. He is said to have asked advice from the oracle of Delphi, having first discovered by trial that it was the most trustworthy of all Greek oracles, and receiving as an answer 'Croesus, if he cross the Halys, will overthrow a great empire,' he resolved to begin the war at once without waiting for his allies (B.C. 546). The rival armies met beyond the Halys ; the battle was doubtful, and as winter was approaching Croesus returned to Sardis to wait till spring brought his allies, and foolishly dismissed his army.

But in spite of the season Cyrus followed up the Lydians vigorously. Croesus was obliged to fight with such troops as he could collect, and was defeated. Sardis, hitherto thought impregnable, was taken, and the Lydian kingdom came to an end. Cyrus, according to the legend mentioned above, placed Croesus on a funeral pyre, and was about to have him burnt alive when he cried aloud, 'Solon ! Solon !' Cyrus in astonishment asked what the words meant, and Croesus told him the story of his interview with Solon. Thereupon Cyrus spared his life and kept him near him as a friend and counsellor. Croesus is said to have complained to the oracle for its false prediction, but the oracle replied that he ought to have asked whose empire he was about to destroy, his own or that of Cyrus.

The Greeks of Asia Minor now found themselves obliged to exchange the mild rule of Croesus for the harder yoke of the Persians. They did not submit at once, but were reduced one after another by the general left behind by Cyrus, who had departed to the East for further conquests ;

and tyrants friendly to Persia were set up in most of the cities. After carrying his victorious arms to the frontier of India, Cyrus turned against Babylon (B.C. 540). The king, Nabonadius, was defeated and fled, leaving Babylon in charge of his son Belshazzar. Secure within his enormous fortifications, said to have consisted of four walls each 300 feet high, Belshazzar, as we read in the Book of Daniel, gave himself up to feasting; but Cyrus, according to the story, diverted the waters of the Euphrates and entered the city by the dry river-bed (B.C. 538). Thus **Babylon was taken**¹ and Belshazzar slain; the mighty Babylonian Empire fell into the hands of Cyrus, and with it Palestine, to which the Jews were soon afterwards sent back.

The Persian Empire now extended from the Indus to the Mediterranean; but Cyrus still continued his wars and perished nine years later (B.C. 529), fighting against the wild Scythian tribes north-east of the Caspian.

Cambyzes, his son who succeeded him, conquered Egypt, and died B.C. 522; with him the line of Cyrus became extinct. Cambyzes is described by the Greek historian as a cruel tyrant and almost a madman; but there appears no real reason for this statement. A Magian priest, pretending to be a son of Cyrus whom Cambyzes had killed, reigned for a few months, and then was slain by a conspiracy of Persian nobles, one of whom, **Darius**, son of Hystaspes, became king (B.C. 521). The opening years of his reign were full of trouble; not being a descendant of Cyrus, he was assailed with revolts in different parts of the empire. Gradually, however, order was restored and many of the rebels were cruelly punished. He then set himself to put the government of his great

¹ According to the cuneiform inscriptions Cyrus took Babylon without any resistance; in that case the diverting of the Euphrates must have taken place at a subsequent siege, when Babylon revolted from the Persians.

empire thoroughly in order. The capital was fixed at **Susa**, and the empire was divided into **twenty whole provinces** under governors called **Satraps**, who ruled almost absolutely as long as they furnished soldiers and a fixed tribute. He is said to have been the first Persian king who coined gold and silver, whence the Persian coins were called **Darics**. To keep up communication with the distant parts of this vast empire Susa was connected with the other cities by means of a system of posting-stations placed at intervals of about **fifteen miles** along the great routes (roads they could hardly be called), and the royal messages were conveyed from station to station by successive couriers at full speed. These Persian couriers were very famous in antiquity.

After having firmly established his power, Darius next turned his thoughts towards military glory. His first expedition was against India, and resulted in the conquest of the country now called the **Punjaub**. He then resolved on an **invasion of Europe**; and the Greeks found themselves for the first time threatened by the fate of their Asiatic kinsmen. Darius's next campaign, however, was not actually against Greece, but against the **Scythians** (see p. 81) north of the Danube. These Scythians were a nation of hunters who roamed over the vast plains from the Danube through the south of what is now Russia to beyond the Caspian, carrying their goods and families about with them in waggons. His object is said to have been to punish them for their raid into Asia in the preceding century, but more probably it was to clear the way for a future invasion of Greece. With an army of several hundred thousand men collected from the different parts of his huge empire, Darius crossed the Bosphorus by a bridge of boats; the native tribes and Greek colonies in Thrace submitted to the invader. The barbarous **Getæ** between the Balkans and the Danube were conquered, and near the mouth of the

Danube Darius was joined by his fleet, 600 vessels furnished mainly by the Asiatic Greeks, which had coasted up through the Euxine. A bridge of boats was made which was left in charge of the Greeks, with orders to guard it for sixty days, and Darius with his army crossed by it, and disappeared into the wilds of Scythia. More than two months elapsed, and Darius did not appear; so the leaders of the Greeks began to think of destroying the bridge and retiring; foremost of those who urged this course was **Miltiades**, despot of the Chersonese, nephew of Miltiades, already mentioned (p. 72), but Histæus, tyrant of Miletus, dissuaded them, pointing out that it was against their interests as tyrants to injure the Persians, for it was the Persians who supported their rule. So the bridge was left, and very shortly the Persian army reappeared; wearied by long marches, harassed by the continual attacks of the Scythians, but unable to come to close quarters with them, and suffering from want of provisions, it was obliged to abandon the campaign and retreat.

Darius returned to Asia, leaving a force behind which reduced all Thrace; even Amyntas, king of Macedonia, submitted; thus the danger was coming very near Greece. Histæus was rewarded for his conduct at the bridge, but soon afterwards was summoned by Darius to Susa, apparently because his loyalty was suspected. His son-in-law, Aristagoras, became tyrant of Miletus. Miltiades, barely escaping capture by the Persians, left the Chersonese for Athens, where we shall hear of him again.

Hardly had Darius recovered from the effects of his ill-success against the Scythians, when he was confronted by another serious trouble, the **revolt of the Ionians** (B.C. 500). The causes of the revolt, which must have seemed quite hopeless, are not very clear; possibly the failure of the Scythian expedition may have given rise to a notion of the weakness of the Persians, while the desire to get rid of the

tyrants, whom the Persians supported, may have had something to do with it ; Herodotus ascribes the revolt wholly to the intrigues of Aristagoras and Histiaëus. According to his account, Aristagoras made an expedition against the island of Naxos with Artaphernes, brother of Darius, satrap of Lydia ; but they quarrelled, and the expedition failed. Aristagoras, being consequently in a great difficulty, was thinking of putting himself at the head of a revolt, when Histiaëus, hoping that if a revolt occurred he would be sent down to quell it, sent him a message urging that very same course. The message, for safety, was written on the shaved head of a slave, on which the hair was then allowed to grow. Whatever the cause may have been, Aristagoras persuaded the Milesians to revolt, and resigned his tyranny ; he then drove out the other tyrants, or persuaded them to resign also. The revolt quickly spread, and soon included all the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor ; but, as the Ionians took the chief part, it is known as the Ionian revolt.

Aristagoras then crossed over to Greece to ask for aid. The Spartans refused when they heard that Susa, the capital of the Persians, was three months' march from the sea. But Athens agreed to help her kinsmen, and sent twenty ships with soldiers, for she was afraid that the Persians would restore Hippias ; Eretria in Eubœa also sent five ships, for Miletus had once aided the Eretrians. With these scanty reinforcements Aristagoras returned to Miletus ; and the Greeks boldly marched against Sardis (see map, p. 82). Artaphernes the satrap, taken by surprise, had only time to throw himself into the citadel ; and the Greeks set the town on fire and sacked it. But they were soon compelled to retreat, and near Ephesus they were attacked and defeated by a large Persian force ; whereupon the Athenians and Eretrians in despair sailed off home (B.C. 499).

Darius was furious when he heard of the sack of Sardis,

and took energetic measures to crush the revolt. Three large armies were sent down to the coast, and a fleet raised from the Phoenicians. With these forces the Greeks were unable to cope ; in spite of some successes city after city was taken ; Aristagoras fled to Thrace, but was killed there by the natives. Histiaëus, after a time, was sent down from Susa to the coast by Darius ; but Artaphernes received him with the remark, 'You made the shoe, but Aristagoras put



THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF MILETUS

it on.' At this he fled to the Ionians ; but, being received by them too with suspicion, he took to fighting on his own account, and became little better than a pirate. He was captured by Artaphernes after the suppression of the revolt and beheaded.

By the year 496 B.C. the war was concentrated round Miletus, which Artaphernes attacked by land and sea. The Greek fleet of 353 ships lay off the Island of **Ladë**,

confronted by 600 Phœnician ships. Disunion and despair reigned among the Greeks, unaccustomed to the endurance necessary for a prolonged campaign ; long discussions were held, and a Phocæan captain told them that their only chance lay in steady and continuous naval drill. For seven days they put themselves under him, but then relapsed into their former indifference and carelessness. Meanwhile the Persians had been tampering with the leaders of some of the contingents, and the Samians, seeing defeat was certain, had agreed to desert. So when the Phœnician fleet advanced to the attack the Greeks came out all unprepared : the Samians were the first to sail away, other contingents followed ; the Chians were left almost alone, and with the few who stood by them were overwhelmed by numbers. Such was the disastrous fight of *Ladē* (B.C. 496).

Next year Miletus, helpless after the loss of the fleet, was taken and destroyed, and its inhabitants were sold into slavery. Its fate sent a thrill of horror through Greece : a poet exhibited a play at Athens on the subject called 'the Capture of Miletus,' which moved the audience to tears, for which he was heavily fined. In the course of the next year, all the other cities in Asia and Thrace which had revolted were reduced or submitted from fear of suffering the fate of Miletus. The victorious Persians punished these cities with merciless severity, but they were left with their own governments, the tyrants not being restored, perhaps because Darius felt that they were not to be trusted.

Thus ended the Ionic revolt : it was plain that the Greeks of Asia were not strong or united enough to free themselves. Freedom could only come by aid of the mother-country ; but the only thought of the mother-country at this time was how she could possibly defend herself against the terrible Persians, for there could be little doubt that their next step would be the invasion of Greece itself.

CHAPTER XII

THE PERSIAN INVASIONS : MARATHON

	<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
First Invasion,	.	492
Second Invasion (Marathon),	.	490
Death of Darius and Accession of Xerxes,	.	485

Chief Names.—Mardonius, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristеides

THE subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks did not satisfy Darius's thirst for vengeance. The audacity of the Athenians in venturing to attack Sardis, one of the chief cities of the empire, had still to be chastised : every day, we are told, it was the duty of one of his servants to say to him three times at dinner, 'Master, remember the Athenians.' Even without this motive, Darius, as has been mentioned, was planning an invasion of Greece, and Hippias was still at his court urging him on to undertake the expedition, in the hope of being restored by the Persians to his tyranny over Athens. That there could be any difficulty in conquering a small and disunited country like Greece seemed absurd.

Two years, therefore, after the end of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 492) a large army under Mardonius, nephew and son-in-law of the king, crossed the Hellespont and started to march through Thrace so as to enter Greece from the north through Macedonia and Thessaly, while a fleet followed its movements along the coast. This is the **First**

Persian Invasion ; but the expedition got no further than Macedonia. The fleet was shattered by a tempest while rounding the dangerous headland of **Mount Athos** in Chalcidicē, and lost 300 ships and 20,000 men, while the army was attacked by night by a Thracian tribe called Brygi, and suffered severely. Mardonius contented himself with chastising the Brygi, and then, considering further advance hopeless, retreated to Asia. He was never again employed by Darius.

Roused only to greater fury by this check, Darius at once began preparations for a second invasion. As the land route through Thrace had been a failure, and Mount Athos had proved disastrous to the fleet, he resolved to place his whole army on board the fleet and send it straight across the *Ægean* ; the disadvantage of this plan was that the numbers could not be so large. While this armada was mustering, heralds were sent to Greece to demand earth and water, the usual Persian tokens of submission, from the various states. All the islands, helpless against the Persian navy, submitted, and some of the land states, among which were Argos, the enemy of Sparta, and Thebes, the enemy of Athens. The Athenians themselves flung the herald into a pit used for criminals, called the *Barathrum*, bidding him get earth thence for himself, while the Spartans flung him into a well for the water.

By the summer of B.C. 490 the armament was ready to start ; it consisted of 600 Ionian and Phœnician triremes with horse transports in addition, and a land force of over 100,000 men under Artaphernes, son of the satrap of that name, and Datis, a Mede, with Hippias and other Greek exiles on board ; its orders were to bring the Athenians and Eretrians prisoners to Darius. Putting out from Samos the Persians crossed the *Ægean* from island to island till they reached Eubœa.

Alarm and discord prevailed at Eretria ; some were for

defending the city, others for abandoning it and retiring to the mountains, some even were meditating a treacherous surrender; meanwhile they sent to Athens for help, and the Athenians ordered the 4000 settlers who had been sent to Euboea (see p. 78) to go to their assistance, but



XERXES'S MARCH

being warned that there was treachery among the Eretrians they judged it prudent to escape to Attica. Finally, the Eretrians made up their minds to defend the city, but after six days' fighting it was taken and the inhabitants made prisoners. Thus the first part of the object of the expedition was accomplished. Meanwhile no Greek state


had sent help to Athens ; even those who had refused earth and water seemed too much concerned about their own safety.

When the news of the fall of Eretria came, the Athenians sent a runner named Pheidippidēs to Sparta, who is said to have covered the distance of over 150 miles of mountainous country in two days ; the Spartans promised to send their army, but said that they were prevented by religious custom from starting till the full moon or middle of the month, it being now the ninth day ; whether this was a mere pretence or not we cannot say.

Meanwhile the Persians, after a few days' rest, had crossed thes trait and landed in Attica at the bay of **Marathon**, the advantages of which were pointed out to the commanders by Hippias, who had landed there with his father before the latter's second return (see p. 73) ; it was the nearest landing-place to Eretria, and the plain of Marathon was most suitable for cavalry, in which arm the Persians were strong and the Greeks weak. On hearing of the landing the Athenians at once marched off to Marathon, 9000 hoplites (*ὁπλίτης*, the ordinary Greek heavy-armed foot-soldier), strong besides light troops, and encamped opposite the Persians on the spurs of the mountains, about a mile off ; they were commanded by the Polemarch Callimāchus and the ten Generals, one of whom was **Miltiades**, late tyrant of the Chersonese (see p. 87). Here, in the very presence of the hitherto invincible Persians, they received the **only help** that reached them from the rest of Greece ; the **Platæans**, in gratitude for the protection afforded them by Athens against their old enemy, Thebes (see p. 77), sent their whole army, 1000 hoplites, to conquer or perish by the side of their protectors. It was one of the most heroic acts recorded in Greek history, for the hope of victory must have seemed small. So unequal did the numbers seem, and

so greatly were the Persians feared, that five of the Athenian Generals were against fighting at all ; thus the decision, on which hung the fate of Greece and of Europe, depended on the casting vote of the Polemarch, and Miltiades, probably knowing that Hippias had friends at Athens, persuaded him to give it for battle. The Generals, who as a rule commanded in turn, now all gave up their commands to Miltiades as being more experienced in war ; but he waited till his own day of command came. Meanwhile the Persians lay inactive in their camp ; with what object we are not told, perhaps they were waiting for the partisans of Hippias, of whom there were still a certain number at Athens, to give a preconcerted signal, a bright shield hoisted on a hill near the city, which was to show that it was open to attack.

When they saw the Athenian line forming for battle on the hill slopes, the Persians were seized with astonishment, but formed their line as quickly as they could in front



MARATHON

of their ships ; of their cavalry we hear nothing, perhaps they were not disembarked. Miltiades had been obliged to weaken his centre in order to extend his troops across the plain, while the barbarians had their best troops, the

Persians themselves, and the Sacians in their centre. Charging at a run, the whole Greek army bore down on the enemy, their heavily-armed compact mass broke through the ill-armed, ill-trained barbarians on the wings in spite of their numbers, but their centre was driven back ; then the wings came to the rescue of the centre and soon the whole Persian army was flying to its ships and endeavouring to launch them. The Greeks followed closely and tried to seize or burn the ships, but the Persians defended them vigorously, and saved all except seven ; they put hurriedly to sea, having lost over 6000 men killed, while the better armed Athenians only lost 192, but among the slain was the Polemarch Callimachus, who fell in the fighting round the ships. As the Persians were sailing away the signal of the bright shield was seen ; so they sailed round Cape Sunium, hoping to retrieve their defeat by capturing Athens ; but Miltiades had also seen and understood the signal and hurried back with his army ; and when the Persians reached the bay of Phalêrum, the harbour of Athens, they saw the victors of Marathon drawn up ready to receive them ; whereupon Datis and Artaphernes abandoned the enterprise and made off to Asia, carrying with them their Eretrian prisoners. Hippias, now an old man, died soon afterwards. So ended the **Second Persian Invasion** of Greece ; it proved the superiority of the Greek soldiers over the Asiatics, and raised Athens into the first rank of Greek states.

The defeat of his army at Marathon only served to spur on Darius to still greater exertions to wipe out the disaster and effect the conquest of Greece. He issued orders for the levying of a still larger force from all the nations of his vast empire, a force that, by its overwhelming numbers, should make all hope of resistance impossible. But while the vast preparations were still in progress his attention was diverted by a rebellion which broke out in Egypt (B.C.

487), and before he could set out to quell it he died (B.C. 485) at the age of sixty-two, after a reign of thirty-six years. He was succeeded by his son *Xerxes*, a young man who, having been reared amid the luxury and voluptuousness of an Eastern court, proved himself a childish and wilful tyrant instead of a capable ruler like his father. However he showed no want of activity at the beginning of his reign. Egypt was reduced to submission in a single campaign (B.C. 484), and then by the advice of his cousin Mardonius (see p. 91) he again set on foot the interrupted preparations for the final invasion and conquest of Greece.

In Greece during these years the first event of importance had been the sad end of the victor of Marathon. The year after the battle Miltiades had persuaded the Athenians to place a fleet of seventy triremes¹ under his command, without telling them the object of his expedition. With these ships he sailed against the little island of Paros in the *Ægean*, with which he had a private quarrel. He landed and assaulted the city, but without success: a priestess then offered to betray the city, bidding him come and talk with her in a temple which no male was allowed to enter. Miltiades set out for the temple, but just before he reached it he was seized with horror at the impiety of his act and turned back; it was too late, the vengeance of heaven (so the Greeks considered) fell upon him, and, as he was climbing over a fence, a sharp stake pierced his thigh. Wounded and unsuccessful he returned to Athens, and was brought to trial for misuse of the state forces. His accuser,

¹ The trireme, the ordinary Greek war ship, was a vessel of about 200 tons, propelled by oars arranged in three rows, the highest of which was six feet above the water; it also had masts and sails, but these were usually left on shore before battle; an iron-tipped beak was fixed to the prow, the method of fighting being to sink the enemy by ramming. The crew consisted of 170 rowers, twenty sailors, and about ten marines.

Xanthippus, demanded the penalty of death, but in memory of his great services a fine only of fifty talents (£10,000), probably the cost of the armament, was exacted. Miltiades died in a few days of his wound and disappointment, and his son Cimon, a young man who afterwards became a famous soldier and statesman, paid the fine.

The two most prominent men at Athens were now **Themistocles** and **Aristeides**, men of the most opposite character, both of whom rendered great services to their state. Themistocles was a far-seeing statesman, full of resource, but utterly unprincipled, not caring what means he used to arrive at his ends; in his latter years he was even accused of treachery to Athens. Aristeides, on the other hand, was not so far-seeing as his rival, but he was a true patriot, and so thoroughly honest in all he did that he obtained the name of the Just.

The first service of Themistocles was to make Athens a great naval state, a step which proved the source of all her subsequent greatness. Already, before the battle of Marathon, he had persuaded the Athenians to make the land-locked bay of Peiræus their chief harbour instead of the open roadstead of Phalærum. Athens was now engaged at war with the neighbouring island of Ægina, and could gain no decisive success owing to the strength of the Æginetan fleet. It happened, however, that the Athenians possessed at Laurium, a mountain in the south of Attica, some silver mines, the profits of which were at this time so large that it was proposed to distribute the money among the citizens. Themistocles however came forward and persuaded the Athenians to use it in building a fleet of two hundred triremes, which would be far larger than that of Ægina or any other state. He also persuaded them to arrange to build twenty new triremes every year.

Aristeides strongly opposed the carrying out of these measures, for he was afraid of the great change that would

come over the Athenians if they became a naval power ; he thought it would unsettle them and make them prone to rash enterprises. The quarrel between the two rivals became so fierce that an ostracism was held, which went against Aristides, and he was obliged to go away in banishment (B.C. 484). It is said that, while the voting was going on, a man who did not know Aristides by sight asked him to write for him, as he himself could not write. Aristides asked him what name he should write, and the man replied Aristides, giving as his reason that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just.

So Themistocles's measures were carried out ; the fleet was built, and a busy town began to spring up on the shores of the Peiræus.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE PERSIAN INVASIONS : THERMOPYLÆ AND SALAMIS

Date, B.C. 480.

Chief Names.—Xerxes, Leonidas, Themistocles, Aristides, Eurybiades.

IN the spring of the year B.C. 481 levies from all quarters of the vast Persian Empire were assembling on the plain of Critalla, in Cappadocia ; by the autumn the muster was complete. No less than forty-six nations are said to have sent their warriors to fight under the banner of the Great King, and many of them were mere savages, with painted bodies and clad in skins ; some were armed with stakes hardened in the fire, or flint-tipped arrows, one tribe even with daggers and lassos. From Critalla the army advanced to Sardis, and there spent the winter ; and Xerxes sent heralds thence to Greece to demand earth and water from all the states except Sparta and Athens.

Meanwhile two great works connected with the invasion were being carried out ; as it was obviously impossible to put so enormous a force on shipboard, Xerxes determined to follow Mardonius's march through Thrace ; but he did not wish to run the risk of having his fleet wrecked on Mount Athos, and therefore had a canal about a mile and a half long cut through the narrow isthmus which joins it to the mainland. It was the fashion of later writers to throw ridicule on the story of this canal, but recent researches

have shown distinct traces of it. Secondly, to convey the army across the Hellespont without wasting time by embarking and disembarking it, two bridges of ships were constructed nearly a mile long between the towns of Abydos and Sestos. Hardly, however, were the bridges completed when a storm swept them away; Xerxes in a fury had the unfortunate engineers beheaded, and, if we are to believe the account of Herodotus, ordered the Hellespont to be flogged and chains to be flung into it, as a punishment for its insolence. Then fresh engineers rebuilt the bridges double as strong as before.

In the spring of B.C. 480 the Persian army started on the march that was to lead it into Greece. At Abydos, on the Hellespont, it was joined by the fleet, 1200 ships furnished by the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cilicians, and Asiatic Greeks, who were thus obliged to aid in the enslaving of their brothers. Here an ivory throne was erected for Xerxes on a hill, that he might gratify his pride by the survey of the multitudes that owned his sway; but when he saw the Hellespont crowded with his triremes, and all the country round Abydos swarming with his troops, he is said to have burst into tears at the thought that in a hundred years not a man among them all would be alive. Protected by the fleet, the army now crossed by the bridges, the troops by one, the baggage by the other. The crossing began at sunrise, Xerxes himself offering up prayers and libations for the success of his enterprise, and lasted seven days and seven nights. The **third Persian Invasion** had begun.

Through the Chersonese and along the southern shore of Thrace the march continued till the River Hebrus was crossed, and the plain of Doriscus was reached; there Xerxes reviewed his army, and wishing to ascertain its numbers, adopted the following plan: ten thousand men were packed together as closely as possible; and a wall was built round the space which they occupied; the enclosure

was then filled over and over again by the rest of the army until the whole had passed through. Thus it was known how many times ten thousand there were. The infantry is said to have numbered 1,700,000, which, with the cavalry and the men on board the fleet, would have amounted to about two and a half millions; but these numbers must be greatly exaggerated, as with the camp-followers and other non-combatants said to have been more than the fighting men, the whole force which crossed the Grecian frontier would have been over five million men, considerably more than the whole population of Greece.

Xerxes now continued his march through Thrace, forcing all the tribes on his route to join him. Large stores of food had been collected at different points along the coast, so that he was able to feed his vast numbers; but some of the rivers which supplied him with water are said to have been dried up, and many a city which had been ordered to furnish supplies was brought to the verge of ruin. A citizen of the town of Abdëra is said to have remarked that it was fortunate that the Great King only ate bread at one meal in the day, otherwise the city would have been utterly ruined.

The fleet followed the march, and passing safely through the Mount Athos Canal, rounded the peninsula of Chalcidice, and rejoined the land forces at Therma in Macedonia; here a prolonged halt was made, and the armament lay encamped along the shore for a distance of twenty-five miles.

At Therma the heralds who had been sent from Sardis in the winter returned to Xerxes, bringing earth and water from all the states north of the Isthmus except Athens, Phocis, and the little cities of Platæa and Thespiæ.

We must now turn to the doings of the Greeks. News of the immense preparations for the invasion of their country had of course reached them, and in the autumn of B.C. 481 the Spartans and Athenians summoned a Congress to meet at the **Isthmus of Corinth** to discuss the means

of defence, which was attended by most states; Argos, from jealousy of Sparta, and Thebes, from hatred to Athens, held aloof. It was agreed that all quarrels such as those between Athens and Ægina should cease, that spies should be sent to Asia to find out the strength of Xerxes's army, that Argos should be requested to join the confederates, and that envoys should be sent to Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, and to the islands of Corcyra and Crete to ask them to come to the aid of their mother-country. The Argives still refused, because they could not have equal command with the Spartans; but it is doubtful whether they actually submitted to the Persians; they are not mentioned as having sent earth and water. Gelo would not come unless he were allowed to hold the chief command, which was out of the question; the Cretans were prevented by an oracle; the Corcyræans promised aid, and, when the time came, despatched a fleet of sixty ships, but ordered them not to pass Cape Malea till after the battle, pretending that the wind delayed them. The spies were discovered in the camp at Sardis, but Xerxes had them conducted through the whole encampment, and then dismissed them unhurt. In the winter came the heralds from Sardis demanding earth and water. Fear and despondency reigned supreme; the Athenians had indeed vanquished the army of Darius at Marathon, but this host seemed invincible in its numbers.

In their despair the Greeks had recourse to the oracles. The Athenians sent envoys to Delphi, but the answer which they received was most alarming: 'Wretched men,' said the priestess, 'leave your homes and flee afar; fire and sword shall destroy your city and the temples of the gods.' The envoys, horrorstruck, entreated for a better reply, on which the priestess replied, 'Pallas Athênē cannot entreat Zeus for you; but he grants that, when all else is destroyed, the wooden wall shall protect you. Divine Salamis will make women childless.'

The Spartans also inquired of the oracle, and were told, 'Either your mighty city is destroyed by the Persians, or you will mourn the death of one of your kings.'

In the spring of B.C. 480, it was known that the march of the invading host had begun. The question now arose at what point it should be resisted ; and, at the earnest entreaty of the Thessalians, who had not as yet submitted to the Persians, a force of ten thousand men was sent under the Spartan Euænētus and the Athenian Themistocles to occupy the pass of **Tempē**, between Macedonia and Thessaly (see p. 9 and map). They held the pass for some days ; but, discovering that there were other passes over the hills to the west, by which it was Xerxes's intention to cross, and also that he could land troops in their rear, they abandoned Tempē without waiting to be attacked, and sailed back to the Isthmus. The Thessalians, thus left defenceless, made their submission to Xerxes, and sent earth and water, as has been already mentioned ; whereupon the Phocians, who had long been the foes of the Thessalians, decided to take the Greek side, and so refused earth and water ; such was the selfishness which many of the Greeks displayed in this time of danger.

For some time the Congress took no further steps ; but, when news came that Xerxes was at Therma, it was absolutely necessary to come to some decision. The next two points where resistance could be made were the **Pass of Thermopylæ**, between Thessaly and Phocis, and the **Isthmus** itself. The real wish of the Peloponnesians was to hold the Isthmus, for they were afraid to fight so far away as Thermopylæ ; but that course would leave Athens and the other states north of the Isthmus defenceless, and enable the Thebans to join the enemy. So it was decided to hold Thermopylæ ; but the Olympic Games and a Dorian festival to Apollo were now being celebrated, and, just as before Marathon ten years previously, this was pleaded as an

excuse for not sending out the full force ; **Leonidas**, however, one of the kings of Sparta, was ordered to march to Thermopylæ with what troops he could muster. He collected 300 Spartans with their attendant Helots, and about 1500 other Peloponnesians ; on his march he was joined by small contingents from Corinth and other towns, and by 700 Thespians, and he forced the Thebans to send 400 men as a guarantee of their loyalty. The Phocians and Locrians sent larger contingents, as they would be the first to suffer should Thermopylæ be lost. Leonidas thus occupied the



THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM

pass with about 10,000 men, which he proclaimed was only the advance guard of the main Peloponnesian army.


The famous pass of Thermopylæ is about two miles long ; the road, which in parts was only wide enough for a single carriage, runs between inaccessible cliffs 800 feet high, spurs of Mount Ceta, and the Malian Gulf ; in the present day, owing to the accumulation of earth brought down by the River Sperchæüs, the sea has receded, and the pass has become a broad plain. The name Thermopylæ (Hot Gates)

was derived from some hot springs which lay in the middle of the pass. Leonidas pitched his camp in rear of the hot springs, close by an old wall, which the Phocians had built in days gone by to keep out Thessalian invaders. He discovered, however, that there was a difficult track over the mountain ridge by which a body of troops could descend in rear of the pass; to hold this he posted the Phocians on the top of the ridge. Meanwhile, to protect the pass against an attack by sea, the fleet was stationed off *Artemisium*, the northern promontory of Eubœa, which is only two and a half miles from the Thessalian coast. The fleet numbered 271 triremes, of which 127 were Athenian, under Themistocles, 40 were Corinthian, and 10 were Spartan; but Themistocles patriotically allowed the Spartan Eurybiades to have the chief command.

By this time Xerxes had broken up his camp at Therma and advanced through Thessaly; the submission of the Thessalians had led him to suppose that he would meet with no resistance; great was his surprise, therefore, when he heard that Thermopylæ was occupied. He halted at the city of Trachis and waited four days, expecting that the sight of his numbers would cause Leonidas to surrender.

There were several stories current among the Greeks about the events of these days of waiting. Xerxes, it is said, sent a trooper to see what the Spartans were doing, who brought back news that he saw several combing their long hair and engaged in gymnastic exercises; and when Xerxes was astonished, Demarätus, the Spartan king (p. 78), who had been deposed and fled to the Persians, told him that it was the Spartan custom to comb their hair with particular care when about to risk their lives in a desperate enterprise. And a Spartan being told by a Persian that their army was so numerous that the arrows would conceal the sun, replied, 'So much the better; we shall fight in the shade.'

On the fifth day Xerxes, without waiting for the assistance of his fleet, which was now engaged with the Greek fleet at Artemisium, sent forward a division of his army with orders, it is said, to take the Greeks prisoners, and the battle of Thermopylæ began. In the narrow pass numbers were of no avail against the superior arms and discipline of the Greeks. The first assailants were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 'Immortals' (the king's body-guard of ten thousand Persians, so called because their numbers were never allowed to diminish) who succeeded met with no better fate. Thrice Xerxes is said to have leapt in rage from the throne, from which he was watching the fight. All next



THE PASS OF THERMOPYLÆ

day the fight went on, division after division was hurled against the Greeks in the hope of tiring them out by the continual attacks, but all was of no avail, and by the evening Xerxes was in despair. Then a countryman named Ephialtes came and told him of the mountain path by which the pass could be turned; Xerxes was delighted and sent off the Immortals at once, and by midnight they reached the top of the ridge where the Phocians were

posted. Taken by surprise the Phocians abandoned their important post and fell back to the higher ground ; the Persians took no further notice of them, but pursued their march along the path.

Great was the alarm in the Greek camp when the morning brought the news that the Persians were descending in their rear. It was hopeless to think any more of defending the pass ; Leonidas and his Spartans had only one course open to them, to die at their post. However, he gave out that any of the allies except the Thebans might retire while there was time ; and all, with the exception of the 700 Thespians, availed themselves of the permission ; they alone stayed to die with the Spartans. Two Spartans lay sick in the camp : one seized his arms and went out to share his comrades' fate ; the other named Aristodēmus stayed behind and so escaped, but on his return to Sparta he was shunned by his fellow-citizens as a coward.

The battle began. Leonidas with his little force left his position and charged boldly into the midst of the Persian army. Terrible was the slaughter inflicted by the Greeks ; many of the Persians were driven into the sea, others were trodden under foot by the troops in the rear, who were forced into the fight by whips, according to the Persian custom. But Leonidas and many of the Greeks fell too ; the Immortals were now advancing in their rear, and the survivors retreated to a hillock where they were all shot down by the light troops, except the Thebans, who took the earliest opportunity of surrendering. Such was the ever-memorable battle of Thermopylæ. The pass was indeed lost, and the **road into Greece lay open** ; but 20,000 barbarians had been slain ; while Leonidas and his Spartans by their deaths won a deathless renown ; and their splendid self-sacrifice taught Xerxes how worthless his Asiatic hordes were against their new adversaries.

The oracle had been fulfilled, a king of Sparta had fallen.

After the war the Spartans erected a lion at Thermopylæ to Leonidas, and a monument with an inscription to the following effect :—

‘Go tell the Spartans, thou that passest by,
That here obedient to their laws we lie.’

During the fighting at Thermopylæ the fleets had also been engaged at *Artemisium*, but with less decisive results. As the Persian fleet advanced, its advanced guard of ten triremes captured or destroyed three Greek triremes who were watching for them. This so alarmed the Greeks that the whole fleet fled from *Artemisium* down the strait of Eubœa to Chalcis, where the strait is only forty yards wide, thus leaving Thermopylæ open to an attack by sea. But before the Persian fleet had rounded the southern end of Thessaly it was exposed to a gale for three days which destroyed 400 triremes. When the Greeks, who in the narrow strait had not suffered from the gale, heard of the disaster they took heart and returned to their old position at *Artemisium*. The sight, however, of the Persian fleet, which now lay opposite, filled them with such terror that they again thought of retreating ; whereupon the Eubœans offered thirty talents to Themistocles if he would keep the fleet at *Artemisium*. Themistocles gave three talents to Eurybiades and two to Adeimantus, the Corinthian, and they agreed to stay. The Persian admiral, wishing to capture the Greek fleet without fighting, sent a squadron of two hundred to sail round Eubœa so as to cut off their retreat. Hearing of this, the Greeks put out and attacked the Persians much to their surprise ; the battle was indecisive, but the Greeks took thirty ships. The next night brought another storm which dashed the two hundred Persian ships to pieces against the cliffs of Eubœa. This news, and the arrival of fifty-three more Athenian ships, encouraged the Greeks still further to hold their ground. Two

days after the first encounter the Persians attacked in full force, a long and desperate battle took place, again with no decisive result; the losses on both sides were heavy; but the Greek fleet was so much damaged that retreat was now necessary, when news came of the capture of Thermopylæ. That settled the question. The fleet abandoned Artemisium and made with all speed for the Isthmus. It is said that, as it sailed down the Straît of Eubœa, Themistocles set up inscriptions along the coast calling on the Ionians not to fight against their fatherland. Eubœa, thus left unprotected, was obliged to submit to Xerxes.

The Peloponnesian army was now at the Isthmus, for the festivals were at last over; and when the terrible news from Thermopylæ arrived it was determined to hold and fortify the Isthmus as the next line of defence.

The greatest consternation prevailed at Athens, thus abandoned to the enemy. But Themistocles encouraged his fellow-countrymen and persuaded them to **leave their city**, telling them that the wooden wall to which the oracle bade them trust was their fleet; a few, however, taking the words of the oracle literally, fortified themselves in the Acropolis with a wooden palisade. The Council of the Areopagus also came to the rescue; it induced the wavering crews to go on board, by providing them with pay; and, by its patriotic conduct all through this critical time, regained much of its old authority. The fleet was employed conveying the Athenians with their families and possessions to places of safety, some to the islands of Salamis and Ægina, others to Trœzen, in Argolis. It then took up its station in the land-locked bay of **Salamis** to protect the Isthmus from an attack by sea.


As the Persians advanced from Thermopylæ most of the states followed the example of Thebes and submitted. The Phocians, however, fled for refuge to the mountains, and their land was devastated; the Thespians, too, and

Platæans abandoned their towns, which were burnt at the instigation of the Thebans. Xerxes sent a force to seize the oracle of Delphi, but Apollo is said to have protected his shrine by hurling down rocks from the peaks of Parnassus, and by other portents ; and the invaders fled in terror.

At length the Persian host reached the deserted city of Athens and the fleet took up its station in the bay of Phalærum, about five miles distant from the Greek fleet. The defenders of the Acropolis resisted for some days till some Persian soldiers climbed up by a difficult way and slew them all. Xerxes burnt the city, temples and all, and sent off a messenger to Susa to announce his success. It only now remained to conquer the Greek fleet ; the Isthmus could then be no longer held, and the Peloponnese would lie open to him.

The Greek fleet had been reinforced since Artemisium, and now numbered three hundred and eighty ships, of which one hundred and eighty were Athenian. But the commanders, with the exception of Themistocles, were as timid as ever. The sight of burning Athens filled them with panic, and at a council of war they decided to retreat from Salamis to the Isthmus ; but Themistocles, fearing that if a retreat were begun it would end in the various contingents breaking up and returning to their own homes, persuaded Eurybiades to call another council of war at night. The discussion was long and angry ; at last the Corinthian, Adeimantus, insultingly told Themistocles that he had no right to speak, as he had no country ; Themistocles replied that the hundred and eighty Athenian ships were a proof that he had a country ; and he declared that if the fleet did not stay at Salamis the Athenians would abandon Greece altogether and sail away to found a new city in Italy. This last threat convinced Eurybiades, and it was decided to fight at Salamis. But, in spite of this decision, there was still a strong feeling among the generals

against fighting at Salamis ; a third council was held, and another angry discussion took place. At last Themistocles, despairing of persuading the majority of his colleagues, took a desperate resolve : he sent a trusty slave to the Persian fleet with the following message : 'Themistocles, who is at heart the friend of the Persians, has sent me to tell you that the Greeks are in great terror and preparing to fly ; and they are so disunited that if you attack at once you will gain an easy victory.' Xerxes also had held a council of war in which all his commanders were in favour of a sea



fight except Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, a Dorian city of Asia Minor, who foresaw the danger of fighting in such narrow waters. Xerxes, confident in his numbers, determined to fight, and his decision was confirmed by the arrival of the messenger in the evening from Themistocles. By the next morning the whole Persian fleet lined the Attic shore opposite Salamis, thus blocking both entrances to the bay in which the Greek fleet lay.

The discussion in the Greek council was prolonged into night, when the exiled Aristides arrived, and sending for his old rival Themistocles told him that the Persians had

surrounded the Greeks. Themistocles, delighted to hear that his stratagem had succeeded, sent him into the council; but the other generals would not believe him. Soon, however, the news was confirmed by the arrival of an Ionian trireme which had deserted from the Persians; and the generals, at last convinced, prepared to fight. In the morning the Greeks beheld the whole Persian fleet drawn up against them from mouth to mouth of the bay; their only hope now lay in fighting, and on the issue of that day hung the fate of Greece.

The Persian fleet, in spite of its losses, still numbered nearly a thousand ships, owing to reinforcements. It was about to fight under the eyes of Xerxes himself, for whom a throne had been erected on the heights of the Attic shore; beneath him was the camp of the Persian army. As the Persian fleet advanced the Greeks were at first seized with panic and backed towards the shore, but the example of one or two captains revived their courage and they boldly charged the advancing foe. For some hours the conflict raged, but at length the superior discipline of the Greeks began to tell. The Phœnicians fought well, but, as Themistocles foresaw, in the narrow waters their numbers only increased their confusion; several of the Ionians were lukewarm. Xerxes's brother who commanded was killed; and in the evening the Persian fleet, shattered and discomfited, fled back to the bay of Phalerum with a loss of over two hundred ships. The Greeks had lost forty. Thus a second time the **energy of Athens had saved Greece**: the real victor at Salamis was Themistocles.

The defeat of his fleet before his own eyes plunged Xerxes from the height of confidence to the depth of despair. His land army was still unconquered, and his fleet was still superior in numbers, but he began to think about his own safety; a second defeat might endanger his retreat. Mardonius, who, having originally advised the expedition, knew

that if it failed his life would be in danger, suggested to him that he had gained one great success by the conquest of Athens, and could therefore return with glory to Persia ; he himself with three hundred thousand picked men would undertake to subdue the rest of Greece. Xerxes determined to adopt the suggestion, especially as a message came from Themistocles saying that the Greeks were about to send ships to the Hellespont to destroy the bridges, a course which he had himself proposed, but Eurybiades, as usual, had refused to adopt.

The fleet therefore set sail from Phal rum by night for the Hellespont. Xerxes followed with the bulk of the army by the long and wearisome land-route through Thrace, during which his losses from disease and famine were enormous ; he found the bridges over the Hellespont broken again by a storm, but the fleet was there to convey the troops across. The remnants of the army wintered at Sardis. Xerxes in time returned to Susa, and strove to forget his disappointment in the luxurious delights of his court. **Mardonius** with his forces took up his winter quarters in Thessaly, as it was now too late to attempt a fresh campaign. A reserve of 60,000 men also lay in Macedonia under a general named Artabazus.

The Greeks who, after the battle of Salamis, had begun to prepare for another engagement, on discovering the retreat of the Persian fleet, pursued them for some distance without success ; they then spent the rest of the year sailing about among the islands, compelling them to throw off their allegiance to Persia.

The Greeks, as was their habit, assigned prizes to the most deserving states and individuals : of the states  gina obtained the first prize, Athens, strange to say, only the second, the Dorians of the Peloponnese thus preferring their own kinsmen to the Ionian Athenians. The first prize for individual bravery was divided between two men, an

Athenian and an Æginetan. The voting for the prize for generalship produced a strange result: each commander gave the first prize to himself, the second to Themistocles.

While the Greeks of the mother-country were battling for their existence against the Persian Empire, in the west their kinsmen in Sicily were similarly engaged against the Phœnician Empire of Carthage. Taking advantage of dissensions among them, Hamilcar, a Carthaginian general, landed with an army said to have consisted of 300,000 men, and besieged the important town of Himëra. Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse, having luckily been refused the chief command in Greece against the Persians, marched to its relief, and on the very day of the battle of Salamis, so tradition says, totally defeated the Carthaginians, Hamilcar himself being slain. The Carthaginians proved in the end more formidable enemies than the Persians, and we shall hear of them again in Sicily later on.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PERSIAN INVASIONS : PLATÆA AND MYCÆLE

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Battles of Platæa and Mycæle,	479
Capture of Byzantium, recall of Pausanias, .	478

Chief Names.—Mardonius, Pausanias, Aristides, Cimon.

THE year B.C. 479 opened under happier auspices than the preceding one. The Athenians had returned to their city in the winter and were beginning to rebuild their ruined homes ; all that remained was for the united Greek forces to take the field against Mardonius ; Thermopylæ and Marathon were sufficient proof of the superiority of the Greeks over the Asiatics to make the victory certain.


But timidity and irresolution still prevailed at Sparta ; the fleet under the Spartan king, Leotychides, was indeed sent into the Ægean, but it got no further than the island of Delos, where it lay inactive, attempting nothing to aid the Asiatic Greeks to throw off the Persian yoke. At home the Spartans made no attempt to take the offensive ; their only thought still was to remain on the defensive behind the fortifications of the Isthmus. Mardonius was now moving south from Thessaly, and the outlook for the Athenians was a dark one ; when Alexander, king of Macedon, came offering them most favourable terms from Mardonius if they would abandon the Greeks. The Athenians, of course, rejected the offer and clung to their ruined city, for they

could not believe that the Spartans, who had sent envoys begging them not to yield, would really desert them. But no help came, Mardonius was now in Bœotia, and the Athenians—to the eternal disgrace of Sparta—were compelled to leave their city, which fell a second time into the hands of the Persians.

Exasperated by this treatment, the Athenians sent envoys to Sparta with bitter complaints, and saying that even now, if reduced to desperation, they might accept the Persian terms. Still the Spartans did nothing but make vague promises; as usual a festival was being celebrated which prevented any active steps being taken. But at last an Arcadian of Tegea pointed out that the fortifications at the Isthmus would be of little use if the Athenian fleet were on the Persian side. This argument convinced the Spartans; **Pausanias**, who was acting as regent for the infant son of his uncle Leonidas, was despatched that very night with five thousand Spartans and five thousand Lacedæmonians to Corinth, where the whole Peloponnesian army began to assemble. When all the contingents had joined, Pausanias advanced into Attica, where he was joined by eight thousand Athenians under Aristeides. The united Greek army now numbered nearly **forty thousand hoplites** and seventy thousand light troops, making a total of about a hundred and ten thousand, the largest force that Greece ever put in the field. One cannot but wonder what would have been the result if such a force had been at Thermopylæ with Leonidas.

When Mardonius heard of the advance of the Greeks he vented his spite on Athens by destroying what there still was to destroy, and then retired over Mount Cithæron into Bœotia, where he thought the level plain would give his cavalry the advantage; for the best cavalry of the Greeks, the Thessalians and Thebans, were now on the side of the Persians. There he fortified a camp on the north of the

little river Asôpus, separated from the town of **Plataea** by a plain about four miles broad. Pausanias followed the Persians, and from fear of the cavalry halted on the northern spurs of Cithæron, overlooking the Asopus valley. The Spartans and other Lacedæmonians were on the right, the Athenians on the left, the Peloponnesians and other allies



in the centre. In spite of the strong position of the Greeks Mardonius launched his cavalry against them; they were successful at first, but were finally repulsed by the Athenians with the loss of their commander, whose body was paraded in triumph through the Greek army. Emboldened by his success Pausanias moved down from the high ground and

took up a position in the plain between the Asopus and Plataea, where there was a better camping ground and a convenient spring of water. For ten days the armies faced one another, neither Persians nor Greeks venturing to attack, for the omens on both sides were unfavourable, and the commanders were not confident of success; but the Persian cavalry gave great annoyance to the Greeks by cutting off their supplies which came over Mount Cithaeron, and at last prevented them from using the spring of water.

Pausanias therefore ordered the army to fall back by night to a position nearer Plataea, where water was easier to get and safer from the Persian cavalry. But the movement was badly executed; the centre, by mistake, fell back close under the walls of Plataea; the right was unable to begin their march till daybreak, owing to the obstinacy of a single Spartan officer, who refused to retire; while the Athenians on the left waited for the Spartans to start. The morning therefore revealed to the astonished Persians the Greeks retiring in disorder; thinking they were in full retreat, Mardonius hurried out in pursuit without waiting to draw up his troops properly. Artabazus, who had now joined the main army, was against fighting.

Mardonius soon overtook the Lacedæmonians, who halted and faced about to receive the attack. For some time Pausanias remained on the defensive, and sent to the Athenians to come to his assistance; but they were some distance off on his left engaged with the Thebans. At last he plucked up his courage and ordered the charge; the onset of the Spartans decided the battle, the lightly-clad Persians, as usual, could not withstand their heavily-armed assailants, numbers were of no avail; for some time they struggled bravely, but the fall of Mardonius was the signal for a general flight. Artabazus, who saw his predictions of defeat realised, retreated with his reserve of forty thousand men without striking a blow. The confused

mass of Asiatics fled to their camp, which was assailed without success by the Spartans. But the Athenians, who had by this time worsted the Thebans after a desperate engagement, now came to the aid of the Spartans, and, being more skilled in attacking fortifications, soon gained an entrance; the Greek centre having heard of the issue of the fight also came up, and the whole army was engaged in slaughtering the helpless mass of barbarians like sheep: hardly any escaped; of the Greeks only thirteen hundred and sixty fell. Among the Spartan dead was Aristodēmus the survivor of Thermopylæ, who, unable to endure his disgrace at Sparta, rushed forward from the ranks and was slain fighting desperately. Artabazus reached Thessaly, and prevented the Thessalians from attacking him by giving out that Mardonius was only a few marches behind: thus he effected his retreat.

The battle of Plataea was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece. They had failed, owing to the utter inability of the Asiatics to stand against the Greeks in the field. But though brave enough when forced to fight, the Greeks showed such timidity and irresolution to meet their foes, in spite of the lessons of Marathon and Thermopylæ, that had it not been for the moral courage and determination of the Athenians in spurring them on, they would probably have succumbed.

The victors spent a few days in burying the dead and dividing the spoil; they then marched against Thebes. After a short siege the city surrendered; as a punishment for having joined the Persians, it was deprived of its headship of Bœotia and compelled to surrender the leaders of what was called the 'Medizing' party; one of them escaped, but the rest were put to death by Pausanias. In memory of the battle Plataea was declared inviolable and was charged with the care of the tombs of the slain, and the different states bound themselves by an oath to

preserve for ever the freedom of its inhabitants ; how long that oath was kept will be seen hereafter.

On the same day as Platea another victory was won on the coast of Asia Minor. Leotychides, who, as has been said, had been lying inactive with the fleet at Delos, was at last persuaded to move by the Samians, who declared that all was ready for a revolt against the Persians. When the fleet reached Samos they found that the Persians, apparently distrusting their Ionian contingent, had retreated to the mainland and drawn their fleet ashore under the promontory of *Mycæle*, near Miletus (see map, p. 89), with an army of sixty thousand men to protect it. Encouraged, according to the story, by miraculous news of the victory of Platea, the Greeks forced a landing, and, led by the Athenians and Corinthians, gained a great victory on land and stormed the Persian camp. The ships were taken ; the Ionians now came over to the side of their fellow-countrymen, and the flying Persians were assailed in the rear by the men of Miletus, who had been posted to protect their retreat.

After this decisive battle the Greeks of the islands and coast cities were eager to throw off the Persian yoke ; the only question was about their protection in the future. Leotychides was willing to accept the islands as allies ; but, with the usual Spartan timidity, he was afraid of the consequences of a land war against the Persians in Asia Minor, and so he refused to protect the coast cities, but offered instead to transport the inhabitants to Greece. The cities refused this offer and were supported in their refusal by the Athenians ; and the only result was the increase of the influence of Athens at the expense of Sparta. The fears of Leotychides proved to be groundless, for Xerxes was so cast down by his defeats that he gave up the struggle entirely ; he levied no more armies and made no more efforts to re-establish his empire over the Greeks of Asia Minor.

The fleet now sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the bridges, the destruction of which, though it had happened nearly a year before, was as yet unknown to the Greeks. Finding their work already done, the Peloponnesians returned home; the Athenians on the contrary remained and with the aid of the Ionians began the work of expelling the Persian garrisons from Europe. They besieged Sestos, the most important town on the Hellespont, and by the autumn starved it into surrender. That ended the fighting for the year; the Persians were finding out that their attack on Greece had not only failed, but was recoiling on their own heads.

The next year (B.C. 478) began a **new era in the history of the Greeks**; hitherto they had been an insignificant collection of little states which had only preserved their independence amid the rise and fall of the great nations of the East owing to their isolated position, which made attack upon them difficult. Now, having emerged victorious from their struggle with the mighty empire of Persia, they took their place in the world as a people of brave enterprising freemen among nations sunk in sloth, the submissive slaves of an all-powerful despot. A great future lay before the Greeks, **if they could only become a nation**. But could they? In Sparta they had a leader acknowledged almost universally as the head of Greece; even Athens, as we have seen, served loyally under Sparta all through the terrible times of the invasion in spite of great provocation. But the statesmen of Sparta were blind; they did not understand the change that had come upon the Greeks; they thought that things would still go on as before; satisfied with their present position they looked forward to nothing greater, and Sparta let the golden opportunity slip by. The only other state that could take her place was Athens; Athens, by her energy and patriotism, was well qualified to weld the Greek states into a nation. But unfortunately she was

Ionian, and to an Ionian city the Dorians would never submit. Therefore her attempt was doomed to failure; nevertheless she made it, and her attempt and failure make up the grandest part of Greek history.

It was in this year (B.C. 478) that Sparta finally lost her opportunity. In spite of all her faults Athens still surrendered to her the command of the fleet that was to continue the war against Persia. Unfortunately for the Spartans, the admiral sent out by them was **Pausanias**, the victor of Plataea. His head had been turned by that victory, little credit for which really belonged to him; he had grown contemptuous of the simple Spartan life, and in particular had given great offence by dedicating the offering, set up in Delphi in honour of the victory, in his own name instead of that of Sparta; so angry were the Spartans that they erased his inscription and substituted a new one. In spite of this conduct Pausanias was allowed to command the fleet; while the Athenian commanders were **Aristeides** and **Cimon**, the son of **Miltiades**, a brave and skilful soldier. Thus at a most critical period, when the question of the revolted Greeks would have to be settled, the representatives of Athens were as good as that of Sparta was bad. The fleet was joined by contingents from the revolted Greeks of the *Ægean*. Its main object was the attack of the fortified towns still held by the Persians in Thrace, especially **Byzantium**, on the *Bosphorus* (see p. 54). **Xerxes** made no attempt to save **Byzantium** and it was compelled to surrender after a long siege.

Pausanias was still further puffed up by this fresh success, and conceived the dream of making himself supreme over the Greeks as a sort of satrap of the Persians whom he had been sent to conquer. So he contrived that the chief officers taken at **Byzantium**, one of whom was royal blood, should escape back to Persia bearing a letter from him to **Xerxes**:

'Pausanias, the Spartan general, desiring to please thee sends thee back these prisoners. I am minded, if it please thee, to marry thy daughter and bring Sparta and the rest of Greece under thy sway. This, with thy aid, I hold myself able to do. If therefore my proposal be acceptable, send hither some confidential man through whom we may correspond.' Xerxes was delighted with the letter, he wrote a friendly reply and sent it by the hand of Artabazus, the general who escaped from Plataea, appointing him satrap of the district of the Hellespont.

Pausanias now began to behave as if he were already a Persian satrap and son-in-law of the great king; he surrounded himself with a Persian body-guard and adopted Persian dress and custom. So outrageous was his behaviour towards those under his command that the Greeks of the *Ægean* turned for redress to the Athenians; they had already begun to consider them their natural protectors owing to the action of the Spartans the preceding year, and the majority of them were Ionians and therefore of the same race as the Athenians.

The authority of Pausanias was openly defied, and it is said that his ship was attacked by a Samian captain. But news of his conduct had reached Sparta, and he was recalled with his squadron to be put on his trial; and when Dorcis his successor arrived, he found that the whole fleet acknowledged Aristides as commander-in-chief. Dorcis, having too few ships to enforce his authority, sailed back to Greece.

The Spartans made no further attempt to take part in the war in the *Ægean*; the war between the Greeks and Persia was ended, but it was succeeded by a war between Athens and Persia, the object of which was to free every Greek city from slavery to Persia.

CHAPTER XV

THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Foundation of the Confederacy of Delos,	477
Ostracism of Themistocles,	471
Death of Pausanias,	469
Battle of Eurymedon,	466
Revolt of Naxos,	466
Flight of Themistocles to Persia,	465

Chief Names.—Aristeides, Cimon, Themistocles, Pausanias.

POSSESSING the full confidence of the allies, and freed from the presence of the Spartans with their timidity and want of enterprise, the Athenian commanders now set to work on the task of rescuing the Asiatic Greeks from Persia and protecting them for the future.

To this end it was decided to unite the islands of the *Ægean* and the Greek cities of the Thracian and Asiatic coasts into a league for common defence against Persia under the presidency of Athens. This league was called the **Confederacy of Delos**, because the treasury was in the temple of Apollo and Artemis in the island of Delos; each state, including Athens, was to send deputies to the general assembly and contribute money, men, and ships to be employed in the war against Persia. The total of the contributions amounted to four hundred and sixty talents (about £100,000) a year. It was a great advantage to Athens

ally of Sparta, became the head of a **powerful naval confederacy**.

While Aristеides was thus laying the foundation of Athenian power in the *Ægean*, his ancient rival, Themistocles, was not less usefully employed in protecting the city against intrigues at home.

The Athenians had returned for the second time to their ruined city, and were engaged in rebuilding their homes. They now made their city larger than before, and by the advice of Themistocles began the construction of **walls far stronger** than the old ones, that they might never again be compelled to abandon it. But the work alarmed their neighbours, especially the Corinthians, who were jealous and afraid of the rapidly rising power of Athens. Sparta was appealed to, and ordered the Athenians to stop the work, declaring that a fortress outside the Isthmus would be dangerous in the case of another Persian invasion, if it once happened to fall into the hands of the enemy. The Athenians, whose walls were not yet high enough for purposes of defence, were in despair how to answer the Spartans; but Themistocles said to them: 'Continue building your walls, and send me to Sparta to explain; give me two colleagues, but do not let them follow me till the walls are high enough.' So Themistocles went to Sparta; but when he arrived he said that he could not discuss the matter till the arrival of his colleagues. Meanwhile the other states complained to Sparta that the fortification was proceeding. Themistocles continually denied the fact, and finally suggested that the Spartans should send envoys to Athens to ascertain the truth. This the Spartans did, but he at the same time sent a private message to the Athenians to keep the envoys as hostages for the safety of himself and his colleagues. At last his colleagues arrived, and Themistocles then told the Spartans that he had deceived them; the Athenians were fortifying their

city, and considered that they had a right to do so, and the walls were now strong enough to resist an attack. The Spartans, finding their duplicity outdone by the duplicity of Themistocles, could make no further objection, and dared not avenge themselves on him because of their envoys at Athens. So Themistocles returned to Athens, and the building of the walls was completed. But the feeling in the Peloponnese against Athens increased.

Next, also by the advice of Themistocles, the *Peiræus* (see p. 98), with the adjacent little harbour of *Munychia*, was enclosed by a wall higher and stronger even than the city wall, so that it would not require a numerous garrison for its defence. In time, a large trading and seafaring population grew up round the *Peiræus*, including many foreigners.

For several years the forces of the Confederacy of Delos were engaged under the command of Cimon, the hero of this period of the war, in destroying the last traces of Persian rule on the coasts of the *Ægean*. Xerxes seems to have been so dispirited by his failure in Greece that he made no efforts to resist his assailants. The details of these operations, with a few exceptions, have not come down to us. We hear of the obstinate resistance of the town of *Eion*, at the mouth of the River *Strymon* in *Thrace*; when all the provisions were exhausted, the Persian governor, disdaining to surrender, burnt himself with his wives and children on a vast funeral pyre (B.C. 476). We shall hear of *Eion* and its neighbourhood several times in the history of Athens; its position was one of great importance.

Ten years afterwards Cimon won a great victory over the Persians. He sailed at the head of a fleet of three hundred ships to free the Greek cities in *Lycia* and *Pamphylia*; a Persian fleet lay at the mouth of the River *Eurymædon* protected by a land force. Cimon totally defeated the fleet and army on the same day; all the ships

and much booty fell into his hands, and also eighty Phœnician ships that were coming as a reinforcement to the Persian fleet (B.C. 466). The Greek cities of Lycia and Pamphylia joined the Confederacy, and the island of Cyprus was the only important Greek territory left in the hands of the Persians, except the scattered colonies on the shores of the Euxine.

The year after the battle of the Eurymedon, **Xerxes** was murdered in his bed by his chamberlain and the chief of his guard (B.C. 465); he reigned twenty years, long enough to see his great project of conquering Greece recoil upon his own head. He was succeeded by his son Artaxerxes, who was occupied in the opening years of his reign in defending his throne against his two brothers, one of whom he caused to be assassinated, and the other he defeated in battle.

Meanwhile, the other great actors in the events of B.C. 480-479 were passing away. The treason of Pausanias at Byzantium, and its far-reaching consequences, have been already described (p. 124); his unhappy end must now be narrated. On reaching Sparta, after his recall from Byzantium (B.C. 478), he was put on his trial for 'Medism' (that is, holding friendly relations with the Persians), but owing to his high position he was acquitted. So great, however, was the suspicion against him that he was not reappointed to his command, whereupon he returned to Byzantium as a volunteer. There he renewed his intrigues with the Persians so openly, that the Athenians were compelled to expel him from Byzantium by force. However, he remained near the Hellespont prosecuting his designs, until at last the Spartans sent a herald ordering him to return home at once on pain of being declared a public enemy. On his arrival at Sparta he was imprisoned by the Ephors, but released by the influence of his friends. Notwithstanding this warning, the infatuated man in the following years plunged still deeper into treason; he not only continued his

correspondence with Xerxes, but began to **stir up the Helots to revolt**, that by their aid he might make himself supreme in Sparta. These new intrigues in time came to the ears of the Ephors ; but they dared not arrest him, for a Spartan of the blood royal could not be accused on the mere word of a Helot. At last, however, a favourite slave of Pausanias, who was intrusted with a letter to convey to Persia, noticing that the bearers of these missives never returned, opened it, and found that it contained orders that he should be put to death, such being Pausanias's method to prevent the return of any witnesses of his treason.

The slave carried the letter to the Ephors, who ordered him to flee for refuge to the temple of Poseidon at Tænårum (p. 11) where two of their number concealed themselves. Pausanias, hearing what his slave had done, came to the temple ; their conversation was overheard by the Ephors and the guilt of Pausanias was established out of his own mouth. On his return to Sparta the Ephors were about to arrest him in the street, but, on receiving a secret sign from a friend, he fled for refuge to the temple of Athênē which was close at hand. While in the temple he could not of course be arrested ; so the Ephors blocked up the door, his mother laying the first stone, and starved him to death ; before he actually expired he was carried outside, so that they could say that the temple had not been polluted. Such was the end of the victor of Platæa (B.C. 469).

Pausanias was not the only great Spartan convicted at this time of misbehaviour. The king, Leotychides, who commanded the fleet at Mycale, was a few years after that battle convicted of receiving bribes from the Thessalians, whom he had been sent to punish for joining the Persians. He was deposed and banished, B.C. 476, and died soon afterwards. At the time of Pausanias's death Themistocles was in exile at Argos. In spite of his incalculable services to his country, in founding her fleet, steering her safely

through the perils of the Persian invasion, and securing her against her rivals at home by his new fortifications, he had been ostracised (see p. 76) in the year B.C. 471. The cause of his ostracism is not clear, for very little is known of the political events at Athens during these years. Perhaps he was leading an attack on the Areopagus, the stronghold of the nobles, such as will be described ten years later. Or perhaps he was suspected of treasonable correspondence with Persia, which would not be improbable considering his conduct before and after Salamis. After the death of Pausanias, however, the Ephors, it is said, found in his correspondence proofs of the 'Medism' of Themistocles; and the Athenians at their request sent men to Argos to arrest him. But Themistocles was forewarned and fled to Corcyra; thence after various adventures, at one time almost falling into the hands of the Athenian fleet at that time besieging Naxos, he reached Persia, and threw himself on the mercy of Artaxerxes who was now on the throne, promising, it is said, to aid him in subduing Greece. Artaxerxes, the story continues, received him kindly and assigned him the revenues of Magnesia (near Ephesus) and two other cities for his support. Themistocles lived at Magnesia till his death some years afterwards (about B.C. 460), which some accounts say was self-inflicted owing to his inability to perform his promises made to Artaxerxes. He was a true Athenian, showing both the good and bad side of the character of that people, far-seeing, energetic, and full of resource, but wanting in straightforwardness and honesty. The history of his latter years is, as has been said, still a mystery; but one thing is certain—history records many services rendered by him to his country, it does not record a single action really done by him against it. There is no reason to suppose that during his exile in Persia he ever actually intended to aid the Persian conquest of Greece.

Not long after the ostracism of Themistocles died his rival Aristides; in spite of his long public life he died a poor man, a striking proof of his personal integrity. Besides his foundation of the Confederacy of Delos one other political measure is attributed to him, the **admission of the Thetes or lowest class of citizens to the archonship.** As all classes had suffered alike in the terrible time of the Persian invasion, it was felt just, after their restoration to their homes, that all should have the same rights. Thus the last two public acts of Aristides were aimed at establishing the power of his country abroad and concord at home.

Cimon's great victory at the Eurymedon had fulfilled the object of the Confederacy of Delos by making the Greeks of the islands and coast of the *Ægean* secure from Persian reconquest. But as its work was accomplished a **great change gradually came over the Confederacy itself.** Many of the smaller states, weary of the continued burden of the war, had been permitted to pay a greater money tribute instead of personal service; this greatly increased the power of Athens, for it made the Athenian contingent, strong as it had been before, far superior to the rest of the forces of the League. Moreover, at some period not exactly known, the Treasury of the League had been removed for safety from Delos to Athens on the suggestion of the Samians; thus the control of the money passed from the members of the League into the hands of the Athenians. Lastly, the meetings at Delos seem to have been gradually discontinued. The members of the League found themselves, instead of allies under the presidency of Athens, slowly but surely becoming her subjects. Even the very success of the League had a bad effect; for in proportion as the danger from Persia passed away the need of the protection of Athens was less and less felt, while, owing to the love of independence inborn in all Greeks, the yoke of

her supremacy became more and more distasteful. Consequently many of the members began to refuse to pay the tribute for which they saw no need, and the Athenians, considering that their services entitled them to the money, used force to collect it: this increased the discontent.

The **first actual outbreak** took place in B.C. 466, the very year of the battle of the Eurymedon. The large island of **Naxos** declared its intention of leaving the League. There was however no union among the discontented members of the League, and Naxos was left to brave Athens alone. Overwhelmed by superior forces it was after a long blockade compelled to surrender; its fortifications were destroyed and it had to accept the position of a tributary subject of Athens. The next year Athens was involved in a dispute with another large island, **Thasos**, which lay off the Thracian Coast, opposite the town of Eion, which the Athenians had taken from the Persians (see p. 128). The Thasians complained that the Athenians were interfering with their rights in the trade of the district, and in the gold-mine of Mount Pangæus, near Eion. The dispute ended in war, and Cimon was sent with a large armament which defeated the Thasians and blockaded the island. At the same time a colony of 10,000 men was sent from Athens to a place called **Nine Roads**, three miles inland from Eion on the River Strymon; but the colonists were destroyed almost to a man by the barbarian Thracians of the district, and the colony was for a time abandoned. After two years Thasos was obliged to surrender and reduced to the same humiliating position as Naxos (B.C. 463). How or when the other members of the League were reduced there is no record. But, in ten years from this time, the only states which remained on their old footing of equality with Athens were the three large islands of **Lesbos**, **Samos**, and **Chios**: their ultimate fate is bound up with the history of Athens and will be narrated hereafter.

Thus, from being a single not over-powerful city, Athens had through her energy in the Persian wars, and the extraordinary want of energy of Sparta, become the mistress of an Empire extending over the whole Ægean, and by far the greatest naval state in Greece.

CHAPTER XVI

THE REFORMS OF PERICLES

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B. C.</i>
Revolt of the Helots at Sparta,	464
Athens breaks with Sparta,	461
Pericles and Ephialtes overthrow the Areopagus.	
Ostracism of Cimon,	460

Chief Names.—Cimon, Pericles, Ephialtes.

BUT little is known of events in Greece during these years. Sparta, whose prestige had probably suffered from the misconduct of Pausanias and Leotychides, and also perhaps from the rapid rise of Athens, was obliged to wage two severe wars to maintain her supremacy, one against her old enemy Argos and the other against her Arcadian allies ; however, she emerged from both of them victorious ; her statesmen might be weak and her kings commit treason, but her soldiers were still the best fighters in Greece.

At Athens the excitement of the Persian invasion and the founding of the Confederacy of Delos had died down, and men's minds began to turn again to party politics. The most powerful politician at this time was **Cimon**, the leader of the party of the nobles ; he owed his power to his victories and his integrity ; his free and engaging manners also, and his great wealth which he expended most generously, won him wide popularity. But the Democratic party, under a leader named **Ephialtes**, was now growing powerful

and was eager to overthrow Cimon. Accordingly, on his return from the conquest of Thasos, he was prosecuted on the ground that after taking Thasos he ought to have attacked Macedonia, but was bribed by the king of Macedonia not to do so. His accuser was **Pericles** of the famous family of the Alcmaeonidae (see p. 65), a rising member of the Democratic party. His father, Xanthippus, had successfully prosecuted Miltiades, Cimon's father; but on this occasion the prosecution failed, probably deservedly. Thus the Democrats were defeated in their first attack on Cimon; but his fall came not long afterwards; it was occasioned by the question of **alliance with Sparta**, about which the two parties had diametrically opposite views.

Cimon held that the proper policy for Athens was to remain friends with Sparta and acknowledge her headship in Greece, while extending her own power by sea: thus the two great states united would always be able to repel the Persian or any other foreign invader. The Democratic party, distrustful of Sparta because of her selfish treatment of Athens during the Persian wars, and also at the time of the building of the walls, and intoxicated by the wonderful rise of their country's power, wanted to break with her and found a great empire by land as well as sea. Of these two policies that of Cimon was undoubtedly safer for Athens, but also better for the peace and interests of Greece, if it had been possible. But, unfortunately for Athens and Greece, Sparta with her usual blind folly made it impossible.

The Spartans had long been regarding the rapid growth of Athens with suspicion; indeed, during the blockade of Thasos, when the Thasians had applied to them for help they had actually agreed to invade Attica, though at that time at peace with Athens. But, before the army could start, a terrible earthquake occurred at Sparta; a large part of the town was destroyed and many persons perished. This

earthquake was considered to be caused by the wrath of the god Poseidon (Neptune), the 'Earth-shaker,' because some insurgent Helots who had sought sanctuary in his temple had been dragged away and slain, a gross violation of the sanctity of temples which, as we have seen, was avoided in the case of Pausanias. Encouraged by this earthquake, the whole body of Helots and Messenians rose in revolt (B.C. 464). At first they almost succeeded in capturing Sparta itself, but after a time they were worsted and driven to bay on the mountain stronghold of Ithōmē, where their ancestors had held out so long in the old days (see p. 44). As in that war, the Spartans besieged Ithome for some time without success; at last (B.C. 461) they were reduced to summon contingents from all their allies, among whom the Athenians were still numbered. Long and bitter was the dispute between the two parties at Athens whether the Spartan summons should be obeyed; in the end the party of Cimon prevailed and he was despatched to Ithome at the head of 4000 hoplites. But the renewed attacks were as unsuccessful as before; whereupon the Spartans, who seem to have suspected without any reason the loyalty of the Athenian contingent, coolly dismissed it, saying that they had no further need of its services.

This deliberate affront, inflicted on their city before the eyes of all Greece, naturally caused a complete revulsion of feeling among the Athenians. The wave of indignation proved fatal to the ascendancy of Cimon and his party; and the Democratic party under Ephialtes and Pericles became supreme. A decree was passed renouncing the alliance with Sparta, and from this year (B.C. 461) the hostility between the two states, which proved in the end the ruin of Greece, may be dated. In place of the Spartan alliance, an alliance was formed with Argos.

Ephialtes and Pericles now took advantage of their power to attack the great stronghold of the nobles, the

Council of the **Areopagus**, which had regained much of the power and authority taken away from it by Cleisthenes, in consequence of its patriotic action at the time of the Persian wars (see p. 110). It was again stripped of all its powers except the trial of cases of homicide, but only at the cost of severe party struggles ; Cimon and his party resisted fiercely, B.C. 460. Cimon at last was ostracised, but one of his extreme adherents in revenge murdered Ephialtes. This wicked and foolish deed utterly discredited Cimon's party, which never again regained power, and made **Pericles** the sole leader of the Democratic party and **the leading statesman of Athens**. His lofty character, patriotic statesmanship, and persuasive eloquence won for him a position of almost undisputed supremacy till the day of his death thirty years later, a fact to which it is hard to find a parallel in any other free state. Though holding no office except that of one of the ten annual generals (*στρατηγοί*, see p. 76), he had absolute control over the policy of Athens, for the Athenians always submitted to his judgment.

The jurisdiction taken from the Areopagus was now given to the law-courts into which the *Heliea* (see p. 69) was divided ; and their work was also much increased by the great extension of the power of Athens. Pericles therefore passed a law that every Athenian acting as a *Heliast* should receive a small payment daily for his services. Also that the poorer citizens might not be deprived of the opportunity of witnessing the performances of plays in the theatre at the great festivals, a law was passed giving them two obols each (about 2½d.), the price of admission. The biographer, Plutarch, tells us that Pericles himself passed this law because his private fortune was not large enough to permit him to equal his rival Cimon's munificence. Whether that was the case or not, it was a very bad law ; for the money came from the war fund, and in time of

war the expenditure became so burdensome that it was in the end abolished.

After the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes there were no further changes in the Constitution of Athens, except two temporary oligarchical revolutions, which will be described later on. The government was now a **complete Democracy**. The Democracy of Athens made mistakes, as we shall see; mistakes, some of which brought terrible consequences to the city; but they were mistakes which, under the circumstances, any kind of government might have made. It cannot be disputed that no state in Greece was so well governed; and though there were party conflicts, and also, as we shall see, revolutions at Athens, they were attended by much less ill feeling and bloodshed than in any other Greek state.

To sum up the results of the various reforms which have been described, the Constitution of Athens was now as follows:—

(1) Nine Archons chosen annually by lot from all the citizens; their duties consisted chiefly in presiding over the law-courts, with a few other special functions; but they had now little to do with the actual government.

(2) Ten Generals (Strategi) elected annually by the Ecclesia, one for each tribe; they commanded the troops and fleets on service and superintended everything connected with military and naval matters.

The Archons and Generals, as well as all the minor officials, were obliged, after their year of office, to give an account of it before a special board of examiners.

(3) The Areopagus, the ancient council composed of ex-archons, now stripped of nearly all its power.

(4) The Council (Βουλή) of 500, chosen by lot, 50 from each tribe, every citizen of thirty years of age being eligible. The duty of the Boule was to manage the details of the administration and prepare matters for discussion

in the Ecclesia. It met every day and was divided into ten divisions called Prytanies, which were on duty a tenth of a year each: every day a President was chosen by lot from the Prytany on duty to preside over meetings of the Boule and of the Ecclesia. The members of the Boule were excused military service during their term of office, and received a drachma (8d.) every time they attended a meeting.

(5) The Ecclesia, the assembly of all citizens of twenty years old and upwards: its meeting-place, called the Pnyx, was on a hillside near the Areopagus, but in later times it generally met in the Theatre; there were four regular meetings under each Prytany, that is forty in the year; besides which, extraordinary meetings could be called when necessary. It elected the generals, discussed and voted on questions of peace and war, and on all other matters of public administration submitted to it by the Boule. The Ecclesia did not itself make new laws, but, when it had voted that a change in the laws was advisable, referred the question to a commission elected from the Heliasts, before which the merits of the new and old law were argued just as in an ordinary trial. In order to check hasty legislation, any one who proposed or passed a new law might be accused of going against the constitution, and if convicted, he was punished, and the law was repealed. This was called the 'Graphē Paranōmon' (*γραφὴ παρανόμων*), or 'prosecution for illegal proposals.' In spite of this precaution, hasty legislation was always a fault of the Athenians, and in later times the Ecclesia itself made new laws without referring them to the commission.

(6) The Heliæa, or Court of Jurymen: all citizens over thirty years of age were eligible to serve; the Heliasts were divided into ten groups, but the number that heard any particular case varied according to its importance.

The number of Athenian citizens was probably about

20,000, amounting with their families to about 90,000. Pericles, however, a few years later took the citizenship away from many who were not of true Athenian descent, and reduced the number of citizens to 14,000. The Metics (*μέτοικοι*), foreigners residing at Athens, chiefly for purposes of trade, seem to have amounted with their families to between forty and fifty thousand. In addition, there were the slaves, chiefly Asiatics, who were the labourers and household servants ; they with their families amounted to the large number of 400,000. Thus the whole population of Attica, men, women, and children, was over 500,000, of whom probably about 100,000 lived in Athens itself.

The army (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) consisted of 1200 cavalry and 29,000 hoplites : of these 13,000 were the active army for foreign service ; and 16,000 the reserve for home defence, consisting of citizens above and below the military age, and metics. Besides there were light troops consisting of the Thetes (see p. 68), and hired mercenaries. The fleet consisted of about 400 triremes (see p. 97) : the marines were hoplites, the sailors and rowers Thetes and mercenaries. Slaves were, however, on emergencies, employed both in the fleet and army.

CHAPTER XVII

THE LAND EMPIRE OF ATHENS

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Expedition to Egypt,	460
War against Corinth and Ægina. Athenian victories,	459
Building of the Long Walls,	458-6
Spartans defeat Athenians at Tanagra,	457
Athenian victory at Ænophyta : conquest of Bœotia,	456
Conquest of Ægina. Destruction of armament in Egypt,	455
Five years' truce with Sparta,	450
Death of Cimon,	449

Chief Names.—Pericles, Cimon, Myronides.

AFTER the ostracism of Cimon and the overthrow of his policy of friendship with Sparta, Athens, under the guidance of Pericles, started on a career of self-aggrandizement and defiance of Sparta, and displayed a most astounding activity in every direction ; for a time it seemed as if nothing could stop her progress, and it even appeared possible that she might bring all Greece under her sway. But the task she had set herself was beyond her strength, and, as we shall see, she was soon obliged to content herself with more moderate aims.

In the East the fleet of the Confederacy of Delos had already been sent to **Egypt** to aid the king, Inaros, who had rebelled against the Persians (B.C. 460) ; it sailed up the Nile and besieged the Persian garrison in the citadel of Memphis, called the White Fort, not far from the modern

Cairo ; but here the expedition met with a stubborn resistance, and its fate will be narrated later.


In Greece an alliance was formed with the Dorian state of **Megara**, on the Isthmus of Corinth, which was induced to join Athens by the ill treatment she suffered from her more powerful neighbour Corinth. Megara had a port, Nisæa, on the Saronic Gulf, only a mile distant (see map p. 250), in which the Athenians placed a permanent garrison ; they then built two **long walls** from it to Megara, so that having the command of the sea, they might be able to send help through Nisæa to Megara, and so protect it against the Corinthians ; and as Megara commanded the passes of Mount Gerania, they hoped to be able to prevent a Peloponnesian army from invading Athens across the Isthmus. This action of Athens caused great alarm and indignation in the Peloponnese. Sparta was still occupied with the Helot revolt, but **Corinth declared war**, and was joined by Athens's old enemy **Ægina**.

After some preliminary fighting on sea and land, a decisive sea fight took place : the naval tactics which the Athenians had learnt in their long campaigns against the Persians proved so effective that the Corinthians and Æginetans were totally defeated, with a loss of seventy ships, B.C. 459, and from this time forward the **Athenian fleet** was regarded in Greece as invincible.

The Athenians now landed a large force in Ægina, and began to besiege the city ; to raise the siege of Ægina the Corinthians attacked Megara, thinking that with so many troops in Egypt the Athenians would have no force at home to oppose them, and therefore would have to recall the besieging army. But a force of 'old men and boys' (*i.e.* the citizens above and below the military age) was sent out under a general named Myronîdēs and repelled the invaders. The Corinthians on returning home were ridiculed by their fellow-citizens for being beaten by such a force,

and marched out again to retrieve their ill luck ; but this time they were totally defeated, and one division was caught in a walled enclosure and destroyed by the Athenian light troops.

But in spite of such temporary successes the position of Athens was obviously a dangerous one. Sooner or later she would have to face the full force of the Spartan confederacy. Her fortifications might save her from assault, but she was liable to be surrounded and cut off from her harbours, and so starved into surrender. The example of Megara suggested a remedy ; it was resolved to join Athens to her ports by similar long walls, one to the Peiræus and the other to Phalærum. As Athens was four and a half



THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS

miles from the sea, the work was a most stupendous one ; but, once accomplished, it would not only assure the safety of the city as long as the fleet held the command of the sea and could import food, but also afford a large space between the walls in which the country people could take refuge from hostile inroads. So the work was taken in hand, and carried out in two years (B.C. 458-6), and the walls were so strong that no enemy ever dared to attack

them. A second wall was afterwards built to the Peiræus ; since the two walls close together could be defended by one force, while the walls far apart would require two forces, and the Peiræus was far more important than Phalærum.

The Spartans, disappointed at the ill success of the Corinthians, felt that it was absolutely necessary for them to take some step to check the alarming growth of the Athenian power, although they were still occupied in the siege of Ithômê. With this object they determined to restore Athens's old enemy, Thebes, to its former position of head of Bœotia. Little more than twenty years had passed since Thebes had been deprived of that headship by Sparta in accordance with the general voice of Greece, as a punishment for its 'Medism'; but now the times were changed, the crimes of Thebes were permitted to be forgotten, in order that she might be made a thorn in the side of Athens. It happened at that time that there was war between the Bœotians and their neighbours the Phocians; and the Phocians had invaded the little country of Doris, the original home of the Spartans (see p. 33). So a force of 12,000 Peloponnesians was sent into Northern Greece on the pretext of driving the Phocians out of Doris (B.C. 457). This was accomplished without any difficulty, and then the expedition encamped in Bœotia, and carried out its real object; the various cities of Bœotia were compelled to submit to the headship of Thebes, the fortifications of Thebes were strengthened, and, it seems, oligarchical governments friendly to Sparta set up throughout the country. These proceedings caused great alarm at Athens, especially as it was rumoured that some of the nobles were in secret correspondence with the Spartan army, with the object of overthrowing the Democracy and stopping the building of the Long Walls. So, having obtained some reinforcements from Argos, and some Thessalian cavalry, the Athenians marched out and crossed the Bœotian frontier.

The Spartans were obliged to fight in order to secure their return march home over the Isthmus, and the battle took place at **Tanagra**. The ostracised Cimon, eager to disprove the charge of treachery made against his party, appeared on the field of battle, and requested leave to fight in the ranks of his tribe; and when this request was refused, his friends brought his armour into the battle, and fought so bravely that one hundred of them fell around it. Pericles also fought in the ranks of his tribe, and displayed conspicuous



BOEOTIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

bravery. The battle was hardly contested; but the desertion of the Thessalians gave the victory to the Spartans; so indecisive, however, was their success, without any attack on Athens or the still unfinished Long Walls, that they made their way home over the Isthmus, ravaging the lands of Megara as they passed. The spirit of the Athenians was raised rather than depressed by the battle of Tanagra; its first result was to heal the party strife; the ostracism of Cimon was revoked by a motion generously made by his

rival Pericles. It also put an end to any question of friendship with the Spartans, and justified Pericles's distrust of them. Sparta had shown her real policy by restoring the Thebans to their headship of Boeotia, and all Athenians saw now that Athens had henceforward only her own strength to depend on, and they determined to use that strength to the utmost. The first step must be the overthrow of this new Theban power.

Early therefore the next year (B.C. 456), they suddenly invaded Boeotia under Myronides, and totally defeated the Thebans in a hard battle near the village of CEnophytæ (B.C. 456). The work of the Spartans was undone, the Boeotian nobles were driven into exile, and democratic governments in alliance with Athens were set up. Thus Athens became more powerful than ever; and the Locrians and Phocians also joined her alliance. Sparta looked idly on at the ruin of her plans; the result of Tanagra did not seem to encourage her to attempt another expedition into Boeotia with the Athenians, now thoroughly hostile, holding the Isthmus at Megara.

The next year (B.C. 455), Ægina was starved into submission, surrendering its fleet and becoming a subject ally of Athens, and thenceforth disappears from Grecian history as an independent state. The Athenian fleet, which had been engaged in the blockade of Ægina, was sent round the Peloponnese under Tolmides, burning and ravaging the coasts. The same year saw the surrender of Ithômê, after a ten years' siege; many of the Messenians, full of bitter feelings against Sparta, were planted by Tolmides in Naupactus, an Ætolian port on the North Coast of the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf, which, from its position, became a most important naval station of Athens.

But in **Egypt a disaster** befell Athens, which would have stayed the energies of most states. It has been already described how a force was sent to that country B.C. 460

(see p. 142), and how its progress was stopped before the 'White Fort.' Artaxerxes then sent large forces to Egypt ; and Inaros and the Athenians were at length defeated, and driven on an island in the Nile ; here they maintained themselves for eighteen months, till the Persians diverted the water of that branch of the Nile, and stormed the island ; nearly all the Athenians perished ; Inaros was taken and crucified. To make matters worse, a fresh reinforcement of fifty Athenian triremes arriving soon after, ignorant of what had happened, was also attacked and destroyed. Thus Egypt again fell into the hands of the Persians ; and this was their only success during their wars against Greece.

In spite of this blow the Athenians continued their efforts to extend their power in Greece. Fresh expeditions were undertaken against the coasts of the Peloponnese, and an attempt was made to gain possession of Thessaly by sending a force to support the exiled prince of one of the states ; but the expedition was unsuccessful. Sparta still made no move ; and in B.C. 450, Cimon, who was probably anxious to retrieve the disaster in Egypt, succeeded in bringing about a truce for five years. The next year he was sent with a fleet of 200 triremes against Cyprus ; but, while besieging the town of Citium (the modern Larnaca), he was struck down by disease and died (B.C. 449).

His successor won two victories over the Persian fleet and army, and then returned home. These were the concluding battles of the Persian war, which had thus lasted just fifty years from the beginning of the Ionic revolt (500-449). According to one account, an Athenian statesman named Callias went to Susa, and arranged a peace (known in history as the peace of Callias) with the Great King, by which the Persians agreed to give up all claim to the islands of the *Ægean* and Greek coast cities, and to send no ships of war into the *Ægean* ; in return for which Athens

abandoned Egypt and Cyprus to Persia. Some historians, however, say that no such peace was ever really made, and that the account of it was invented by the Greeks of a later age ; however that may be, there is no doubt that the war ceased from this time, that Athens made no more attempts on Egypt and Cyprus, while Persia, as long as the power of Athens was secure, made no attempt to re-establish her power on the *Ægean* ; it was not till the Athenian Empire was in its death-throes that the Persians reappear again in the history of Greece, and then they will be found welcomed as allies by Sparta and her friends.

CHAPTER XVIII

ATHENS LOSES HER LAND EMPIRE : THIRTY YEARS' PEACE

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B. C.</i>
Battle of Coronea,	447
Revolt of Eubœa, Megara deserts Athens, . . .	446
Thirty years' Peace,	445
Ostracism of Thucydides,	443
Revolt of Samos,	410
Foundation of Amphipolis,	437

Chief Names.—Pericles, Tolmides, Pausanias, Thucydides
(son of Milesias).

Athens was now at the height of her power ; possessing an overwhelming fleet and connected with her ports by the famous Long Walls, she was herself absolutely secure ; for her fortifications were impregnable owing to the ignorance of the Greeks in the art of besieging, and she could always bring in supplies by sea. She was mistress of the Hellespont and the Ægean, where the Confederacy of Delos had, as has been seen, gradually been converted into an Athenian Empire. In Greece itself she possessed the large island of Eubœa, and by her alliances was supreme from the Isthmus of Corinth to the Pass of Thermopylæ, while in the Peloponnese she was in alliance with the great state of Argos. It seemed at the time almost possible that the whole of Greece might be united under her leadership ; and then how different its history would have been.

But splendid as was her position, it contained **two serious points of weakness**. In the first place she had incurred the undying hatred of Sparta and of the Boeotian nobles, now in exile ; slow as Sparta was to move, she had a terrible persistence when once she had really made up her mind. Secondly, Athens was offending against the Greek love of independence, which has been so often mentioned. Though her empire conferred great benefits on her subjects by freeing them and protecting them from the Persians, and her rule was probably on the whole just and beneficent, Athens made no effort to conceal the fact that her object in maintaining it was now the selfish one of self-aggrandizement ; she did not try to conciliate her subjects, and when they revolted crushed them according to the Greek custom with relentless ferocity. Thus they chafed at their bonds and were ready to revolt if an opportunity came ; Athens was beginning to be regarded as a tyrant state, and when her enemies attacked her they found it easy to say that they were fighting to free the Greeks from slavery to Athens.

It was not long before the storm burst, and it burst in Boeotia. The democratic governments set up there by Athens seem to have been very bad, and to have soon disgusted the inhabitants ; and in B.C. 447 the exiled nobles, feeling the time ripe for a revolution, suddenly entered the country aided by anti-Athenian exiles from Locris, Phocis, and Eubœa, and seized the towns of Orchomēnus and Chæronēa. The Athenians at first deemed the outbreak as of trivial importance ; instead of waiting till they had got together a sufficient force they hurriedly despatched Tolmides with 1000 men, many of them volunteers of high rank ; he recovered Chæronea but was surprised on his return march near the town of Coronea ; Tolmides himself fell and the whole of his force were either killed or captured.

This defeat caused the **downfall of the land empire of Athens**. There was nothing which a Greek state felt so keenly as the capture of any of its citizens by the enemy, especially if they were of high rank. Such, therefore, was the anxiety of the Athenians to recover these prisoners that they agreed to absolutely abandon Boeotia; the democratic governments were overthrown throughout the country, and Thebes became again the head of the Boeotian League, with feelings naturally more hostile to Athens than ever. Similar results followed in Locris and Phocis, where the Athenian alliance had been supported by the democratic governments, and those districts were also lost to Athens.

But this was not all. First Eubœa revolted; and Pericles with a large force, including 5000 hoplites, was sent across to reduce the island. Then Megara (for some unknown reason) abandoned the Athenian alliance; suddenly without any warning she opened her gates to the Corinthians, many of the Athenian garrison were slain, the rest fled to Nisœa. The Isthmus was now open to an invading army, and the five years' truce had expired; accordingly, the whole force of the Spartan confederacy under the young king Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, marched into Attica burning and ravaging. But they did not venture to advance further than the plain of Eleusis (see map, p. 112) and then retired. It is said that Pericles, who had been recalled from Eubœa, bribed the young king and his adviser; the Spartans seemed to have thought so, for they banished them both. After the retirement of the Spartans, Pericles set off again with his forces to Eubœa which soon submitted. The Athenians inflicted no severe punishment on the country except that some land was taken away and given to Athenian settlers.

Both sides were now ready for peace. The Peloponnesians were content with the success they had gained in destroying the land empire of Athens, and did not care to risk

what they had won by pressing her still further ; while the Athenians felt that the recovery of their land empire was beyond their strength, and that they must now devote all their resources to strengthening and maintaining their **naval empire**. So a **peace for thirty years** was concluded (B.C. 445), and Athens surrendered Nisæa and a few places she had taken on the coast of the Peloponnese. But a few years afterwards she revenged herself on Megara by closing her own harbours and those of the Confederacy of Delos to her, which nearly ruined her trade. The land empire of Athens had lasted about nine years from B.C. 456 (the battle of *Enophyta*) to B.C. 447 (the battle of *Coronea*).

Thus passed away the hope of an Athenian Empire, and with it all hope of Greek unity. But the struggle was not over yet ; the **Thirty Years' Peace** was only a truce, the hatred of the Peloponnesians against Athens still remained and would not be appeased till her power was utterly broken. Sooner or later the struggle would have to be fought out ; it needed only a spark to rekindle it.

We must now turn back to the home affairs of Athens ; after the death of Cimon the nobles found a new leader in **Thucydides, son of Milesias** ; this Thucydides must not be confused with the famous historian of the same name who will come into the history later. Though not a general like Cimon he was an able politician, and he so organised his party that they were able to present a strong front against Pericles, though not powerful enough to overthrow him. The chief subject of dispute between Pericles and Thucydides was no longer the relations of Athens and Sparta, which had been settled once for all, but the employment of the contributions of the Confederacy of Delos : Thucydides held that the money should only be used for the purpose for which it was levied, that is, the defence of Athens and the Confederacy ; but Pericles argued that Athens was providing sufficiently for the defence of the

Confederacy and was entitled to make what use she liked of what remained over. Accordingly, he used some of the money for the payments to the Heliasts, which have been mentioned; but a very large part he devoted to adorning Athens with the splendid temples and other buildings which made her the wonder of Greece, and the ruins of which to this day excite the admiration of the world. The rest of the money was laid by as a reserve fund for times of danger, which at one time amounted to 9000 talents (about £2,000,000); but, owing to the amount expended by Pericles on building, it only amounted to 6000 talents at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At last, B.C. 443, party feeling ran so high that an ostracism was demanded and Thucydides was banished; henceforward Pericles held undisputed sway at Athens, and we hear nothing more of the moderate party till after his death.

To extend the influence of Athens after the check inflicted on her on the mainland in the late war, and perhaps also to rid the city of his political opponents, Pericles turned his attention to colonisation. He planted Athenian settlers in many of the islands. He sent out some Athenian and Ionian settlers to Magna Græcia to refound the city of Sybaris, which had been destroyed in a war with its neighbour Croton seventy years before (see p. 52). The scattered remnants of the old inhabitants joined the new colonists, and a new city was founded near the site of the old one; disputes arose between the old and new citizens, in which the latter were victorious, and changed the name of the city to Thurii. In the year B.C. 437 another attempt was made to colonise Nine Roads on the River Strymon in Thrace (see p. 133); this time the attempt was successful, and a town was founded to which the name *Amphipolis* was given. *Amphipolis* was a most important post; for lying in a bend of the Strymon between Lake Cercine and the

sea it commanded the coast road from Macedonia to Thrace, which crossed the river here by a bridge, and also the valuable gold mine of Mount Pangæus. But very few of the colonists of Amphipolis were Athenians, so we shall see that in after time Athens was unable to retain possession of it. We shall find Amphipolis a source of great trouble and disappointment to Athens.

Three years before the founding of Amphipolis (B.C. 440) occurred another revolt in the Confederacy of Delos. *Samos*, one of the three islands still remaining independent, had a quarrel with Miletus about some territory. The Milesians sent an embassy to Athens which was supported in its complaint by emissaries from the democrats of Samos; for the government of Samos was at this time aristocratic, a striking proof of the liberality of Athens in its treatment of its subject allies. The Athenians now sent a fleet to Samos and overthrew the aristocrats, driving their leaders into exile and setting up a democratic government. But in a short time the aristocratic exiles collected forces from the neighbourhood with the assistance of the Persian satrap of Sardis, surprised the small Athenian garrison left in Samos, and seized the government again.

Thereupon the Athenians sent out Pericles with a fleet of sixty triremes, all they had ready, to reduce the island. Pericles defeated the Samian fleet consisting of seventy ships, fifty of them triremes; he then sailed off with the greater part of his fleet in search of a Phœnician fleet which was expected to be coming to the aid of Samos but never came. During his absence the Samians defeated the squadron left behind, and having for a time command of the sea sent an embassy to Sparta to implore aid against the tyranny of Athens. The Spartans and most of their allies thought this a good opportunity to attack their dreaded rival, but the Corinthians who had, as we have seen and shall see again, trouble with their own colony, Corcyra,

insisted on the principle that every state should be left to deal as it liked with its own subject allies. So help was refused to the Samians. Meanwhile Pericles had returned from his cruise, reinforcements kept arriving from Athens as they were fitted out, and also from Chios and Lesbos, till the blockading force numbered nearly 200 ships, and the Samians, in spite of a brave resistance, were compelled to surrender after a nine months' siege; they were, according to the usual practice of Athens, compelled to destroy their walls and give up their ships, and were reduced to the position of tribute-paying subjects; but the oligarchical government does not seem to have been overthrown.

Dates.

PERSIAN WARS AND ATHENIAN SUPREMACY.		B.C.
Ionic Revolt,		500
Battle of Lade,		496
First Persian invasion of Greece (attempted),		492
Second Invasion: Battle of Marathon,		490
Third Invasion: Battle of Thermopylæ and Salamis,		480
„ Battles of Platea and Mycale,		479
Capture of Byzantium. Treason of Pausanias,		478
Foundation of the Confederacy of Delos,		477
Battle of the Eurymedon, Revolt of Naxos,		466
Revolt of the Helots,		464
Ephialtes and Pericles overthrow the Areopagus. Athenian Expedition to Egypt,		460
Athens at war with Corinth and Ægina,		459
Building of the Long Walls of Athens,		458
Athens at war with Sparta. Battle of Tanagra,		457
Battle of Œenophyta: conquest of Bœotia by Athens,		456
Destruction of Athenian armament in Egypt,		455
Five Years' Truce between Athens and Sparta,		450
Battle of Coronea. The Athenians lose Bœotia,		447
Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta,		445
Revolt of Samos,		440
Foundation of Amphipolis,		437

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

The West.

The East.

Rome. Secession to the	Darius, King of Persia, 522-485
Sacred Mount, . . . 494	Xerxes, ,, 485-465
Carthaginian Invasion of	Artaxerxes, . . . 464-423
Sicily. Battle of Himera, 480	
Decemvirs at Rome, . . 450	

CHAPTER XIX

OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR : DEATH OF PERICLES

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, . . .	436
Alliance between Corcyra and Athens, . . .	433
Revolt of Potidæa from Athens	432
Outbreak of Peloponnesian War,	431
Plague at Athens : surrender of Potidæa, . . .	430
Death of Pericles,	429

Chief Names.—Pericles, Perdiccas, Archidamus, Brasidas.

It was not probable that the thirty years' truce would be permitted to run its full course. The jealousy of Sparta and the unfriendliness of Thebes were still smouldering : a single spark was sufficient to set them again in a blaze, and to kindle the flames of a war that raged with but slight intermission for twenty-eight years throughout Greece and ended in the utter overthrow of Athens. This war, known as the **Peloponnesian War**, was the greatest of all the fratricidal struggles in which the Greeks engaged ; almost every state in Greece was at one time or another drawn into it.

To find the cause of the war we must leave the Eastern Coast of Greece and the *Ægean Sea*, where most of the interest of our history has hitherto lain, and turn to the Western Coast of Northern Greece ; there lay the large island of **Corcyra** (*Κερκύρα* was its Greek name) the colony

of Corinth (see p. 53), famous for its powerful navy and its quarrels with its mother country. On the mainland was **Epidamnus**, a colony which, as has been mentioned, Corcyra had founded in conjunction with Corinth.

At this time Epidamnus was torn by civil strife; and the people, being besieged by the oligarchs in alliance with the neighbouring barbarians, appealed for help to Corcyra; the Corcyraeans rejected their appeal, whereupon they turned to the mother city, Corinth. The Corinthians were delighted with the opportunity of humbling Corcyra, and sent a small expedition to the help of Epidamnus; but the Corcyraeans indignant at this interference united with the



CORCYRA

oligarchs and natives in besieging the relieving force in Epidamnus; the Corinthians then prepared a large fleet of seventy-five triremes including contingents from their allies. The Corcyraeans tried to stop the despatch of the fleet by negotiations, but being unsuccessful they put to sea with eighty ships, and defeated it; the same day Epidamnus surrendered (B.C. 435).

The triumph of Corcyra was a bitter humiliation to the Corinthians, and revenge was now their only thought; by the end of the summer they had sufficient ships to keep the victorious fleet in check, and they spent the whole of the next year in building and fitting out an armament that would be irresistible. The Corcyraeans, now thoroughly alarmed, applied to Athens for help; a meeting of the

Ecclesia was held at which envoys from both sides spoke.

The Corinthians reminded the Athenians that a few years before they had prevented Sparta from helping Samos in its revolt against Athens, because they held that every state should be free to treat its subject allies as it liked. The Corcyreans pointed out that war between Athens and the Spartan Confederacy must come sooner or later, and that their fleet would be a great increase of strength to Athens. The Corinthians were undoubtedly in the right, but the Athenians by the advice of Pericles finally decided to make an **alliance with Corcyra** for defence only, not for offence (B.C. 433), and despatched a small squadron of ten ships with instructions to fight only to save the Corcyreans from destruction.

At length the Corinthian fleet put to sea 150 strong ; the Corcyreans met them with 110 ships, and after a confused and desperate engagement the Corinthians were victorious, and the Athenians were obliged to interfere to save the flying Corcyreans ; later in the day the Corinthians were about to renew the attack, but they desisted owing to the sudden appearance of twenty more Athenian ships (which they wrongly imagined to be the advanced guard of a large fleet), and next day, not venturing to fight against the more experienced Athenian sailors, they sailed away home (B.C. 432).

The Corinthians were naturally furious at this action of the Athenians, which seemed to them such gross ingratitude after their conduct at the time of the revolt of Samos. Henceforward they became the bitterest enemies of Athens, and sought for every opportunity of injuring her. The opportunity soon came. The Athenians were at this time engaged in war with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia ; and he began to stir up revolt among the subject towns of Athens on the Chalcidian peninsula. The most important of

these was **Potidæa** (see map, p. 93), a town in an extremely strong position on a narrow neck of land, and originally a colony of Corinth; so the Corinthians sent a force of 2000 men to its help, but the Athenian force in Thrace defeated the Corinthians and Potidæans and proceeded to blockade the city. Disappointed in this enterprise the Corinthians appealed to Sparta; after a long debate in their council, in which Archidāmus one of the kings spoke strongly for peace, the **Spartans decided on war**, and a meeting of the allies was called which ratified the decision.

Before actually declaring war the Spartans made an attempt to bring about the downfall of Pericles, who at this time chanced to be somewhat unpopular at Athens. The mother of Pericles was an Alcmaeonid, the family accursed nearly two hundred years before for the murder of Cylon (see p. 65); so the Spartans ordered the Athenians to rid themselves of the curse by banishing him, just as they had ordered them to banish Cleisthenes eighty years before (see p. 77). The only reply made by Athens was that Sparta should banish those accursed for the pollution of the temple of Athene by the death of Pausanias (see p. 130), and of the temple of Poseidon by the murder of the Helots (see p. 137). Then the Spartans sent an embassy with three demands: that Athens should restore their independence to Potidæa and Ægina, and rescind the decrees against Megara (see p. 153). Finally came another embassy with the Spartan ultimatum, that **Athens must restore independence to the Greeks**; this was practically a declaration of war, as Athens could not accept such terms, which meant the dissolution of the Confederacy of Delos. There was, however, a debate in the Ecclesia, and by the advice of Pericles the demand of Sparta was rejected.

War was now inevitable, the war which was to decide whether Athens or Sparta should be the head of Greece.

Most of the States of Greece were ranged on the one side or the other. Sparta was supported by Corinth and all the Peloponnesians except Argos and the Achæans, and north of the Isthmus by Megara, Thebes, the Phocians, Locrians, and Ambracia, a Corinthian colony in the south of Epirus. On the side of Athens was Corcyra and the Confederacy of Delos in which Chios and Lesbos were still free ; but the Confederacy was hardly a source of strength to Athens, being held together by fear rather than by love. On the mainland the allies of Athens were the Thessalians and the Acarnanians, whom Athens had lately assisted against their neighbours, the Ambracians ; and the town of Naupactus, with its garrison of Messenians, gave her a convenient port for her squadron which guarded the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth.

Sparta had an overwhelming land force against which it was hopeless for Athens to contend ; and Corinth and a few other states furnished ships. But **Athens possessed a fleet** not only greater in numbers, but also, as has been mentioned, vastly superior in naval tactics owing to the experience her sailors had won during the long war against Persia. Athens itself, thanks to Themistocles's fortifications, was impregnable ; and, being united to the sea by the 'Long Walls,' could always be supplied with food as long as her fleet was unconquered. Pericles's plan therefore was (1) to attempt no resistance on land outside the city walls, and not to waste the resources of the state on distant enterprises, but (2) to keep a firm hold on the sea and the empire which Athens now possessed, and (3) to attack the enemy's coasts at every point with the fleet, and, if possible, to seize some post on the Peloponnese and so raise a revolt among the Helots. The plan of the Spartans was to invade and ravage Attica with their army, and they thought that two or three years of this treatment would force the Athenians to submission. The struggle therefore would be

one of endurance ; but the prospect of seeing their homesteads and farms ravaged and burnt year after year was a terrible one to the Athenians, they began the war with great despondency, and it needed all Pericles's cheering eloquence to keep them to their purpose.

The war had not yet been formally declared when, in the spring of B.C. 431, the Thebans made a treacherous **attempt to surprise Plataea**, which still remained faithful to Athens. On a rainy night during a festival a force of 300 Theban hoplites were admitted into the town by the leaders of the oligarchical faction and seized the market-place ; there they waited expecting to be joined at daybreak by the main body from Thebes, and hoping that surprise would overawe the Plateans into submission. But the Plateans, after they had recovered from their first alarm, perceiving the small numbers of the Thebans, determined on resistance : by breaking passages through the walls of their houses, they communicated together and collected their forces without alarming the enemy, and at daybreak suddenly attacked them. The reinforcements, delayed by the river Asopus which was swollen by the rain, were not in sight ; and, after a steady resistance for some time, the Thebans were driven in flight from the market-place ; utterly lost amid the narrow crooked streets, and assailed with missiles from the houses, the survivors at length surrendered unconditionally, except a few who succeeded in escaping through the gate. Then the reinforcements arrived, and, hearing of the disaster, seized all the Plateans they could find outside the walls ; being upbraided by the herald of the Plateans for having thus flagrantly broken the peace, they agreed to give up the captives and retire on the understanding, according to the Theban account, that the Plateans also should release their prisoners. But as soon as the Thebans had retired the Plateans killed all the prisoners to the number of 180, for according to their account they had made no such

promise. When the Athenians heard of the slaughter of the prisoners they were much annoyed, for, as we have seen, there was nothing that made a Greek state so anxious for peace as the fact that some of its citizens were in the hands of the enemy. They could not hope to protect Plataea, but they withdrew all the population incapable of fighting to Athens and provisioned the town for a long siege.

A few weeks afterwards the Spartan king Archidamus invaded Attica with the whole force of the Peloponnesian Confederacy. Before he crossed the frontier he made one more effort in the cause of peace by sending a herald to Athens, but the Athenians would not receive him, and he returned to his camp exclaiming, 'This day will be the beginning of great woes to Greece.' Archidamus now set his army in motion: the Peloponnesian war had begun. After wasting several days in an unsuccessful attempt to storm the frontier fort of Cænōë, Archidamus advanced into Attica and began his work of destruction. It was now June and the corn was ripe in the fields; and the Peloponnesians felt sure that the Athenians would come out and fight in defence of their lands. But they were mistaken; the farms and country towns were deserted, the inhabitants were encamped in the wide space between the long walls, having taken everything portable with them and sent their cattle to Eubœa. It was however with ill-suppressed fury that they witnessed the destruction of their homes and crops, and when the devastating host reached Acharnæ, a flourishing country-town seven miles from Athens, and Acharnæ itself was seen to be in flames, the excitement became intense, especially among the Acharnian hoplites, and it was all Pericles could do to keep them within the walls. Pericles now delivered his counter-stroke: a fleet of a hundred ships was sent out, which, joined by fifty Corcyraean ships, harried the coasts of the Peloponnese and the Corinthian colonies up the western coast

of Epirus ; they attacked Methōnē, an ill-defended town in the south of Messenia, and would have taken it but for the prompt action of a Spartan named **Brasīdas**, of whom more will be heard later.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian army having exhausted its provisions returned home and was disbanded ; its stay in Attica had lasted about six weeks. The Athenians now marched out and in their turn mercilessly ravaged the territory of Megara, an operation which they repeated every year, reducing Megara to the greatest distress, which the Spartans made no effort to relieve. They also expelled the inhabitants of Ægīna, which was inconveniently near the Peiræus. Another measure adopted by the Athenians this year shows their determination to resist to the last. They laid aside a fund of a thousand talents (£200,000) and a fleet of a hundred of the best triremes, and passed a decree making it a capital offence to propose to use them except in the case of extreme danger.

In the second year of the war (B.C. 430) the usual invasion of the Peloponnesian army under Archidamus took place, followed by the harrying cruise of the Athenian fleet round the Peloponnese. But the year was specially marked by the outbreak of a terrible **Plague** at Athens, caused, or at least aggravated, by the over-crowded state of the city filled with refugees from the country ; for two years the scourge raged and then after an interval broke out again for a year ; in all it swept away at least one-fifth of the entire population. The appalling misery broke for a time the spirit of the Athenians, and they vented their rage on Pericles as the author of all their calamities ; he was accused by his political opponents for mismanagement and condemned to pay a fine ; but afterwards the people relented and re-elected him general. At the same time an unsuccessful attempt was made to obtain terms of peace from Sparta. Pericles himself lost his two sons and many relations by the plague :

a sad gloom was surrounding the closing days of this great man.

Determined to leave no stone unturned to compass the overthrow of Athens, the Spartans despatched some envoys to obtain the aid of the king of Persia. The envoys were forced to travel overland, the risk of being caught by the Athenian ships being too great; but while traversing Thrace they fell into the power of a Thracian prince, Sitalces, who, having lately become an ally of Athens, handed them over to her, and they were all put to death. This, the Athenians said, was in retaliation for the Spartan practice of putting to death the crews of all Athenian merchant ships captured by their privateers. Late in the year Potidæa surrendered after a close blockade of two years: the Athenian generals granted surprisingly favourable terms, considering length and expense of the siege; the inhabitants were allowed to depart with a small sum of money each, and one thousand Athenian colonists were sent to take their place.

The third year of the war (B.C. 429) was memorable for the death of Pericles; he died of weakness following an attack of the plague, from which he never completely recovered, aggravated probably by the troubles of the past year. His loss was an irreparable blow to Athens; for while he lived he forced his excitable and venturesome fellow-countrymen to keep to his policy of tiring out their enemies by dogged resistance, and not to fritter away their strength in distant enterprises. Freed from his restraint they gradually began to listen more and more to the grand projects of ambitious politicians, which in the end brought about their ruin.

CHAPTER XX

PELOPONNESIAN WAR—*continued*

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Siege of Plataea,	429-427
Naval victories of Phormio,	429
Revolt of Lesbos,	428
Surrender of Mitylene: conquest of Lesbos,	427

Chief Names.—Phormio, Cleon.

THE summer of the year that Pericles died, Archidamus, instead of ravaging Attica, advanced with his whole army against the little town of Plataea, which was held by only 400 of its citizens, with 80 Athenians and 110 women to cook for them. The Plateans reminded the Spartan king of the oath sworn by the Greeks after the battle of Plataea (see p. 121), but he replied that he had only come to 'free' the Plateans from their bondage to the Athenians. After much negotiation, and a message from the Athenians that they would never desert Plataea, the Plateans resolved on resistance, though it is difficult to understand what help they could have expected. Thus began the famous **siege of Plataea**: all attempts to take the city by storm having failed, in spite of overwhelming numbers, Archidamus was forced to blockade it; he built a double line of walls round it, in which were the quarters for the troops; and leaving part of his force there with the Boeotians, returned home with the rest.

Meanwhile an important campaign was fought in the north-

west of Greece, which exhibited, in the most striking manner, the wonderful naval superiority of the Athenians. By request of the Ambracians, backed up by the Corinthians, a force of 1000 Peloponnesians was sent across to join in an attack on Acarnania and compel it to give up the Athenian alliance ; a fleet of forty-seven ships was to co-operate. The only Athenian force in the neighbourhood was a squadron of twenty triremes under **Phormio**, stationed at Naupactus. The Acarnanians themselves repulsed the invasion, owing



MOUTH OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF

to the over-confidence of some barbarian auxiliaries accompanying it. After the failure of the land force the fleet appeared on the scene : Phormio, in spite of his inferior

numbers, attacked it; the superiority of the Athenians at sea at this period consisted in the rapidity with which they could manœuvre their ships. At Salamis the two fleets simply charged prow to prow; now the Athenian tactics were to pass through the enemies' line, and turning rapidly ram the opposing trireme on its unprotected side or stern; this manœuvre was called the 'diekplus.' On this occasion the Corinthian admiral in command having a number of store-ships with him formed his ships into a circle, prows outward, close enough together to prevent the diekplus. Phormio rowed round and round the circle in single file. The Peloponnesians found it hard to maintain order in such a formation, especially as the wind began to rise; the strange manœuvre of Phormio perplexed them; and when the confusion was at its height, at a signal from Phormio, the Athenian ships suddenly turned their prows and charged. There was little resistance; many ships were sunk, and twelve were taken with their crews.

The Spartans were most indignant at the news of this defeat, which they could not comprehend. They reinforced the fleet till it numbered seventy-seven triremes, and put a Spartan in command. The Athenians also reinforced Phormio with twenty ships, but this squadron on its way made an unsuccessful attack on Crete, and therefore did not reach him in time, and he was left with his twenty ships against seventy-seven. For seven days the two fleets watched one another on opposite sides of the coast outside the gulf. The Peloponnesians then sailed into the gulf in a column four deep, as if about to attack Naupactus. Phormio also was therefore obliged to sail into the gulf along the northern shore to save Naupactus. Suddenly the Peloponnesian fleet changed its course and bore down on him, hoping to cut him off from Naupactus and drive him ashore. In this they were only partially successful, for the eleven leading ships were too quick and slipped by;

but the nine others were driven ashore. While most of the Peloponnesian ships were endeavouring to secure these nine, which were stoutly defended by Messenian hoplites, twenty ships sailed after the eleven Athenian which fled to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians, confident of victory, followed in disorder and became separated in the pursuit. Suddenly affairs took an unexpected turn; the eleventh Athenian trireme, seeing a merchantman moored outside the harbour, rapidly rowed round it, and then unexpectedly charged and disabled the Peloponnesian trireme leading the pursuit. At this the other ten Athenian triremes came out of the harbour and renewed the battle; the Peloponnesians, taken by surprise and in disorder, could make no resistance, they were beaten in detail, and the whole fleet was soon in retreat; and Phormio recovered the nine ships that had been previously lost. After this startling exhibition of Athenian prowess the Peloponnesians gave up their attack on Acarnania and left the Athenians in undisputed mastery of the sea.

When the defeated fleet reached Corinth, the Megarians, observing the unguarded state of the Peiræus, persuaded the commanders, one of whom was Brasidas, to make a sudden attack on it. The crews were marched over the Isthmus, and embarked on forty old Megarian triremes. But at the last moment they shrank from the enterprise, and attacked instead the island of Salamis, capturing three guard-ships, ravaging the land, and getting off with their booty in safety before the Athenians could come to the rescue. There was great indignation at Athens, and henceforth the Peiræus was properly guarded. The same autumn Sitalces, the Thracian prince (see p. 166), invaded Macedonia with a huge host that caused great alarm in Greece, but the expedition seems to have been too late in the year, and accomplished nothing. Perdicas induced Sitalces to make peace, and the danger passed away.

In the fourth year of the war (B.C. 428) the Spartans renewed the invasion of Attica in spite of the blockade of Plataea, which still continued. But the year was marked by the revolt of the powerful island of Lesbos, the capital of which was Mytilenē. Lesbos had always been treated with great respect by Athens, and, like Samos, permitted to retain its oligarchical government. The oligarchs had even before the outbreak of the war been intending to revolt, and had only been deterred by the refusal of Sparta to break the Thirty Years' Truce by sending them aid. Now, however, they thought that Athens was so exhausted by the war and the plague that the time was ripe for their project. News of the impending revolt reached Athens from time to time, but it was not believed, and nothing was done, for in fact the Athenians were greatly exhausted, and their reserve of 6000 talents was all spent except the special fund. At last such positive news came, that the fleet of forty ships about to start for the usual cruise round the Peloponnese was sent against Lesbos instead. The commander hoped to surprise Mytilene during a festival, but he failed, and then allowed himself to be drawn into negotiations, of which the Mytilenean oligarchs took advantage to send to Sparta to ask for aid. It was now July, the time of the Olympic Festival, and the envoys were sent to it by the Spartans to make their appeal to the whole body of the Peloponnesians; and it was resolved to aid the Lesbians by a general attack on Athens, the usual invasion having already taken place. But the Athenians, with incredible exertions, manned a fresh fleet of 100 ships, which so intimidated the Peloponnesians that they gave up the projected invasion, and prepared a fleet to raise the siege of Mytilene. Fighting had begun again there, but the Athenian force was not strong enough to effect anything decisive; so in the autumn reinforcements were sent under

a commander named Pachēs, and Mytilene was closely blockaded by land and sea.

The fifth year of the war (B.C. 427) saw the end of two sieges, Mytilene and Plataea. By the beginning of the year, Mytilene was in great distress, and the oligarchs were already talking of surrender, when a Spartan envoy named Salæthus arrived in the city, having evaded the watchfulness of the besiegers. He put new life into the besieged by declaring that the relieving fleet was at hand; but days passed by, no fleet appeared; at last Salæthus advised the oligarchs to arm the whole people, and make a general sally. But when the people got their arms, they showed on which side their sympathies were, by demanding that peace should be made, and the oligarchs, utterly helpless, were obliged to surrender. Seven days after the surrender, the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas arrived, but finding it was too late hastily retreated.

Pachēs, having chased the Spartan fleet out of the *Ægean*, and reduced the rest of Lesbos, sent off to Athens Salæthus, who was discovered in hiding, and a thousand of the most guilty of the oligarchical party. Salæthus was put to death, and a meeting of the Ecclesia was held at Athens to decide on the punishment of Mytilene. The leader of the democratical party was now a man named Cleon. He had made himself prominent by attacking Pericles in his later years; he is described by the historian Thucydides as a vulgar, incompetent bully, whose only weapon was abuse of his opponents; but Thucydides was perhaps influenced in his judgment by personal feelings, as will be seen later, and painted his character in too black colours. Cleon now proposed and carried the horrible decree that all the men of Mytilene, oligarchs and democrats alike, should be put to death, the women and children sold into slavery; and a trireme was sent off to Pachēs with orders to this effect. But many of the Athenians repented,

and saw how wrong and impolitic it was to punish alike the rebellious nobles and the democrats who had surrendered the city. A second meeting of the Ecclesia was called on the next day, and in spite of the strenuous opposition of Cleon, the decree was rescinded by a small majority, and it was determined that only the guilty prisoners sent by Paches should be put to death. A second trireme was sent with these counter orders, and by incredible exertions arrived only just in time to prevent the original decree from being carried out. The fortifications of Mytilene were destroyed, her fleet confiscated, and the land of Lesbos parcelled out among Athenian settlers, to whom the Lesbians paid an annual rent.

In Platea by the beginning of this year the continuous blockade had produced great distress, for the Athenians, as might have been expected, had been unable to give any help. It was determined to make an attempt to escape over the besiegers' lines; but so desperate did the enterprise seem that only half the garrison had sufficient courage to make the attempt. Choosing a moonless, rainy, and windy night, the devoted band of Plateans and Athenians, two hundred and twenty strong, stole out and by means of ladders climbed the inside wall before the alarm was given; even then the besiegers in the darkness and confusion did not know at what point the danger was, and all the fugitives except one made good their escape. The remainder held out till the summer, and then surrendered on the promise of a fair trial; but they were all put to death by the Spartans, who only asked them one question: 'Have you during the war done any service to the Lacedæmonians or their allies?' Platea was razed to the ground and its surviving citizens made citizens of Athens. But this is not the last we shall hear of the unfortunate little city.

CHAPTER XXI

PELOPONNESIAN WAR (*continued*): PEACE OF NICIAS

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
The Athenians seize Pylus,	425
Battle of Delium. Brasidas takes Amphipolis, .	424
Battle of Amphipolis,	422
Peace of Nicias,	421

Chief Names.—Demosthenes, Brasidas, Cleon, Nicias.

THE sixth year of the war (B.C. 426) there was no invasion of Attica; for there were several earthquakes which so alarmed the Spartans that they dismissed the army which had already assembled. Athens was, however, visited with a renewal of the plague, which broke out for the last time, and continued for a year.

The chief fighting of the year was in the region of Acarnania (see p. 168). The Athenian commander at Naupactus was now **Demosthēnes**, an able and energetic soldier. He had a scheme for conquering the semi-barbarian Ætoliens, next the Phocians and Locrians, and then finally attacking Boeotia from the East. But the Ætolian mountaineers were stronger, and their country more difficult, than he expected, and he was compelled to retreat with heavy loss to Naupactus; but he soon retrieved his reputation by helping the Acarnanians to win a brilliant victory over the Ambraciots, who had again attacked them, aided by a Peloponnesian force; the fighting men of Ambracia were almost exterminated. Thus, though his great scheme failed,

Demosthenes was able to return to Athens with the spoils of victory. The Acarnanians and Ambraciots, tired of fighting, made peace on the condition of both remaining neutral in the war; and the Spartans were obliged to give up all attempts in that quarter of Greece.

The Peloponnesian invasion next year (B.C. 425), the seventh year of the war, only lasted fifteen days; for the army was suddenly recalled by the news that the Athenians had landed on the Messenian coast and established a fortified port at **Pylus**. This was the work of Demosthenes, and had come about in the following way:—There was at this time war in Sicily between the Ionian colonies and the Dorian colonies, headed by Syracuse. The Athenians, contrary to the policy of Pericles, were beginning to interfere on behalf of their kinsmen; and this year despatched a fleet of forty ships under Eurymedon to their aid. Eury-

medon was also to land at Corcyra, where a savage political conflict was raging: the democrats by the aid of the Athenians, had overcome the nobles and ruthlessly massacred them; but a remnant had seized a mountain stronghold, and were causing great distress in the city by their ravages. Demosthenes, who now had no actual command, was permitted to accompany him and do what damage he



PYLUS AND SPHACTERIA

could on the voyage round the Peloponnese. His intention was, in accordance with Pericles's policy, to build a fort at Pylus and plant there a Messenian garrison who would

harass the Spartans and encourage their Helot fellow-countrymen to revolt. Pylus was a rocky point forming the northern end of a bay, now the famous harbour of Navarino ; across the mouth of the bay lay a wooded and rocky island, Sphacteria, leaving two entrances to the harbour, which must have been much narrower than they are now.

Eurymedon, anxious to accomplish his voyage, would not agree to Demosthenes's proposal ; but the fleet was driven into the Bay of Pylus by stress of weather and detained there some days ; and so the fort was built and Eurymedon left Demosthenes there with five triremes. The Spartans in alarm recalled the army from Attica ; the fleet also came under Alcidas, and a determined attack was made on the fort by land and sea in order to take it before the Athenians could send any reinforcements. Demosthenes had just time to send off two ships to Eurymedon ; but so well had he chosen his position that his little force (two or three hundred hoplites and half-armed sailors) were able to repulse every attack ; for the landing-place was so narrow that only four or five triremes could attack at once. Brasidas was in the Spartan fleet and greatly distinguished himself, but he was wounded, and, fainting from loss of blood, left his shield as a trophy to the Athenians. Meanwhile, to prevent a relieving fleet entering the harbour, they determined to block up the two channels with ships, and they also put a force of hoplites on Sphacteria to prevent a landing there. Unfortunately, however, the blocking up of the channels was not carried out ; and in a few days the fleet of Eurymedon returned, sailed into the bay unopposed, and easily defeated the fleet of Alcidas. Thus by the carelessness of the Spartans, not only was Pylus relieved, but their own hoplites, 420 in number, the majority Spartans of the highest families, were hopelessly cut off on Sphacteria. The loss of so many citizens would be a great blow to

Sparta, for the number of true Spartans was very small (see p. 41); so they at once made a truce with the Athenians on the condition of temporarily handing over their defeated fleet to them. Ambassadors were now sent to Athens to propose peace on the condition that each side should retain what they had at the beginning of the war. But Cleon demanded that the possessions given up by Athens at the Thirty Years' Truce should be restored to her; and the Athenians, flushed with their unexpected success, supported him. The Spartan envoys could not accept such monstrous terms and left Athens.

The war began again. But Eurymedon refused to restore the Spartan ships, his excuse being some trifling attack on the fort during the truce; the Spartans protested, but to no purpose. The Athenians now tried to starve out the Spartans on the island; but while they themselves were in difficulties for provisions and water owing to the Spartan army on the mainland, the besieged hoplites were fairly well supplied. The large rewards offered by the Ephors induced the mariners of the neighbouring coast to run the blockade on dark stormy nights, often deliberately wrecking their ships in order to land the cargoes; while swimmers towed bags of provisions across the bay by night.

At Athens the impatience was great. The summer was passing away; the fleet would not be able to stay much longer on such an exposed anchorage; and the news of the surrender of the Spartans still did not come. Cleon virulently attacked the absent generals in the Ecclesia, and at last exclaimed that they ought to have boldly attacked the Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria, adding that he would have done so if he had been in command. At once his political opponents caught up his words and proposed that he should go: taken aback, he replied that he was not one of the generals, but Nicias, leader of the moderate party, offered to surrender him his command, and Cleon finally accepted,

saying that he would bring back the Spartans prisoners in twenty days or perish in the attempt. He only took with him a few reinforcements, chiefly light-armed troops.

On arriving at Pylus he found that the woods which had been a great protection to the Spartans had been accidentally burnt; he at once ordered an attack and left it to Demosthenes to carry out. A landing was effected, the Spartans were driven back by the light troops to the extremity of the island, where they were at last surrounded, and the survivors 292 in number, 120 being Spartans of high rank, were compelled to surrender. Thus Cleon performed his rash promise, and Demosthenes lost the credit of the greatest success won by Athens during the war. The blow to the prestige of the Spartans throughout Greece by the surrender of her hoplites was enormous. They made repeated efforts to recover the prisoners, for they dared not invade Attica, while the lives of so many of their citizens were at the mercy of the Athenians (see p. 152); but the Athenian demands were too great. The Athenians now established at Pylus a permanent garrison of Messenians brought from Naupactus. Eurymedon proceeded with his fleet to Corcyra. The nobles in their stronghold surrendered to him, but he handed them over to the democrats, and they were all killed to the number of 300 with the most cold-blooded cruelty. This was the end of the civil dissensions of Corcyra, the ferocity of which shocked even the Greeks, accustomed as they were to such scenes. Eurymedon sailed on to Sicily, but, before he could accomplish anything, the Sicilian Greeks made peace among themselves.

The next year (B.C. 424) found the Athenians full of confidence and high hopes. They began by inflicting a fresh blow on Sparta; Nicias took the island of Cythëra, which lay off the most vulnerable part of Laconia and was a convenient starting-point for raiding cruises. He

next destroyed Thyrea on the coast of Laconia itself, where the expelled Æginetans were settled, and the unhappy Æginetans were all put to death. The Spartans were kept in the greatest anxiety from these constant raids of the Athenians, while the occupation of Pylus caused such fear of a Helot revolt that the Ephors now resolved to **get rid of all the leading Helots**. They treacherously offered freedom to all those who considered their services in the war entitled them to it; about two thousand came forward and received their freedom, and were crowned with garlands; but subsequently they all mysteriously disappeared, slain by the secret police (see p. 43).

The Athenians relieved from the annual invasion, and feeling that the tide of success was now flowing in their favour, began to entertain hopes of **recovering their old land empire** which they had lost after the defeat of Coronea (see p. 152). Their first attempt was made on Megara. That unhappy city had suffered intensely not only from the invasions of the Athenians, but also from a body of aristocratic exiles; and a conspiracy was formed among some of the democrats to hand over the city to Athens. Demosthenes was sent to co-operate, and the conspirators admitted him within the Long Walls; but they were prevented from opening the gates of the city. Demosthenes blockaded the Peloponnesian garrison who had fled into the port of Nisæa and compelled it to surrender. He hoped now to be able to take the city itself, but was prevented by the arrival of Brasidas. That brave soldier the only able general produced by Sparta during the early period of the war, was collecting a small force to march to Thrace at the invitation of Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and strike a blow at Athens by inducing her subjects in Chalcidice to revolt. Happening to be at the Isthmus at this critical moment, he marched against Nisæa reinforced by troops from Boeotia, and offered battle to the Athenians, which they did not venture to accept.

Brasidas soon afterwards went away to resume his preparations, and a revolution took place at Megara; the exiles were recalled and an oligarchy established; many of the democrats fled to Athens, of those that remained a hundred leading men were put to death.

Thus the first attempt of the Athenians to regain their land empire resulted only in partial success, the capture of Nisæa; their second attempt was more ambitious, no less than the **subjugation of Bœotia**, but it met with complete failure. The scheme was a combined attack on Bœotia from two sides at once; Demosthenes was to start from his old post Naupactus with Acarnanian reinforcements, and land in the south of Bœotia, while Hippocrâtes invaded it from Attica with the main Athenian army; the invasion was to be assisted by a rising of the democratic party, many of whom were in exile. But the plot was betrayed to the Thebans, and a mistake was made about the day; so Demosthenes, landing before Hippocrates had started, found the Thebans ready to receive him and retreated by sea; and Hippocrates when he at length crossed the frontier found no one to co-operate with him. He, however, fortified a Bœotian temple, called Delium, strongly situated on the Eubœan strait, and was just beginning to return to Attica when the whole Bœotian army approached. The **Battle of Delium** which now took place was the first great land fight that was fought during the war. The hoplites on the two sides were about equal, 7000 strong, but the Thebans were superior in cavalry, the Athenians in light infantry. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up as usual, eight deep, so were the Bœotians, but the Thebans themselves were in a column twenty-five deep, the front ranks of which were composed of a body of picked men called the Sacred Band.


When the two armies closed in the charge the Athenian right was victorious over the Bœotians, while the heavy Theban column forced back their left; but some Theban

cavalry suddenly charged their victorious right and turned its victory into defeat, and their whole line gave way and fled in all directions, hotly followed by the cavalry till night put an end to the pursuit. Hippocrates and one thousand hoplites were slain. Seventeen days after the battle the temple of Delium was taken by the Thebans.

But this blow, terrible as it was, was not the only one that the Athenians were destined to suffer. Late in the year came the news that the important Thracian colony of **Amphipolis** (see p. 154) was in the hands of **Brasidas**. Brasidas had accomplished his overland march in safety and reached Thrace with a little army of 1700 hoplites, many of whom were Helots. He proclaimed himself as come to free the Greek cities from their slavery to Athens, and his frank bearing and persuasive eloquence, very rare in a Spartan, won him many adherents, while in most of the towns there was an oligarchical faction ready to join him. Having won over one or two smaller towns he advanced against Amphipolis. The approach of Brasidas was a surprise; **Thucydides**, the historian, who commanded the Athenian squadron in the Thracian waters, was at the time away at the island of Thasos. Brasidas seized the bridge with little resistance during a snowstorm and captured all the citizens he found outside the walls. Great was the commotion in the city: the Athenian party sent off at once to Thucydides, but Brasidas offered such easy terms, allowing any one who liked to depart with all their possessions, that when Thucydides arrived he found Amphipolis in the hands of Brasidas and had to content himself with saving Eion. For his neglect of duty Thucydides, on his return to Athens, was banished, probably on the motion of Cleon.

Thus the next year (the ninth year of the war), B.C. 423, did not find the Athenians in such a state of confidence as the preceding year. And when ambassadors come from the

Spartans, who were still anxious to recover their prisoners, they agreed to a truce for one year, during which terms of peace could be arranged. In Thrace two more cities revolted, but an expedition sent under Nicias recovered one. No terms of peace were arranged, and in B.C. 422 (the tenth year of the war) the truce came to an end. But both sides were so weary, and the Athenians so disinclined for offensive action after their defeat at Delium, that no fighting took place in Greece itself. But Nicias had done so little in Thrace that a fresh expedition was sent under Cleon, whose success at Pylus had inspired him with a thirst for military distinction. He recaptured one town, Toronē, which had revolted, and then sailed for Amphipolis and landed at Eion, where he lay several days waiting for reinforcements from Thrace and Perdiccas, who had quarrelled with Brasidas, and was now on the Athenian side. But, owing to the impatience of his soldiers, he marched out to reconnoitre, before the arrival



AMPHIPOLIS

Cleon, seeing the city practically defenceless, allowed his men to get out of hand and approach near the walls. Presently Brasidas was seen to cross the river, and then news was brought that the feet of a large force of men and

of the reinforcements. Brasidas was encamped on the high ground west of the river, for the bridge was now connected with the city wall by a stockade, so that he was in no danger of being cut off from the city.

horses could be seen under the gates. Still unwilling to fight before his reinforcements arrived, Cleon gave the order to retreat, thinking that if Brasidas came out to attack him with his full force he would have time to form line of battle. But Brasidas adopted other tactics. He suddenly sallied forth at the head of 150 men against the Athenian column which was marching in some disorder, and routed the centre by his unexpected onset; at this the left fled panic-stricken down the road to Eion, while another division attacked the Athenian right which was still on the high ground. Cleon himself who was with it fled, but **was overtaken and slain**: his men, who had had time to form, resisted bravely till attacked in flank and rear by cavalry and light troops, when they, too, fled. Of the force with which Cleon marched out of Eion, only half, about 600, got back in safety, and the armament at once sailed back to Athens. The loss of the enemy was only seven, but it included **Brasidas himself, who fell in the moment of victory**. The people of Amphipolis showed the greatest honour to Brasidas, they buried his body within the city, and henceforward regarded him as their 'Oekist' or founder. Amphipolis never again came into the possession of the Athenians.

The Athenians were thoroughly disheartened by these continual reverses. Cleon and Brasidas, the chief advocates of the war, were dead. The result was that early next year (B.C. 421), the eleventh year of the war, a Peace for Fifty Years was concluded between Sparta and Athens, commonly known as the **Peace of Nicias**, he being the chief negotiator on the Athenian side. The main terms of the treaty were a mutual exchange of prisoners and places taken; thus the Spartans recovered the prisoners taken at Pylus; the Athenians were to give up Pylus and Cythera in return for Amphipolis. Thus, after a terrible expenditure of blood and treasure, the

Peloponnesian war seemed about to end in the contending parties being exactly in the position in which they began the war. But such a peace could be no real ending ; the quarrel was one that had to be fought out to the bitter end ; how the war was renewed will be described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXII

AFTER THE PEACE OF NICIAS. THE ARGIVE LEAGUE

<i>Dates.</i>	B. C.
Alliance between Athens and Argos,	420
Battle of Mantinea,	418
The Athenians seize Melos,	416

Chief Names.—Alcibiades, Nicias.

DIFFICULTIES very soon began to arise with regard to the Peace. The Corinthians and Thebans were dissatisfied with the conditions, and refused to subscribe to it, but they refrained from hostilities. Amphipolis was not restored to the Athenians, owing to the refusal of its inhabitants; whereupon the Athenians refused to give up Pylus. It happened also that this year a Thirty Years' Truce between Sparta and Argos expired, which added additional uncertainty to the prospect, and Sparta in alarm made a separate alliance with Athens. The result was that some of the dissatisfied states invited Argos to put itself at the head of a league against Sparta; the Corinthians took the leading part, but, when they found the Bœotians would not join, they returned to their allegiance to Sparta. Elis and Mantinea (a state in Arcadia) joined Argos, and hostilities soon began against Sparta, but with no decisive result.

It was unfortunate for Athens that at this critical state of affairs the leader of the democrats, now that Cleon was dead, was a still more dangerous politician named

Alcibiades. Young, handsome, wealthy, of noble birth, and brilliant ability, but of an utterly reckless, depraved, and vicious character, such a man was calculated to dazzle the light-headed democracy of Athens and to lead it into dangerous paths diametrically opposed to the policy so strongly urged by Pericles (see p. 162) whose generation was now passing away. The chief opponent of Alcibiades was Nicias, leader of the moderate party, a respectable general who had obtained a reputation for success in some not very important operations, a man of unblemished character and deep religious feeling whose virtues gained him more respect than his abilities.

Alcibiades warmly espoused the cause of Argos, his policy being to create a powerful confederacy against Sparta under the united leadership of Athens and Argos. In B.C. 420 the Argives sent ambassadors to Athens to ask for her alliance, and the Spartans at the same time sent ambassadors to settle the points in the treaty about Pylus and Amphipolis which were still unsettled. But Alcibiades deceived the Spartan ambassadors by a trick, and persuaded the Athenians to join the Argive alliance.

The relations of the various states were at this time in a strange confusion. Athens had made an alliance with Sparta and also with Argos the enemy of Sparta; while Corinth, though an ally of Sparta, had never agreed to the Peace, and had also for a time been in alliance with Argos.

The Olympic Games of this year were the first at which Athens had been permitted to attend since the beginning of the war; and there was much curiosity among the Greeks to see what sort of a display the Athenian deputation would make; for it was thought that Athens must be exhausted by the long years of war. But the Athenian representative was Alcibiades, and he with his great wealth was able to make a most magnificent display, and so impress the Greeks with the sense of the inexhaustible resources of

Athens. Alcibiades entered three chariots for the chariot-race and won the first, second, and fourth prize. Sparta, on the other hand, was excluded from the games by the Eleans, who presided, for an alleged act of war during the truce, a striking proof how low she had now fallen in the eyes of the Greeks.

In B.C. 419 fighting began in the Peloponnese, but it was for some time indecisive; the Athenians as yet sent no troops to the assistance of their allies, though Alcibiades was in the Peloponnese busily engaged in consolidating the League. Next year (B.C. 418) Agis might have destroyed the Argive army, but allowed himself to be led into negotiations and concluded a short truce; the Athenians now sent a thousand hoplites and four hundred cavalry to the assistance of the Argives; and after the conclusion of the truce the forces of the two confederacies met on the plain of *Mantineia*. On the Argive right the Mantineans and a picked force of Argive nobles called the 'Thousand' routed the Spartan left wing, but then pursued them too far; meanwhile the Spartan centre had utterly routed the Argive centre, and then fallen on the flank of the Athenians who were on the Argive left: the Athenians were only saved from destruction by the appearance of the Mantineans and Argive Thousand, against whom Agis now advanced, but seeing the rest of the army defeated they made no attempt to fight, and retreated into *Mantineia*. Thus the Spartans were completely victorious: the Argive league from which Alcibiades had hoped so much was ruined in a single day, while the prestige of Sparta, which had fallen owing to her failure to achieve any great success during the war, and the disaster of Pylus, was now completely re-established.

Feeling themselves unable to meet the Spartans in the field the Argives now began to build 'Long Walls' to the sea, five miles distant, in which they were aided by the Athenians. But Agis came with an army and destroyed

the walls before they were finished. Argos being thus sufficiently weakened and humbled, Sparta made no further attempt to conquer her. And for the next few years Greece remained in a condition half-way between peace and war.

In spite of the failure of his schemes in the Peloponnese, Alcibiades still retained great influence over the Athenians, who were in a restless state, eager to strike some great blow, but unable to make up their minds where to strike it. Their right policy would have been to reconquer Amphipolis and the Chalcidian states, but that does not seem to have been sufficient for the ambitious mind of Alcibiades. A small force was indeed to have been sent under Nicias to attack Amphipolis with the help of Perdiccas (B.C. 417), but the fickle Perdiccas proved faithless and the expedition was given up.

In the summer of B.C. 416 they sent a force to compel the island of **Melos** to join the Confederacy of Delos. Melos was an utterly unimportant island among the Cyclādes; it was the nearest of them to the Peloponnese and was inhabited by Lacedæmonian colonists, for which reason probably it had never joined the League. All the Melians asked was to be allowed to remain neutral; the Athenians refused, starved the island into surrender, and then put all the fighting men to death, and sold the rest of the inhabitants into slavery. This brutal and utterly unprovoked act of aggression is said to have been the work of Alcibiades. It was not only a crime but a blunder; for the miserable fate of the Melians caused a great sensation throughout the whole of Greece, and made the enemies of Athens still more determined to effect the overthrow of the 'tyrant state.'

CHAPTER XXIII

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST SYRACUSE

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Sailing of the Expedition against Syracuse. Mutilation of the Hermæ,	415
Siege of Syracuse,	414

Chief Names.—Alcibiades, Nicias, Lamachus, Hermocrates, Gylippus.

THE punishment of Athens for her treatment of Melos was not long delayed. The very next year, again by the advice of their evil genius Alcibiades, the Athenians engaged in the fatal **expedition against Syracuse** which was the cause of their downfall. It will be remembered how in the early years of the Peloponnesian war the Athenians had sent a squadron to Sicily to aid the Ionian cities in their war against the Dorians, and how the Sicilians had made peace among themselves. Now again war broke out between the native city of Egesta and the Dorian Selinus, both in the west of Sicily, and the people of Egesta sent to Athens to implore aid, telling them that there was a danger that the Dorians under Syracuse would conquer the whole island, and promising them plenty of money in support of the expedition. Thereupon the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sicily to report on the statements of the Egestæans. The ambassadors returned in the spring of B.C. 415, bringing back a glowing account of their wealth; and it was

proposed to send an expedition of sixty ships to Sicily under Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, a good soldier but a man of no influence. Alcibiades strongly urged the expedition, for he had visions of the glory he should win by founding an Athenian empire in Sicily. Nicias naturally was utterly opposed to it, and pointed out how dangerous it was to make such a distant expedition against Sicily, while Sparta and her allies were still hostile, only waiting for an opportunity to renew the war against Athens, and Amphipolis and the Chalcidian cities were still unsubdued. Finding all his arguments in vain, Nicias tried to check the ardour of the Athenians by saying that the armament was not strong enough. But he was asked what force he would consider enough: unable to avoid the question he replied a hundred ships, five thousand hoplites, and everything else in proportion. Whereupon the Athenians voted what he asked for, and the whole state threw itself enthusiastically into the work of preparation.

When the expedition was almost ready to start, one of the most mysterious events in Greek history occurred. There were at Athens in front of temples and public and private buildings busts of the god Hermes, which were regarded by the Athenians with the greatest reverence. One morning it was discovered that these Hermæ, all except one it is said, had been defaced beyond recognition. The authors and motive of this sacrilegious action have ever remained a mystery. Perhaps it was hoped to frighten the Athenians from the Sicilian expedition, or it may have been to ruin Alcibiades by throwing suspicion on him, for Alcibiades was notorious for his daring impiety. In the excited state of public feeling the **Mutilation of the Hermæ** naturally threw the city into a fever, for it could only have been effected by a very numerous conspiracy. It was determined to discover the perpetrators of the outrage, and the air was full of suspicion. No information could be discovered about the

Hermæ, but a charge was brought against Alcibiades of holding a mock celebration of the Sacred Mysteries of Eleusis (see p. 20), and his enemies attacked him in the Ecclesia; he demanded to be put on trial at once, and not to be sent to Sicily with so grave a charge hanging over his head, but his request was refused.

At last the day of departure arrived. The troops marched down to the Peiræus at daybreak, accompanied by the entire population, many to bid farewell to friends and relations, others from curiosity to see the greatest and most splendid armament that had ever started on so distant a campaign. Prayer was offered to the gods, in which all present joined, libations were poured in gold and silver goblets from every trireme, and the Pæan, or song of victory, was sung; then the signal to start was given, the triremes racing with one another as far as Ægina. Corcyra was the first halting-place; there the contingents of the allies and the provision ships joined. The whole armament now numbered a hundred and thirty four triremes, of which a hundred were Athenian; five thousand hoplites, of which two thousand were Athenians and five hundred Argives, with light troops; in addition there were the provision ships, which were very numerous, and many private traders who hoped to make profit out of the expedition.

Three fast triremes were sent ahead to announce at Egesta the approach of the expedition, and to obtain the promised money from them. Then the whole expedition crossed from Corcyra to Italy and coasted along Magna Græcia; at once the Athenians began to meet with disappointment, not a city would join them. Rhegium was the first town to allow them even to buy provisions and encamp outside its walls; but Rhegium refused to do more than remain neutral. Here they waited for the report of the three triremes, which soon arrived and brought a second disappointment. It turned out that the ambassadors originally sent to Egesta

had been deceived by a trick, and that all the money that could be obtained from Egesta was thirty talents.

Under these new circumstances the three generals deliberated as to their course of action. Nicias was for simply making a display of the power of Athens, if possible forcing Selinus to come to terms with Egesta, and then returning home. Lamachus advised that a sudden attack should be made on Syracuse while it was unprepared. Alcibiades proposed to wait and negotiate with the Sicilian Greeks and native Sicels in order to obtain a base of operations before proceeding to attack Syracuse. This plan, which was the worst of the three, was adopted, Lamachus voting for it when he found that his own plan, which would probably have succeeded, met with no support.

The adoption of Alcibiades's plan probably saved Syracuse; for though rumours had from time to time arrived of the intentions of Athens, they had been scouted by the Syracusans as utterly absurd, in spite of the earnest warnings of one of their leading men named **Hermocrātes**, the Syracusan hero of the war. When therefore news came that the armament was actually in Italy, Syracuse was wholly unprepared and open to attack. Finding, however, that they were not attacked, the Syracusans set about collecting forces and preparing for defence.

Part of the Athenian armament now crossed the strait of Messina from Rhegium and made a demonstration before Syracuse; Naxos joined them, as also did Catāna, after the Athenian hoplites had accidentally obtained entrance within the walls. Catāna, about twenty miles north of Syracuse, now became the headquarters of the whole armament, and one or two fruitless expeditions were made thence.


Meanwhile, after the fleet had sailed from Athens, the excitement about the mutilation of the *Hermæ* broke out afresh, for the people began to connect the outrage with an oligarchical conspiracy. Informers came forward in

numbers, and many citizens were thrown into prison on suspicion, and some were put to death. The enemies of Alcibiades took advantage of this state of things to press their charges against him, and the government trireme, the *Salaminia*, was sent to Catana to order him to return home and be tried on the charge of profaning the Mysteries, there being still no evidence to connect him with the mutilation of the *Hermæ*. Alcibiades obeyed the order; but in the course of the voyage home he succeeded in escaping, and eventually fled to Sparta, burning with a desire for revenge on his native country.

Nicias and Lamachus left alone in command made various attempts to win over more cities, but without success; then in the autumn, after enticing the Syracusan army to Catana on the pretence that the Catanæans would betray the Athenian army to them, they landed in the Bay or Great Harbour of Syracuse. A land battle was fought in which the Athenians were victorious, but, being unable to complete their victory from want of cavalry, they sailed away, and, after an unsuccessful attempt to win over Messânâ, wintered at Naxos. The Syracusans spent the winter in strengthening the fortifications of their city.

Syracuse is situated on a rounded promontory bordered by low but steep cliffs. From this promontory a table-land about two miles broad called *Epipolæ* extends inland, rising with a gentle slope and gradually narrowing to a point where it joins the mountains of the interior about three miles from the sea. South of this promontory is the Bay or Great Harbour of Syracuse, a semi-circular bay more than two miles across at its broadest part, and less than a mile across at its entrance. Syracuse consisted of two towns: the Inner or Old Town on *Ortygia*, originally an island, but now connected with the mainland, and the Outer or New Town on the mainland. *Ortygia* and the Outer City were separately fortified, but there was about a mile of open

ground between them. Between Ortygia and the mainland on the seaward side was the Smaller Harbour, the real harbour of the Syracusans, where their fleet and docks were.



- A A New Syracusan City-wall.
- B B } Syracusan Cross-walls, taken by the Athenians.
- C C }
- D D Gylippus's Cross-walls.
- E Labdalum.
- F The Athenian 'Circle.'
- G G The Athenian Lines (completed).
- H H " " (uncompleted).
- I Station of the Athenian Fleet } during the latter part of the
- J Athenian Camp } siege.

The Syracusans, by the advice of Hermocrates, built a new wall from the Great Harbour across Epipolæ to the outer sea, thus uniting Ortygia and the Outer City, as well as the hitherto unfortified suburbs, in one fortification; this

wall made the task of surrounding the city much more difficult than it would have been if the Athenians had followed Lamachus's advice and attacked during the preceding summer.

Hermocrates also sent ambassadors to Greece to ask for help, who reached Sparta just at the same time as Alcibiades. Alcibiades advised the Spartans (1) to send a force to Syracuse as soon as possible, or at least to send a single Spartan to take command; and (2) also to renew their attacks on Attica; but, instead of sending an army every summer for a few weeks, to fortify Decelæa (see map, p. 146), a hill fourteen miles from Athens, and keep a permanent garrison there, which would annoy the Athenians just as Pylus had annoyed the Spartans; and (3) to make the naval allies of Athens revolt. The Spartans did not as yet renew the war with Athens; but they determined to send a Spartan named Gylippus to the aid of Syracuse, and forces as soon as possible.

With the spring of B.C. 414 the siege of Syracuse began. The Athenians landed a mile to the north of Syracuse, and so were able to seize the upper slopes of Epipolæ, of which they knew the importance; the Syracusans, who were expecting them to land on the other side in the Great Harbour, attempted to dislodge them, but were driven into the city with considerable loss. The Athenians now built a fort called Labdålum near the summit of Epipolæ, and then marching down towards the city, began a large round fort, called the 'Circle,' in front of the Syracusan wall, which was intended to be the centre of their besieging lines. The Syracusans felt so conscious of their inferiority that they did not dare to interrupt the work; but they built a cross wall from their own wall to the edge of Epipolæ, crossing the intended line of the Athenian fortification south of the Circle. The Athenians took no notice of the Syracusan cross-wall until they had completed the Circle; they then

surprised and took it. The defenders fled into Syracuse, and in pursuing them some of the Athenians actually penetrated through the gate into the city, but were driven out again.

The Athenians now built their lines from the circle to the south edge of Epipolæ, and the Syracusans built a new cross-wall across the low marshy ground south of Epipolæ to the river Anāpus, which flows into the Great Harbour; this would prevent the Athenian lines from being continued down to the shore of the Great Harbour. Lamachus, however, skilfully brought his men across the marsh, and surprised the cross-wall; but in the fighting that followed, the Athenians, attempting to cut off some of the defenders, were thrown into confusion. Lamachus by his vigour restored the fortunes of the day, but was himself killed. The Athenian fleet now sailed round from the original landing-place into the Great Harbour, and threatened the rear of the Syracusans, who retreated into the city, and made no further attempts to hinder the Athenian works; and the Athenians proceeded to build their lines from the shore of the Great Harbour to the cliff of Epipolæ. The Syracusans now were in the greatest despair; they would soon be wholly blockaded, and no help had come from Sparta. Accordingly, they began to make overtures of peace to Nicias; but nothing definite was settled. Nicias was convinced that Syracuse would soon surrender; but he was unfortunately suffering from a painful internal disease, and his very confidence made him inactive in prosecuting the siege. The result was that though the lines from the Circle to the Great Harbour were finished, those on the north of the Circle were left unfinished, though the stone and wood was in position ready for the work to be completed.

Meanwhile Gylippus was on the west coast of Greece at the island of Leucas preparing forces. He was kept informed of the progress of the siege, but felt little hope that

he could be in time. Soon news came that Syracuse was wholly blockaded, and Gylippus, despairing of being able to enter Syracuse, sailed to Italy with only four ships to try to preserve the cities of Magna Græcia. While there, however, he heard that the Athenian walls north of the Circle were still uncompleted ; whereupon, evading the Athenian look-out squadron, he passed through the straits of Messina, and landed at Himera, where he began to collect troops for the relief of Syracuse. At the same time a Corinthian trireme reached Syracuse with the news that Gylippus was on his way ; and the Syracusans thought no more about surrender. Nicias must also have known of the proceedings of Gylippus ; but he took absolutely no steps against him. Soon **Gylippus** appeared over the summit of Epipolæ at the head of about 3000 men, composed of the crews of his ships Himereans and native Sicels, and **marched in** through the unfinished part of the Athenian lines without the slightest opposition from Nicias. From this moment fortune entirely changed ; so great was the effect of the arrival of a single Spartan.

CHAPTER XXIV

RUIN OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST SYRACUSE (B.C. 413)

Chief Names.—Nicias, Demosthenes, Gylippus.

GYLIPPUS's first act was to surprise and capture the Athenian fort of Labdålum ; he then began to build a cross-wall to the north of the Circle, using the stones and timber collected there by the Athenians. Two battles were now fought : in the first the Athenians were victorious, but in the second, which Gylippus took care should be fought on more open ground, the Syracusan cavalry broke the Athenian left wing, and the whole army was routed. This was the first defeat on land sustained by the Athenians, and put an end to any possibility of success. Gylippus now carried the cross-wall right past the Athenian lines, then built another wall from it to the summit of Epipolæ. Having thus rendered **Syracuse safe from being blockaded**, and advised the Syracusans, who had been reinforced by twelve Corinthian ships, to get their fleet ready to attack the Athenians by sea, he left Syracuse to collect reinforcements from different parts of Sicily. Meanwhile Nicias, having lost the command of Epipolæ, had built a fort on Plemmyrium, the headland south of the Great Harbour, and removed thither all his stores from the Circle ; he also sent a despatch home entreating the Athenians to recall him, or else to send out a second expedition as large as the first ; for instead of besieging Syracuse he himself was now

practically besieged, his numbers were reduced, his ships were rotten, and he himself was suffering from illness. Thus the year which had opened so brightly for the Athenians ended in gloom and failure. This despatch from Nicias was a bitter disappointment to the Athenians ; but they would not give up the struggle, in spite of the fact that their relations with Sparta were growing worse, and the war was on the point of breaking out again. They sent off Eurymedon at once with ten triremes and money, with the news that Demosthenes would be despatched with the required force in the spring.

Early next year (B.C. 413), while Demosthenes was engaged in preparing his expedition, reinforcements of 1500 hoplites were despatched from Thebes, Corinth, and the Peloponnese, and landed safely in Syracuse. Meantime Gylippus, having returned with his Sicilian reinforcements, renewed his attacks on the Athenians ; having beaten their army last year, his object was now to **beat their fleet**, and then they would be at his mercy. Accordingly the Syracusans came out of their harbours with eighty ships, the Athenians put out against them with sixty, and after an obstinate engagement the Syracusans were defeated, losing eleven ships to the Athenians' three ; but, during the fight, Gylippus surprised and **took Plemmyrium** with all the money and stores kept there. This was a severe blow to the Athenians ; besides the loss of the stores, their fleet had to take up a new station near their camp in the recess of the Great Harbour, while the Syracusans now held both sides of the mouth and interfered with the bringing in of supplies. The Syracusans though defeated were encouraged by the result, as they had made a better fight than they had expected. They built fresh ships and by the advice of the Corinthians, who had themselves adopted this plan with success, made the bows of their triremes of extra strength and thickness. Although they knew that

Demosthenes was at hand with his fresh fleet, the Athenians, for the honour of their navy, did not decline battle. Their available ships were seventy-five against eighty. On the first day there was only indecisive skirmishing, for the Athenians would not charge the heavy Syracusan ships prow to prow, and they had not room to perform their ordinary tactics properly, as the fighting was now inside the Great Harbour. After an interval of a day the Syracusans again appeared and similar skirmishing took place; about mid-day the Syracusans retired, and the Athenians, thinking that the fighting was over for the day, disembarked and set about getting their dinners. Suddenly the Syracusans, who by previous arrangement had had a meal ready prepared for them, reappeared; the Athenians scrambled on board, most of them still dinnerless, and, impatient to make an end of the fighting, boldly charged the enemy. The Syracusan tactics were successful; seven Athenian triremes were destroyed and many others terribly damaged. Thus the Syracusans established their superiority by sea as well as by land.

But almost immediately the fleet of Demosthenes, with colours flying and trumpets sounding, sailed majestically into the Great Harbour. He brought seventy-three triremes, 5000 hoplites, and a large number of light troops, to the utter dismay of the Syracusans who imagined Athens to be too much occupied at home to be able to despatch so large a force. The Athenians were now superior again by land and sea; but Demosthenes, after a review of the situation, perceived that the only chance of success was to take the Syracusan wall on Epipolæ; if that failed there was nothing for it but to abandon the siege and return home. So he at once attacked the wall with battering-rams and other means, but to no purpose; every attempt failed.

He then determined to attack it from the rear by means

of a night march round its western extremity, which rested on a steep cliff near the summit of Epipolæ. This device was at first successful. Demosthenes found himself in rear of the wall without his march having been discovered by the enemy, and took the first of four forts which had been built by Gylippus to protect the wall. But, in pursuing the retreating Syracusans, the Athenians fell into disorder, and the foremost of them were met and defeated by the Boeotian contingent which was advancing in serried ranks to the support of the Syracusans. The Syracusans now rallied, while the defeated Athenians, falling back on the main body in the darkness, made the disorder worse. Soon all was confusion, owing to the difficulty of distinguishing friends and foes ; the triumphant shouts of the Syracusans seemed everywhere, for the Dorian Argives in the Athenian army had the same war-cry as the Dorian Syracusans ; the confusion became panic, and the whole army fled in utter rout back to the camp ; but many perished leaping down the cliffs, or lost their way in the hills, and were cut to pieces next day by the Syracusan cavalry.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon now advised instant departure, but Nicias would not consent, so afraid was he of returning to Athens unsuccessful. But after some time, Gylippus, who had been absent since the night attack collecting more reinforcements, returned with a considerable force ; Nicias now gave way and everything was ready for the retreat when a total eclipse of the moon occurred (August 27, B.C. 413), and the soothsayers declared that the departure must be postponed for a month, and the superstitious Nicias insisted upon obeying their directions.

The Syracusans, who had discovered the intentions of the Athenians, determined to frustrate them. With seventy-six ships they attacked the Athenians, who put out with eighty-six and defeated them with the loss of eighteen ships, Eurymedon being slain. The Athenians were now in a

desperate strait, for they could not retreat even by sea ; and Gylippus blocked up the entrance of the Great Harbour by mooring merchantmen from Ortygia to Plemmyrium.

As a last chance the Athenians launched every ship that could possibly be considered seaworthy, a hundred and ten in number, and put on board all the troops they could in order to try to force their way out. The Syracusans could muster only eighty vessels to oppose them, but they were in a better condition. The Athenians reached the barrier, and were trying to break it when they were assailed on all sides by the Syracusans ; a long and desperate struggle followed, the Athenians fighting with the courage of despair, the Syracusans with the confidence of victory. There was no room for the manœuvring, in which the Athenians were so superior ; whenever two triremes came in collision the soldiers on board fought as if they were on land.

The shore of the Great Harbour was thronged with spectators who watched with terrible interest the fight on which their fate hung, cheering when they saw one of their ships successful, and uttering loud lamentations when they saw one worsted. But after many hours' heroic effort the Athenians were no nearer victory ; at last they began to waver, the Syracusans pressed on with renewed vigour, and groans and wailings rose from the land army as the whole fleet was seen retreating with all haste to the shore. In this terrible conflict the Athenians lost fifty triremes, the Syracusans thirty. Demosthenes wished to make a second attempt to break out at daybreak, for in numbers the Athenians were still superior, but the sailors refused to fight again.

All hope of escaping by sea was now gone ; it only remained to retreat by land into the interior which was inhabited by the native Sicels. It was intended to start that very night ; if that had been done they might

have escaped, for the Syracusans were celebrating their victory with feasting and merriment and were not thinking of preventing the retreat of the defeated enemy. But Hermocrates, knowing that Nicias had friends in Syracuse who often gave him intelligence, sent some men out who shouted to the Athenians that they had better not start that night, as the Syracusans had occupied all the roads. The trick deceived Nicias, and the retreat was postponed for two days ; but meanwhile the Syracusans had seized all the important points by which the Athenians might retreat, and their cavalry were everywhere. At last the retreat began. Including camp-followers, forty thousand men started, in two divisions, the front one under Nicias, the rear under Demosthenes. All the sick and wounded who were unable to travel were left behind, and the scene of parting was heartrending.

The first day they forced their passage over a ford of the Anāpus, and marched about five miles inland harassed by the Syracusan cavalry and light troops. At daybreak they started again, but the Syracusans now knew their line of retreat, and occupied a strong position on the road by which they must pass. For two whole days the Athenians remain before this position, unable to force it ; the third night they started again, back towards the coast, so as to find some other road into the interior. At daybreak the Syracusans discovered that the Athenians had slipped away ; their cavalry started in hot pursuit, and caught up the division of Demosthenes, which for some reason had fallen six miles behind that of Nicias. Assailed on all sides, and at last driven into a walled enclosure from which escape was debarred, this *division*, now reduced to six thousand men, surrendered to Gylippus in the evening, on condition that their lives were spared.

The next day Gylippus came up with Nicias, and informing him of the fate of Demosthenes, summoned him to

surrender. But terms could not be agreed on, and Nicias pursued his march amid the usual attacks of cavalry. He attempted to escape from them by another night march, but this time the Syracusans discovered it. The hopeless retreat was continued the next day ; and the division came to a river called Asinárus, the opposite bank of which was steep and occupied by the enemy ; the Athenians utterly exhausted and overcome by a raging thirst rushed down into the water, trampling over one another in their eagerness to drink, while the Syracusans on the bank rained down their missiles upon the helpless struggling mass. Nicias, seeing further resistance was hopeless, **surrendered** to Gylippus, who as soon as possible put an end to the useless slaughter ; thus six days after the disastrous retreat began, the last miserable remnant of the force fell into the hands of the enemy.

Thus the **great Athenian expedition to Sicily**, which had started with such high hopes, **ended in utter ruin**, and the forebodings of Nicias were justified. But it was Nicias himself who was the cause of the ruin. A man of blameless character, but of moderate ability and incapacitated by illness, he was unfit for the sole command of so important a campaign, in which he was left by the unfortunate recall of Alcibiades and death of Lamachus ; his weakness and indecision ruined the splendid force intrusted him, and involved Athens's best general, Demosthenes, in the same fate.

Gylippus wished to take back Nicias and Demosthenes as prisoners to Sparta, but by a decree of the Syracusan assembly they were put to death, though, according to one account, he contrived to furnish them with the means of putting an end to their own lives.

A few, very few, of the Athenians escaped on the march, and reached Catana ; others were seized and sold as slaves throughout Sicily, many of whom from time to time

escaped and made their way back to Athens. But the great bulk of the prisoners, seven thousand in number, was placed in the stone quarries of Syracuse, whither the Syracusans used to come to gaze at them in triumph. Miserably fed, exposed to the heat of the sun by day and cold by night, with the air poisoned by the bodies of those who perished, they suffered untold torments. Their ultimate fate is uncertain. The Syracusans celebrated their triumph by an annual festival called *Asinaria*, from the name of the river where the last surrender took place.

Their saviour Gylippus returned to Sparta, but, strange to say, was never given another command against the Athenians. After the fall of Athens he was convicted of stealing some of the captured treasure which he was conveying to Sparta, and went into exile—a sad end for one of the ablest Spartans.

CHAPTER XXV

RENEWAL OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR : THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
The Spartans seize Decelea,	413
Revolt of Chios: alliance between the Spartans and Tissaphernes,	412
Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens, .	411

Chief Names.—Astyochus, Tissaphernes, Alcibiades, Peisander,
Theramenes, Thrasylbulus.

IN the spring of B.C. 413 the war began again in Greece, eight years after the conclusion of the peace of Nicias. The Spartans, according to the advice of Alcibiades, seized the hill of Decelea and fortified it; they held it during the rest of the war, for which reason these years are often called the Decelean War. The occupation of this post caused great annoyance to Athens; it cut off the direct road to Eubœa; slaves deserted to it in great numbers, and the most fertile part of the country was always exposed to its ravages.

In the summer a despatch had reached Athens announcing the defeat of the night attack on Epipolæ; after that came no more news, till one day in the autumn, a barber of the Peiræus came up to the city and announced that he had heard from a stranger of the total destruction

of the armament. His story was disbelieved and he was put to the torture, but gradually fugitives from Sicily began to arrive and the terrible news was confirmed.

After an outburst of rage against the politicians and soothsayers, who had urged the fatal expedition, the Athenians turned their thoughts to the future, and began to consider measures of defence. They had lost a hundred and fifty triremes, and all their best sailors in Sicily; and the Spartans would now try to make their subjects in the Delian Confederacy revolt (see p. 195), and so gain command of the sea. If they did so, Athens must be starved into surrender. Thus the character of the war now changed; it was fought at sea in the Hellespont, and on the Asiatic coast; the Athenians were now fighting for their very existence, and made no more expeditions against the Peloponnesians as at the beginning of the war. Her enemies thought that her last hour had now come, but in spite of her present weakness, and in spite of the garrison of Decelea which kept Athens almost in the condition of a besieged city, the Athenians had still plenty of resistance in them, and the end only came at last through treachery.

During the winter envoys came to Sparta from Eubœa, Chios, the only state of the Confederacy of Delos still free, and Lesbos asking for aid to revolt. Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, and Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespont, also sent envoys offering their aid in money in overthrowing their hated enemy, Athens, and this aid the Spartans were not ashamed to accept.

Accordingly, in the spring of B.C. 412, the Spartans despatched a squadron of twenty-five ships to Chios; but the Athenians were aware of their proceedings, and sent thirty-seven ships after the Peloponnesian squadron, which drove it ashore and blockaded it. The Spartans were much discouraged at this unexpected display of strength by Athens; but Alcibiades prevailed on them to send out

the Admiral Chalcideus, accompanied by himself, with a squadron of five ships, which succeeded in evading the Athenians.

Only the oligarchical party at Chios was desirous of revolting; the government which was democratic was loyal to Athens, who had given them fifty years' peace and prosperity; but the arrival of the Peloponnesian triremes turned the scale and Chios revolted. Its revolt was followed by that of Miletus and a few other towns. Chalcideus now made a **treaty of alliance with Tissaphernes**, acknowledging the right of the king of Persia to all the Greek territory which his predecessors had ever possessed. Tissaphernes in return promised to provide pay for the Peloponnesian sailors. The news of the revolt of Chios, though expected, caused great excitement at Athens. It was at once resolved to use the **reserve fund of a thousand talents** (see p. 165); and incredible exertions were made to equip a fleet as soon as possible.

At the same time a **revolution** took place at Samos, where the people suddenly rose and drove out the oligarchical government, which apparently had been left in power by the Athenians after the revolt of Samos, thirty years before (see p. 156); the new democratic government declared its loyalty to Athens, and the Athenians in gratitude made Samos a free and equal ally instead of their subject. Samos became the headquarters of the Athenian fleet throughout the war.

The Chians next persuaded the Lesbians to revolt, undeterred by their terrible punishment on the previous occasion; but an Athenian squadron of twenty-five ships from Samos surprised Mitylene, and reconquered the island. The Athenians then proceeded against Chios; they defeated the Chians and ravaged their country, and soon reduced them to great straits. In the course of the summer the Athenians had greatly increased the number of their ships, and sent a

fleet of forty-eight, with three thousand five hundred hoplites, against Miletus. A battle took place on land in which the Ionians in each army were successful, for the Athenians beat the Peloponnesian troops at Miletus, and the Milesians beat the Argive allies of Athens; but the final victory remained with the Athenians, and Chalcideus was slain. By this time, however, the Spartans had equipped a fleet, and fifty-five ships under Astyöchus, including twenty Syracusan under Hermocrätes, came to the relief of Miletus.

Some of the Athenian generals wanted to fight, but one of them, Phrynichus, dissuaded them, pointing out that the risk was too great in the present weak state of Athens. So the Athenians returned to Samos, and the Peloponnesians remained at Miletus. In place of the disgraceful treaty concluded by Chalcideus, Astyöchus now made a new one in which nothing was said about the rights of the king of Persia to any Greek territory.

Astyochus made no attack on the Athenians at Samos, and allowed them to continue their devastation of Chios. Thus the year was passing away without any great success on either side; this was equivalent to a defeat to the Spartans, who had expected that Athens would at once succumb; and they vented their rage on Alcibiades, whom they considered responsible for the failure. Alcibiades had many private enemies at Sparta who encouraged the feeling against him, and a despatch was sent to Astyochus directing that he should be put to death. But Alcibiades being forewarned fled to Tissaphernes. His object now was to pave the way for his return to Athens by pretending to gain Tissaphernes over to the Athenians. He obtained considerable influence over Tissaphernes, and pointed out to him that it was to the interest of Persia that the Peloponnesians should not be too successful, but that both sides, Peloponnesians and Athenians, should wear themselves out,

and then both would be an easy prey to the Persians. Acting on this advice, Tissaphernes kept the Peloponnesian fleet inactive by lessening the pay of the men by a half, and promising that he would shortly bring up a Phœnician fleet, which would enable them to finish the war at one blow. The objections of Astyochus and the other officers were silenced by bribes ; Hermocrates the Syracusan alone refused to accept one.

About this time the Spartans, dissatisfied with Astyochus, sent commissioners to the fleet, who attempted to obtain from Tissaphernes a better treaty than the one signed by Astyochus ; but the terms could not be agreed on, and Tissaphernes broke with the Spartans altogether and gave them no money at all. Astyochus, however, obtained money for the present from the large island of Rhodes, where, as at Chios, the Peloponnesian fleet, invited by the oligarchs, frightened the people into revolt. Rhodes now became the station of the Peloponnesian fleet.

Alcibiades felt that the time was now ripe for him to carry out his project of procuring his return to Athens. He entered into communication with the wealthy men in the Athenian fleet at Samos, who at heart were oligarchs, and declared that, if recalled from exile, he could bring Tissaphernes over to the side of Athens ; but first it would be necessary to bring about a revolution at Athens and set up an oligarchy, since Tissaphernes would not treat with the democracy. The oligarchs eagerly entered into his plans, with the exception of the general Phrynichus, who, though an oligarch, distrusted Alcibiades. With great difficulty they won over the mass of soldiers to their side by pointing out that the only chance of carrying on the war lay in obtaining Persian gold ; and then despatched one of their number named Peisander to Athens. Peisander on his arrival at Athens set in motion the 'clubs,' secret societies of rich men, which were always hostile to the democracy, but had

been reduced to impotence since Pericles came into power. A meeting of the Ecclesia was held, and after much opposition it was decided to send Peisander with ten colleagues to treat with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; for Peisander declared that there was no other chance of resisting the Spartans.

But when Peisander and his colleagues reached Asia, Alcibiades, finding that he could not bring Tissaphernes really over to the side of the Athenians, made most extravagant demands in his name, which he knew they could not accept. The negotiations were broken off, and Tissaphernes again espoused the cause of the Spartans.

Peisander was furious at being thus duped by Alcibiades, but he was too far committed to the oligarchical conspiracy to draw back. On his return to Athens he found that the clubs had brought about a veritable reign of terror by secretly causing the assassination of many of the leading democrats; and that Phrynichus, who had been deposed from his command, had joined the conspiracy now that Alcibiades was not to be recalled. He accordingly assembled the Ecclesia at a temple a mile outside the city, where it was at the mercy of the conspirators, and forced it to vote the overthrow of the democracy and the establishment of an oligarchical **Council of Four Hundred**, who were to draw up a list of five thousand out of the citizens (about twenty thousand) to form the Ecclesia. **Thus democracy for a time came to an end at Athens, B.C. 411**, and the Four Hundred ruled supreme, for the list of the Five Thousand never appeared.

The first acts of the Four Hundred were to make overtures of peace to Agis at Decelea, and send envoys to the fleet at Samos announcing the change of constitution, but explaining that the Five Thousand would soon be summoned. Agis treated them with contempt, and marched against Athens, thinking in the present state of affairs it

would be open to attack ; but, being repulsed with loss, he allowed ambassadors to be sent to Sparta.

Meanwhile an attempt had been made by the Samian oligarchs, aided by the oligarchs in the Athenian fleet, to overthrow their own democracy ; but the rest of the Athenians took the part of the democrats, and defeated the oligarchs. Ignorant of the events at Athens, they despatched the government trireme *Parālus* thither with an envoy to bear the news. The Four Hundred seized it with its crew ; but the envoy escaped, and brought back to Samos such a tale of the tyranny of the Four Hundred that the Athenian **soldiers and sailors** met together in a solemn assembly, **declared that they and not Athens were now the true Athenian democracy** ; they expressed their determination to wage war on the Peloponnesians, and to have no dealings with the Four Hundred, and elected new generals, the chief of whom were *Thrasylbulus* and *Thrasyllus*.

The envoys of the Four Hundred therefore met with a bad reception at Samos ; the message they brought back was that the army had no objection to the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred must resign. The ambassadors to Sparta were still more unfortunate, for they were seized by the crew of the trireme conveying them, and handed over to the custody of Argos. Dissension also arose in their own ranks ; the more moderate of them, headed by *Theramenes*, one of the leaders of the clubs, demanded that a list of the Five Thousand should be made out, so that they might be summoned to meet in the *Ecclesia*. *Phrynichus* and *Antiphon* were now in great straits ; they went themselves with ten colleagues as ambassadors to Sparta ; but the Spartans would not make terms, apparently distrusting their position. Then they began to build a fort on the Mole at the mouth of the harbour of the *Peiræus*, as a defence they said against an attack from Samos ; but *Theramenes* said it was to introduce the Spartans into the

harbour. A Peloponnesian fleet was at this time fitting out for an expedition to Eubœa, which was preparing to revolt from Athens; and Theramenes declared it was intended against the Peiræus. There was great excitement at Athens; and Phrynichus, on his return from Sparta, was murdered in the market-place in broad daylight, and his assassin was never discovered; then the soldiers engaged on building the fort mutinied, and destroyed it. The Four Hundred were now thoroughly frightened, and offered to draw up the list of the Five Thousand; but before the terms were arranged, the Peloponnesian squadron, forty-two ships strong, was sighted off the island of Salamis. Thinking that they were making for the Peiræus, the whole available population rushed down to the harbour, and manned all the ships there. But the Peloponnesians, whatever their intentions really were, passed the Peiræus, and sailed round Cape Sunium towards Eubœa. The Athenians followed, joined the squadron stationed in the strait, which brought their numbers up to thirty-six, and then engaged the enemy: as might have been expected, they were totally defeated, losing twenty-two ships, and Eubœa revolted to Sparta.

The loss of Eubœa was a great blow to Athens. The loss of the ships was still greater, for the Peiræus was now defenceless; but for some reason the Peloponnesian admiral preferred to sail across the Ægean, and reinforce the main fleet under Astyochus. The danger of the State put an end to the party dissensions; the Four Hundred had lost all their authority, and an assembly held in the old meeting-place voted to depose the Four Hundred and put the government in the hands of the Five Thousand; but as the Five Thousand were to consist of every one who possessed arms, it does not seem to have been limited to that number: in fact within a short time the original democracy was restored. Peisander and some other leaders of the Four

Hundred took refuge with the garrison of Decelea. The only two survivors of the ambassadors to Sparta were tried and executed as traitors. Theramenes had saved himself by changing sides at the right moment. No other executions seem to have taken place, so that the Athenians acted with great moderation compared with other states, such as Coreyra. The usurpation of the Four Hundred lasted about four months, from March to June, B.C. 411; it was brought about by the selfish intriguing of Alcibiades, and might have proved the destruction of Athens if her enemies had been more enterprising.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (*continued*) NAVAL VICTORIES OF ATHENS

	<i>Dates.</i>	B. C.
Revolt of Byzantium. Battle of Cynossema,	411
Battle of Cyzicus,	410
Pylus retaken by Sparta,	409
Byzantium retaken by Alcibiades. He returns to Athens,	408

Chief Names.—Mindarus, Thrasybulus, Pharnabazus, Alcibiades.

DURING these events at Athens, Alcibiades himself had been recalled from exile by the army at Samos by the advice of the new generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, for he seemed the only man who could save Athens, and had been elected by the army one of the generals ; he now again promised to bring Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side.

In spite of the disunited state of the Athenians, Astyochus had been doing nothing. His inactivity caused the greatest indignation in the Peloponnesian fleet, and the men held a meeting in which they roundly abused him and Tissaphernes. He therefore sailed out against the Athenian fleet ; but the Athenians, having only 82 ships against 112, declined battle. Then the Athenians, being reinforced, sailed against Miletus ; but Astyochus in his turn declined battle. At length invitations came to the Peloponnesians from

Pharnabazus, the Satrap of the Hellespont, and from Byzantium, which was anxious to revolt from Athens. A squadron



was sent thither, of which ten ships only arrived, the rest being driven back by a storm; but they were sufficient to effect the revolt of Byzantium and Chalcedon,—a great blow to Athens, as they commanded

the west and east shores of the Bosphorus, through which the corn-ships from the Euxine came to Athens. Astyochus now was succeeded as admiral by Mindärus, a man of much greater energy, who, weary of Tissaphernes's duplicity, sailed off with the fleet to the Hellespont in order to cut off the corn supplies of the Athenians, and at the same time hoping to find Pharnabazus a more trustworthy ally.

Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, aware of the importance of the Hellespont, immediately followed, and attacked Mindarus between Sestus and Abydus near a promontory named *Cynossema* (Κυνός Σῆμα, the Dog's Tomb). The Athenian fleet, numbering seventy-six ships, was sailing along the north coast of the Hellespont in a single line towards Sestus, and the Peloponnesian eighty-six ships were also in a single line along the south coast. Mindarus

was victorious in the centre ; but the two Athenian wings, under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus respectively, were victorious on their side ; and eventually the Peloponnesians were driven back to Abydus with the loss of twenty ships. This was not a very great victory, but it was the first pitched battle won over the Peloponnesians since the renewal of the war, and caused great exultation at Athens. The Athenians now began to hope for a successful end of the war.

In spite of his defeat at Cynossema, Mindarus's change of the scene of operations from the satrapy of Tissaphernes to that of Pharnabazus proved a great success : Chios was relieved from the Athenian attacks ; Pharnabazus proved a firm ally : he regularly supplied the pay for the men, and brought a considerable land force to the aid of the fleet. The Athenians, on the other hand, suffered greatly from want of money, and often had to break up their fleet in order to make collections from the islands, which seriously interfered with their operations. However, their good fortune at sea still continued ; in the autumn of B.C. 411 they won a second victory over Mindarus at Abydus, capturing thirty ships, owing to the sudden arrival of Alcibiades from Samos in the middle of the battle with a squadron of eighteen ships. After this victory Alcibiades paid a visit to Tissaphernes, who had come to the Hellespont, and the Satrap, wishing to show his friendliness to the Peloponnesians, seized him and sent him prisoner to Sardis ; he soon however escaped and rejoined the fleet ; but he could no longer pretend that he could bring Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side.

The winter was spent by the Athenians in collecting money, and by Mindarus in repairing his losses. In the spring of B.C. 410, he set sail with about sixty ships and besieged the town of *Cyzicus*, on the south shore of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora), Pharnabazus co-operating with

his land-force. Alcibiades and Thrasybulus having got the Athenian fleet together again to the number of over eighty ships, surprised Mindarus on a misty day, cut his fleet off from the harbour and drove it ashore: Alcibiades then landed and defeated the land force of Pharnabazus and the Spartans combined. **Mindarus was killed**, and his whole fleet captured or sunk, except the Syracusan ships which Hermocrates caused to be burnt by their crews. Mindarus was a vigorous though unfortunate commander, and his loss was a great blow to the Spartans.

This splendid success of Alcibiades to some degree counterbalanced the injuries inflicted on Athens by him. The Athenian fleet had now again complete command of the sea, and had cleared the Hellespont of the Spartans. The condition of the latter may be judged from a despatch from Mindarus's successor which was intercepted by the Athenians: 'All is lost: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we know not what to do.' Pharnabazus came to the rescue with food and clothing; and also provided wood for new triremes, but it was more than a year before a fleet could be built.

The Spartans were so discouraged by this defeat that they sent the Ephor Endius with overtures for peace: the terms were that Decelea should be exchanged for Pylus, and the revolted cities should keep their freedom. But the Athenians refused to consent to such a peace; they would not give up Chios and Miletus, and probably they did not trust the sincerity of the Spartans. The first object of the Athenian generals was to recover the Bosphorus so as to secure a free passage for the corn-ships. They attacked Chalcedon first, which, assisted by Pharnabazus, proved too strong for them. However, they seized its port and fortified it, and thus obtained some command over the Bosphorus and were able to levy toll on ships passing through, as they had done from Byzantium before its revolt. The Spartan

king Agis, from his lofty post at Decelea now again beheld the corn-ships sailing into the Peiræus, and felt how useless it was for him to blockade the city as long as the corn was allowed to come in by sea.

The following year (B.C. 409) Alcibiades spent chiefly in raiding attacks on Pharnabazus. Thrasyllus was sent with fifty ships and a force of hoplites to the Ægean; but he only won over one unimportant town; he did not venture to attack Chios or Miletus, and near Ephesus he was badly beaten on land by Tissaphernes, after which he rejoined Alcibiades. This summer the Spartans attacked and captured Pylus, and so at last rid themselves of that thorn in their side. The Athenians sent a squadron of thirty ships to its relief, but the commander returned without even reaching it, owing to the stormy weather about Cape Malea.

Next year (B.C. 408) the Spartans still had no fleet ready. Alcibiades and the other generals now pressed the siege of Chalcedon, and completely blockaded the town. Pharnabazus attempted to relieve it but was repulsed. Utterly wearied out by the apparent fruitlessness of all his attempts to crush the Athenians, he now agreed to the capitulation of Chalcedon on favourable terms, and promised to escort some Athenian ambassadors to Susa to make peace with the king of Persia. The Athenians then attacked Byzantium: it was defended by a Spartan governor with troops from Greece; but after many months' blockade famine did its work, and the inhabitants, during the temporary absence of the governor, opened the gates to Alcibiades at the end of the autumn.

Having thus completely restored the Athenian supremacy on the Hellespont and Bosphorus and secured the corn supply, Alcibiades returned to Athens at the end of B.C. 408, after eight years' absence. His brilliant services during the last three years had caused his former misdeeds to be

forgotten : and though he is said to have been somewhat apprehensive of his welcome, and to have landed amid an escort of his personal friends, he was enthusiastically received, and his sentence of condemnation revoked. Such great expectations did the people feel of what he could accomplish that they made him sole commander of a fleet of a hundred triremes and fifteen hundred hoplites.

His first action was intended to impress the Athenians at home with a sense of his power. Owing to the Spartan occupation of Decelea, the annual procession to Eleusis to celebrate the Mysteries (see page 20), had been obliged to go by sea. Alcibiades now employed his force to escort it by land in accordance with the ancient custom, and the Spartans did not venture to molest it.

He then, in the spring of B.C. 407, sailed for the *Ægean* ; but on his arrival he found that a great change had come over the state of affairs.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FALL OF ATHENS.—END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

	<i>Dates.</i>	B. C.
Battle of Notium,	407
Battle of Arginusæ,	406
Battle of Ægospotami,	405
Surrender of Athens,	404

Chief Names.—Cyrus, Lysander, Conon, Callicratidas,
Thrasylbulus, Theramenes.

THE Athenian ambassadors when journeying with Pharnabazus to Susa in hopes of obtaining the aid of the king of Persia, fell in with his younger son **Cyrus** coming down to the coast to supersede Tissaphernes as Satrap of Lydia. Cyrus was a young man of eighteen, but brave, able, and ambitious; he was the favourite son of the Queen Parysätis, and regarded himself as his father's successor. His one object was to help the Peloponnesians by money and every means to crush Athens, and he at once ordered Pharnabazus to stop the Athenian ambassadors, and Pharnabazus was compelled to obey. At Sardis Cyrus had an interview with the new Spartan admiral, **Lysander**, and promised him that he would aid him to the utmost: the scene of the war was now transferred from the Hellespont to Cyrus's Satrapy, and Ephesus became the headquarters of the Spartans. Lysander was an able man who had won his way by his own ability from a humble position; but he was a selfish man, influenced more by personal ambition than duty to Sparta or Greece. He soon won the friendship of Cyrus, and thus made doubly sure of his firm

support. A new Peloponnesian fleet had by this time been built, and when Alcibiades reached Samos he found Lysander with ninety ships at Ephesus, with his men in receipt of regular pay, while the Athenians, disappointed of the expected aid from Persia, were as badly off for money as ever. Alcibiades tried to negotiate with Cyrus through Tissaphernes ; but Cyrus, fortified by his friendship for Lysander, rejected his advances.

Lysander, well aware of the difficulties of the Athenians, would not come out and fight ; so at last Alcibiades sailed off with a squadron to collect money, leaving his fleet in command of a favourite companion, Antiochus, who was pilot of his ship, but with strict orders not to fight. Antiochus however sailed out of ~~Notium~~ with two ships to Ephesus, and challenged Lysander to come out and fight : Lysander came out and drove him back ; the Athenian fleet came out in disorder to his rescue and was defeated with the loss of fifteen ships, Antiochus himself being slain. Alcibiades soon returned from his cruise, in the course of which he had plundered the territory of an allied town, Cym  : furious at the defeat of the fleet he tried again to bring Lysander to battle, but the latter would not give him a chance of retrieving his fortunes. There was great indignation in the fleet against Alcibiades for leaving Antiochus in command : complaints also reached Athens from Cyme, and the Athenians, disappointed at the ill success of the year, superseded Alcibiades, who went off to the Thracian Chersonese where he possessed a private estate and a fort.

His successor, **Conon**, found himself in such want of money that he was obliged to reduce the number of the fleet from a hundred to seventy ships, and to scatter even these on plundering expeditions.

When Lysander's year of command expired he was succeeded by **Callicratidas**, an able and brave soldier, and a man of high and generous character. Lysander seems to

have hoped that he might be continued in his command ; and to spite his successor he paid back to Cyrus what was over of the money supplied by him. Callicratidas therefore on his arrival found the pay-chest empty, and the officers of the fleet who had been won over by Lysander bitterly opposed to him. He went up to Sardis to see Cyrus, who kept him waiting so long for an audience that he returned in disgust, resolved, if he survived the campaign, to reconcile Sparta and Athens, in order that Greeks might not be obliged to pay court to barbarians. He obtained some money with difficulty from Miletus and Chios and put to sea. The Peloponnesian fleet had been largely increased since the last year, and now numbered about a hundred and fifty ships.

With this overwhelming fleet he attacked Methymna, a town in Lesbos (B.C. 406). Conon hastened to relieve the town, but he found it already taken ; he attempted to retreat to Samos, but Callicratidas cut him off, drove him into the harbour of Mitylene, capturing thirty of his ships, and blockaded him there by land and sea. Conon contrived to despatch a trireme through the blockading force to Athens with the news. The Athenians immediately prepared for sea every single trireme in the docks of the Peiræus, a hundred and ten in number ; to furnish crews, even slaves were induced to serve by the promise of freedom, and the knights went on board as marines. In a month the fleet sailed ; at Samos it was raised to a hundred and fifty by reinforcements from the allies.

Callicratidas, leaving fifty ships to blockade Conon, sailed with a hundred and twenty ships against the Athenians, and met them at the islands of *Arginūsæ*, south of Lesbos. The Athenian fleet, being composed of inferior ships and manned by raw crews, was drawn up mostly in two lines, but the Peloponnesian fleet was in a single line, a striking change since the days of Phormio (see page 168). After a long desperate action, in the course of which Callicratidas fell

overboard from the prow of his trireme owing to the shock of collision and was drowned, the Peloponnesians were defeated with the loss of seventy ships. The Athenians lost twenty-five ships ; and owing to a storm coming on, the crews were not rescued from the disabled wrecks, nor were the corpses of those slain in the battle taken up for burial, though to be left unburied was regarded as the worst fate that could befall a man. The Peloponnesian squadron blockading Conon, by pretending that Callicratidas had been victorious, escaped from Mitylene without being attacked, and joined the defeated fleet at Chios.

The Athenian fleet having relieved Mitylene returned to Samos ; but here the generals who commanded at Arginusæ received the news that they were superseded and ordered home ; for the Athenians, in the midst of their joy at a victory which had saved their state from certain ruin, were full of indignation at their neglect to save the drowning crews, whose relations called loudly for vengeance. Six out of the ten **generals**, including Thrasyllus and a son of Pericles, **were put on trial** before the Ecclesia ; one had died since the battle, two others had fled into voluntary exile, the tenth, Conon, had not been at the battle. The accusers were Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had served in the battle in command of triremes. The defence of the generals was that they had given the order to Theramenes and Thrasybulus themselves ; they, however, denied it ; and it is impossible now to say on which side was the truth. At length it was proposed by a citizen named Callixenus that the Ecclesia should decide the guilt or innocence of all six generals by a single vote ; this would be illegal, as according to law each person must be tried separately. Amid much protest and excitement the motion was carried ; the six generals were voted guilty, and all put to death. When they had time for cool reflection the Athenians were bitterly ashamed of their action ; Callixenus was impeached

for his unconstitutional proposal (see *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, p. 140), but he escaped from Athens before his trial, and in the end perished miserably, loathed by all his fellow-citizens.

Owing to the ill success of the fleet since the departure of Lysander, the Chians and Milesians, as well as Cyrus himself, sent envoys to Sparta requesting that he might be sent back; whereupon the Spartans sent him nominally as secretary to the new admiral, but really with supreme command. Lysander arrived at Miletus at the beginning of B.C. 405; he at once obtained fresh supplies of money from Cyrus, who being summoned to Susa to see his father, who was on the point of death, actually left the management of his satrapy to Lysander. He at once set about building fresh triremes, while the Athenian fleet, a hundred and eighty strong, under Conon and five other commanders, was occupied, as usual, in collecting money. At length, after various operations, Lysander, like Mindarus, sailed to the Hellespont and attacked and took the town of Lampsacus, on the southern shore of the strait. Collecting all their ships the Athenians followed, and took up their station in September on an open beach at the mouth of a river named *Ægospotāmi* (Goat's Streams) opposite Lampsacus, and two miles from Sestus, whence their provisions came. For four days they tried to bring Lysander to battle, but he refused to leave his safe position; and each day on their return they grew more and more careless—the men, except those under Conon, being allowed to roam away from the fleet to procure food. Alcibiades, from his estate in the neighbourhood, saw what was going on; he came to the camp and warned the generals of their dangerous position, and advised them to move to Sestus. But his warning was received with contempt; for it is probable that the report current after the battle was true, and that some of the generals were bribed by Lysander. On

the fifth day Lysander, on receiving a signal that the Athenians had as usual disembarked after coming out to offer him battle, suddenly rowed across. Conon at once ordered the fleet to be manned for battle, but it was too late ; hardly a ship except Conon's own squadron was ready. Conon rowed across and carried off Lysander's sails from his camp, so that he could not follow him, and then fled with twelve ships ; **the rest, a hundred and seventy, fell into the hands of Lysander** almost without a blow being struck. Many of the crews not being on board escaped, but four thousand prisoners were captured and put to death, including some of the generals.

Conon, not daring to return home after such a disaster, fled to Cyprus ; but he sent the government trireme *Paralus* to Athens with the fatal news. When it arrived, a long wail went up from the Peiræus to the city ; on that night not a man slept. Next day it was resolved to put the city in a state of defence ; but all resistance was really hopeless, for no more food could now come in by sea, and there were no more ships to make a new fleet. It was in vain that at Cyzicus and Arginusæ they had destroyed the fleets of their enemies ; Persian gold had supplied new ones ; but when once her own fleet was destroyed Athens was helpless.

But as yet Lysander came not. He was engaged in securing his conquest in the Hellespont and *Ægean*. Every town that he came to opened its gates except Samos ; and in every town he set up an oligarchy of ten under a Spartan governor or **Harmost** ; wherever he found Athenian settlers he sent them to Athens to increase the numbers to be fed there. In November Lysander at last appeared off the Peiræus, while Agis, with the army from Decelea, reinforced by the full force of the Peloponnesians, encamped before the walls of the city, and the **Siege of Athens** began. By the end of the year famine had begun to do its work, and ambassadors were sent to Agis offering peace ; they

proposed that Athens should give up all her possessions and become the ally of Sparta, but retain her Long Walls. Agis sent the ambassadors to Sparta, but the Ephors dismissed them contemptuously. The question of the Long Walls was the one obstacle to peace; and the Athenians passed a vote forbidding any one to propose their destruction. But the famine was increasing, and at length Theramenes persuaded the Ecclesia to send him to Lysander; he remained with him no less than three months, and on his return declared that he had been detained by Lysander, and that ambassadors must be sent to Sparta. He was sent with nine colleagues; and Sparta held a congress of the allies to decide on the fate of Athens. The Thebans and Corinthians wished her to be utterly destroyed; but the Spartans said they would never consent to the destruction of a city that had done such services to Greece at the time of the Persian wars. Probably the Spartans were afraid that the destruction of Athens would make Thebes and Corinth too strong. The terms that Theramenes brought back were that Athens must give up her possessions and all her ships but twelve, recall her exiles, and become the ally of Sparta, and that the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed. The famine and the distress in the city were now so terrible that the conditions were accepted; for it was a relief to the Athenians to learn that slavery was not to be their fate.

In March B.C. 404, twenty-seven years after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, **Lysander entered the Peiræus**; he carried off the few ships found there, except twelve, and destroyed the arsenals and ships in course of construction. Then the work of **demolishing the Long Walls** began, to the accompaniment of flute-playing and dancing, in honour of the commencement of freedom, as it was thought, in Greece.

Such was the end of the Peloponnesian war and the attempt of Athens to found an empire. She failed, and

must have failed owing to the determined opposition of Sparta and the other powerful states; but her defeat in this war was brought about by one single mistake, the expedition against Syracuse.

The 'tyranny' of Athens being overthrown, it remains to be seen what 'freedom' under Sparta was like.

Dates.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

	B.C.	
Outbreak of the War,	431	} First Period : fought in Greece.
Plague at Athens,	430	
Siege of Plataea,	429-427	
Naval victories of Phormio,	429	
Revolt of Lesbos,	428	
The Athenians seize Pylus,	425	
Battle of Delium. Capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas,	424	
Battle of Amphipolis,	422	
Peace of Nicias,	421	
Battle of Mantinea,	418	
The Athenians seize Melos,	416	} Second Period, Ionian or Decelean War : fought in the Ægean and Hellespont.
The Expedition against Syracuse,	415-413	
The Spartans fortify Decelea,	413	
Revolt of Chios,	412	
Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens,	411	
Battle of Cynossema. Battle of Cyzicus,	410	
Battle of Notium,	407	
Battle of Arginusæ,	406	
Battle of Ægospotami,	405	
Surrender of Athens,	404	

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

<i>The West.</i>		<i>The East.</i>
The Romans begin the siege of Veii,	406	Artaxerxes, King of Persia, 464-424
		Darius Nothus, 424-404

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY.—THE THIRTY AT ATHENS

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Usurpation of the Thirty Tyrants,	404
Pausanias restores the Democracy,	403

Chief Names.—Critias, Theramenes, Thrasybulus, Lysander,
Pausanias.

AFTER seeing the demolition of the Long Walls fairly begun, Lysander left the completion of the work to the unfortunate Athenians themselves, and sailed off to reduce Samos, but he was soon summoned back to Athens to aid in overthrowing the democracy. Theramenes began to intrigue with the restored oligarchical exiles, to establish an oligarchy; and the oligarchical clubs were set in motion again, as in the days of the Four Hundred. Among these exiles was a noble named **Critias**, a man of great ability and eloquence, and once a friend and pupil of the philosopher Socrates. He at once took the lead, aided by Theramenes, and supported by the knights; the leading democratic generals and statesmen were thrown into prison; and a proposal was made in the Ecclesia to establish a Board of Thirty, including of course Critias and Theramenes, to revise the Constitution; and the Ecclesia, overborne by the outspoken threats of Lysander, was obliged to vote it.

Lysander then returned to Samos, which was soon afterwards compelled by famine to surrender; the democrats were allowed to depart with the loss of all their property,

and the government was as usual put into the hands of a Council of Ten and Spartan Harmost.

His work now being completed, Lysander came back in triumph to Sparta, bringing vast spoil, including the figure-heads of the captured tiremes, and four hundred and seventy talents, the residue of the money given him by Cyrus. This spoil the Spartans insisted on keeping to themselves, and thus gave great offence to Thebes and Corinth and the other allies, who now discovered that in freeing Greece they had only imposed a new master on themselves. It was unfortunate both for Sparta and for Greece that her triumph had been accomplished by such a man as Lysander, instead of the more noble-minded Callicratidas. But the selfish ambition of Lysander was already rousing the jealousy of many in Sparta, including the king Pausanias.

Meanwhile, the Board of Thirty at Athens were in no hurry to carry out the task for which they were appointed, but proceeded to get all the power into their own hands, whence they have obtained the name of the **Thirty Tyrants**. They established a Boulē (Council) of their own followers, many of them former members of the Four Hundred, who, even if they wished, dared not disobey the bidding of Critias ; and they obtained from Sparta a force to garrison the Acropolis under a Harmost named Callibius. Thus fortified, they put to death the democrats already imprisoned, and other noted politicians ; and then proceeded to seize and execute all other citizens whom they thought likely to prove dangerous. A veritable **reign of terror** now existed in the city ; many fled into exile, including Thrasybulus, the famous general, and were hospitably received by the neighbouring states, especially by Thebes. Theramenes, who had disapproved of the introduction of the Lacedæmonian garrison, began to feel that the Thirty were going too far ; he knew that a government founded on bloodshed could not last in Athens. He therefore determined to leave the sinking ship,

as he had done in the days of the Four Hundred, and began to form a party in opposition to Critias ; but he found to his cost that Critias was a different sort of man from the leaders of the Four Hundred. He now proposed that the revision of the Constitution, for which the Thirty had been appointed, should be carried out, and that all citizens who furnish themselves with the arms of hoplites should be given the franchise. Critias refused this ; but he drew up a list of three thousand, whose only privilege was that they could not be put to death without the vote of the Senate. Soon afterwards, on Theramenes refusing to join in a scheme for killing and plundering the wealthy metics (see p. 141), Critias accused him before the Boule, having taken the precaution to surround the Senate House with a band of armed adherents. Theramenes defended himself so well that the Boule loudly applauded ; whereupon Critias, after conferring with his colleagues, struck his name out of the list of the three thousand, and, being thus able to put him to death by a mere vote of the Thirty, ordered the executioners to carry him off. Theramenes, loudly protesting, clung to the Senate House altar ; but the Boule, surrounded by Critias's armed adherents, dared not object. Theramenes was dragged off to prison, and put to death in the usual Athenian fashion, by being given a poison named hemlock, which he drank, with the words, 'Here's to the health of gentle Critias.' From his readiness to change sides, he was, before the days of the Thirty Tyrants, ridiculed by Aristophanes, the great comic dramatist of Athens, and called the Buskin, a shoe that would fit either foot. But some regard him as a well-meaning politician, who aimed at establishing a more moderate government than the democracy, and only turned against his friends when they went further than he expected.

After the death of Theramenes, Critias continued his course unchecked : altogether about fifteen hundred citizens

are said to have been put to death ; but his course was now nearly run. At the end of the year a little band of exiles, about a hundred men, came from Thebes, under Thrasybulus, and seized the fort which guarded the wild pass of Phylê (see map, p. 146), where the road from Athens to Thebes crosses the mountains, about twelve miles from the city. The Thirty sent a force to take the fort, but it was repulsed ; and a snowstorm, which Thrasybulus declared was sent by the gods, drove them back to Athens. Part of the Lacedæmonian garrison was next sent ; but Thrasybulus, whose forces meanwhile had swelled to seven hundred owing to his original success, surprised them at daybreak and routed them, capturing a large quantity of arms. The Thirty began to be alarmed, and in order to secure themselves a retreat, treacherously seized the town of Eleusis, and carried off to Athens all the hoplites that were not on their side, and put them to death. Thrasybulus now left Phylê and boldly seized the Peiræus, where many citizens joined him, but mostly unarmed. When attacked by the Thirty he retreated to a temple in Munychia, approachable only by one steep street ; here the Thirty could make no use of the numbers. They were defeated with the loss of seventy men, Critias himself being among the slain. This double blow greatly disheartened the Thirty, and spread disunion among their followers, who held a meeting and deposed them, appointing instead a new Board of Ten, one from each tribe. The Thirty fled to Eleusis, while the Ten defended Athens against the attacks of Thrasybulus, who was growing stronger every day.

Suddenly all was changed. Lysander, in answer to an appeal from the Ten and the Thirty, appeared with a fleet and army, and blockaded Thrasybulus in the Peiræus : his surrender could only be a question of time. But Pausanias, king of Sparta, did not wish Athens to fall into the power of Lysander, and obtained leave to go himself to Athens.

With contingents from all the allies except Thebes and Corinth, who refused to join in an expedition against Athens, Pausanias arrived in Attica, and Lysander was obliged to submit to his orders. A slight victory over Thrasybulus satisfied the military honour of Pausanias, and he could now afford to be generous; he privately instructed Thrasybulus to send envoys to him, and sent them on to Sparta, together with envoys from the Ten in the city. The Spartans thereupon sent fifteen commissioners to aid Pausanias in effecting a reconciliation. The terms of peace arranged were, that the exiles should return, and there should be a general amnesty except for the Thirty and a very few more. Eleusis was left in their possession as a refuge for any of their partisans who might fear for their lives. Both sides took an oath to observe these conditions, and Pausanias retired, taking the Lacedæmonian garrison with him. Thrasybulus and the exiles from the Peiræus marched in a solemn procession to Athens, and offered sacrifice in the Acropolis for their restoration. The **democracy was restored**, never again to be overthrown while Athens was free. The democrats made a solemn oath with their opponents that no one should suffer from any acts committed under the Thirty, and the old laws of the democracy were re-enacted and revised, and the Athenians ever afterwards held this year (B.C. 403) in great reverence, the **archonship of Euclides** as it was called, after the name of the Archon Eponymus (see p. 64): the preceding year was known as the **Year of Anarchy**.

The Athenians remained faithful to their oaths; no vengeance was taken on any in the city; but the Thirty in Eleusis began to collect mercenaries to renew the strife, whereupon the Athenians marched against them, and put to death the leaders who came out for a conference. The rest of the Thirty and their partisans fled into exile, and Eleusis was reunited to Athens.

Lysander, deeply humiliated at his treatment by Pausanias, obtained leave to return to Asia, where he hoped to re-establish his former influence. Many complaints had come to Sparta from the islands and coast towns against the exactions and brutalities of the governments and Harmosts set up by him, but these received little attention from the Ephors; now, however, a complaint came from Pharnabazus that Lysander had expelled the inhabitants of Sestus, and the Ephors recalled him, and soon afterwards permitted any states that wished to do so, to overthrow the Councils of Ten, but the Harmosts still remained. Lysander, not caring to remain for the present at Sparta, obtained leave to visit the temple of Zeus Ammon in Africa, and remained abroad a year or two, visiting also the oracles of Delphi and Dodona, apparently with some hope of obtaining power and even the throne at Sparta by their aid.

During the Tyranny of the Thirty, the career of Alcibiades came to a miserable end. After the battle of Ægospotami, fearing the vengeance of the Spartans, he fled for refuge to Pharnabazus, who for a time permitted him to reside in his satrapy. The Thirty, however, feared him as a possible rival; and the Spartans, probably at their request, sent orders to Lysander, at that time in the Ægean, to have him put to death. At Lysander's request, Pharnabazus sent a party who set fire to his house; Alcibiades rushed out sword in hand, and his assailants, not daring to face him, overwhelmed him from a distance with their missiles. So perished one of the ablest and most dangerous of Athenian statesmen. By advocating the fatal expedition against Syracuse, and by the treacherous advice he gave Sparta, he dealt two mortal blows against his country which his subsequent brilliant success never wholly atoned for.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE TEN THOUSAND.—XENOPHON AND SOCRATES

<i>Dates.</i>	B. C.
Expedition of the Ten Thousand. Battle of Cunaxa,	401
Arrival of the Ten Thousand at Trapezus, . . .	400
Execution of Socrates at Athens,	399

Chief Names.—Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Clearchus, Xenophon, Tissaphernes, Socrates.

IN B.C. 401 a campaign took place, which, though belonging to the history of Persia rather than of Greece, produced a great effect on the minds of the Greeks and the future course of history ; this was the famous **Campaign of the Ten Thousand**. King Darius died B.C. 404. Cyrus, who was at Susa at the time, was disappointed of his hope of succeeding to the throne, and his elder brother Artaxerxes, a man of little ability or courage, became king. Accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring against his brother's life, Cyrus only escaped death by the mediation of his mother, and was sent back to his satrapy ; he returned to Sardis, nursing bitter feelings of revenge against his brother. Cyrus knew well the superiority of Greeks over Asiatics, and resolved to enlist a Greek army and fight his brother for the throne ; but as no Greek would be willing to march such a vast distance inland, he gave out that he was about to attack the mountain brigands of Pisidia.


During the long years of the Peloponnesian war, many men had grown accustomed to soldiering, and when the peace came were reluctant to return to the ordinary life of peace. They were ready to hire themselves out to any one who would pay them ; and it is from this time that the rise of *mercenaries* may be dated, which later on almost took the place of citizen soldiers.

Cyrus, therefore, had little difficulty in collecting a force of about twelve thousand hoplites and two thousand light troops. They were under the command of a Spartan named Clearchus, who was a friend of Cyrus, and in the secret of the real object of the expedition. In the ranks was a young Athenian of good family named *Xenophon*, who was serving as a volunteer, and afterwards wrote the history of the expedition.

In the spring of B.C. 401 Cyrus started from Sardis with his Greeks and a hundred thousand Asiatics, and began the long inland march. Just before reaching Cilicia, the princess of the country brought Cyrus money, of which he was in great need, and Cyrus held a review in her honour. When the Greeks raised their war-cry and charged, the Asiatics fled in terror, and the princess, who had never seen a Greek army, sprang down from her litter and rushed away on foot. Cyrus was greatly delighted at the effect produced by his Greeks. The march was continued over the range of Mount Taurus by a long and difficult pass called the *Cilician Gates*, which was but feebly defended, and Tarsus was reached. It was now plain to the Greeks that they had been tricked, for Pisidia was now passed and so could not be the object of the campaign : they accordingly mutinied and refused to go any further. But Cyrus, aided by Clearchus, pacified them by telling them that he was marching against a satrap on the Euphrates, and by promising them more pay. The army reached the Euphrates unopposed, and then Cyrus threw off the mask and told the Greeks he

was really leading them against the king of Persia. There was much grumbling, but to retreat by themselves was impossible ; so they contented themselves with demanding a present on arriving at Babylon, to which Cyrus consented.

The Euphrates was crossed by a ford at Thapsacus, and the army advanced down its left bank towards Babylon



ROUTE OF THE TEN THOUSAND

still unopposed ; and at last, about a month after the crossing of the Euphrates, and more than six months after the start from Sardis, they encountered the army of Artaxerxes at the village of **Cunaxa**, ninety miles north of Babylon, in the autumn of B.C. 401. The king's army was said to number over a million men, and with him was Tissaphernes, who had all along guessed the object of the expedition. The Greeks who were on the right put to flight the Asiatics opposed them without a blow : but in the centre, Cyrus

catching sight of Artaxerxes, 'charged towards him with only a few followers, shouting, 'I see the man': he succeeded in wounding Artaxerxes, but was himself overpowered and slain. The Asiatic part of his army, hearing of his death, fled back to their camp.

It was not till the next morning that the news reached the victorious Greeks, and it filled them with despair; they were now in the very heart of the Persian empire, more than a thousand miles from home, and they could not return by the road by which they had come, for they had exhausted all the provisions. However, the Persians were greatly afraid of them and dared not attack them openly; and Tissaphernes came to their camp offering to give them provisions and conduct them back. The Greeks agreed to his terms and started on their homeward march, crossing the Tigris and marching up its eastern bank. But in a few days, Tissaphernes treacherously murdered Clearchus and the other generals, and summoned the army to surrender. The despair of the Greeks was now greater than ever, but they were encouraged by a speech from Xenophon, and elected fresh generals, one of whom was Xenophon himself, who thenceforward took a leading part in the retreat.

They now continued their march, harassed at first by the cavalry of Tissaphernes; but they beat off the attacks, and pushed on northwards into the inhospitable mountain district of Armenia. Fierce tribes inhabited the country, who resisted the invaders at every pass; the snows of winter lay deep on the ground; but animated by the words and example of Xenophon, the Greeks forced their way on until, five months after the battle of Cunaxa, the Euxine burst into view, and was greeted by shouts of 'Thalatta! Thalatta!' (the sea! the sea!) and in two days they reached the Greek colony of Trapezus (Trebizond) in the spring of B.C. 400. Here they rested a month and celebrated games in honour of their preservation: they hoped that their

weary marching was over, and that they would be able to return to Greece on shipboard; but they were disappointed. The Greek colonies regarded them with suspicion; and the Spartans, who at this time wished to be on good terms with Persia, looked on them with disfavour. Eventually, after many difficulties, they reached Byzantium; but the Spartan Harmost treated them so badly that they were compelled to take service with a Thracian prince: the following year, however, a change in the policy of Sparta brought about a change in the fortunes of the Ten Thousand, and they found themselves again engaged in a war against the Persians.

Soon afterwards Xenophon returned to Athens, but he found that during his absence the Athenians had, in what seems to us a most unaccountable manner, **condemned to death** the great and good philosopher **Socrates**, of whom he was a devoted disciple (B.C. 399). Socrates was born in the year B.C. 469, and was brought up as a sculptor, but soon gave himself up to philosophy. The philosophers of that time occupied themselves chiefly in speculations as to the origin of the universe or in brilliant oratorical displays; Socrates taught that the business of a philosopher was to search after truth and to confine himself to questions of right and wrong in the daily life of man. Having been declared by the oracle of Delphi to be the wisest of mankind, he said that the reason was that he alone was aware of his own ignorance, while other teachers thought they knew all things: his method of teaching was to cross-question his hearers, and thus prove to them the uncertainty of their fancied knowledge. He attracted round him numbers of young men of high family, among whom, besides Xenophon, was Plato, afterwards himself a great philosopher, also Alcibiades and Critias, who were perhaps charmed by his arguments without profiting by his teaching. Though no friend of the democracy, whose faults he could see only too plainly, he did his duty as a good citizen, showing his

endurance at the siege of Potidæa (see p. 166) and his steady valour in the rout of Delium (see p. 180); while, at the risk of his life, he stood out alone against the execution of the six generals and the tyranny of Critias.

Socrates was accused of impiety and of perverting the minds of young men; and the jury, remembering his friendship for Critias and Alcibiades, the cause of the terrible troubles from which the state was only just beginning to recover, convicted him. He might, however, have escaped with a moderate fine, but he chose to defy his opponents, and treated the whole accusation with lofty contempt; whereupon he was condemned to death, and after a month's imprisonment drank the fatal hemlock (see p. 231) with calm resignation, surrounded by weeping friends. The Athenians, it is said, bitterly repented afterwards of the rash sentence; and Socrates soon was universally regarded as the greatest philosopher who had ever appeared; and all the schools of philosophy which afterwards arose in Greece owed their origin to his teaching.

Xenophon quitted Athens in grief and disgust, and returned to share the fortunes of his old comrades. His subsequent career will be described hereafter.

CHAPTER XXX

PERSIAN WAR.—SPARTA LOSES HER NAVAL EMPIRE

<i>Dates.</i>	B. C.
War between Sparta and Persia,	399
Agésilas becomes King of Sparta. Conspiracy of Cinadon at Sparta. Agésilas sent to Asia, .	396
War between Sparta and Thebes. Battle of Haliartus,	395
Agésilas recalled to Greece. Battle of Cnidus, .	394

Chief Names.—Tissaphernes, Tithraustes, Pharnabazus,
Agésilas, Lysander, Conon.

THE expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand had greatly impressed the Greeks, and especially the Spartans, with a sense of the weakness of the Persian Empire, which, owing to its vast size, had still been thought formidable in spite of Marathon and Salamis.

Now it will be remembered that in the agreement made with the Persians in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, Sparta had admitted the right of the Great King to the Greek coast-cities of Asia Minor. This right Cyrus, being occupied in preparing his expedition and wishing to remain friendly to Sparta, had not enforced. But after his death, Tissaphernes was sent back to Sardis as satrap by Artaxerxes as a reward for his services, and immediately began to attack these cities, which, thereupon, sent envoys to Sparta asking for aid.

The Spartans, who, as has been mentioned, were

unpopular in Greece owing to their overbearing conduct, and had increased their unpopularity by an unprovoked attack on their weak neighbour, Elis, thought that a war with the national enemy, Persia, would be a good method of retrieving their reputation, especially as the Ten Thousand, being veterans in war against Persia, would form a formidable addition to their forces. They, therefore, despatched a general named Thimbron to Ephesus (B.C. 399). His army consisted of the Ten Thousand, now reduced in number to six thousand, five thousand Peloponnesians, and three thousand Asiatic Greeks; there were also three hundred Athenian cavalry, for the Athenians as subject allies, being required to furnish troops, sent some of the knights as a punishment for their support of the Thirty Tyrants.

Thus the war of revenge, which had slumbered since the Athenians had made peace with Persia fifty years before, broke out afresh; and henceforward the idea of an expedition to overthrow the great empire was continually before the minds of the Greeks. But they were too much distracted by their own petty jealousies and disputes to undertake such an expedition, which it would require their united strength to carry through. Sparta had too lately made use of Persian aid to overthrow Athens; so that the other states did not trust her sincerity, and preferred to join the Persians against her; even Athens herself, struggling to regain her independence, was ready to make use of any means to accomplish that end, even the aid of the once hated Persian. The time for the overthrow of Persia had not yet come; it was destined never to be carried out by Greece, but by the semi-barbarian Macedonian after he had first crushed the liberties of the Greeks.

With all the forces at his disposal, Thimbron accomplished nothing. His successor Dercyllidas was more successful, and after two years made a truce with Tissaphernes (B.C. 396), that ambassadors might be sent to Sparta to settle on

what terms the coast-cities should be freed. But instead of making peace, the Spartans were at this moment resolved to carry on the war with more vigour than ever. A most dangerous *conspiracy*, led by a young man named *Cinādon*, a Spartan who had lost his rank (see p. 41) had just been discovered, and the Ephors were anxious to divert the minds of the people by a vigorous attack on Persia, especially as news came that the Persians were preparing a large Phœnician fleet, under Conon the Athenian admiral, who had escaped from *Ægospotami*.

There was at this time a new king at Sparta. *Agis* died, B.C. 399. He should have been succeeded by his son *Leotychides*; but *Leotychides* was believed to be not really the son of *Agis*, and *Lysander* persuaded the Ephors to elect instead *Agēsilaüs*, half-brother of *Agis*. *Agēsilaus* was a man of middle age, who had never as yet particularly distinguished himself, and *Lysander* intended to use him as a tool to regain his own power: he proved, however, a man of strong character, and one of the most famous kings and soldiers that Sparta ever possessed. He was slightly lame of one foot, and there was an oracle bidding the Spartans beware of a lame reign; but *Lysander* declared that it meant the reign of a man like *Leotychides*, who was not a true descendant of the royal line. How the prophecy about the lame reign was fulfilled will be seen later.

It was now arranged, at the instigation of *Lysander*, that *Agēsilaus* should be sent with fresh troops and take command in the war against Persia; he was to be accompanied by thirty Spartans of high birth as advisers, among whom was *Lysander*. *Lysander* intended to have the real control of the war, as in the days of *Ægospotami*; his main object was to re-establish his lost influence in the *Ægean*. *Agēsilaus*, on the other hand, was sincerely anxious to lead a united Greek army to overthrow the Persian Empire. He met with disappointment from the first;

Corinth, Thebes, and Athens refused, on various excuses, to send contingents. But that was not all; Agesilaus, regarding himself as a second Agamemnon leading the Greeks to the conquest of Asia, proceeded, like him, to offer sacrifice before starting at Aulis, a port on the northern coast of Boeotia; but the Thebans would not allow it, and drove him away by force. Ever afterwards we shall find Agesilaus a bitter enemy of Thebes.

On his arrival in Asia (B.C. 396), Agesilaus at first continued the truce with Tissaphernes; and while the army thus lay inactive at Ephesus, Lysander was surrounded by his old partisans, who, thinking that he was the real head of the expedition, took no notice of Agesilaus. But Agesilaus, to Lysander's astonishment, refused every request he made for any of his followers, till at last Lysander, discovering that Agesilaus intended to be his master and not his tool, requested to be sent on some command away from Ephesus, and Agesilaus sent him to the Hellespont against Pharnabazus. Such was the end of Lysander's attempt at self-aggrandisement in the *Ægean*.

Tissaphernes, having received reinforcements from Artaxerxes during the truce, ordered Agesilaus to depart from Asia; whereupon Agesilaus invaded Phrygia, Tissaphernes having sent his main army into Caria, where he expected to be attacked. Agesilaus obtained much spoil by his unexpected attack, but he suffered from want of cavalry; the few horse that were with him were worsted in a skirmish by the Persian cavalry, and he was obliged to return with his plunder to Ephesus.

The winter was spent in preparations for the next campaign; Ephesus became one vast camp and arsenal, and Agesilaus raised a cavalry force by ordering the rich Asiatic Greeks to serve as horsemen, or to provide a substitute fully armed and horsed. In the spring of B.C. 395, he advanced against Sardis, the capital of Tissaphernes's

satrapy: a battle took place between the Persian cavalry and the Greek army, in which the Greeks were victorious and captured the Persian camp with a large amount of money. Agesilaus now ravaged the country up to the walls of Sardis. Tissaphernes, who was at Sardis, made no attempt to retrieve the disaster with the rest of his army; and Artaxerxes, disgusted at his failure to accomplish anything with the forces lately sent him, and influenced by the Queen Parysatis, who considered Tissaphernes as the cause of the death of Cyrus, sent down Tithraustes as his successor with orders to behead him. **Tissaphernes was seized by surprise in his bath and beheaded**—a fate which, after his career of intrigue and treachery, can hardly be called undeserved. Tithraustes, however, preferred intrigue to fighting: he made an armistice with Agesilaus, who, on condition of receiving thirty talents for the support of his army, agreed to transfer the war to the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Then Tithraustes took a most effectual step for ridding Asia of the Spartans: he sent Timocrates, a Rhodian, to persuade the **Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians to attack Sparta**, offering them fifty talents towards the expenses of the war.

The Spartan fleet opposed to Conon lay at Rhodes; but the Rhodians, who had long groaned under the tyranny of the Spartan Harmost, encouraged by the nearness of Conon, revolted, and drove the Spartan fleet out of the harbour. Rhodes now became Conon's headquarters. When the Spartans heard of the loss of this important island, they appointed Agesilaus to the command of the sea as well as land forces. He at once set about raising new ships from the islands, and put his brother-in-law, Peisander, in command. Agesilaus himself met with little resistance in Phrygia: he plundered the country and took many towns, and went into winter-quarters at Dascylium, the residence of Pharnabazus. A successful raid by the

Persian cavalry was avenged by the surprise and destruction of Pharnabazus's camp, after which a personal interview took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus. The simple surroundings of the Spartan king formed a striking contrast to the splendid retinue of the satrap. Pharnabazus began by accusing Agesilaus of ingratitude to an old ally : Agesilaus protested that he had no wish to fight against Pharnabazus ; his enemy was the king of Persia ; and he promised to spare his satrapy for the future. The interview ended with declarations of friendship between the two commanders. Agesilaus left Phrygia, and began preparations for the next campaign : he received large reinforcements ; the coast-cities were enthusiastic in his support, and he had high hopes that the time for the real attack on the Persian Empire had come.

In Greece, in spite of their hatred of Sparta, the Argives and Corinthians could not quite muster up their courage to accept the offer of Tithraustes. The Thebans were more venturesome ; a quarrel having arisen between the Phocians and Locrians, they interfered on behalf of the Locrians. The Phocians appealed to Sparta, who at once declared war on Thebes, thinking it a good opportunity to chastise her. Lysander, who had returned home from the Hellespont, was to invade Bœotia from the north with a force of Phocians and other tribes, while the king Pausanias, with the Peloponnesian force, was to meet him before the town of Haliartus (see map p. 146). The Thebans, perceiving their danger, applied for aid to their old enemies the Athenians, reminding them how they had helped their exiles in restoring the democracy, and promising to aid them in recovering their lost empire. In spite of the unprotected state of their city without its Long Walls, the Athenians voted for war against Sparta ; but before their forces joined the Thebans, **Lysander** attacked Haliartus without waiting for the arrival of Pausanias, and **was defeated and slain ; and**

his selfish and intriguing career was ended. Soon afterwards Pausanias arrived ; but finding the Thebans reinforced by the Athenians, and feeling distrustful of his Peloponnesians, he agreed to depart from Boeotia on condition of receiving the bodies of Lysander and the other slain for burial. For this cowardly conduct he was condemned to death on his return to Sparta, but fled into exile and soon afterwards died. He was succeeded by his son Agesipolis.

The result of the defeat of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias from Boeotia was, that Corinth and Argos, as well as Euboea and several other smaller states of northern Greece, joined the alliance of Thebes and Athens. Thus within ten years after these states had banded together with Sparta for the destruction of Athens, they were banded together in alliance with Athens against Sparta ; and preferred to accept the alliance of their national enemies the Persians, rather than join the Spartans in overthrowing them. Such was the hatred the selfish policy of Sparta had aroused ; the jealousy which the Greeks felt against any state which seemed to be trying to make itself too powerful was now transferred from Athens to Sparta.

The Spartans were so much alarmed at this coalition against them, that they sent Agesilaus orders to **return at once to Greece** with his army. These orders reached him in the spring of B.C. 394. Leaving four thousand troops to protect the coast-cities, and promising if victorious to come back again to them, Agesilaus started on his homeward march through Thrace, bitterly disappointed at being forced to abandon his projected campaign. Thus the skilful policy of Tithraustes saved Persia by land ; by sea a still more **fatal blow** was struck : Conon, by special request to the king of Persia, had obtained Pharnabazus as his colleague : with a fleet partly Phoenician and partly Greek, they sailed

against Peisander who lay at **Cnidus** (see map, p. 93), in the summer, B.C. 394. Peisander did not decline the combat, though his fleet was inferior in numbers, but many of the islanders in the fleet fled, the rest of his ships were driven ashore and captured, and he himself fell fighting to the last. Conon and Pharnabazus sailed through the *Ægean* with their victorious fleet ; and every island groaning under the yoke of the Spartan Harmost, so different from the milder sway of Athens, eagerly welcomed them as deliverers, on being promised their independence by Pharnabazus : even Ephesus and the other coast-cities, now that Agesilaus was gone, readily opened their gates. Thus Conon avenged *Ægospotami* ; and the **naval empire of Sparta was shattered** at one blow, after it had lasted only ten years.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE CORINTHIAN WAR.—PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Battles of Corinth and Coronea,	394
Rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens,	393
Destruction of a Spartan Mora,	390
Surprise of the Peiræus,	388
Peace of Antalcidas,	387

Chief Names.—Agesilaus, Conon, Iphicrates, Thrasybulus,
Antalcidas.

THE spring of B.C 394, when Agesilaus was sadly starting on his homeward march, and Conon and Pharnabazus were preparing to sail against Peisander, found the forces of the confederates assembled at Corinth, numbering twenty-four thousand hoplites, besides cavalry and light troops. As the isthmus was the scene of most of the fighting, the war is known as the **Corinthian war**.

At the council of war held at Corinth, it was proposed to march at once on Sparta and destroy the wasps in their nest. But, finding that the Spartans were already in the field and had reached Sicyon with an army of about equal strength, the allies fell back to Corinth, in front of which a pitched battle was fought. The Spartans on the right of their army routed the Athenians with great loss, but their Peloponnesian allies were defeated all along the line by the confederates, who, however, returning in disorder from the

pursuit, were severely handled by the better-disciplined Spartans. Thus the victory remained with the Spartans, who themselves lost only eight men ; their allies lost about a thousand, while the confederates lost nearly three thousand : the Spartans, however, in view of the severe loss of their allies, did not feel strong enough to force the isthmus, which was



ISTHMUS OF CORINTH

protected on one side by Long Walls a mile and a half long, extending from Corinth to its western port, Lechæum, and on the other by a rugged mountain ridge about four miles long, between Corinth and its eastern port, Cenchrea.

Dercyllidas, Agesilaus's predecessor, was sent to convey to him the news of the victory, and met him at Amphipolis. Agesilaus ordered him to proceed to Asia and carry the good tidings to the Greek cities ; but when he reached Asia he heard of the battle of Cnidus and found that the cities were in revolt against Sparta. He threw himself into Abydus, which he persuaded to remain loyal, and held it against all effort of Pharnabazus and Conon : Abydus became a place of refuge for the expelled Harmosts. Agesilaus, meanwhile, still ignorant of the disaster,

proceeded on his march to Greece, forcing his way with some difficulty through Thessaly, for many of the tribes were friendly to the Boeotians. Marching through the Pass of Thermopylæ, which the Phocians kept open for him, he entered Boeotia, and on the plain of **Coronea**, on the main road to Thebes, found his progress barred by the army of the Thebans reinforced by contingents from the allies at Corinth. An eclipse of the sun (which astronomers place on the 14th of August) always regarded as of ill omen by the ancients, was followed by the arrival of the tidings of Cnidus : but Agesilaus, not wishing to discourage his men, proclaimed that a victory had been won, but Peisander had been killed. Agesilaus had been reinforced by a few Lacedæmonians, as well as by the Phocians, and Boeotians of Orchomenus, and the forces on both sides were fairly equal.

The battle of Coronea began in the same way as the battle of Corinth. The Thebans on the right of their army were victorious, as were the Lacedæmonians and 'Ten Thousand' on the right and centre of Agesilaus's army. But on this occasion the Thebans, instead of falling into disorder as at Corinth, kept their ranks, and, wheeling about, prepared to force their way back through the victorious troops of Agesilaus, who, instead of assailing their flanks and rear as they passed, preferred to meet them face to face. The conflict that followed was one of the most desperate recorded in Greek history ; Agesilaus himself was wounded and with difficulty rescued ; but at last the Thebans, who were formed in a deep column, forced their way through the Lacedæmonian lines with tremendous loss. The victory belonged to Agesilaus, who remained master of the battle-field ; but the chief glory rested with the Thebans.

Agesilaus did not feel disposed to attack the Thebans again after the battle. He marched to Delphi, where he dedicated to the god Apollo a tenth of the spoil of Asia,

and then returned to Sparta by sea across the Corinthian Gulf, and disbanded his army.

The following year (B.C. 393) the Spartans were still unable to force the Isthmus ; and Pharnabazus having crossed the Ægean with his fleet to harry the Peloponnesians, Conon persuaded him to leave himself with the fleet in order to **rebuild the Long Walls** of Athens while the Spartans could not interrupt the work. The Boeotians lent their aid ; in the course of the summer the walls were completed ; and Athens was once again united to the sea, to the great joy of her citizens, who began at once building a fleet. Thus, by a very fortunate concurrence of circumstances, Conon appeared as a second Themistocles, the refounder of Athenian greatness.

The next year (B.C. 392) there was a fierce political conflict in Corinth ; for the richer class, whose lands were continuously ravaged, being desirous of peace, wished to make terms with Sparta ; but the people, with the help of the Argives, overpowered them. Many were slain, and others driven into exile ; and Corinth and Argos were confederated into one state. There were still many malcontents left in the city, and by their aid the Spartans, after a sharp battle, obtained possession of the Corinthian Long Walls and ravaged the country to the north of them ; they then retired to Sicyon, having pulled down a considerable length of the walls, which were soon repaired by the Athenians. Desultory warfare went on, and a force of mercenary 'Peltasts,' under the Athenian Iphicrâtes, won several successes over the Peloponnesian allies. These were troops armed with sword and spear, but without the heavy shield and body-armour of the hoplites ; they obtained their name from the Pelta, or small round shield, they carried.

In B.C. 391 Agesilaus was put in command of the Spartan forces, and retook the Long Walls ; while his brother Teleutias, at the head of a Spartan squadron, captured the port,

Lechæum. In the following year (B.C. 390) Agesilaus overran the whole isthmus ; and so great was the alarm among the confederates, that they began to think of making peace. The Thebans sent ambassadors to Agesilaus, and when they reached his camp, the triumphant general, surrounded by his staff, was watching a long line of prisoners defiling past guarded by Spartan hoplites. Agesilaus purposely took no notice of the Theban ambassadors, and they were humbly awaiting his commands when a horseman dashed up on a foaming horse and delivered him a message.

Visibly affected, Agesilaus at once broke off the proceedings and ordered the camp under arms ; for the news was that a '*mora*,' or regiment of the Spartans themselves, numbering about 600 men—one sixth of the whole Spartan force—**had been destroyed near Lechæum by the Peltasts of Iphicrates.** The *mora* had gone as an escort to a body of Peloponnesian soldiers, who were returning home to celebrate a festival : as soon as it had conducted them beyond reach of the enemy, the *mora* turned back ; but when it was passing near Corinth, Iphicrates, who had watched the whole proceedings and thought it a good opportunity to pit his Peltasts against the Spartans, sallied out and assailed it in flank and rear with missiles. Being unaccompanied by light troops, the *mora* suffered severely. The Spartan commander ordered the younger hoplites to charge the assailants ; but the light-armed Peltasts easily evaded them, and as they fell back again, attacked and killed many of them. This manœuvre was continually repeated, until at last the exhausted *mora* was charged and routed by some Athenian hoplites. More than half perished, the rest fled to Lechæum. This disaster, the first that had befallen a Spartan force since Sphacteria, created a profound sensation throughout Greece. The Theban envoys made no mention of peace, and Agesilaus having offered battle to the garrison of Corinth, which Iphicrates was not foolish enough to accept,

marched back to Sparta, being careful to pass Mantinea by night : for the Spartans had been in the habit of jeering at the Mantineans for being beaten by Peltasts. Iphicrates now retook all the places captured by Agesilaus, except Lechæum, and the fighting round Corinth came to an end.

The interest of the war was now transferred to Asia. Tithraustes had been succeeded in his satrapy by Tiribazus, who was friendly to the Spartans. In B.C. 392 the Spartans sent Antalcidas to Asia, who negotiated a peace with Tiribazus on the terms that all Greek cities should be independent, but that the coast-cities should belong to Persia in accordance with the agreement made by Sparta with Tissaphernes in the Peloponnesian war. But the Athenians and Thebans would not agree to this peace. However, Tiribazus aided the Spartans secretly with money, and arrested Conon on the charge of using the Persian fleet solely in the interests of Athens. Nothing more is heard of Conon ; but one account says he was put to death in prison. His loss was a great blow to Athens. Tiribazus went up to Susa to obtain the king's consent to the peace. During his absence the war went on. The Spartans had but little success. Thimbron (see p. 242) was sent to Ephesus, but was defeated and slain by the Persians.

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, was sent with thirty ships to Rhodes to help the oligarchs in a civil war with the democrats, who had revolted from Sparta in B.C. 395 (see p. 245). He surprised a small Athenian squadron of ten ships, but accomplished little else. The Athenians now sent out a fleet of forty ships under Thrasybulus, the first that they had equipped since Ægospotami. He sailed first to the Hellespont, where he won over many cities to Athens, especially Byzantium and Chalcedon, which gave her again the command of the Bosphorus. Having thus obtained supplies of money, of which he was much in need, he sailed down the Ægean, levying sums from many of the cities

and islands ; but at Aspendus, in Pamphylia, the conduct of his soldiers enraged the inhabitants, who surprised and killed him (B.C. 389). Thus perished, at a time when his services were most needed, the man to whom Athens owed her restored democracy ; he was an able commander and patriotic citizen, and an upright man. The Spartans sent out a force to check the progress of the Athenians on the Hellespont. The Athenians thereupon sent out Iphicrates with his Peltasts, who, by his skilful tactics, surprised and destroyed the Spartan force (B.C. 388). Meanwhile, desultory naval warfare had continued between the Spartans and Athenians, neither being strong enough to crush the other without Persian aid. The only striking incident was the **Surprise of the Peiræus** by Teleutias, who commanded a squadron at Ægina. Hearing that the Athenians had grown careless in their guard of the harbour, he surprised it at dawn with only twelve ships, sailing right inside and capturing many merchant ships with their crews, and much spoil and other prisoners, and even a few triremes, and then sailing off again to Ægina before any force could be summoned to repel him. The Athenians were much annoyed at the misfortune, and in future kept a better guard.

However, the end of the war was at hand. The Spartans sent out Antalcidas again to command in Asia ; and Tiribazus, who had come down again to the coast, took him up to Susa ; he there had an interview with the king of Persia, and the terms of the peace were settled. Reinforced with the Persian fleet, Antalcidas drove the Athenian fleet from the Hellespont and Ægean ; then Tiribazus summoned the representatives of the Greek states to Sardis to hear the decree of the king of Persia, which was the same as the terms offered by Antalcidas to Tiribazus, namely : the coast-cities were to belong to Persia ; all other cities were to be independent, except three small islands (Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros), which were to belong to Athens ;

any state refusing to accept the peace would be an enemy to Persia and the other states. The representatives were to report this edict to their governments, and reassemble at Sparta to sign their acceptance. The Athenians were too exhausted by the war to make any resistance, and all the states accepted the peace. The Thebans, indeed, claimed to sign for all Bœotia ; but Agesilaus pointed out that this was contrary to the edict, which declared all cities to be independent, and threatened them with war if they persisted. So eager was he to attack the hated Thebans that he immediately began to put an army in the field ; but the Thebans gave way, and signed for themselves alone (B.C. 387).

Thus was brought about this infamous peace, known in history as the **Peace of Antalcidas**, by which the Greek cities of Asia, ninety years after they had been freed by the energy of Athens, were handed over again to the yoke of the barbarian by the selfishness of Sparta. The freedom which Sparta had promised at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war turned out to consist of a few years' oppression under the Spartan Harmosts, followed by renewed slavery to Persia ; never in recent times had the Greek cities of Asia been so secure or so prosperous as when they formed part of the Delian Confederacy under Athens.

The state which gained most by the Corinthian war was Athens. Instead of being a subject ally of Sparta it was again an independent state, united to the sea by Long Walls, with every hope of regaining some of its old naval power. Corinth and Argos suffered most ; they were both seriously weakened, and disappear henceforth from the front rank of Greek states. Thebes, though deprived of the headship of Bœotia, was still unbroken in spirit ; its military reputation had been greatly increased by the battles of Coronea and Corinth, and it was plain that the quarrel

between it and Sparta was by no means ended. Sparta itself was left supreme in Greece at the head of the only confederacy which it permitted to exist ; but it had lost the naval supremacy of the *Ægean*, and had been forced to abandon its great project of the war of revenge against Persia. Henceforward its policy was harsher and more selfish than ever ; it despised the strength of Thebes and Athens.

CHAPTER XXXII

SEIZURE OF THE CADMEA.—THE BŒOTIAN WAR

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Conquest of Mantinea by Sparta,	385
Sparta attacks the Olynthian Confederacy.	
Seizure of the Cadmea,	382
Destruction of the Olynthian Confederacy. The	
Thebans recover the Cadmea,	379
Alliance between Athens and Thebes against	
Sparta. Foundation of a new Athenian Con-	
federacy,	378
Battle of Naxos,	376
The Plateæans expelled by Thebes,	373
Peace of Callias (the Thebans excluded),	371

Chief Names.—Phœbidas, Leontiades, Pelopidas, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Cleombrotus, Chabrias, Timotheus.

TRUSTING in this fancied security, Sparta now started on a career of self-aggrandisement which soon led to acts that shocked the public sentiment of Greece, and in the end brought about her downfall. Immediately after the peace, Agesilaus forced the Argives to break off their union with Corinth, and withdraw their garrison, as being contrary to the terms of the peace. He then restored the Corinthian exiles, and set up an oligarchical government friendly to Sparta, and thus made Sparta mistress of the Isthmus. She would now be able to attack Attica and Bœotia.

Next, to further weaken and humiliate the Thebans, the Spartans restored the Plateæans, who, since the capture of

their city, had been living at Athens as Athenian citizens. Platea thus became a Spartan garrison within ten miles of Thebes itself. Then they fell upon one of their own allies, the Arcadian city of Mantinea, which had in some way incurred their displeasure, and ordered it to demolish its walls. On its refusal, they besieged it, and when it was forced to surrender, compelled the inhabitants to demolish the city and live in five separate villages (B.C. 385).

In B.C. 382, ambassadors came to Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia, cities of Chalcidice in Thrace, praying for help against the neighbouring city of Olynthus. The cities of Chalcidice, which, it will be remembered, had been freed from Athens by Brasidas during the Peloponnesian war (see p. 181), being exposed to the attacks both of the barbarian Thracians and the semi-barbarian Macedonians had formed a league under Olynthus. Acanthus and Apollonia, having refused to join, were threatened with war; hence their appeal to Sparta.

The Spartans, unable to foresee that the Olynthian confederacy would be required in a few years as a bulwark against the rising power of Macedon, determined to stop the proceedings of the Olynthians, as being contrary to the terms of the Peace. They at once sent off Eudamidas with two thousand men; and his brother Phœbidas followed soon afterwards with three thousand more. In the course of his march northward Phœbidas arrived at Thebes and encamped outside the city. There happened at this time to be political dissension at Thebes between the oligarchs under Leontiades and the democrats under Ismenias, and Leontiades offered to help Phœbidas to seize the citadel of Thebes, called the Cadmæa, during a festival when it was left in the possession of the women, on condition that he helped the oligarchs to overthrow their opponents. Though Sparta was at peace with Thebes Phœbidas agreed; in the heat of the day, when few citizens were astir, Leontiades

opened the city gates to the Spartans, who, without any opposition, seized the Cadmea and all the women in it. Great was the consternation of the Thebans, but with the Cadmea in the hands of the Spartans they could do nothing. Ismenias was seized and thrown into prison, where he was afterwards put to death on the charge of receiving money from the Persians; three hundred of his followers fled to Athens, and Leontiades established an oligarchy at Thebes friendly to Sparta, and supported by the Spartan garrison in the Cadmea. Thus Thebes became a subject ally of Sparta. Phoebeidas's action of seizing the Cadmea in time of peace was, of course, in flagrant violation of all the principles of law and right; but, when the question was debated at Sparta, Agesilaus carried the day for him, by declaring that the only question was whether his action was beneficial or not to Sparta.

The war against Olynthus lasted four years. Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, was defeated and slain with most of his army, the young king Agesipolis who took his place died of fever; but, aided by the king of Macedonia, the Spartans compelled Olynthus to surrender, B.C. 379, and the **Olynthian confederacy was broken up.**

Meanwhile the Theban exiles at Athens, the adherents of the murdered Ismenias, were impatiently looking for the day of deliverance for their down-trodden country. They hoped that their friends in Thebes would have effected a rising; but Leontiades, with the Spartans at his back, was too strong for them; he not only prevented any outbreak at Thebes, but procured the assassination at Athens of the man who had succeeded Ismenias as leader of the patriots. At last, weary of waiting, they formed a plot themselves to assassinate Leontiades and his colleagues; the leader of this rash enterprise was **Pelopidas**, a man of noble birth and great wealth, and of a brave and chivalrous character.

Pelopidas succeeded in communicating with his friends in Thebes without alarming the government, and obtained two important allies, Charon, a citizen of high standing, and Phyllidas, who would be of the greatest use to them, since he was secretary to the Polemarchs Archias and Philippus. Pelopidas was anxious to obtain the help of his friend **Epaminondas**, a brave and high-minded man, who afterwards became the greatest general and one of the greatest statesmen that Greece produced. But Epaminondas, though he hated the government, was afraid that the enterprise would lead to scenes of bloodshed, such as had occurred in Corcyra, and would not join, though Pelopidas assured him that no lives would be taken except those of the government.

On a snowy winter's evening in December, B.C. 379, Pelopidas and some half a dozen comrades entered Thebes singly, disguised as huntsmen, without exciting any suspicion, and made their way according to arrangement to the house of Charon, where about forty of their sympathisers secretly assembled. Here they remained in hiding till the next evening, on which Phyllidas had invited the two Polemarchs to a banquet, promising to introduce to them some Theban ladies of high rank.

The evening arrived ; the Polemarchs were at Phyllidas's house, all was ready for the execution of the enterprise, and the government seemed still in complete ignorance, when a messenger arrived and summoned Charon to the presence of the Polemarch Archias. Consternation seized the whole party ; but there was no help for it, and Charon departed with the messenger. Archias had indeed received vague information from Athens, but he had already been drinking deeply, and Charon, aided by Phyllidas, easily calmed his fears and returned to the conspirators. In a short space of time a messenger arrived with a despatch, which he said was 'serious business,' but Archias put it under his cushion

with the words 'serious business to-morrow.' The despatch actually contained a precise account of the plot and the names of the conspirators. The time had now arrived for the introduction of the ladies, who were none other than conspirators disguised in female dress and long veils. The pretended ladies refused to come into the room until all the attendants had been sent out, to prevent any attempt at rescue; they then sat down by their victims, and the moment they raised their veils easily despatched them with their daggers.

Leontiades was not at the banquet, and still remained to be dealt with. Phyllidas conducted another party under Pelopidas to his house, and obtained admittance by saying that they brought a message from the Polemarchs. Leontiades was resting after supper, his wife spinning by his side; the moment he saw the conspirators he seized his sword and rushed to the doorway; he was a man of great bravery and strength, and killed his first assailant, but was himself slain by Pelopidas after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter.

The conspirators then proceeded to the prison, surprised and slew the jailer, and freed the prisoners, whom they provided with arms. They were now joined by Epaminondas and more adherents. The Spartan Harmosts in the Cadmea, aware that something extraordinary was taking place, were afraid to take any steps in the confusion of the night, and contented themselves with sending for help to the garrisons in Plataea and Thespiæ. When morning came the whole population, except a few oligarchs, ranged themselves on the side of Pelopidas; an assembly of the people was held, which hailed the conspirators as saviours of their country, and put the government in the hands of Pelopidas and Charon, but gave them the title not of Polemarchs but Bœotarchs, for the Thebans now intended to become again the head of all Bœotia. Soon the rest of the exiles marched

in from Athens, aided by some Athenian volunteers and two Athenian generals; the Spartan reinforcements from Thespiæ and Plataea were driven back, and preparations were made to attack the Cadmea in force; but the Spartan Harmosts, with strange weakness, offered to surrender if allowed to retire with their troops; their terms were readily granted, and thus **Thebes became free again.**

The loss of Thebes roused the greatest indignation at Sparta; two of the Harmosts were put to death and the third exiled and fined; complaints were made to Athens for having given aid to the conspirators, and the Athenians were so anxious not to offend Sparta that they condemned one of the two generals to death, while the other fled into exile. It seemed as if Thebes would be left to fight Sparta single-handed. Though it was winter, an army was despatched under Cleombrötus, who had succeeded Agesipolis as king; he forced the passes of Mount Cithæron, destroying the body of released prisoners who had been posted to guard them; but, owing to his incompetency or half-heartedness, he accomplished nothing and soon retired, leaving part of his troops at Thespiæ under Sphodrias to carry on the war.

Sphodrias, remembering the credit given to Phœbidas for his treacherous seizure of the Cadmea, seems to have wished to emulate his example. Hearing that the Athenians had become careless again in their guard of the Peiræus, which was not surprising, considering that they were at peace, he formed the project of surprising it by a long night march, and thus winning for Sparta the most important position in Northern Greece. Unfortunately he miscalculated the distance, and finding himself at daybreak still some miles from the Peiræus he was compelled to retreat (B.C. 378).

The only result of this unscrupulous attempt was to provide the Thebans with a powerful ally; for the Athenians, alarmed at this fresh instance of Spartan perfidy, were

still more furious when Sphodrias was acquitted on his trial at Sparta by the influence of Agesilaus. They at once prepared for war, and, in addition, feeling themselves too weak and poor for a naval campaign without allies, they sent ambassadors, Timotheus, the son of Conon, and Chabrias, an able general, round to all the islands, inviting them to form a **new confederacy**. The few years of Spartan rule had so completely effaced the old hatred against Athens that seventy cities were soon enrolled, and the Athenians took care in the new arrangements to avoid the points which had given offence in the old Confederacy of Delos. Even the Thebans, by the advice of Epaminondas, enrolled themselves among the allies of Athens in order to obtain her hearty support; and the Athenians sent a large force to the aid of Thebes under Chabrias. In the summer of this year (B.C. 378) the Spartans again invaded Boeotia, this time under Agesilaus himself; the allies did not venture to attack him, but endeavoured to protect the country round Thebes by a palisade, while they continually annoyed him with their cavalry. At length Agesilaus forced the palisade and ravaged the country up to the walls of Thebes; he then advanced against the main army, but found it so ably posted by Chabrias, and so ready to receive his onset, that he thought it prudent to refrain from battle. He soon afterwards returned to Sparta, leaving Phœbidas in command, whom the Thebans had the satisfaction of killing in a skirmish.

The next year (B.C. 377) Agesilaus repeated his invasion with no more success than before; he again forced the palisade, but nothing but indecisive skirmishes took place, which only served to increase the confidence of the Thebans, and Agesilaus was reproached by Antalcidas, who was serving with him, for giving the Thebans lessons in the art of war. During his homeward march Agesilaus injured his leg so seriously that he was unable to take the field next

year (B.C. 376); thereupon Cleombrotus was again given the command. This year the allies held the passes of Cithæron, and Cleombrotus, unable to force them, was obliged to return home. The Spartans now resolved to attack Athens by sea, so as to overthrow the new confederacy; they sent a fleet of sixty triremes into the Ægean, which prevented the arrival of the corn ships, and so caused great distress at Athens; but the Athenians fitted out a fleet of eighty triremes under Chabrias, who totally defeated the Spartans off the island of *Naxos*, only eleven of the ships escaping, B.C. 376). This sea victory, the first which Athens had won since the Peloponnesian war, firmly established Athens at the head of her new confederacy. Chabrias cruised for the rest of the year over all the Ægean, enrolling new members and capturing ships and prisoners, thus enriching the treasury, which was in great need of funds.

The next year (B.C. 375) the fleet was sent round the Peloponnese under Timotheus, who enrolled *Corcyra* and other islands in the confederacy and defeated a new Spartan fleet sent against him. Distracted by this naval warfare, the Spartans made no further attempt to invade *Boeotia*, and the Thebans were thus able to take in hand the task of driving out the garrisons still left in the country, and won several successes, the most conspicuous of which was won by Pelopidas; when marching against *Orchomenus* he was surprised by the Spartan garrison, which was double his small force; when one of his men exclaimed, 'We have fallen into the midst of the enemy!' he replied, 'Why not say that they have fallen into the midst of us?' And he attacked with such skill and boldness that the enemy were utterly routed. This victory, won in fair fight over a superior number of Spartans, had such effect that very soon the whole of *Boeotia*, except *Orchomenus*, was in the hands of the Thebans. They now

felt emboldened to take the offensive and invaded Phocis, but a large army sent by sea across the Gulf of Corinth under Cleombrotus compelled them to retire. Cleombrotus did not venture to follow them, but remained in Phocis (B.C. 374).

But the very success of the Thebans began to arouse the jealousy of the Athenians, who were by no means anxious to have a strong united Boeotia for their neighbours. They had refounded their naval confederacy and had nothing to gain by a continuation of the war; while their fear of Sparta had died down owing to her ill success. A further grievance against Thebes was her refusal to contribute her share to the confederacy, owing, perhaps, to the ravages of Agesilaus. The Athenians were again in want of money, for the enthusiasm with which the confederacy had been started had by no means been kept up; in his last cruise Timotheus was in such want of funds that he was obliged to borrow from his captains. They therefore made peace with Sparta and sent orders to Timotheus at Corcyra to return home; Timotheus, however, in the course of his voyage, restored some exiles in the island of Zacynthus; the Zacynthians complained to Sparta, and war broke out again almost immediately.

The Spartans now attacked Athens's new ally Corcyra; and were so successful that the Athenians ordered Timotheus to sail again to its relief. He, however, spent so much time in cruising among the islands collecting money, that the Athenians superseded him by Chabrias and Iphicrates. When the Athenian fleet reached Corcyra, they found that the Spartans had been already beaten, owing to the carelessness of the general, and had retreated. Iphicrates soon afterwards captured ten Syracusan triremes coming to the aid of Sparta, from which he obtained the much-needed funds to pay the sailors. Timotheus was prosecuted for his dilatory conduct, and, though acquitted,

left Athens in disgust and took service under the Persian government.

About this time, the Thebans fearing that the Plataeans, who had always been unfriendly to them, would be an obstacle to their domination in Bœotia, suddenly seized the town and expelled the inhabitants; the unfortunate Plataeans, dispossessed of their homes for the third time, retired to Athens where they were warmly received (B.C. 373). The Athenians at this became still more estranged from Thebes, and again eager for peace with Sparta; they were anxious to restore the old state of things that had existed after the Persian wars a hundred years before, when Sparta was supreme on land and Athens at sea. The Spartans, whose coasts were suffering from the attacks of the Athenian fleet under Iphicrates, were also anxious for peace, and in B.C. 372 sent Antalcidas a second time to Susa to ask the Great King to enforce the peace of 387.

In the spring of B.C. 371 the Athenians brought about a congress of the various states at Sparta, and a peace was agreed on called the **Peace of Callias**, from the name of one of the Athenian deputies, the terms of which were that all cities should be independent as in the Peace of Antalcidas. Athens signed for herself alone, and the cities of her confederacy for themselves. But Epaminondas claimed to sign for all Bœotia just as the Theban deputies had done in the Peace of Antalcidas. Thereupon Agesilaus asked him angrily, 'Will you or will you not leave the Bœotian cities independent?' Epaminondas's only reply was, 'Will you leave the Laconian towns independent?' Agesilaus at once struck out the name of the Thebans, and the treaty was concluded without them. Sparta and Thebes were thus left face to face, and throughout the Grecian world there was no doubt what the issue of the war would be: a single pitched battle would bring the Thebans to their senses.

CHAPTER XXXIII

BATTLE OF LEUCTRA : THE THEBAN SUPREMACY


<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B. C.</i>
Battle of Leuctra. End of the Spartan Supremacy,	371
Epaminondas marches into the Peloponnese, restores Messenia and founds Megalopolis, . . .	370
Theban Expedition into Thessaly and Macedonia,	368
War between Spartans and Arcadians; the 'Tearless Battle,'	367
Pelopidas taken prisoner by Alexander of Phæræ,	366

Chief Names.—Epaminondas, Cleombrotus, Jason of Phæræ, Agesilaus, Lycomedes, Pelopidas, Alexander of Phæræ.

So confident were the Spartans in their superiority to the Thebans that they did not wait until their whole force was ready to take the field.

The army of Cleombrotus still lay in Phocis, whither it had been sent three years before. By the terms of the Peace it ought to have returned to Sparta; but the Spartans determined to use it to crush the Thebans and ordered Cleombrotus to invade Bœotia. Epaminondas held the main road from Phocis into Bœotia, but Cleombrotus took an unexpected route over the southern spurs of Mount Helicon and advanced upon Thebes; at **Leuctra**, ten miles south-west of Thebes, he was confronted by Epaminondas with an army considerably inferior in strength, though the exact numbers are not known. The Spartans were full of confidence owing to the skill with which Cleombrotus had out-

generalled Epaminondas and forced his way into Boeotia, while despondency reigned among the Thebans; some of the Boeotarchs wished to send away the women and children to Athens and stand a siege in Thebes, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Epaminondas could obtain a majority for fighting. Epaminondas knew that his army was no match for the Spartan force in numbers, but he trusted to his own skill for victory. It was the usual rule for a Greek general to draw up his hoplites in one long line from eight to twelve men deep, and the whole line on each side charged simultaneously; but the Thebans used to fight in a deeper formation, as was mentioned in the battle of Delium (see page 180); and Epaminondas, knowing that, according to the immemorial Spartan custom, Cleombrotus himself and the Lacedæmonians would be in the post of honour on the right, drew up his own left wing opposite to them in a **heavy column no less than fifty deep**, and ordered the rest of his army, who were opposite the allies of the Spartans, not to engage until the conflict on their left had been decided. At the head of his column he placed the '**Sacred Band**,' a body of 300 picked



men of noble family, bound to one another by the closest ties of friendship. The battle began with a cavalry engagement in which the Thebans as usual were victorious; Cleombrotus then ordered the usual charge, and the Theban column bore down and burst with a terrific crash on his right wing just where he was stationed himself. The Spartans surprised at this novel form of attack resisted desperately, for it was lifelong disgrace for a Spartan to return home defeated; but the weight of the column was irresistible, Cleombrotus fell mortally wounded, most of the officers were slain including the unfortunate Sphodrias, and the hitherto invincible Spartans were compelled to give way and retreat to their original position; but how well they fought was shown by the fact that out of 700 Spartans engaged 300 fell, and over 1000 Lacedæmonians. In the rest of the field, according to the plan of Epaminondas, there was hardly any fighting; and the allies, whose feelings towards the Spartans were not very friendly, when they saw them defeated, fell back also. The battle was over; in a single hour the skill of Epaminondas had shattered the military supremacy which Sparta had enjoyed for centuries; and had **wrested from her the headship of Greece** never to be regained. The effect of the battle throughout Greece was prodigious, it was felt that a new military power had arisen; in most states the news of the overthrow of the Spartan tyranny was received with joy; but the Athenians, who hoped to have seen the insolence of the Thebans chastised, were disappointed and gave but a cold reception to the herald who was sent with the news of the victory.

The Spartans received the tidings of the defeat with their usual calmness; the Ephors refused to interrupt a festival that was being celebrated and forbade any public mourning, and when the names of the dead were made known, their relations went about the streets with joyful countenances, while the relations of the survivors were covered with


shame ; all the remaining troops were called out and despatched to the aid of the defeated army.

Meanwhile the Thebans at Leuctra had not ventured to attack the camp of the defeated enemy, who were still probably superior in numbers ; they were soon joined by **Jason** the able and unscrupulous **tyrant of Phæræ** in Thessaly (see map p. 286) ; he had made himself supreme in Thessaly, and was aiming at playing a leading part in Greek affairs. When the Thebans proposed to assault the Lacedæmonian camp, Jason advised them to make terms with the Lacedæmonians and let them go, pointing out that it would be unwise to run the risk of a defeat after their late victory ; in reality he probably did not wish to see the Spartans too much weakened. The Lacedæmonians therefore were allowed to retire and met the relieving army at the Isthmus ; the whole force then returned home. When the survivors of the defeat reached Sparta, they ought, according to the law of **Lycurgus**, to have been punished with the loss of their civic rights, but they were so numerous in comparison with the total number of true Spartans, that by the advice of **Agesilaus** the law on this occasion was not enforced.

Sparta now began to feel the effects of her defeat. All through the Peloponnese, in Arcadia and Achæa and at Corinth her allies began to revolt : her Harmosts were expelled, the aristocratic governments which supported them were overthrown, and many of the states joined the Athenian confederacy. Even at Argos, which was not an ally of Sparta, a revolution, disgraced by terrible bloodshed, broke out against the aristocratic government, and 1200 of the nobles were beaten to death by the mob, who had armed themselves with cudgels : whence the outbreak was called **Skytalism** (from *σκύταλον*, a cudgel).

The severest blow came from **Arcadia**. It will be remembered that fourteen years before (B.C. 385), the Spartans had forced the Mantineans to break up their

city into villages. The Mantineans now took advantage of Sparta's weakness to rebuild their city, and the Spartans could do nothing more than protest. Then a Mantinean citizen of high rank, named **Lycomēdes**, proposed that the different states of Arcadia should join together and make one strong state; but there was a good deal of jealousy between the three leading cities, Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus (which must not be confused with the Orchomenus in Boeotia), and the two latter were still under governments friendly to Sparta. Accordingly Lycomedes sent troops to Tegea, by whose aid a revolution was effected and the government overturned. The Spartans were very angry at this, and sent an army into Arcadia under Agesilaus, whereupon the Arcadians applied for aid to the Athenians, and when they would not take up arms against the Spartans they turned to the Thebans.



THE CITIES OF ARCADIA

Accordingly Lycomedes sent troops to Tegea, by whose aid a revolution was effected and the government overturned. The Spartans were very angry at this, and sent an army into Arcadia under Agesilaus, whereupon the Arcadians applied for aid to the Athenians, and when they would not take up arms against the Spartans they turned to the Thebans.

The Thebans since the battle of Leuctra had been strengthening their position in the north of Greece. First of all they had completed their supremacy in Boeotia by the submission of the towns of Orchomenus and Thespiæ; by the influence of Epaminondas the Orchomenians had been permitted to enrol themselves in the Boeotian League without any punishment for having taken the part of Sparta against Thebes, but the Thespians were expelled from their town and took refuge, like the Plateans, in Athens. Then the Phocians and Locrians were brought

under the sway of Thebes; and Jason of Pheræ having been assassinated in the summer of B.C. 370, Thebes reigned supreme in the north of Greece, for the Athenians had no land force capable of opposing her.

When therefore the appeal for help came from the Arcadians, the Thebans were only too ready to grant it. Epaminondas, who, being one of the Bœotarchs, really directed the Theban policy, wished to weaken Sparta, by raising up hostile states on her borders in the Peloponnese: one of the states was to be Arcadia, the other Messenia. Messenia, it will be remembered, had been conquered by the Spartans long ago, after two desperate wars (B.C. 630): most of the Messenians had been made Helots, but many had left the country and preserved their nationality during centuries of exile, and were still scattered about the Greek colonies; some had been placed in Naupactus by the Athenians (see p. 147), only to be driven out again at the end of the Peloponnesian war. Epaminondas now made proclamation that he was about to restore the Messenians to their native land, and numbers flocked to his standard: late in the autumn of B.C. 370 he marched into the Peloponnese at the head of an army, said by some writers to have amounted to 70,000 men. He met with no opposition, for Agesilaus had already retreated from Arcadia after an ineffectual campaign. Epaminondas's first step was to **march to the attack of Sparta** itself: the Spartans were greatly alarmed, for they had always disdained the protection of fortifications; but Agesilaus ordered the defence so skilfully that Epaminondas was unwilling to risk the chance of failure, and, after ravaging the Eurotas valley down to the sea, he retreated to Arcadia, satisfied with the humiliation inflicted on the proud city, whose women had never before beheld the camp-fires of an enemy.

He now turned his attention to the Arcadian confederacy; as it was impossible, owing to mutual jealousy, to make any

existing town the capital, a new city was founded in the south of Arcadia called **Megalopolis** (the great city, ἡ μεγάλη πόλις) with walls six miles in circumference. Next the **Messenians were restored** to their country, where they were joined by many Helots and Perioeci, and their capital, Messênê, was founded on the hill Ithômê, where they had so bravely resisted the Spartans in the first Messenian war. Thus the Spartans lost half their territories, and saw a powerful state founded on their northern frontier: in their alarm they appealed for aid to the Athenians, who sent a force under Iphicrates to block the Isthmus against Epaminondas on his return home: but the appearance of the Theban force was so formidable that he contented himself with harassing their march. Epaminondas reached Thebes in the spring of B.C. 369; owing to his operations in the Peloponnese he had retained the office of Bœotarch some months beyond the legal time; he now resigned it, and apologised for his illegal conduct in a speech describing all he had done to weaken and humiliate Sparta: this speech was so effective that he was re-elected Bœotarch with his friend Pelopidas, for the year 369 B.C. Messene and Megalopolis were not yet strong enough to stand alone; so Epaminondas again raised an army to invade the Peloponnese. The Spartans marched to the Isthmus, where they were joined by the Athenians, under Chabrias, and the Corinthians, and attempted to hold it against the Thebans, just as the Thebans, Athenians, and Corinthians had tried to hold it in the opposite direction thirty years before, against the Spartans (see p. 250). Epaminondas surprised the part of the line held by the Spartans by an attack at daybreak, and forced his way through; but he was unable to effect any great success, as the allies were in too strong a position at Corinth; at the same time the Spartans were unable to interfere with the completion of the walls of Messene and Megalopolis.

Next year (B.C. 368) no invasion of the Peloponnese took place: the attention of the Thebans was diverted northwards to Thessaly, where **Alexander of Pheræ**, a son-in-law of Jason, was following his footsteps and trying to bring the other Thessalian cities into subjection to him. Pelopidas was sent with an army against Alexander, and compelled him to restore freedom to the Thessalian cities. Pelopidas, having thus brought Thessaly under the influence of Thebes, marched into Macedonia. That kingdom was in great confusion; the king Amyntas had lately died, and his eldest son Alexander had been slain after a reign of one year, by an usurper named Ptolemy, who was now ruling as regent. The widow of Amyntas with her two youthful sons, Perdiccas and **Philip**, of whom we shall hear a great deal hereafter, had put herself under the protection of the Athenians, who were just now very anxious to obtain the aid of Macedonia to recover the important colony of **Amphipolis**, the capture of which by Brasidas had been such a blow to them in the Peloponnesian war (see p. 181). Pelopidas compelled Ptolemy to enter into alliance with Thebes, and to send to Thebes thirty youths of noble rank as hostages. Among them was the young prince Philip, whose sojourn at Thebes proved of great advantage to him, for he was able to study the splendid system of military discipline and drill established by Epaminondas.

During the absence of the Thebans the war was kept up by the Arcadians and Messenians aided by the Argives, who took up the Theban side in opposition to their old foes the Spartans. The Arcadians, under Lycomedes, won some successes over the Athenians and the few other states which still stood by Sparta, and became so puffed up with their good fortune that they thought themselves invincible. Lycomedes exhorted them to stand up for themselves and not to submit any more to the dictation of the Thebans or any one else. They now began to quarrel with their

neighbours the Eleans about a question of territory. But their pride soon had a fall. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, with the Spartans and a body of Gallic mercenaries sent from Syracuse, inflicted such a crushing defeat on them that they are said to have lost 10,000 men, while not a single Spartan fell, and the battle was called the **Tearless Battle** (B.C. 367). Agesilaus and the senators wept with joy when the herald brought the news of the victory; for the disgrace of Leuctra was now wiped away. Nor were the Thebans displeased at the chastisement inflicted on the arrogant Arcadians, but Epaminondas judged it expedient to appear in the Peloponnese. He forced the Isthmus, which was negligently guarded, and, marching into Achæa, persuaded the Achæan cities to join the Theban alliance; he did not, however, make any changes in the government of these cities, which so annoyed the Thebans that they did not re-elect him as Bœotarch for the next year, and sent Harmosts to establish democratic governments in the Achæan cities. But the result proved the wisdom of the policy of Epaminondas, for the Achæans, offended at their treatment by the Thebans, drove out the Harmosts, restored their governments, and joined the Spartan alliance again.

The Thebans were too much occupied in other matters to interfere again in Achæa. They determined to bring about peace and have their position as head of Greece recognised by means of a **decree from the king of Persia**. Pelopidas was therefore sent to Susa with colleagues from Elis, Arcadia, and Argos, accompanied also by counter embassies from Athens and Sparta. Pelopidas obtained the desired decree, which recognised the headship of Thebes and the independence of the Messenians; but when he returned to Greece no state would accept the decree, not even the Arcadians; Pelopidas visited state after state in vain, and at last came to Thessaly. Trusting to his mission as an ambassador, he had no escort, and Alexander treacherously

seized him and threw him into prison (B.C. 366). The Thebans at once sent an army to rescue him, in which Epaminondas, no longer Boeotarch, was serving in the ranks. But Alexander, reinforced by some Athenians, forced them to retreat, and the retreat was conducted so unskilfully that the soldiers compelled Epaminondas to take the command, and he brought back the army safely. Afterwards a second expedition was sent under Epaminondas; and Alexander was forced to give his prisoner up; but by these events Thebes lost much of her influence in Thessaly, and Alexander of Pheræ again became powerful.

But in a few years (B.C. 363) Pelopidas again invaded Thessaly, and, being reinforced by many Thessalians, attacked Alexander, who had a large force of mercenaries. After an obstinate fight, Pelopidas was on the point of victory, when he caught sight of the hated despot himself; burning for revenge, he charged rashly forward to slay him, but was himself killed by his bodyguard. When the death of Pelopidas was known, his troops charged so fiercely that Alexander's defeat was soon complete. The Thebans sent fresh generals and additional troops, who speedily conquered Alexander; he was allowed to retain his own city of Pheræ, but was compelled to swear allegiance to Thebes, and was soon afterwards assassinated. Thus the whole of Thessaly passed under the control of Thebes; but the death of Pelopidas, the liberator of the Thebans and of the Thessalians, was deeply mourned by both peoples.

CHAPTER XXXIV

BATTLE OF MANTINEA. END OF THE THEBAN SUPREMACY

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Battle of Olympia between Arcadians and Eleans,	364
Naval cruise of Epaminondas,	363
Battle of Mantinea : Death of Epaminondas, .	362

THE Athenians, chafing at the great power of Thebes on land, had meanwhile turned their attention to the sea. Timotheus, who had returned to the service of his native land, conquered Samos from the Persians (B.C. 365), and also acquired considerable territory in the Thracian Chersonese, whither Athenian settlers were sent. He then made an alliance with Perdiccas, who had become king of Macedonia after overthrowing the regent Ptolemy ; and with his aid attacked and took several Chalcidian cities ; but his attack on Amphipolis, which the Athenians were so anxious to recover, was a failure. The citizens of Amphipolis appealed to Perdiccas for aid against the Athenians, and, although their ally, he put a Macedonian garrison into it.

Epaminondas, alarmed at the growth of the Athenian power in the Ægean, persuaded the Thebans to build a large fleet, at the head of which he suddenly appeared in the Ægean, B.C. 363. He did not, however, encounter the Athenian fleet, and does not seem to have done anything

but make a display of Theban power. Epaminondas never repeated his cruise, for in the following year he found himself obliged to make an expedition into the Peloponnese owing to serious news from Arcadia. In B.C. 365 the war between Elis and Arcadia had blazed up again. The Thebans did not interfere, but this time the Arcadians proved capable of holding their own; they defeated the Eleans and repulsed a Spartan invasion under Archidamus. The next year, B.C. 364, was the year of the Olympic festival; and the Pisatans thought the present a good opportunity for recovering the presidency of the games, of which they had long ago been deprived by the Eleans (see p. 12); so they appealed to the Arcadians, who sent an army and began to hold the festival under their presidency. In the midst of the games an army of Eleans and Achæans appeared; but the Arcadians and Pisatans, though worsted at first, eventually compelled them to retire, and continued the celebration of the festival. The **Battle of Olympia** caused great indignation against the Arcadians; for the Olympic Games were a religious and national institution with which the quarrels of states should never interfere. The indignation was increased when the Arcadians took some of the treasure from the temple at Olympia to pay their soldiers. The Arcadians themselves began to feel that they had been guilty of great impiety, and the Mantineans, who had always been jealous of Tegea and Megalopolis, and were beginning to think of allying themselves with their old enemies the Spartans, took the matter up strongly, and after much discussion in the Arcadian assembly they carried the day. Peace was made with the Eleans and the presidency of the games was restored to them (B.C. 362).

Deputies from all the towns of Arcadia came to Tegea to ratify the peace, but in the evening those who were suspected of being on the Mantinean side were seized by the Theban Harmost of the town. So loud were the

protests from Mantinea and the other towns that the Harmost released the prisoners, declaring as an excuse for his action that he suspected a plot to admit a Spartan army into the city. However, the Mantinean party sent envoys to Thebes complaining of his conduct. Epaminondas was at this time much annoyed at the ingratitude of the Arcadians: they owed their present freedom and power to Thebes, and yet they had been setting themselves up as independent of her, and had made peace with Elis without consulting her, while the Mantinean party were deserting her for her enemy Sparta. He therefore supported the action of the Harmost, and at the head of a large army, collected from all the Theban allies in the north of Greece, **marched into the Peloponnese** to re-establish the power of Thebes there (B.C. 362). Passing the Isthmus, now undefended, he reached Tegea, where he was joined by the Argives, Messenians, and the Theban party of the Arcadians; meanwhile the Eleans, Achæans, and the Mantinean party of the Arcadians were assembled at Mantinea. Agesilaus was preparing to take the field with the Spartan army, and a contingent of Athenian infantry and cavalry was expected.

Epaminondas at Tegea was on the direct road from Mantinea to Sparta, a position which gave him great advantage. He first tried to crush the Mantinean force before the arrival of Agesilaus, but found them too strongly posted: then, hearing that Agesilaus was on the march towards Mantinea by a circuitous route to the west of Tegea, he determined to surprise Sparta in its undefended state. Marching by night from Tegea, a distance of thirty-five miles, he reached the town in early morning, only to be foiled again; for Agesilaus, informed of his march by a Cretan runner, hurried back with part of his forces and repulsed the attack. On his return to Tegea, Epaminondas sent on his cavalry to surprise Mantinea, for the Mantineans

had gone to the aid of the Spartans. But the Athenian cavalry had just arrived at Mantinea, and, wearied though they were, they attacked and defeated the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, who, though superior in numbers, were still more exhausted by their long marches. Soon afterwards, **Agasilaus reached Mantinea**, and thus the allied army was united. The skilful tactics of Epaminondas had failed, and there was nothing for it but to fight a pitched battle; and the allies, though inferior in numbers,—22,000 against 33,000, according to one account,—were no less eager for the fray. The road from Tegea to Mantinea, ten miles in length, runs through a plain bordered by hills, which four miles from Mantinea approach closer to another, and form a pass about a mile in breadth. Here, when the army of Epaminondas was seen on the march from Tegea, the allied forces were posted; but Epaminondas, instead of advancing straight against them, swerved and marched along the slope of the hill, and, as soon as he approached their right flank, halted. As it was late in the day, the confederates imagined that he did not intend to fight, and began to leave their ranks; but as soon as his dispositions were completed the Theban army advanced to the charge, and the allies hurriedly re-formed to meet them. The tactics of Epaminondas were the same as at Leuctra: on his left were the Bœotians in the heavy column fifty deep, while the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, forming the centre and left, were slightly thrown back; the cavalry were on the left of the Bœotians, where the main shock of the battle was to be. In the allied army, the Spartans and Arcadians were on the right, the Athenians on the left, the Achæans and Eleans in the centre.

As at Leuctra, the Bœotian column crashed its way through the Spartan and Arcadian line like the prow of a trireme, as Xenophon describes it, in spite of the most gallant resistance; the cavalry were also victorious, and the

whole allied army were soon in disordered retreat towards Mantinea, when suddenly the pursuit stopped. For Epaminondas himself had fallen, pierced in the breast by a spear; and the terrible news of their great general's fall paralysed the troops with grief. He was carried out of the battle, and, having learned that his shield was safe and the victory won, he gave as a last advice to his countrymen that they should make peace, for he knew that he left no successor capable of carrying on his work.

Thus died the great Theban, and perhaps the greatest of all Greek generals and statesmen. The Thebans followed his advice and made peace, by which things were to remain as they were; this peace was accepted by all the states except Sparta, which still obstinately refused to recognise the independence of Messenia. But the Spartans were now so weak that their opposition was disregarded: they still continued their efforts to break up the Arcadian confederacy, but the Mantinean party had been hopelessly ruined by the battle of Mantinea, and the despatch of a small Theban force next year (B.C. 361) re-established Megalopolis for the present as the head of a united Arcadia.

The year after the death of Epaminondas, his great rival Agesilaus passed away. Disgusted at the humiliation of his country, whose armies he had led to victory in the height of her power, he left Sparta with one thousand hoplites to aid the Egyptians in their revolt against Persia: as usual, he was successful in his military operations, but no great result followed. He was returning home, when he died near Cyrene. In spite of all his great qualities, the reign of the lame king had brought disaster on Sparta, according to the prophecy: and one cause of the disaster was his obstinate hostility to the Thebans.

CHAPTER XXXV

PHILIP OF MACEDON

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Accession of Philip of Macedon,	359
Philip takes Amphipolis,	358
Social War between Athens and her Allies, . .	357-355

Chief Names.—Philip, Chabrias, Iphicrates, Timotheus.

HAD Epaminondas lived and completed the victory of Mantinea, he might possibly have been able to found the headship of Thebes on so secure a basis that it would have endured after him. But, as he foresaw, **his work was incomplete**, he left no successor to carry it on, and Thebes, deprived of its skilful helmsman, soon sank back again into the position of an ordinary state. The only lasting result, therefore, of the career of Epaminondas was the overthrow of the Spartan supremacy without leaving anything in its place.

Selfish and oppressive as the headship of Sparta had been, it would still have been a rallying point for Greece against foreign aggression. But no one in Greece had any fear of a foreign aggressor: the only quarter from which an invader seemed possible was Persia, and the utter weakness of the Persian Empire was a byword among the Greeks. So each state as it rose to power was at once the mark for the jealous attacks of its neighbours. Athens was vindictively pursued to its fall by Sparta and Thebes. Thebes

and Athens then united against Sparta, and lastly, Athens and Sparta united against Thebes. All three states had had their day; now there was not one but two leading states, Thebes fairly powerful on land, and Athens fairly powerful on sea, bitterly hostile to one another. Athens too, though she had regained much of her old power, had lost that spirit of enterprise which she had shown in the days of her greatness. It was at this time, when the vitality of Greece had been fatally sapped by the long internecine struggles, and when the headship was divided between two jealous rivals, that the foreign aggressor appeared in a quarter quite unsuspected.

This foreign aggressor was Philip, the young prince of Macedon, whom we heard of as having been sent as hostage to Thebes (see p. 275). The kingdom of Macedon has been mentioned from time to time in these pages; but it will be useful to recapitulate a few leading facts concerning it. The Macedonians dwelt in the north-east of Greece, in the mountain valleys of the Haliacmon and Axios, and the plain at the mouths of those rivers where they flow into the Thermaic Gulf. In race they formed a link between the true Hellenes and the barbarians (see p. 5). From time immemorial they had been ruled by a royal family, whose claim to be regarded as Hellenes had been admitted by the Greeks, though Demosthenes, the great Athenian orator, reviled Philip in one of his speeches as a mere barbarian. These kings of Macedon gradually welded the different tribes of the Macedonians into a compact kingdom, but little notice was taken of them in the Greek world; any one who in B.C. 360 suggested that there was any danger to Greece from that quarter would have been scouted as a madman. Of the kings of Macedon mention has been made of Alexander, who submitted to Xerxes, but did his best to befriend the Greeks (see p. 116), of Perdiccas, who at the time of the Peloponnesian war played fast and loose

with the Athenians and the Spartan Brasidas, and of Amyntas, the father of Philip, for whose benefit the Spartans conquered the Olynthian Confederacy, B.C. 383. The more recent history of Macedon has lately been narrated in connection with Thebes and Athens to the point where Philip returned from his sojourn at Thebes, his brother Perdiccas being now king. Philip was eighteen years of age, and was placed by Perdiccas over one of the districts of Macedonia, where he began to organise and drill a small army after the model he had seen at Thebes.

In B.C. 359 Perdiccas died, and no less than five claimants to the throne appeared, the strongest of whom, Argæus, was defended by the Athenians, while the Illyrians and other barbarians were threatening the frontiers. **Philip** became regent for the young son of Perdiccas, but soon **seized the throne himself**, being supported by the strongest party in the country. By various means, bribery and murder, he rid himself of most of the pretenders. Argæus alone remained ; Philip detached the Athenians from him by making peace with them, and withdrawing the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis ; he then defeated him and put him to death. Finally, he cleared the frontiers of the barbarians, totally defeating the Illyrians in a great battle.

Philip was now securely seated on the throne of Macedon. Skilled in all physical prowess, handsome in appearance, and of winning manner, he gained the complete loyalty of his subjects, and was absolute master of Macedon and all its resources. Ambitious and unscrupulous, he saw in the divided and exhausted state of Greece the opportunity of raising himself to a leading position, and determined to take advantage of it. The victories of Epaminondas had shown him what a skilful general could do with a well-drilled army ; starting, therefore, with the force he had already raised in his province, he formed a large standing army ;

he was not content with the arms and drill borrowed from the Thebans, but he introduced many improvements of his own, until he at length produced the famous **Macedonian Phalanx**, which proved invincible against all foes until it met its match in the Roman Legion. In the Macedonian Phalanx (often called simply 'the Phalanx,' although the name properly belongs to the ordinary Greek formation),



MACEDONIA AT PHILIP'S ACCESSION

the men were drawn up twenty-five deep, and armed with an enormous spear called the 'sarissa,' twenty-five feet long, five spear-points projecting in front of the front rank.

East, north, and west of Macedonia dwelt barbarian tribes, Thracians, Scythians, and Illyrians, easy for Philip

to conquer with his disciplined army. To the south was Thessaly, whose distracted condition, owing to the decline of the Theban power, would afford an easy excuse for an invader. But on the eastern sea-coast lay formidable obstacles in Philip's path : the Olynthian Confederacy was again recovering strength after its overthrow by Sparta twenty years before (see p. 259) ; Amphipolis, from which he had lately in his dire straits withdrawn the Macedonian garrison, blocked the coast-road eastward ; and, most dangerous foe of all, Athens, with her colonies on the Macedonian coast and her naval power, was also to be reckoned with. Fortunately for Philip, disunion reigned among his foes. Athens was jealous of the rising power of the Olynthians, and the Olynthians, as well as Athens, were eager to obtain Amphipolis ; neither of them had as yet an inkling that there was any danger in this young half-barbarian king of Macedonia. Philip thoroughly understood the situation and played his game with wonderful skill : he besieged Amphipolis (B.C. 358), and prevented the Athenians from sending troops to its aid, by secretly promising to hand it over when taken in exchange for the unimportant Athenian colony Pydna ; and the Athenians, in their anxiety to recover Amphipolis, actually believed him. Having taken Amphipolis, Philip proceeded to take Pydna without resistance ; and then, on the ground that Athens had not *given* him Pydna, he refused to hand over Amphipolis. Next he attacked and took Potidæa from the Athenians, and, by handing it over to the Olynthians, secured their friendship until he should be in a position to attack them, and widened the breach between them and Athens.

Disgusted as they were at the duplicity of Philip and their own simple-mindedness which had lost them their chance of regaining Amphipolis, the Athenians were for the time incapable of taking any steps, owing to the revolt

of their allies, headed by Rhodes, Byzantium, and Chios (B.C. 357). This revolt, known as the **Social War**, was caused by the exactions of the Athenian commanders, always, as we have seen, in want of money to pay their mercenary troops, and by the arbitrary conduct of Athens in planting Athenian cleruchs (settlers) in Samos, in distinct violation of her promise given on the formation of the league. Chabrias was sent against Chios with a large fleet, but in attempting a landing he was slain, and his force repulsed. The allies were now supreme at sea, and attacked Samos; and the Athenians sent a fresh fleet under Chares, Iphicrates, and Timotheus against Byzantium. The fleets met in the Hellespont; Iphicrates and Timotheus for some reason were against fighting, but Chares insisted on engaging by himself, and was naturally repulsed. Thereupon, he accused Iphicrates and Timotheus at Athens of receiving bribes from the enemy. Iphicrates was acquitted, but never again employed, while Timotheus was fined one hundred talents; he retired from Athens, and died soon afterwards (B.C. 354). Chares continued the war, but being, as usual, in want of funds, he took service with a Persian satrap, in revolt against the king of Persia, and won a great victory for him. Thereupon, the king at once took measures to assist the allies, and the Athenians in alarm made peace (B.C. 355), and granted them their freedom, the consequence of which to Rhodes was that, two years later, it was conquered by the Persians. Thus the fatal inability of powerful Greek states to govern fairly, and of the smaller states to submit to government, deprived Athens of her confederacy at a critical point of Greek history, when it was needed against the Macedonian aggressor, and at the same time cost her her three best generals.

CHAPTER XXXVI

PHILIP AND GREECE : THE SECOND SACRED WAR

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Beginning of the Second Sacred War,	357
The Phocians invade Thessaly,	353
Philip drives the Phocians out of Thessaly, but is stopped at Thermopylæ by the Athenians, . .	352
The Olynthian War,	350-348
Peace of Philocrates : Conquest of the Phocians.	
End of the Second Sacred War,	346

Chief Names.—Philip, Onomarchus, Phaÿllus, Demosthenes,
Æschines, Phocion.

DURING the progress of this unfortunate war, grave events happened in Northern Greece, which, in the end, gave Philip his long, long-coveted opportunity of interfering in Greece itself.

Mention has been made in the beginning of this history of the ancient religious council called the **Amphictyonic Council** (see p. 21) which met at Delphi to protect the interests of its members and of the god. Its work in causing the First Sacred War (B.C. 595), which resulted in the destruction of the Phocian town of Cirrha, has been mentioned ; since then, although its meetings were held, it had ceased to have any influence and had become quite antiquated. At this time, however, it had fallen into the power of the Thebans ; and the Thebans, chafing at their loss of authority since the death of Epaminondas, took the

short-sighted step of employing it to recover that authority. They had already, soon after the battle of Leuctra, obtained from it a decree, fining the Spartans for seizing the Cadmæa in peace; they now obtained a fresh decree, imposing a heavy fine on the Phocians for cultivating the accursed territory of Cirrha. This, of course, was a mere pretence, for the First Sacred War had long been forgotten; the real offence of the Phocians was that they had renounced their allegiance to Thebes since the battle of Mantinea. The Phocians had long had a quarrel with the Delphians, for, Delphi being in Phocis, they claimed to control it, but the Delphians, being Dorians, had always resisted the claim. Unable to pay the fine now imposed, and threatened in consequence with the loss of their country, they took the desperate advice of **Philomêlus**, a rich and prominent citizen, and boldly seized Delphi itself (B.C. 357). **Philomêlus** visited Athens and Sparta, and obtained promises of aid, but all the other members of the Amphictyonic League were against him. However, he raised a mercenary force with which he severely defeated the Locrians in their attempt to recover Delphi. But his foes were gathering round him; the Thebans now took the field; and **Philomêlus**, sorely against his will, began to appropriate the treasures of the Temple in order to hire more mercenaries, an act regarded by the Greeks as wicked sacrilege. After some more successes, however, **Philomêlus** was defeated and slain by the Thebans (B.C. 355); but his place was taken by an able and unscrupulous leader, named **Onomarchus**, who plundered the Temple recklessly and raised so large a force of mercenaries, that even the Thebans, whose weakness at this time seems unaccountable, were no match for him. He conquered the Locrians, seized **Thermopylæ**, and even invaded **Boeotia**.

Philip, since he has last been mentioned, had been extending his power in Thrace, while the Athenians were

occupied by the Social War. The conquest of Amphipolis had given him the silver mines of Mount Pangæus, from which he derived a large revenue ; and he had founded the afterwards famous town of Philippi in the neighbourhood. He had also taken Methonē, the last Athenian possession on the Macedonian coast. He now turned his attention to Thessaly, and had no difficulty in obtaining a footing in the country ; for the new tyrant of Pheræ, Lycōphron, was trying to tread in the footsteps of Jason and Alexander, and Philip was entreated by the Thessalian nobles to help them against him. This he promptly did, whereupon Lycophron, in his turn, appealed to Onomarchus. Onomarchus came, beat Philip in two battles, and drove him out of Thessaly (B.C. 353). But next year, Philip, having reorganised his army, again entered Thessaly and totally defeated Lycophron and Onomarchus. Onomarchus was slain, and Lycophron fled to Pheræ, where he was besieged till he surrendered, and retired with his mercenaries to Phocis (B.C. 352).

Thus Philip not only won Thessaly, but also stood forward as the **champion of the Amphictyonic Council** and the outraged god in the place of the feeble Thebans. The surrender of Pagasæ, the port of Pheræ, gave him a convenient harbour for harassing the Athenian commerce ; the Athenians voted an expedition to save Pagasæ, but, as so often, it started too late. He now pushed on to complete the conquest of the Phocians whose leader was now Phaÿllus ; they held the pass of Thermopylæ, but had not recovered from their defeat, and so appealed to Athens. Recognising the imminence of the danger, the Athenians made no delay, they sent a fleet and troops, and Philip retired baffled. Phaÿllus continued the struggle against the Locrians and Thebans : all the money at Delphi had now been used up, and he was obliged to lay violent hands on the splendid votive offerings presented at various

times to the oracle by kings and states. For a time the theatre of war was transferred to the Peloponnese, owing to an attack made by Sparta on her old enemy Megalopolis ; battles were fought with various success, but no decisive result, between the Thebans and Spartans ; in the end Sparta made peace and acknowledged the independence of Megalopolis (B.C. 351).

Meanwhile, Philip was again pushing on his conquests in Thrace in a way that seriously threatened the Athenian possessions on the Chersonese. This so alarmed the Athenians that a large expedition was prepared under Charidēmus, a mercenary leader of great reputation, but little real performance. But a false report of Philip's death caused the expedition to be abandoned. It was about this time that the great Athenian orator, **Demos-thenes**, began to come prominently forward as a speaker in the Ecclesia ; he alone of all the Athenians saw the real danger which threatened not Athens alone, but all Greece, from Philip ; he saw, too, that the disinclination of the Athenians to serve in person, which caused heavy expense and delay in hiring mercenaries, put them at a great disadvantage against Philip, absolute master of a well-trained standing army, and all the resources of Macedon. In a series of speeches, which have come down to us as the finest specimens of Greek oratory, he exhorted his countrymen to stop Philip's progress at all costs, by prompt action, and especially by serving in the army themselves as in old days. He continually reminds them of the energy and patriotism shown by their ancestors in the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. But the words of the young speaker fell for the most part on deaf ears, and produced but little result. His chief opponent was Phocion, a brave soldier and honest statesman, who affected Spartan ways, especially in brevity of speech.

From Thrace, Philip turned his arms against the **Olynthian Confederacy** (B.C. 350), having spared it until he felt sufficiently strong to crush it entirely. An excuse for the war was the conduct of Olynthus in receiving a half-brother of Philip who was exiled from Macedonia. The Athenians, who, from fear of Philip, had some time previously made up their quarrel with Olynthus, sent help after a time, mercenaries as usual, under Charidēmus; this aid was sufficient to prevent Philip from gaining any great success. While engaged in her attempt to protect Olynthus, Athens found herself called upon to deal with a revolt in Eubœa, stirred up apparently by Philip. A force of Athenians was sent across, under **Phocion**, won a considerable victory over the rebels, but after that the Athenians could effect nothing more, and gradually, in course of time, the island seems to have passed into the power of Philip.

In spite of the Eubœan rebellion, fresh aid, partly citizens, was sent to Olynthus, though the strain on the resources of Athens was almost more than she could bear. On one occasion cheering news of a victory was brought, but in B.C. 348 came the terrible tidings that **Olynthus had fallen**, betrayed, according to Demosthenes, by traitorous citizens, after the thirty other cities of the confederacy had been taken one by one. All the cities of this once flourishing confederacy were utterly destroyed, and the surviving inhabitants were sold into slavery; trains of wretched Olynthian captives were a common sight in Greece at that time, and excited the deepest pity. At Athens the consternation was great, not only at the fate of Olynthus, but also because many Athenian citizens were now prisoners in the hands of Philip. The first thought of the Athenians was to arouse a general crusade against Philip; and ambassadors were sent to the different states to discover their sentiments, but the report brought back

by the ambassadors was so discouraging that the Athenians in despair, and unable, from want of funds, to continue the war, began to think of peace. This feeling was increased by the events in Phocis. Phayllus had died (B.C. 350) and had been succeeded by the fourth and last leader, **Phalæcus**, son of Onomarchus; the Temple treasure was coming to an end and the Phocians were quarrelling among themselves. Phalæcus was accused of misappropriating the treasure and deposed, but he took post at Thermopylæ with ten thousand mercenaries. In spite of these dissensions, the Thebans were still unable to bring the war to a close, and (B.C. 347) took the fatal step of **appealing to Philip** to intervene. A report was spread that Philip was marching on Thermopylæ, and the Phocians implored the Athenians for aid; but Phalæcus refused to allow them to occupy Thermopylæ, as they had done five years previously. This reduced the Athenians to despair; accordingly a proposal to send ambassadors to Philip, made in the Ecclesia by a citizen named Philocrâtes, was carried. Ten ambassadors were sent, including Philocrâtes, Demosthenes, and **Æschines**, a rival orator to Demosthenes. (December, 347.)

After some wandering the envoys found Philip at his capital, Pella; in their interviews with him he greatly impressed them (except apparently Demosthenes) by his royal bearing and courteous geniality; **Æschines** certainly was henceforward his warm partisan. In the spring of B.C. 346 they brought back proposals for a peace between Philip and his allies, and Athens and her allies, with the exception of the Phocians. After a debate in the Ecclesia, the terms of the peace (known as the **Peace of Philocrates**) were voted, except the exclusion of the Phocians; but Philip's ambassadors on their arrival insisted on this point. **Æschines** and his friends persuaded the Athenians to yield by assuring them that Philip only wished to exclude the Phocians to please his present allies, the Thebans and

Thessalians, and that having obtained the alliance of Athens, he would help the Phocians against the Thebans ; moreover, if they refused Philip's terms, they must prepare for war. The unfortunate Athenians tried to persuade themselves that *Æschines* was speaking the truth, and took the oath to observe the treaty excluding the Phocians, and not even Demosthenes seems to have protested.

Then the same ten ambassadors were ordered to administer the oath to Philip. Philip was now in Thrace fighting against *Cersobleptes*, an ally of Athens, and their neighbour in the Chersonese. But, though it was important to reach him as soon as possible and stop his operations against *Cersobleptes*, the ambassadors did not even start from Athens until forced to do so by a decree proposed by Demosthenes, and then went slowly, not to Thrace, but Pella, and waited there till Philip returned, bringing the conquered *Cersobleptes* with him as prisoner. Even then Philip did not take the oath, but marched southwards towards Greece, accompanied by the ambassadors both from Athens and from other states, all of whom were trying to win him over to their side. At *Pheræ* he at length took the oath to the peace ; and then, showing his true colours, marched against *Thermopylæ*. *Phalæcus*, despairing of help from Athens, without whose ships he could not hold the pass, surrendered on condition of being allowed to depart with his mercenaries. Phocis lay helpless at the conqueror's feet, and submitted unconditionally.

The Second Sacred War was ended ; but it ended by making Macedon the most powerful state in Greece. Philip celebrated a solemn thanksgiving with the Thebans for his success, which *Æschines* is said to have attended. Then a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council was held, and punishment was meted out to the Phocians : all the towns were destroyed, and the inhabitants condemned to dwell in villages ; a yearly tribute was laid

upon the land to repay the Temple for the stolen treasure, and all those concerned in the desecration were declared accursed, and fled into exile, accompanied by most of the upper classes. The Phocians were also deprived of their vote in the Council, which was given to Philip; and, when a few months later the Pythian Games were held, he was named one of the Presidents.

Great was the dismay of the Athenians when they found how they had been tricked. Fearing an attack from Philip, they put the city in a state of defence; but Philip did not feel strong enough yet for the struggle with the Athenians, and sent them a friendly letter, and Demosthenes, knowing the hopelessness of their position, advised a pacific policy. But the Athenians vented their rage on Philocrates, the author of the unfortunate Peace; he went into exile and was condemned in his absence. A few years afterwards Demosthenes prosecuted Æschines in a speech called 'The False Embassy' (*περὶ τῆς παραπροσβείας*) but without success. The speech with Æschines's reply has come down to us, and it is from them that we chiefly learn the facts of this period.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THIRD SACRED WAR : CHÆRONEA : END OF GREEK FREEDOM

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Renewal of War between Philip and Athens, . . .	340
Third Sacred War. Philip seizes Elatea : Alliance between Thebes and Athens,	339
Battle of Chæronea. Philip acknowledged head of Greece,	338
Murder of Philip : Accession of Alexander, . . .	336
Revolt and Destruction of Thebes,	335
Alexander invades Persia,	334

Chief Names.—Philip, Æschines, Demosthenes,
Olympias, Alexander.

SATISFIED for the present with the position he had gained in Greece, Philip returned to Macedonia, leaving a garrison in Thermopylæ to keep the gate of Greece in his hands. But peace between him and Athens could not last long. He again plunged into wars of aggression in Thrace, which naturally brought him into conflict with the Athenian interests in the Chersonese ; and the Athenians in their state of irritation, and encouraged by the renewed harangues of Demosthenes, were not disposed to tamely submit. The first actual cause of quarrel was the little unimportant island of Halonnêsus, in the middle of the Ægean, which Philip seized, to rid himself of a gang of pirates who made it their headquarters. The Athenians claimed it as theirs ; and much diplomatic correspondence ensued, but with no

result (B.C. 343). Then followed fighting in Eubœa, where the Athenian party rose against the Macedonians, and, aided by an Athenian force under Phocion, drove them from the island, and even attacked Philip's port, Pagasæ, and captured a number of merchantmen (B.C. 341). Finally, Philip's operations against the Thracian princes, near the Chersonese, brought him into collision with Diopceithes, the Athenian general there; and Philip sent an angry letter of remonstrance to Athens. Such a state of things could not continue, and in B.C. 340 both **Philip and the Athenians** formally **declared war**. Demosthenes, at this time, was most active in his opposition to Philip; he went on an embassy to the Peloponnese to form a league against him, but the Peloponnesian states persisted in regarding Philip as their protector against Sparta, and would not listen to him. He then sailed to the Propontis and persuaded Byzantium, the successful rebel of the Social War, and its neighbour, Perinthus, to form an alliance with Athens; for Philip's victorious arms had reached so near the Propontis as to endanger the route of the Athenian corn ships from the Euxine. Philip now attacked Perinthus with a large army; but the Perinthians held out bravely, aided by the Byzantines, till the arrival of an Athenian force under Chares forced him to raise the siege. He then made an attempt to surprise Byzantium, and very nearly succeeded, but a larger Athenian armament under Phocion, with contingents from Chios and Rhodes, former members of the Athenian league, arrived in the autumn of B.C. 340, and at length Philip was compelled to abandon the siege, and to retire altogether from the Propontis. Thus the war opened with the distinct success of Athens; and Demosthenes was thanked by the assemblies of Athens, Byzantium, and Perinthus, and voted a crown for his exertions in defeating Philip, and securing the corn route.

Just when the prospect looked so cheering for Athens,

the unfortunate Amphictyonic Council, by the action of Æschines, who was either guilty of utter blindness or was deliberately playing into Philip's hands, ruined everything. Æschines was Athenian delegate at the spring meeting of the Council in B.C. 339; according to his own account the Locrian deputy attacked Athens with reference to some shields she had dedicated in honour of the battle of Plataea, which naturally were distasteful to the Thebans. Irritated by this attack, and by the rudeness of the Locrian, he lost control of himself, and pointing to the rich plain of Cirrha, which all could see from the lofty height of Delphi, denounced the Locrians of Amphissa for having for many years past cultivated it in defiance of the curse pronounced at the end of the First Sacred War, two



THE CAMPAIGN OF CHAERONEA

hundred and fifty years before (see p. 21). The speech roused the fury of the Council. Next day, with the population of Delphi, they marched out against Cirrha, but the approach of the Amphissians compelled them to retreat. A special meeting was held to induce the Locrians to submit, but they refused; and, at the regular autumn meeting, the

Council took the fatal step of **appealing to Philip**, their protector, to come and be the instrument of divine vengeance against the impious Locrians.

Feeling that his opportunity had now come, he marched down with a force of about 30,000 men, accompanied by his son, Alexander, now eighteen years old. He passed through Thermopylæ, and then, instead of proceeding southward to Amphissa, which he would have done had his object been simply to punish the Amphissians, he halted at Elatea, a ruined Phocian town, which commanded the road towards Thebes and Athens, and proceeded to fortify himself there.

The news of the seizure of Elatea reached Athens, Demosthenes tells us, in the evening, when the market-place was crowded with buyers and sellers. Great was the consternation: the market-place was cleared with the utmost speed, and a meeting of the Ecclesia was summoned for the next morning. When it assembled no one had any proposal to make till Demosthenes rose and said that Athens must lay aside her long-standing hostility to the Thebans, and ask them to join in alliance against the invader. His suggestion was adopted, and he himself with other ambassadors was sent to Thebes, while every nerve was strained to equip a force for the field. Demosthenes reached Thebes only just in time; Philip's ambassadors were there already, and were supported by a considerable party among the citizens; but patriotic sentiments and the eloquence of Demosthenes prevailed, and the Thebans decided to **throw in their lot with Athens**. This was a bitter disappointment to Philip, who had counted at least on the neutrality of the Thebans, if not on their aid, and he was brought for a time to a standstill.

Through the winter and the early part of B.C. 338 the allied army, Thebans, Athenians, with contingents from the Corinthians, Achæans, and a few other states,

collected by the activity of Demosthenes, kept Philip in check on the frontier of Bœotia, between Elatea and Chæronea, and are even said to have won two victories. But by August he seems to have obtained reinforcements from home, and attacked the allies on the **plain of Chæronea**. The Athenians were on the left, the Thebans, headed by their Sacred Band, on the right, the other allies in the centre. Philip commanded the wing opposite the Athenians, Alexander that opposite the Thebans. The accounts of this most momentous battle are unfortunately meagre, but the issue could not have been doubtful between Philip's well-trained phalanx and the Greek citizen-soldiers, whose quality may be judged from the fact that Demosthenes, aged forty-seven, was fighting in the Athenian ranks ; the impetuous charge of the Athenians at first bore back Philip's wing, but his better-trained soldiers gradually forced them back again ; Alexander, after a desperate struggle, overpowered the Thebans, the whole of the Sacred Band dying where they fought ; he then assailed the rest of the Greek army, which soon was in full flight. The loss of the two armies is not known ; but the Athenians left a thousand men on the field and two thousand prisoners in Philip's hands. All was over ; the liberty of Greece had been fought for and lost ; the Macedonian phalanx had triumphed over the eloquence and patriotism of Demosthenes.

Thebes surrendered at once, and was severely punished for its desertion. Philip sold his Theban prisoners into slavery, banished the leaders of the party opposed to him, and set up an oligarchy of 300 of his partisans, supported by a **Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea**. At Athens all was agony and despair, but on the motion of Demosthenes, who escaped from the rout and was accused by Æschines of cowardice, preparations were made for a last resistance.

But Philip felt respect for the Athenians, though so long

his foes, nor did he wish to drive them to extremities, for with their powerful fleet they might have successfully resisted a siege. He therefore offered to restore them their prisoners without ransom, and to leave them unmolested, on condition that they gave up their possessions in Thrace, and acknowledged him as the head of Greece. These unexpectedly generous terms the Athenians, hopeless of being able to offer any sustained resistance, accepted ; the horrors of a victorious invasion were averted, but the glory of free imperial Athens was gone for ever. Corinth and the other allies submitted in their turn. The Spartans alone, who had not fought at Chæronea, held sullenly aloof and refused to humble themselves before the Macedonian conqueror. Philip marched into the Peloponnese, and deprived them of some territory, but for what reason we know not, he did not attack Sparta itself, but left it in its self-chosen isolation.

At the end of the year a congress was held at Corinth, which was attended by all the states of Greece except Sparta ; and Philip was definitely acknowledged Head of Greece. In order to divert the minds of the Greeks from their humiliating subjection to Macedonia, he proclaimed that he was about to renew the **war of revenge against Persia**, which had been attempted and abandoned by the Spartans sixty years before. This project had been in the minds of the Greeks ever since the campaigns of Agesilaus, though the wars between Sparta and Thebes had prevented it being carried out, and the friendship of the Great King had been sought even by the Spartans for political purposes ; but a treatise has come down to us, written by the Athenian orator, Isocrates, in the form of a speech, in which he proposes that the states should settle their differences, and, under the joint leadership of Sparta and Athens, undertake a new Persian war. At length this war was to be really undertaken, but under the leadership of Macedonia, not of

Sparta and Athens. Philip was named commander-in-chief of the united Greek forces, and returned to Macedonia to begin the preparations for the great campaign. In the spring of B.C. 336 the advanced guard, under the two Macedonian generals, Parmenio and Attalus, had already crossed the Hellespont, when Philip was murdered. The cause of his murder was as follows: he had quarrelled with his first wife, Olympias, the mother of Alexander, a woman of ungovernable temper and savage disposition, and had lately married a new wife, Cleopatra, niece of Attalus, who persuaded him to deprive Alexander of the succession to the throne. To calm these family dissensions, Philip arranged a marriage between Alexander, king of Epirus, the brother of Olympias, and her daughter, also called Cleopatra, but this did not appease Olympias; hearing that a young man named Pausanias had been deeply wronged by Attalus, and had in vain appealed to Philip for redress, she and her partisans stirred him up to revenge. At a splendid festival, in honour of the marriage of Olympias's daughter and the birth of a new son and heir to Philip, Pausanias stabbed him with a dagger, but was himself caught and slain.

Thus, in the prime of his life at the age of forty-six, died the man who raised Macedonia from the position of a weak, semi-barbarous state to be the mistress of Greece, and laid the foundations of the astounding conquests carried out by his still greater son. Of kingly bearing and captivating manners, endowed with untiring energy and resource, a skilful diplomatist, who never shrank from duplicity and even corruption to gain his ends, an able general and trainer of soldiers, but in his private life a coarse and brutal sensualist, Philip is one of the most striking characters of Greek or any other history.

Alexander, who does not appear to have been himself involved in the plot, was at once proclaimed king by the

adherents of Olympias, being now only twenty years old, and was loyally accepted by the army and nation; he satisfied public opinion by giving his father a splendid funeral, and punishing some of the accomplices of Pausanias with death. He then secured his position in true Eastern fashion by putting to death his cousin, Amyntas, son of Philip's elder brother Perdiccas (see p. 275), the infant son of Cleopatra, and her uncle, Attalus; Cleopatra herself was afterwards put to death by Olympias. His next proceeding was to show himself with a large army in Greece; the death of Philip had for the moment excited wild hopes of freedom, especially at Athens, where, on the motion of Demosthenes, a vote of thanksgiving was passed. But the appearance of Alexander with his army soon crushed these hopes, and a congress at Corinth confirmed him as commander-in-chief in the place of his father. The next year (B.C. 335) he started on a campaign in Thrace to show his power in that quarter; here his wonderful military genius first began to display itself, he made long and rapid marches, forced his way over difficult mountain passes, crossed the Danube without loss in the face of the enemy, and defeated the barbarian tribes of the country.

During Alexander's prolonged absence in these regions discontent again broke out in Greece, and encouraged by the report of his death, and by promises of help from several quarters, **the Thebans declared their independence**, and besieged the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea. Demosthenes attempted to enlist the Athenians on their side, but Phocion and his party threw doubts on the reported death of Alexander, and persuaded the people to keep the peace. The news of the revolt reached Alexander in Illyria; a rapid march of a fortnight brought him upon the astonished Thebans before help could reach them. He at once **attacked Thebes**, stormed it after desperate fighting, and punished it for its rebellion in a severe and exemplary

fashion. The city was levelled to the ground, and the surviving inhabitants, except actual friends of Macedonia, were sold into slavery; the Cadmea was left with its Macedonian garrison. Such was the sad end of the city which, more than any other, was the cause of the entrance of the Macedonians into Greece. Alexander then ordered the Athenians to surrender Demosthenes and the leading orators on his side; but, at the urgent entreaties of the Macedonian party in Athens, he was induced to forgo the demand. After another congress to settle details for the invasion of Persia, he returned to Macedonia; and in the following spring (B.C. 334), leaving Antipater with 12,000 men to keep order in Macedonia and Greece, he crossed the Hellespont. He never saw Macedonia or Greece again.

With the battle of Chæronea, the real history of free Greece ends; many men, no doubt, like Demosthenes, still looked forward to a time when the fetters of the Macedonian tyrant might be thrown off; and the dying flame of Greek freedom flickered up again fitfully more than once. But the past was gone beyond recall: worn out by the internecine struggles of her leading states for pre-eminence, Greece could no longer stand alone. But a new and greater destiny awaited her; under the shield of the soldier king of Macedon she was to spread her civilisation, her arts, and culture over the Eastern world, and then over the West, where a race of mighty but rude conquerors were already beginning their career on the banks of the Tiber.

Dates.

SUPREMACY OF SPARTA.

	B.C.
The Thirty Tyrants at Athens,	404-3
The Expedition of the Ten Thousand,	401
The Spartans attack Persia,	399
Agesilaus sent to Asia,	396

War in Greece: Thebes and Athens against Sparta. Battle of Haliartus,	395
Corinthian War: Thebes, Athens, Argos and Corinth against Sparta. Agesilaus recalled from Asia. Battles of Corinth, Cnidus and Coronea. End of the Spartan Naval Supremacy,	394
Rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens, . . .	398
Peace of Antalcidas,	387
The Spartans seize the Theban Cadmea in time of peace,	382
The Thebans recover the Cadmea,	379
War: Athens and Thebes against Sparta. Athens founds a new Naval Confederacy,	378
Battle of Naxos,	376
Peace of Callias (Thebans excluded). Battle of Leuctra,	371

THEBAN SUPREMACY.

Epaminondas repulsed from Sparta. He frees Messenia and founds Megalopolis as capital of Arcadia,	370
The 'Tearless Battle.' Spartans against Arcadians,	367
Battle of Olympia: Arcadians against Eleans, .	364
Dispute between Mantinea and Tegea. Battle of Mantinea: Thebans and allies against Spartans, Athenians, and Mantineans. Death of Epaminondas,	362

RISE OF MACEDON.

Accession of Philip of Macedon,	359
Philip takes Amphipolis,	358
Social War: the allies of Athens revolt, . . .	357-5
Second Sacred War: against Phocians, . . .	357
Philip tries to invade Phocis, but is stopped at Thermopylæ by the Athenians,	352
Philip destroys the Olynthian Confederacy, .	350
Peace of Philocrates: Sacred War ended by the Conquest of Phocians by Philip,	349
Renewal of war between Athens and Philip, .	340
Third Sacred War: against Locrians. Philip	

marches into Greece : alliance of Thebes and Athens,	339
Battle of Chæronea : Philip acknowledged Head of Greece,	338
Murder of Philip. Accession of Alexander,	336
Revolt and Destruction of Thebes,	335
Alexander invades Persia,	334

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

<i>West.</i>	B.C.	<i>East.</i>	B.C.
Siege of Syracuse by the Carthaginians,	396	Artaxerxes Mnemon, king of Persia,	405-359
Capture of Rome by the Gauls,	390	Ochus,	359-336
First Samnite War,	343	Darius Codomannus,	336-330
Conquest of the Latins by Rome,	340		
Archidamus, king of Sparta, killed fighting in Italy,	338		

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ALEXANDER THE GREAT : OVERTHROW OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE


	<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B. C.</i>
Battle of the Granicus. Siege of Halicarnassus, .		334
Battle of Issus,		333
Sieges of Tyre and Gaza : Alexander in Egypt, .		332
Battle of Arbela. End of the Persian Empire, .		331
Death of Darius,		330

Chief Names.—Alexander, Darius, Memnon,
Parmenio, Bessus.

THE force with which Alexander began the wonderful series of campaigns, which shattered the empire founded by the great Cyrus, consisted of about thirty thousand infantry, of whom twelve thousand formed the phalanx and the rest were Greek hoplites, and five thousand cavalry, including the bodyguard of young nobles called the Companions : he had also a formidable train of siege engines, battering-rams, and catapults. Small as this force seemed for the gigantic enterprise before it, it proved amply sufficient. It was a thoroughly organised fighting machine of professional soldiers, ready to march anywhere and to undertake any kind of fighting ; and so its campaigns form a striking contrast to the puny efforts of the Spartan citizen-soldiers under Agesilaus.

The Persian Empire was at this time apparently stronger

than it had been for many years, for the late king, Ochus, had recently reconquered Phœnicia and Egypt. Darius Codomannus, the present king, succeeded to the throne, B.C. 336. A virtuous but weak king, he was not the man to cope with such an antagonist as Alexander. He had begun his preparations for defence when he first heard of Philip's hostile intentions, but had dropped them at the news of his murder. The Phœnician fleet, therefore, was not yet ready, and so Alexander was able to cross the Hellespont unopposed. Darius's ablest general was a



CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER (I.)

Rhodian named Memnon: his plan of action was not to fight Alexander, but to attack him with the fleet in Greece which would be certain to join the invaders. But the satrap of Phrygia who was in command disregarded this advice, and, with a large force of Persian cavalry and Greek mercenaries, confronted Alexander on the banks of the little

river **Granicus**. Alexander forced the passage of the river against the Persian cavalry, fighting himself bravely with his Companions, and being several times in danger of his life; and then surrounded and destroyed the Greek infantry. Appalled by this crushing defeat, Sardis and Ephesus threw open their gates; but Miletus relying on the Phœnician fleet, which had now arrived, held out; so formidable were the Phœnicians that Alexander would not let the Greek fleet engage them, and soon disbanded it as being of no further use. He took Miletus by means of his siege artillery, and then attacked Halicarnassus. Memnon who conducted the defence resisted desperately, but was at length compelled to abandon the city, carrying off as many of the inhabitants as he could. Memnon now attempted to put his original plan into execution: in the following spring he took Chios with the fleet, but died while besieging Mitylênē, and after his death his plan, which had roused great excitement in Greece, collapsed. After the capture of Halicarnassus, Alexander pushed on during the autumn and winter, reducing by his rapid marches all the country as far as Pamphylia, and then marched northward to **Gordium** in Phrygia, where he at last halted his army for their well-earned repose at the beginning of B.C 333. At Gordium was an ancient waggon, said by tradition to belong to Midas, son of Gordius, a mythical king of Phrygia. The yoke was fastened to the pole by a complicated knot; and he who could untie the knot would, according to an ancient prophecy, become the conqueror of Asia. Alexander, in the presence of a large crowd, attempted the task in vain; whereupon he drew his sword and cut the knot, and was at once hailed as the destined conqueror.

At the beginning of summer Alexander resumed his advance; the Cilician gates (see p. 236), as in the days of Cyrus and the Ten Thousand, were left undefended, and he reached Tarsus, where he nearly died of a chill from

bathing in the river Cydnus. On his recovery he continued his march towards Phœnicia and Egypt; where the coast-line turns southward the road runs through a long defile about two miles wide between the spurs of Mount Amānus and the sea; in this defile lay the town of *Issus*.

But Darius was now approaching with a host of 500,000 men, 30,000 of whom were Greek mercenaries and 60,000 Asiatics armed after the Greek fashion. Hoping to find Alexander still ill, he was pushing on towards Tarsus; and, crossing a pass in Mount Amanus, he descended to Issus a few days after the Macedonian army had passed. Alexander immediately faced about and advanced against him; owing to the narrowness of the ground, Darius could only bring into action a quarter of his force, consisting of the best troops, the remainder being massed in rear; a little river protected his front. Alexander charged across the stream with his Macedonian cavalry against the Persian hoplites on the left, who quickly broke and fled; after completing their rout he fell upon the left flank and rear of the Greeks in the centre, who, from the nature of the ground, had successfully resisted the attack of the Phalanx. Seeing the defeat of his left wing, Darius, in terror for his life, rode from the field; the Greeks, attacked on two sides at once, broke and fled, except 8000 who bravely fought their way through the foe and escaped by sea to Egypt; and the Macedonians fell upon the crowded and defenceless mob in the rear and slaughtered them like sheep, numbers being trampled under foot in their vain attempt to escape from their relentless pursuers. Darius, with a few thousand fugitives, escaped over Mount Amanus to the Euphrates. But his army was destroyed, his camp and military chest were taken, and his wife, sister, mother, and two daughters fell into Alexander's hands, who treated them with all respect and courtesy. The Macedonian loss in killed and

wounded was under one thousand, Alexander himself being slightly wounded (November, B.C. 333).

After this prodigious victory Alexander renewed his march towards Phœnicia. Of the two great Phœnician cities Sidon welcomed him gladly, but Tyre closed its gates. Then ensued the famous **siege of Tyre**, which lasted eight months (December 333 to July 332). The city of Tyre was situated on an island, fortified with enormous walls, about three-quarters of a mile from the shore. Having no fleet, Alexander set to work to build a mole across the strait; this was a work of incredible difficulty owing to the continual attacks of the Tyrian ships; and, when it was nearly completed, the Tyrians destroyed it and all Alexander's engines by means of fireships. Nothing daunted, he began to build the mole again, and collected a fleet from Sidon and Cyprus, which totally defeated the Tyrian fleet. After this resistance was hopeless. The mole was finished: Tyre was stormed with fearful slaughter, and the survivors sold into slavery. During the siege came an **embassy from Darius** offering all the country west of the Euphrates, the hand of his daughter in marriage, and 10,000 talents as ransom for his family. These terms were discussed in a council of war: 'I would accept them if I were Alexander,' said Parmenio. 'So would I if I were Parmenio,' replied Alexander, and contemptuously rejected the offer.

He encountered no further resistance except from the important Philistine city of Gaza, which he took after a siege of two months by building a mound right round it 150 feet high. From Gaza he is said by the Jewish historian Josêphus to have visited Jerusalem, intending to punish it for not sending him aid against Tyre; but being met outside the city by the venerable high priest Jaddua, he desisted from his purpose and offered sacrifice in the Temple.

Alexander reached **Egypt** in the autumn of B.C. 332, and was welcomed enthusiastically as its deliverer from the Persian yoke, the weak Persian garrison in Memphis surrendering. While in Egypt he founded **Alexandria** by joining the island of Pharos to the mainland by a mole ; Alexandria became the greatest Greek city in the East, rivalling Corinth in its trade and Athens in its learning, and to this day playing no unimportant part in European history. He also made a march through the desert to an oasis where was the Temple of Zeus Ammon, wishing, it is said, to ascertain whether, like his ancestors Heracles and Perseus, he also was of divine birth, and the priest hailed him as the son of the god and promised him a career of conquest.

Asia Minor, Palestine, and Egypt being now secured, the time had come for the advance to the Euphrates valley, the heart of the Persian Empire. Alexander left Egypt in the spring of B.C. 331, **crossed the Euphrates** in August by the ford of Thapsacus, the same which Cyrus and the Ten Thousand had used, then crossed the Tigris north of Nineveh, and learnt that Darius was at hand with a fresh army, with elephants and scythe-chariots, to try once more the fortune of war against the terrible invader. Supposing that his defeat at Issus had been caused by the narrowness of the ground, Darius had carefully selected for the battle-field a wide level plain on the east bank of the Tigris, about fifty miles from the city of **Arbēla**, which has given its name to the battle ; and there he lay encamped with a force, the numbers of which are variously stated from 250,000 to 1,000,000, awaiting the approach of Alexander.

Level plain or narrow defile however was all one to Alexander ; to prevent his small force being surrounded he simply drew up a second line in reserve. The night before the battle Parmenio came to him and suggested a night attack, but Alexander replied that he would only conquer

openly in fair fight ; the Persians, however, had remained under arms all night in expectation of such an attack, and were thus already wearied out when the time for fighting came.

The battle began by Darius sending some cavalry to outflank Alexander's right while the chariots attacked it in front, but the cavalry were defeated and the chariots driven back on the troops behind them ; then Alexander followed up the success by charging with his cavalry and phalanx at the Persian centre just where Darius was, and so terror-striking were the Macedonian charge and war-shout that, as at Issus, the wretched king turned his chariot and fled, and his flight was soon followed by his left wing and centre. Meanwhile Parmenio, on the Macedonian left, was hard pressed by the Persian right, which, by its superior numbers, nearly surrounded him ; and some Indian and Persian cavalry even forced their way through his line and attacked the camp in the rear ; but, in response to his appeal for aid Alexander brought up his victorious left wing, and the whole Persian army was in utter rout ; about forty thousand were left on the field, but the army was utterly ruined, and Darius himself was a fugitive among the mountains ; the Macedonian loss was, as usual, trifling, but many horses were lost in a vain attempt to overtake Darius. Such was the battle of Arbela which decided the destiny of Asia (September, B.C. 331). The empire founded by the great Cyrus had come to an end after lasting a little over two hundred years.

Babylon and **Susa** at once made their submission, and with them Alexander obtained an enormous treasure, over ten million pounds, the hoardings of the Persian kings. The Babylonians, like the Egyptians, welcomed him as a deliverer ; for they hated the Persians, who, being fire-worshippers, had persecuted their idolatrous worship and destroyed their temples ; but Alexander sacrificed to their


god and ordered the temples to be rebuilt. At Babylon he stayed a whole month, resting his weary soldiers and arranging the government of his empire ; for he now acted as king of Persia and set satraps over the different parts of the conquered territory, some Macedonians, others Persians who had surrendered.

Alexander then left Babylon (B.C. 331, autumn) to pursue and capture Darius and to conquer the remaining part of the Persian Empire, the vast region of mountain and desert stretching from the Tigris to the Indus, which is roughly comprised by modern Persia, Afghanistan, and Beloochistan. He did not see Babylon again for seven years.

The first halt was at Susa, where reinforcements of 15,000 men arrived from Macedonia. Thence, after severely chastising a barbarian tribe which barred his march, he pushed on for the province of Persis, the ancient home of the Persians. Ariobarzanes, the satrap of the province, tried to hold the Persian Gates, a narrow defile in the mountains, but Alexander destroyed his army by sending a force over a difficult mountain path to fall upon his rear. Persepolis, the chief treasury and one of the burial places of the Persian kings, surrendered, and Ariobarzanes was slain in attempting to carry off the treasure, which fell into the hands of Alexander to the almost incredible amount of twenty-seven million pounds. In revenge for the destruction of Athens by Xerxes, and enraged at the sight of 800 Greek prisoners horribly mutilated after the Persian fashion, Alexander set on fire the citadel with all the temples it contained, and let his soldiers loose on the city and its inhabitants to kill and plunder. With Persepolis also surrendered Pasargādæ, the ancient capital of the Persians and the burial-place of Cyrus.

From Persepolis Alexander now marched northward towards *Ecbatāna*, the old capital of the Medes, whither Darius had fled over the mountains from the fatal field of Arbela ; hearing of the approach of his relentless foe, he

fled eastwards, accompanied by a few thousand troops and by Bessus, satrap of Bactria (the country now called Balkh, north of Afghanistan); there he hoped that Alexander would leave him in peace. Alexander reached Ecbatana eight days after Darius had left; he made it his chief store-place and base of operations, leaving Parmenio there in command, with orders to hand the money (over £40,000,000) to his treasurer, Harpālus; then having reorganised his army to make it more suitable for its new kind of work, he hurried on in hot pursuit through the mountainous country south of the Caspian Sea. He hoped to overtake Darius before he had passed a long and difficult defile called the Caspian Gates; but not succeeding, he gave his exhausted troops five days' indispensable rest, and then started off again through the Gates. During his rapid flight Darius's forces had become greatly thinned by desertion; and Bessus, knowing, from his conduct at Issus and Arbela, that no effective resistance could be made under his command, made him a prisoner, loading him with chains of gold, and took the command upon himself. This news, brought to Alexander by Persian deserters of high rank, spurred Alexander to still greater efforts, for he feared that the king's life was in danger. Pushing on with a picked force, by incredible exertions he reached a village where the fugitives had encamped the previous day, and then learning that he might cut them off by a shorter route through a waterless desert, he rode forty-five miles by night and fell upon the unsuspecting Persians in the morning; the troops fled, Bessus tried to induce Darius to flee with them, but he refused, whereupon Bessus and his friends ran him through with their javelins and made off. When Alexander came up the **unhappy king was dead** (B.C. 330, summer). Vowing vengeance against Bessus for depriving him of his royal prisoner, Alexander sent the body of Darius to Persepolis and ordered it to be given a royal burial.



CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER (II.)

CHAPTER XXXIX

CONQUEST OF THE EAST : DEATH OF ALEXANDER

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Conquest of tribes South of the Caspian and of modern Afghanistan. Execution of Philotas and Parmenio,	330
Conquest of Bactria. Murder of Cleitus,	329
Conquest of Sogdiana,	328
Invasion of India. Defeat of Porus. Voyage down the Indus,	326
Return march of Alexander and Voyage of the Fleet from the Indus to the Euphrates,	325
Death of Alexander,	323

Chief Names.—Alexander, Philotas, Parmenio, Hephæstion, Roxana, Cleitus, Porus, Nearchus, Perdikkas.

AFTER a long halt, to reunite and rest his scattered and harassed troops, Alexander conquered the tribes on the southern shore of the Caspian and then turned his arms eastwards against Bessus, who had escaped to his satrapy. The autumn and winter were spent in the subjugation of the country now called Afghanistan; and near the modern Cabul Alexander founded a town called **Alexandria near the Caucasus** (for the Greeks thought that the Hindoo Koosh were a continuation of that range).

In the spring of B.C. 329 he **crossed the Hindoo Koosh** into Bactria, which submitted, and Bessus, unable to muster sufficient troops to resist, fled northwards into the district called Sogdiana. Alexander pressed after him across a hot

desert, and then transported his army over the river Oxus, three-quarters of a mile broad, on inflated tent-skins : a feat which so astonished the adherents of Bessus that they surrendered him. Alexander ordered the wretched satrap to be brought naked and in chains to the roadside, and, after upbraiding him for his murder of his master, sent him back to Bactria. Afterwards he cruelly cut off his nose and ears, and sent him to Ecbatana to be put to death by the Persians. From the Oxus Alexander proceeded northwards to the river Jaxartes, the northern boundary of the Persian Empire ; here, after a skirmish with the wild Scythians beyond that river, he founded another city to guard the frontier called ' Alexandria on the Jaxartes,' or **Furthest Alexandria**, probably the modern Khodjend. This was the limit of Alexander's northward march ; he remained two years in these wild regions, thoroughly subduing their savage inhabitants ; his most notable feat of arms was the storming of a precipitous mountain stronghold called the **Sogdian Rock** ; here he captured the family of a Bactrian chief, one of whose daughters, called Roxāna, was so beautiful that he soon afterwards married her.

This wonderful career of conquest demanded far greater military skill and endurance than the overthrow of the hordes of Darius, but it was marred by some atrocious crimes worse than the punishment of Bessus, which showed that beneath the brilliant exterior of the Macedonian conqueror there still lurked traces of the barbarian. From the time that he had become the master of Persia, Alexander, fascinated by the grandeur and wealth of that Empire, or, perhaps, wishing to please his Persian subjects, and so weld them and the Macedonians into an united people, had assumed Persian dress and manners, and tried to force them upon his officers. To this many of them, sturdy veterans of Philip's wars, strongly objected, as they did also to Alexander's claim to a divine birth, which they considered

an insult to their old master Philip. Among these malcontents was **Philotas**, commander of the Companions, and son of the old general Parmenio. It happened during the campaign on the Caspian that a conspiracy was formed against Alexander's life, and betrayed to Philotas, who omitted to tell Alexander; the plot was afterwards discovered and crushed. Alexander, who had long been aware of Philotas's sentiments, seized the opportunity, and, according to Macedonian custom, accused him before the army of being an accomplice in the plot, and he was condemned. Being put to torture before his execution, he is said to have confessed his guilt, and even implicated his father Parmenio; and so secret orders were sent to Ecbatana, where Parmenio was in the command, and the aged veteran was put to death: great indignation broke out among the troops at Ecbatana, and a mutiny was with difficulty averted. The command of the Companions was now divided and given to **Hephaestion** and **Cleitus**, the latter of whom had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus.

Cleitus was the cause of the second crime. At a banquet during the campaign beyond Bactria, when the revellers, including Alexander, had already drunk overmuch wine, and his flatterers were as usual extolling him as a god, Cleitus broke out and said words to which, in soberer moments, he would never have given utterance in Alexander's presence. 'Alexander is no Zeus-born hero; it is not he but Parmenio and the Macedonian army which have won the victories, and that army was made by Philip.' Then, turning to the infuriated Alexander, he cried: 'This is the hand that saved your life at the Granicus; if you do not like my words, go to your barbarian slaves, and do not ask Macedonian freemen to your table.' At this Alexander, wild with drunken rage, felt for his dagger to stab Cleitus, but his attendants had removed it. All was confusion. Some officers in terror tried to hurry Cleitus from the room,

others seized Alexander, but he shook himself free, snatched a spear from a soldier, and slew Cleitus on the spot, with the words, 'Go to Philip and Parmenio.' At once terrible remorse seized him : for three days he lay on his bed refusing food ; but at last the arguments of his officers, and a vote of the army to the effect that Cleitus had deserved his death, restored his peace of mind.

The third crime was the murder of the philosopher Callisthènes, an Olynthian, and nephew of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Alexander, who liked to encourage philosophy, literature, and art, was attended in his long marches by poets, historians, actors, and philosophers, and thus kept up the semblance of a court even in the wilds of Asia. Callisthenes offended Alexander by being too outspoken, and at a banquet he argued strongly against a fellow-philosopher, who made a speech extolling Alexander as a god ; and then, in the most public and marked way, he refused to prostrate himself, that being the way in which Alexander wished the divine honours to be paid. When, therefore, a conspiracy was discovered among the royal pages, Alexander revenged himself by accusing Callisthenes of being involved in it on no other grounds than that the chief conspirator was his friend ; and the unfortunate philosopher was tortured and hanged.

It was in the summer of B.C. 327, soon after this last disgraceful crime, that Alexander left Bactria, and turned southwards again. His object now was the conquest of **India**. Recrossing the Hindoo Koosh, he conquered the tribes in his path as far as the Indus, which he crossed in the spring of B.C. 326, and advanced into the district now called the Punjab. On the banks of the Hydaspes (the Jhelum), his passage was disputed by an **Indian monarch** named **Porus** with a large army and many elephants. Alexander with his usual skill forced the passage, and defeated Porus, who, after losing his two sons, was taken

fighting bravely: the elephants for a time caused great loss to the Macedonians, but soon they became unmanageable, and threw their own infantry into confusion.

When Porus was brought before him Alexander asked him how he wished to be treated. 'Like a king,' was the gallant reply, which so pleased Alexander that he restored him his dominions, and afterwards increased them by his fresh conquests. He founded two cities on the Hydaspes, Nicæa (the city of victory, *Níkaiā*) and Bucephala, in honour and in memory of his favourite charger Bucephalus who died there. He then advanced, conquering those tribes which did not submit as far as the Hypāsis (Sutlej), the easternmost of the five rivers of the Punjaub. Here his victorious career was brought to an end by the refusal of his army to advance any further; he appealed to their devotion; he offered to take only volunteers; he shut himself up for three days. But it was all in vain, the limits of human endurance had been reached; and, after erecting twelve altars on the bank of the Hypāsis to mark the limit of his conquests, he returned to the Hydaspes. He now busied himself in building and collecting a large fleet of 2000 vessels to sail down the Hydaspes and Indus, which he thought was the upper part of the Nile. The start was made in the autumn of B.C. 326: he himself with one division was on board the fleet, which was commanded by Nearchus, a Cretan, while another division marched on either bank; after a voyage of nine months, occupied by continual engagements with native tribes, the Indian Ocean was reached in the summer of B.C. 325, and Alexander discovered his mistake. Ordering Nearchus to sail to the mouth of the Euphrates along the coast, he started on his homeward march about August through the modern Beloochistan, the hot sandy deserts of which caused great suffering to the troops for sixty days; on one occasion, when the whole army was afflicted with thirst, a little water is said to have been found and brought

in a helmet to Alexander, but with noble self-restraint he poured it out on the sand, refusing to be better treated than his men. In February, B.C. 324, the army reached Susa, and the long series of marches and campaigns, the most wonderful the world has ever seen, were over.

Alexander now began to busy himself in settling and arranging the government of his great empire. His first task was to inquire into the conduct of the satraps, several of whom, during his prolonged absence, thinking perhaps that he would never return, had abused their high position to rob and ill-treat their subjects. Some were put to death, but one, the treasurer, Harpalus (see p. 316), who had been made satrap of Babylon, had already fled to Greece with five thousand talents and some mercenaries, and tried to stir up revolt. Then, still intent on his scheme of uniting the Persians and Macedonians, Alexander married a daughter of Darius and another Persian princess, in addition to his existing wife, Roxana, ordered his soldiers to take to themselves Persian wives, raised a force of 30,000 men from the most warlike of the tribes he had conquered, and introduced them into the Phalanx and cavalry, announcing his intention of sending the older soldiers home. These measures roused the greatest discontent in the army; a present of money to those who were in debt, said by the historian Arrian to have amounted to the incredible sum of 20,000 talents (£4,600,000), failed to appease it, and a mutiny broke out. Then Alexander withdrew himself from his army as he had done on the Hypasis: this time the plan succeeded, the soldiers came in tears and implored his forgiveness, they agreed to take Persian wives, and Alexander only set apart 10,000 of the oldest and feeblest to be sent back to Macedonia.

At Ecbatana, whither he proceeded from Susa, he lost his favourite officer, Hephæstion, who died of fever, brought on by the drunken revelry, which, as the story of Cleitus shows,

often followed the banquets of Alexander and his officers. His death, which came at the last very suddenly, filled Alexander with uncontrollable grief; he lay for hours without eating by the dead body of his friend, proclaimed a general mourning throughout the camp, put to death the physician who attended the patient, and sent the body to Babylon, where a huge funeral pyre, costing, it is said, the enormous sum of 10,000 talents (£2,300,000), was to be erected. In the winter Alexander found some relief to his sorrow in the excitement of a campaign against a savage mountain tribe, the Cossæi. He exterminated them after a six weeks' campaign, and started for Babylon, the capital of his empire (spring of B.C. 323); as he approached the city, he was met by embassies from the Grecian states, and from many foreign nations and tribes, whom the fame of his exploits had reached, Carthaginians, Etruscans, Gauls, Scythians, Æthiopians, and even, according to one account, the Romans themselves.

As he drew near to **Babylon** he was stopped by some Chaldean priests who warned him that their god Bel had told them that if he entered the city evil would follow, a warning which he naturally disregarded. He found at Babylon preparations in progress for the next enterprise which he was already planning, the conquest of Arabia by sea and land, and the docks on the Euphrates were filled with the new fleet that was being built for this purpose. With this fleet Alexander made a trial cruise on the Euphrates; on his return to Babylon he received 20,000 more troops from different tribes of Persia, which he incorporated in the Phalanx, keeping Macedonians in the first three ranks and in the rear rank. The time had now come for the funeral of Hephæstion, which was celebrated with vast expense and magnificence; but after the funeral feast which followed, Alexander was, like Hephæstion, seized with fever from the very same cause; he rapidly

grew worse and after eleven days died, in the thirty-third year of his age and the thirteenth of his reign (June, B.C. 323). On his last day, as he lay unable to move or speak, some of the soldiers were permitted to walk past his bed, that they might see him once more alive, and he could only recognise them with his eyes. As he left no children, the question arose who would be his successor, and his last act was to give his ring to his oldest general, **Perdiccas**.

Such was the end of the man, who, by the time he was thirty, had made himself the greatest conqueror that the world has ever seen. To his contemporaries his conquests must have seemed far more wonderful than they do to us. To his military skill he added an intrepid courage, a generous heart and great charm of manner, with a wonderful power of government and organisation : but beneath all lay concealed the savagery of his Macedonian birth, breaking out from time to time.

CHAPTER XL

GREECE DURING ALEXANDER'S REIGN : THE LAMIAN WAR

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Defeat of the Spartans by Antipater,	331
Speech of Demosthenes 'On the Crown,'	330
Harpalus at Athens,	324
Revolt of the Greeks : the Lamian War,	323
Battle of Crannon : submission of the Greeks.	
Death of Demosthenes,	322

Chief Names.—Antipater, Demosthenes, Æschines,¹
Leosthenes, Phocion.

THE exemplary punishment of Thebes by Alexander (see p. 305) made Antipater's task of keeping Greece quiet, on the whole, an easy one : the only trouble came from Sparta, which, having made no real effort to help Athens to resist Philip's aggressions, now in B.C. 331, when Alexander was in the midst of his victorious career, took up arms without any apparent hope of success. Reinforced by Greek mercenaries who had been serving under the Persians, and by many of the Arcadians, they besieged Megalopolis, but were totally defeated by Antipater with the loss of their king, Agis. How the Spartans were punished for this outbreak we do not know, but when the news of it reached Alexander, he is said to have observed to his officers, 'It seems, gentlemen, that, while we have been conquering Darius, there has been a battle of mice in Arcadia.' The following year at Athens, the duel between Demosthenes

and his rival, Æschines, which began at the time of the famous embassy to Philip (see p. 294), was brought to a conclusion; the year after Chæronea, a citizen named Ctesiphon proposed that a crown (or rather, a wreath) should be voted to Demosthenes for his great services to his country, whereupon Æschines prosecuted him for making an unconstitutional proposal (see p. 140, *γραφὴ παρανόμων*); but it was not till B.C. 330 that he ventured to bring the matter before the court of law. His speech 'against Ctesiphon' was really an attack on the whole policy of Demosthenes, who replied with such effect in the speech '**On the Crown**,' which may be regarded as the **funeral oration of Athenian liberty**, that Æschines did not obtain even one-fifth of the votes, and therefore, by the law of Athens, was liable to a fine of 1000 drachmæ (about £30); but sooner than pay the fine, and witness the triumph of his hated rival, he quitted Athens and ended his life as a teacher of rhetoric at Rhodes.

Six years after this memorable trial, Harpalus, fleeing from his satrapy of Babylon, to escape the wrath of Alexander (see p. 323), came to Athens. For some time he had been seeking to make himself popular among the Athenians by sending them presents of corn; he now tried to induce them to take up his cause, and for that purpose employed some of the treasure-money he had brought with him in bribery. But at this time Alexander had returned from his campaigns, and was at the height of his power, so that the risk seemed too great, even to Demosthenes, and he joined with Phocion in counselling the people to reject the overtures of Harpalus. A demand soon came from Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus; the Athenians at first refused, but afterwards threw him into prison, and lodged his treasure in the Acropolis. Harpalus escaped, probably with the connivance of the Athenians, and was murdered soon afterwards in Crete; but, when the

treasure was examined, it was found to be only half the original sum stated by Harpalus ; several of the orators, including Demosthenes, were accused of having received bribes, and Demosthenes, though he had acted against Harpalus, was convicted, unjustly we must hope, and went into banishment.

Within a year came the news of Alexander's death. Greece was at once in a ferment of excitement. The patriotic party at Athens regained their ascendancy, and, in spite of the protest of Phocion, it was resolved to prepare for war and make every effort for liberty. Envoys were sent to all the states of Greece : Sparta, still crippled by her last ill-timed effort, refused her aid, as did the Arcadians, who looked to the Macedonians as their protectors as formerly Thebes had been. But many of the smaller states sent contingents ; a considerable army under Leosthènes, an Athenian general, advanced through the pass of Thermopylæ, and defeated Antipater a little north of it, owing to the desertion of his Thessalian cavalry (B.C. 323). Unbounded was the joy at Athens at this success, and Demosthenes, who in his exile had been working in aid of the revolt, was recalled and received an enthusiastic welcome.

Antipater, after his defeat, threw himself into the neighbouring town of Lamia, whence this war is called the **Lamian War**. Leosthenes was killed in the siege of Lamia : reinforcements came pouring in from Asia, and after one more victory the Greeks were finally defeated near **Crannon**, a town in the centre of Thessaly (August B.C. 322). The battle, in spite of the superior numbers of Antipater, was not very decisive ; but one by one the Greek states became alarmed, and made terms, and soon Athens, exposed to the invasion of the whole Macedonian army, was obliged to submit. Phocion negotiated the terms of submission, which were, that a **Macedonian garrison should be admitted into**

Munychia, Demosthenes and the other patriotic orators surrendered, and the poorer citizens should be deprived of their citizenship and banished from Attica. In accordance with this provision 12,000 citizens were transported to Thrace, Africa, and Italy, while 9000 remained in Attica. Phocion and his party were now supreme at Athens, supported by Antipater. **Demosthenes** fled, but, unable to escape the emissaries of Antipater, he **took poison** which he had concealed in a writing-reed. Thus, after a lifelong struggle against the rising power of Macedon, the danger of which he was the first to see, died the greatest orator and one of the most patriotic statesmen of Greece. He lived long enough to see the utter failure of all his hopes, and his beloved Athens humbled by the presence of a foreign garrison.

CHAPTER XLI

THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER

<i>Dates</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Coalition of the other Generals against Perdiccas.	
Perdiccas murdered by Seleucus, who obtains his dominions,	321
Cassander seizes Greece and Macedonia,	318
Coalition of the other Generals against Antigonus,	316
Demetrius Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus, takes Athens,	307
Antigonus assumes the title of King,	306
Battle of Ipsus: Death of Antigonus. Lysimachus and Seleucus divide his kingdom, . .	301
Demetrius seizes Macedonia,	294
Demetrius driven out by Pyrrhus, king of Epirus.	
Pyrrhus driven out by Lysimachus,	287
Lysimachus defeated and slain by Seleucus, . .	281
Invasion of the East by the Gauls,	280
Antigonus, son of Demetrius, seizes Macedonia, .	278
Antigonus driven out by Pyrrhus,	274
Death of Pyrrhus: Antigonus recovers Macedonia,	272
 <i>Chief Names</i> —Perdiccas, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Lysimachus, Antipater, Eumenes, Seleucus, Cassander, Demetrius, Poliorcetes, Pyrrhus, Antigonus, Gonatas.	

IN Asia, as might be expected, all was confusion. Soon after Alexander's death Roxana gave birth to a son, to whom the name Alexander was given, and for whom she was anxious to secure the succession, and he also left a half-brother named Philip Arrhidæus, who, however, was

half-witted. The leading generals were all aiming at the throne, and naturally jealous of one another; and Alexander's mother Olympias, who on his death fled to her native Epirus owing to her bitter enmity against Antipater, had also ambitious designs. Thus there ensued a long period of intrigue, murder, and war, till at length from the ruins of Alexander's empire there arose **three kingdoms**: (1) **Macedonia** with Greece, (2) **Syria**, including most of the old Persian Empire, and (3) **Egypt**.

The first arrangement was that Perdiccas should govern Babylon and the East as regent on behalf of Philip Arrhidæus and the infant Alexander, while of the other generals Ptolemy held Egypt as satrap, Antigonus Asia Minor and Syria, Lysimachus Thrace, Antipater Macedonia, and a Greek named Eumenes was given the still unsubdued country south of the Euxine.

The troubles began with the murder by Roxana of Alexander's other wife Statira, the daughter of Darius. Then **Perdiccas began to intrigue for the throne**; supported by Eumenes he made an alliance with Olympias on the understanding that he should marry her daughter Cleopatra (see p. 303), now a widow. Immediately the other generals led by Antigonus combined against Perdiccas and Eumenes, and civil war broke out; Antipater invaded from the Hellespont, but his army was defeated by Eumenes, a most able soldier; Perdiccas, however, after an unsuccessful attempt against Ptolemy in Egypt, was murdered by his own troops under an officer named Seleucus, owing to his unpopularity. Antipater now became regent, and Seleucus was rewarded with the satrapy of Perdiccas. The war was continued against Eumenes; he fought bravely and skilfully, but, weakened by the treachery of his Macedonian officers, who hated him as a Greek, was at last compelled to take refuge in a fortress.

In B.C. 318 Antipater died, and left as regent after him

not his son Cassander, but a general named Polysperchon. Thereupon Cassander obtained the support of Antigonus, and at once began to intrigue against Polysperchon; he succeeded in placing one of his own officers in command of the Macedonian garrison of Munychia, and by the aid, it is said, of Phocion obtained possession of the Peiræus, thus drawing Athens into this miserable strife. Polysperchon tried to win over the Greeks by restoring the free governments which Antipater had overthrown after the Lamian war, and by recalling the exiles. The Athenian exiles came back very bitter against Phocion, whom they considered the cause of their exile; he was accused of treason, for helping Cassander, and fled to Polysperchon, who was now in Greece. But Polysperchon, who was anxious to please the Athenians, in order to obtain possession of the Peiræus, gave him up. He and four friends were brought to Athens, and condemned to death by a vast majority; his last words to his son before his death were, 'Tell him not to think evil of the Athenians' (B.C. 317). Phocion was eighty-five years old at the time of his death; his one aim had been to do his duty to his country, but he thought that that duty consisted in securing it peace and prosperity, not in maintaining a hopeless struggle for foreign dominion, or even political freedom; therefore he was content to see Athens gradually fall under the Macedonian yoke, and even helped in holding her in subjection.

Cassander now arrived in Greece with a fleet and army obtained from Antigonus; he defeated Polysperchon and restored the Peiræus to the Athenians, who thereupon espoused his cause; but they gained little from the change, for Cassander set up an oligarchical government under a man named Demetrius of Phalerum. Polysperchon retreated from Greece, and joined Olympias, who, with Roxana and the infant Alexander, was still in Epirus. In the spring of B.C. 317 they invaded Macedonia, and seized Philip

Arrhidæus and his wife, who had taken the side of Cassander. Olympias had them cruelly put to death, and then took vengeance on all Cassander's relations and adherents. But next year Cassander invaded Macedonia, besieged the royal ladies in Pydna, and forced them to surrender. The savage Olympias he put to death ; Roxana and the infant king he shut up in Amphipolis. Of Polysperchon little more is heard.

Meanwhile, in Asia, the gallant Eumenes had again been fighting desperately for the royal family against the overwhelming forces of Antigonus ; but a second time the treachery of his officers ruined him ; he was betrayed to Antigonus and put to death, B.C. 316. His death left **Antigonus** so powerful that he, like Perdiccas, began to aim at mounting the throne of Alexander ; whereupon the other generals, including Cassander, attacked him just as they had before attacked Perdiccas (B.C. 315). For four years a fierce war raged, in which the unhappy Greeks suffered as usual. Neither side won any decisive success, and in B.C. 311, exhausted by the struggle, they made peace. Antigonus was to be supreme in Asia, and Cassander was to have Macedonia until the infant Alexander came of age ; whereupon he sent to Amphipolis, and had him and his mother put to death (B.C. 311). Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, who was to have married Perdiccas, still survived, but in B.C. 308 she was murdered by Antigonus, when about to go to Egypt to marry his rival Ptolemy, and the family of Alexander the Great was blotted out.

The war broke out again after a year's peace, and in B.C. 307 Demetrius, son of Antigonus, sailed to Greece and seized the Peiræus with his fleet, before Demetrius of Phalerum, Cassander's adherent, could stop him. Having declared that he had come to free Athens from the yoke of Cassander, he won over the Athenians, and Demetrius of

Phalerum fled into exile. Then, having stormed Munychia and destroyed its fortifications, that it might never more be a menace to the Athenians, he made his entry into the city; he was received with a most enthusiastic welcome, and the degenerate Athenians paid divine honours to both him and his father, Antigonus. The next year he sailed to Cyprus and besieged the town of Salamis, where he won a great naval victory over Ptolemy, who was coming to its relief. Encouraged by his son's great success, **Antigonus assumed the title of king**, and his example was at once followed by the other generals. Demetrius, after an unsuccessful attempt on Egypt, then attacked Rhodes as a punishment for not helping him in Cyprus. His siege of Rhodes lasted for a whole year, and, owing to the novelty and vastness of the engines employed, gained for him the name of Poliorcètes (*Πολιορκητής*, the besieger); but all his efforts were baffled, so he made peace with the Rhodians and returned to Greece. There he drove back Cassander, who was besieging Athens, and defeated him near Thermopylæ. But, in B.C. 301, he and his father were totally defeated by Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy at **Ipsus** in Phrygia. Antigonus was killed at the age of eighty-one, and Demetrius Poliorcètes became for a time a wanderer, even Athens now refusing to receive him. Lysimachus and Seleucus divided the territories of Antigonus between them; Lysimachus taking most of Asia Minor, and Seleucus Syria, where he founded the great sea-port of Seleucia, named after himself, and twelve miles inland, the still more famous Antioch (named after his father), which he made his capital. Cassander kept Macedonia and Greece. Athens again fell into his hands, and he sent a man named Lachares over the government, who proved a cruel tyrant. Thus the number of kingdoms was reduced to four, Macedonia, Thrace, Syria with the East, Egypt.

Seleucus and Ptolemy were now firmly established in the

kingdoms which they had carved out for themselves with the sword, and both founded dynasties which ruled in Syria and Egypt until they fell before the advancing power of Rome. The descendants of Seleucus in Syria bore either his name or that of his father, Antiochus; these were the kings against whom the Jews fought so bravely for their religious liberty under Judas Maccabæus and his famous brothers. These kings of Syria did not long retain the distant Eastern conquests of Alexander. The first to go was the Punjaub kingdom, over which Alexander had made the noble-minded Porus king. After the death of Alexander there was confusion in this kingdom; Porus was murdered and the throne seized by an usurper, who threw off his allegiance to the Macedonians. Seleucus, whose energies were occupied with this war against Antigonos, was obliged to acknowledge the independence of this new kingdom, which increased till it embraced all the north of India, and had a most flourishing existence for some centuries. Then, about B.C. 250, Bactria, Sogdiana, and the neighbouring countries revolted and founded another kingdom; soon after which, the Parthians, a tribe of savage archers, dwelling in the deserts south-east of the Caspian, revolted, and set up a barbarian kingdom, which gradually conquered all its neighbours, and extended from the Euphrates to the borders of India, defying even the mighty power of the Roman Empire.

Macedonia was for some time longer the scene of discord and bloodshed. Cassander himself died in possession of the kingdom (B.C. 297); but, after the death of his eldest son, Philip (B.C. 295), a dispute arose between his two younger sons, Antipater and Alexander. Alexander appealed for aid to Demetrius Poliorcètes, who, having given his daughter in marriage to Seleucus, had recovered from his downfall, and had lately taken Athens after a long and terrible siege. Demetrius marched into Macedonia,

caused Alexander to be assassinated, and made himself king (B.C. 294). This act of aggression brought against him a coalition of the other kings, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy, aided by **Pyrrhus**, a young Epirot prince, related to Olympias, who had lately won for himself the throne of Epirus, and who afterwards became famous from his war against Rome. Pyrrhus had been a comrade of Demetrius and fought on his side at Ipsus, but, having taken up the cause of Antipater, now fought against him. Demetrius was at length driven out of Macedonia after a seven years' reign (B.C. 287), and, falling into the hands of his son-in-law, Seleucus, was kept in honourable captivity until his death (B.C. 283). Pyrrhus tried to make himself king, but after seven months was driven out by Lysimachus, who added Macedonia to his existing dominions, thus reducing the number of kingdoms to **three**. But a war broke out between him and Seleucus, and he was defeated and slain (B.C. 281) at the age of eighty. Seleucus thus added Asia Minor to his dominions, but before he could take possession of Macedonia, he was treacherously murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus, an exiled son of Ptolemy of Egypt, whom he had befriended (B.C. 280). He was succeeded in his kingdom by his son Antiochus. Ptolemy Ceraunus now seized the Macedonian throne, but almost immediately he was slain in battle against the **Gauls**; who at this time invaded the East in great hordes, and finally crossing into Asia Minor, settled in the district which was called after them, **Galatia**.

After two years of confusion, Antigonus Gonatas, son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, seized the throne of Macedonia in B.C. 278, but was driven out in B.C. 274 by Pyrrhus, who, returning defeated from Italy, tried to console himself by conquest at home. The war between the two rivals continued in Greece; Pyrrhus attacked Argos, to the relief of which Antigonus came, and, in the

street fighting that ensued, Pyrrhus was struck by a tile, hurled by a woman from a house-top, and died (B.C. 272). Antigonus now established himself firmly on the Macedonian throne, and his successors ruled there until they also were overthrown by the Romans, as will be described presently.

Thus the career and conquests of Alexander resulted in the extinction of the royal dynasty of Macedonia, and the rise of three half-Greek kingdoms, **Macedonia**, **Syria** and **Egypt**, on the thrones of which sat the descendants of his three generals, Antigonus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy.

CHAPTER XLII

THE ACHÆAN AND ÆTOLIAN LEAGUES AND CONQUEST OF GREECE BY THE ROMANS

<i>Dates.</i>	B.C.
Rise of the Achæan League,	280
Rise of the Ætolian League, (about)	250
Sparta attacks the Achæan League. Battle of Sellasia. End of the Spartan Monarchy,	221
Philip v., king of Macedonia, defeats the Ætolian League,	217
Alliance between Ætolian League and Rome,	211
Battle of Cynoscephalæ,	197
Proclamation of the Freedom of Greece by Flamininus,	196
Battle of Magnesia,	190
Battle of Pydna. Macedonia made a Roman Province,	168
Mummius destroys Corinth. Greece made part of the Province of Macedonia,	146
Syria made a Roman Province,	63
Egypt made a Roman Province,	30

Chief Names.—Aratus, Cleomenes, Philip v., Flamininus,
Philopemen, Perseus, Mummius, Mithridates, Cleopatra.

THE confusion and troubles which attended the foundation of this second kingdom of Macedonia naturally weakened its hold on Greece, and permitted the rise of two independent powers, the **Achæan and Ætolian Leagues**, which for about a century kept alive the expiring flame of Greek liberty.

The Achæans, on the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, have as yet hardly been mentioned, so insignificant a part did they play in Greek politics ; but when the great states, Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, had exhausted their energies, the cities of Achæa began to assert themselves, and in B.C. 280 reconstituted the federal league which had once existed among them, and declared themselves independent. In B.C. 251 the Dorian city of Sicyon was brought into the league by its leading citizen, *Arātus*, an able statesman, and a brave, though not very successful, general. Aratus was repeatedly elected Strategus (President and Commander-in-chief) of the League and raised it to considerable power ; he surprised Corinth by night and united it to the League. Athens and several cities and states of the Peloponnese also joined the League, but Sparta, according to her usual practice, held aloof from any combination.

North of the Corinthian Gulf, the Ætolian mountain tribes, less refined but braver than the Achæans, also revived an ancient league, which grew till it included most of Northern Greece, and had alliances with some Peloponnesian cities.

There was great jealousy between the Leagues, and the Achæans had another bitter enemy in Sparta. Sparta, which, as has been mentioned, had preserved her independence even during the reign of Alexander, owing to her strong and remote position, had fallen into a sadly degenerate state on account of the growth of luxury and the decay of the institutions of Lycurgus. In B.C. 244 Agis iv. became one of the kings, and attempted to reform the state by re-establishing the institutions of Lycurgus and other changes ; but he met with great resistance from his colleague, Leonidas, and the wealthy Spartans, and was thrown into prison and put to death (B.C. 240). Leonidas was succeeded by his son, *Cleomenes* III. (B.C. 236), the last great Spartan. The son of Agis

now returned to Sparta, but was put to death by his father's enemies, according to some accounts by Cleomenes himself, and with him one of the two royal families came to an end. Cleomenes, however, though the son of Agis's opponent, successfully carried out the reforms which he had attempted; and, as a result, the strength of Sparta was greatly increased. Cleomenes next attacked the Achæan League, in order to regain the Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese: and thus the closing years of Greek freedom were cursed by the fatal spirit of disunion which brought into conflict two great statesmen, Cleomenes and Aratus, who, fighting side by side, might have driven the Macedonians out of Greece.

So hard pressed was Aratus by the military skill of Cleomenes and renewed vigour of Sparta, that he was at last driven to the humiliating course of calling in Antigonos Doson, the king of Macedonia, and on the fatal field of *Sellasia* in Arcadia, Cleomenes was totally defeated, and Sparta, for the first time in her history, taken (B.C. 221). Cleomenes himself fled to Egypt, where he put an end to his own life (B.C. 220); with him ended the second royal line, and Sparta fell under the sway of a series of usurping tyrants, and sank to an even lower point than before the reforms of Cleomenes.

The Achæans continued their struggles with the Ætolians, and had a powerful but dangerous ally in Philip v., who succeeded to the throne of Macedonia (B.C. 220). He defeated the Ætolians and made peace with them (B.C. 217), but in B.C. 213, fearing that Aratus might be an obstacle to his ambitious designs, he caused him to be murdered. Now, however, a mightier power was beginning to appear on the scene: the great republic on the Tiber, which sixty years before had given Pyrrhus such a rude reception in Italy. Since the defeat of Pyrrhus, Rome had waged a long and victorious war against the Carthaginians, the old enemies of the Greeks of Sicily, and had made Sicily itself a Roman

Province. Her arms might at any moment be expected in Greece; but, at the time of Philip's accession, Rome was again assailed by the Carthaginians under their great soldier, Hannibal, and such wonderful reports came to Greece of the great victories won by Hannibal in Italy that **Philip made an alliance with the Carthaginians** and declared war against Rome. The Romans accordingly made alliance with the Ætolians (B.C. 211), but they were too much occupied with their desperate struggle for existence against Hannibal to undertake anything of importance in Greece; when, however, after their great victory at Zama, they had dictated peace to Carthage (B.C. 201), they renewed the war against Philip, and, for the first time, a consular army of Roman legionaries trod the soil of Greece. After some indecisive campaigns, the two armies met at **Cynoscephalæ** in Thessaly; the legion proved again its superiority over the phalanx. Philip was totally defeated, and obtained peace on condition of abandoning Greece and all his possessions outside Macedonia (B.C. 197). The next year at the Isthmian Games, the Roman consul, Flamininus, proclaimed amid universal enthusiasm that Greece again was free. But this gift of freedom was a mere mockery; Greece, delivered from Macedonia, was now absolutely in the power of Rome. The first to feel her heavy hand were the Ætolians; these ignorant mountaineers believing that they, not the Romans, had had the greater share in the conquest of Philip were grievously disappointed when the peace brought them no addition of territory. When, therefore, the Roman army left Greece, they appealed for aid to Antiochus, surnamed the Great, king of Syria, who was already at variance with Rome. In B.C. 192 Antiochus came to Greece, but, after a defeat at Thermopylæ, he was driven out, and in the great battle of **Magnesia**, [near Ephesus, the Romans totally defeated him, with hardly any loss to themselves (B.C. 190).

Antiochus was obliged to accept peace on humiliating terms; and the Ætolians, left without an ally, were driven into the town of Ambracia, where, after a gallant resistance, they were compelled to surrender, and became the subject allies of Rome (B.C. 189). Such was the end of the Ætolian League.

Meanwhile, in the Achæan League, after the death of Aratus a still greater statesman had come to the front. This was **Philopœmen**, a native of Megalopolis. He fought successfully against the tyrants of Sparta; but he was wise enough not to come into conflict with the Romans, whose great power he fully recognised. Therefore in the war between Rome and Philip, when the Romans proposed alliance with the Achæans, he persuaded them to accept it, although there was a large party in favour of Macedon; he also aided the Romans again in their war against Antiochus and the Ætolians.

He succeeded at last in inducing Sparta, which had lately got rid of the last of its tyrants, to join the League (B.C. 192); and its example was followed by Elis and Messenia. But a quarrel soon broke out and the Spartans declared their independence; then Philopœmen marched against Sparta and took it; he restored the exiles driven out by the tyrants and expelled the mercenaries whom they had introduced; and having destroyed the walls, and abolished the Spartan laws, united the city again to the Achæan League. Not long afterwards the Messenians also left the League; and Philopœmen attacking them was defeated, taken prisoner, and put to death by poison. Thus, in his seventy-first year, died the last great Greek statesman. The Achæans avenged his death by capturing Messene the next year, and compelled the Messenians to rejoin the League (B.C. 183).

Philip died in B.C. 179, having during the latter years of his reign re-organised his army in order to try conclusions once

more with Rome. He was succeeded by his son **Perseus**, the last king of Macedon, who continued the warlike preparations ; and the Romans becoming alarmed declared war on him (B.C. 171). Both the Ætolian and Achæan Leagues were forced to help them, and in B.C. 168 Perseus was totally defeated in the **battle of Pydna** ; he fled from the field but was captured, and, after being led in the triumphal procession of the victorious general, dragged out a few years of miserable existence in Italy, dying, according to some accounts, of self-starvation. The ancient realm of Macedon, the kingdom of Philip and Alexander which first trampled on the liberties of Greece, was broken up into four districts inhabited only by wretched husbandmen, and all the officers and leading men were carried off to Italy. Later on Macedon was made into a single Roman Province.

After the battle of Pydna, the Romans set up their partisans in all the states of Greece. In the Achæan League there had always been a large party hostile to Rome, and the Romans, on the charge of lukewarmness in the war against Perseus, carried off a thousand of the leading men to Italy, among whom was the historian **Polybius**, our chief authority for the history of the time. Polybius became friendly with several of the leading Romans, and by his influence the exiles at length obtained leave to return to their native land (B.C. 150). They found Greece in a wretched state, poverty-stricken, and torn by petty dissensions.

The Achæan League very soon became involved in a fresh quarrel with Sparta, and both sides appealed to Rome. The Romans after some delay sent an ambassador to Corinth, who proclaimed that Sparta, Corinth, and all other states which were not Achæan must leave the League. This produced a furious burst of indignation, and the League determined to fight ; but it was no match for the Roman legions. The Greeks were easily defeated, the final battle taking place at the Isthmus ; after which the Roman

general **Mummius took Corinth**, and, by the express orders of the Senate, utterly destroyed it ; all the inhabitants who had not already fled were slain or sold into slavery : the pictures, statues, and other works of art were carried off to Rome. A few of the leaders of the revolt were put to death, but otherwise the Romans took no cruel vengeance. They left each state its own government ; but they were obliged to disband their armies and pay tribute, and all were subject to the Governor of Macedonia (B.C. 146).

The Roman Conquest came as a relief to most of the Greeks, weary of the wretched bickerings of the petty states which kept the country in a perpetual state of unrest. For many years there was peace, the Roman wars were in the West ; but in B.C. 90, Mithridates, an able barbarian who ruled over the kingdom of Pontus in south-east shore of the Euxine, rose against Rome and overran Asia Minor, massacring in one day, it is said, 80,000 Romans. From Asia Minor he came to Greece, and many of the Greeks, including Athens, joined him as a deliverer. But the famous Roman general Sulla soon came, beat Mithridates in two great battles in Boeotia, and drove him out of Greece ; and Athens was besieged and stormed. The East still continued in a disturbed state ; the Mediterranean and *Ægean* swarmed with pirates, and Mithridates broke out again ; till at last the Romans commissioned their great general Pompeius to restore order. He speedily cleared the sea of the pirates, and finally crushed Mithridates ; he then put an end to the kingdom of Syria which had been left independent after the battle of Magnesia, but had been growing feebler and feebler ever since, and made it into a Roman Province (B.C. 63.)

Egypt, the last of the kingdoms founded by Alexander's generals, still survived, being preserved by its remoteness from the attacks of the Romans. The line of the Ptolemies ended with the beautiful but wicked queen Cleopatra,

whose fatal fascination enslaved the Roman Antonius and lost him the victory in his struggle for Empire with Octavius. After their defeat in the great sea-fight of Actium, the queen and her lover committed suicide, and Octavius made Egypt a Roman Province (B.C. 30).

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND CONQUEST OF THE
EAST BY THE ROMANS.

	B. C
Alexander invades Persia. Battle of the Granicus,	334
Battle of Issus,	333
Battle of Arbela,	331
Death of Darius. End of the Persian Monarchy,	330
Alexander in India,	326
Death of Alexander. Lamian War in Greece, .	323
Battle of Crannon,	322
Murder of Perdiccas. Commencement of Wars among the Generals,	321
Antigonus assumes the title of King,	306
Battle of Ipsus,	301
Revival of the Achæan League in Greece, . .	280
Antigonus Gonatas makes himself King of Macedonia,	272
Battle of Sellasia: end of the Spartan Monarchy,	221
Battle of Cynoscephalæ,	197
Proclamation of Greek Freedom by Flamininus, .	196
Battle of Magnesia,	190
Battle of Pydna. Macedonia made a Roman Province,	168
Syria made a Roman Province,	63
Egypt made a Roman Province,	30

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.

The West.

	B. C.
Conquest of the Samnites by Rome,	290
Defeat of Pyrrhus by Rome,	275
Conquest of Southern Italy by Rome,	272
First Punic War between Rome and Carthage, .	264-242
Second Punic War,	218-202
Destruction of Carthage,	146

CHAPTER XLIII

SICILY AND THE WEST

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>B.C.</i>
Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians,	409
Capture of Agrigentum,	406
Dionysius makes himself Tyrant of Syracuse,	405
Siege of Syracuse by the Carthaginians,	396
Dionysius succeeded by Dionysius the Younger,	367
Timoleon comes to Syracuse and expels Dionysius,	344
Battle of the Crimissus,	339
Archidamus killed fighting for Tarentum against the Lucanians,	338
Agathocles makes himself Tyrant of Syracuse,	317
Tarentum invites Pyrrhus to help it against Rome,	282
Defeat of Pyrrhus. Conquest of Italian Greeks by Rome,	272
Hiero becomes King of Syracuse,	270
The Romans drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily,	242
Death of Hiero,	216
Siege of Syracuse by the Romans,	210
Sicily made a Roman Province,	201

Chief Characters.—Dionysius, Dionysius the Younger, Dion,
Timoleon, Agathocles, Archidamus, Alexander of
Epirus, Pyrrhus, Hiero, Hieronymus.

It is now time to trace the fortunes of the Greeks in Sicily during the years succeeding the great deliverance of Syracuse from the invading armament of Athens (B.C. 413). Overjoyed as the Syracusans were at their crowning triumph,

they were destined for many years to come to suffer troubles far greater than an Athenian dominion would have inflicted, and from which it might have saved them,—troubles from discord and tyranny at home, and from the Carthaginian foe without. Gelo's great victory at Himera (B.C. 480 ; see p. 115), and perhaps the great naval power of Athens had kept Carthage, during seventy years, from making any attacks on Sicily, where she only retained the important sea-port of Panormus and one or two other towns. But in B.C. 409, four years after the defeat of the Athenians, **Carthaginians came again** ; and the struggle which now began, and was marked by horrible ferocity and appalling loss of life, lasted with interruptions over a hundred years, and resulted, after many changes of fortune, in the conquest by the Carthaginians of the western part of the island ; nor did it finally end until both sides fell before the rising power of Rome, about a hundred years before their fellow-countrymen in Greece shared the same fate.

The cause of the renewed invasion of the Carthaginians was the same fatal quarrel between Selinus and Egesta which had brought the Athenians to Sicily (see p. 189). The Egestæans, deprived of the protection of the Athenians, and again hard pressed by Selinus, appealed in despair to Carthage ; and Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar who fell at Himera, came with a huge host of over 100,000 mercenaries ; after taking and ruthlessly sacking first Selinus and then Himera, where he slaughtered 3000 prisoners as a sacrifice to the spirit of his grandfather, he sailed off. Three years later he returned and besieged Agrigentum, the second city of the island : a large army from Syracuse and other cities was collected in its defence, desperate fighting took place, a horrible pestilence broke out in the crowded Carthaginian camp which carried off Hannibal himself, but his colleague Himilco, in the end, took the city by famine and utterly destroyed it, most of the inhabitants escaping (B.C. 406).

The Syracusans were greatly annoyed at this defeat, and a young and energetic man named **Dionysius**, taking advantage of this feeling, persuaded them to depose the generals and nominate him sole general (B.C. 405). Armed with this power, he next obtained a bodyguard of mercenaries and so made himself **tyrant of Syracuse**, expelling or slaying all his political opponents, and, amid many vicissitudes of fortune, maintained his position for thirty-eight years till his death. Being unsuccessful against the Carthaginians he made peace, giving up to them the west of Sicily with Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus on condition that they recognised him as ruler of Syracuse. To secure himself against his subjects he strongly fortified Ortygia (see map p. 194), making it a citadel from which he could command the rest of the city. He extended his power over all the east of Sicily and then began to prepare for another war with Carthage; to secure the city against a siege he enclosed the whole of Epipolæ with fortifications; he levied fresh troops, made fresh docks, and built a new fleet of ships of five and four banks of oars (quinqueremes and quadriremes) instead of the old-fashioned triremes. Then he declared war, and the Greek subjects of the Carthaginians rose in revolt and cruelly massacred them in revenge for the sack of Selinus and Himera. Dionysius advanced to the west of Sicily and obtained some success, but Himilco landed with an army from Carthage, drove Dionysius back to Syracuse, defeated the Syracusan fleet, and besieged Syracuse itself. The Syracusans were very bitter against Dionysius for his failure, and his position was for a time critical, but fortunately a pestilence broke out in the besieging army crowded together in the damp marsh land in the plain of the Anāpus, and Dionysius attacked them by sea and land and set fire to their camp. Himilco with a few troops fled to Carthage by a secret agreement with Dionysius, and left the remains of his army to its fate (B.C. 396). This disaster

crippled Carthage for some years, and Dionysius was able to extend his power over nearly the whole of Sicily ; after which he attacked the Greeks of Magna Græcia ; being hard pressed by the Lucanians and other Italian tribes they could only offer a feeble resistance, and the western part of Magna Græcia fell into his hands (B.C. 385).

Dionysius waged two other wars against the Carthaginians, with varying fortune, but he was unable to drive them from the west of Sicily. He died B.C. 367, just after the second war, at the age of sixty-three.

Dionysius was regarded as the greatest of the tyrants of antiquity. Philosophers and historians were fond of relating his cruelties, his precautions against assassination, and the unhappiness of his position amid all his greatness and success. He made Syracuse great at the expense of its freedom, and adorned it with splendid buildings, but the rest of Sicily he reduced to a state of poverty and wretchedness. His wars with Carthage were costly in money and human lives, and left her with hardly less territory than he found her.

Cruel and unscrupulous as he was, he was fond of literature and philosophy, and attracted poets and philosophers to his court, among whom was Plato, the pupil of Socrates. He himself was a poet of no small ability ; he composed several tragedies to compete at Athens, and the year of his death won the first prize with the 'Ransom of Hector' ; he also sent poems to be recited at the Olympic Games, which are said to have been hissed, owing to their badness, but perhaps the cause was the indignation aroused by his attacks on the Italian Greeks.

He was succeeded by his son, Dionysius the Younger, a young man reared in the court, unaccustomed to war, but, like his father, fond of philosophers and literature. His chief adviser was his friend and brother-in-law, Dion, a strong-willed and upright man, but haughty and over-

bearing. Aided by Plato, now at Syracuse, he attempted to direct the young ruler in the path of good government ; but Dionysius after a time grew tired of their lessons, sent Plato away, and banished Dion.

Dion, after some years, landed with a small force (B.C. 356) and, advancing against Syracuse, besieged the party of Dionysius in Ortygia, Dionysius himself flying to Locri in Italy, his mother's native town. Though hampered by the jealousy and intrigues of the leading Syracusans, by whom he was at one time deprived of his command, Dion at last took Ortygia. But when, instead of demolishing the fortifications of the tyrant's stronghold, he made himself tyrant in his place, the Syracusans rose against him and he was murdered (B.C. 353). His death brought no relief to the unhappy Syracusans : tyrant after tyrant started up, till at last Dionysius himself came back and ruled more oppressively than ever. Moreover, the Carthaginians were again threatening an invasion, and the Syracusans in despair applied for aid to their mother-city, Corinth. No leading man at Corinth would undertake the task of freeing Syracuse, so **Timoleon** was sent, a man fifty years old, of blameless life, whose sole claim to distinction up to that time had been his hatred of tyrants, which had lately impelled him to kill his own brother for trying to make himself tyrant of Corinth.

With under 1000 men Timoleon started on his apparently hopeless enterprise ; eluding the Carthaginian fleet, he landed in Sicily and advanced victoriously on Syracuse (B.C. 344). Dionysius, besieged in Ortygia by the Carthaginians, agreed to surrender if Timoleon would send him safely to Corinth. This he did, and Dionysius spent the rest of his life in Corinth, an object of great curiosity to citizens and strangers, enjoying the conversation of philosophers, drowning his sorrows in the wine-cup, and, it is said, teaching reading and recitation. Meanwhile,

Timoleon defeated the Carthaginians and gained possession of Syracuse. Then the real greatness of the man appeared. Instead of using his power to make himself tyrant like Dion, he destroyed the fortifications of Ortygia and restored the old constitution of the Syracusans. He then set himself to the work of healing the troubles of the Sicilians, by putting down tyrants, recalling exiles, and inviting colonists from Greece, to the number, it is said, of 60,000, to repair the ravages of war and civil dissension in Syracuse, Agrigentum, and the other cities. When the Carthaginians declared war on him, he attacked them at the **River Crimisus**, in the west of the island, and, aided by a storm of hail and lightning, inflicted on them one of the most crushing defeats known in history (B.C. 339). Finally, after accomplishing his task, he laid down his office and lived for the few remaining years of his life as a private citizen in a house provided for him by the state; he was regarded by the Syracusans with the deepest affection and respect, and even when his eyesight failed, the blind statesman used to be led into the assembly amid thunders of applause to give his opinion on the question in discussion. At his death (B.C. 337) crowds came from all quarters of Sicily to attend his funeral. The grateful Syracusans founded a festival in his honour, and raised as a memorial a pile of buildings known as the *Timoleontœum*.

How long the peace and prosperity established by Timoleon lasted is unknown, for the history of the next few years has been lost. By about B.C. 320, when a generation had grown up ignorant of the horrors of civil discord and tyranny, the troubles had begun again at Syracuse, and ended in the establishment of a new tyranny by a soldier named **Agathōcles**, brave, able, and handsome, but utterly ruthless (B.C. 317). Being admitted into the city with a force of mercenaries, after swearing a solemn oath to observe the constitution, he let loose his soldiers on

the city and massacred some thousands of the citizens ; having thus firmly planted himself at Syracuse, he occupied the next few years in extending his power over the other Greek cities, by overthrowing their governments : thus everywhere, the good work of Timoleon was undone, and the Carthaginians were encouraged by the discord of the Greeks to renew their attacks. They defeated Agathocles at the River Himera, (B.C. 310), whereupon the Greek cities, regarding them as liberators, came over to their side.

Then Agathocles took the desperate step of invading Africa himself. Victorious at first, he did enormous harm to Carthage and gained immense booty, but his army was not strong enough to hold out against the repeated attacks of the Carthaginians, and was at last, after four years, compelled to surrender, he himself having previously returned to Syracuse. Agathocles made peace with Carthage by acknowledging her right to all her possessions in Sicily and then attacked and defeated the army of the Greek cities who had banded together against him and re-established his dominion in Sicily (B.C. 301). He kept up the same fierce energy to the last ; and when he died (B.C. 289)—poisoned, according to one account, by his grandson—he was planning a fresh expedition against his old foes the Carthaginians.

Meanwhile the Greeks of South Italy, incapable of any sustained effort, and unable to produce any great leader, were gradually succumbing before the Lucanians and their kinsmen the Samnites, till at last Tarentum, one of the few cities which still remained independent, implored the aid of her mother country, Sparta, just as Syracuse about the same time applied to Corinth. The Spartan king, Archidamus, the victor of the 'Tearless Battle,' came over with an army, but fell in battle the same year as Chæroneia (B.C. 338). Then the Tarentines invited over Alexander of Epirus, brother-in-law of Philip of Macedon

(B.C. 332): he came hoping to win a great empire in the West, such as his nephew, Alexander, was conquering in the East; but, after winning many battles against the Lucanians, he fell by the dagger of a traitor (B.C. 326).

But soon a new enemy appeared on the scene. The Romans conquered the Samnites and Lucanians after long and bloody wars (B.C. 290), which gave the Tarentines a respite from their assaults. But in the year B.C. 282 the Tarentines, in a most reckless manner, provoked a war with Rome, and invited over Pyrrhus of Epirus (see p. 336), who came with the same hopes as his uncle Alexander. He won indeed two victories over the Romans, but, meeting with a much more stubborn resistance than he expected, he was only too glad to receive a request for aid from the Syracusans. Syracuse, since the death of Agathocles, had been again hard pressed by the Carthaginians and was also suffering from the usual dissensions at home. Pyrrhus, with his wonted military skill, won victory after victory over the Carthaginians, but he was destined never to be successful in a war. He was repulsed in the siege of their great sea-port, Lilybæum; and the Greeks, finding him inclined to be their master rather than their ally, began to turn against him. In disgust he returned to Italy, was beaten by the Romans, and, sailing back to Greece, left the Tarentines to submit to the rule of Rome (B.C. 272). Such was the fate of the cities of Magna Græcia: henceforward they became mere provincial towns of Italy.

After the departure of Pyrrhus, the Syracusans made one of their citizens, **Hiero**, a descendant of Gelo, general; but he was soon acclaimed as king by the army (B.C. 270). But the struggle in Sicily was no longer between Carthaginians and Greeks, but between Carthaginians and Romans. For the Romans having made themselves masters of Italy by the defeat of Pyrrhus soon came into collision with the Carthaginians, and fought against them the famous 'Punic Wars,'

which belong to Roman rather than Greek history. Hiero at first took the Carthaginian side, but he was soon so convinced of the great strength of the Romans that he went over to them and remained faithful in his alliance to the day of his death fifty years afterwards ; thus securing for Syracuse a longer period of peace and prosperity than she had enjoyed for many years. The first Punic war resulted in the Carthaginians being driven from the island in which they had been trying to establish themselves for so many hundreds of years, and the part of Sicily in their possession became a Roman Province.

In B.C. 216, two years after the outbreak of the second Punic war (the war between Hannibal and Rome), Hiero died, and with him passed away the prosperity of Syracuse ; for his grandson and successor Hieronymus, a vain youth of fifteen, dazzled by the great victories of Hannibal, began to hanker after alliance with Carthage. Hieronymus was soon murdered, civil dissensions and bloodshed followed, in which the party favourable to Carthage were victorious, and Syracuse again changed sides. But Rome was not so weak as was supposed ; in the midst of her awful struggle with Hannibal in Italy she was able to spare an army to fight the Carthaginians in Sicily. Syracuse was besieged, and after a two years' resistance was taken by treachery and ruthlessly sacked, the efforts of the Carthaginians to relieve it being unavailing (B.C. 210). The whole of Sicily now fell into the power of the Romans, and was formally surrendered to them by the Carthaginians, when, after the defeat of Hannibal at Zama, they were compelled to sue for peace (B.C. 201).

Sicily was made into a Province (the first of the Roman Provinces), and ruled by a governor sent from Rome. Unfortunately, in their treatment of it, the Romans followed the example set by the Carthaginians, who regarded a Province as a place from which to get money ; the Sicilians

were, therefore, ground down by taxation and the tyranny and exactions of the Roman Governors, the worst of whom, Verres, was successfully prosecuted by the great Roman orator Cicero, in a speech which gives a terrible picture of the sufferings of the unfortunate provincials. The cities dwindled, the land was divided into huge estates cultivated by gangs of slaves for their Roman masters, who more than once broke into revolt, and the island was devastated by horrible slave-wars. The establishment of the Roman Empire by Augustus brought better government, but the Greek life of Sicily had passed away, it had become a mere appendage of Italy, and its further history concerns us no longer.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE LITERATURE OF THE GREEKS

THE earliest literature in Greece was poetry ; for in a ruder age, when there was little or no writing, poetry was a more natural form of composition than prose, as being easier to remember. It was not until the historical times that a real prose literature arose. The earliest known poetry was epic, and its home was not in Greece but the Asiatic colonies. It has been already mentioned (see p. 26) that epic poems were songs of fighting and adventure sung by wandering minstrels in the halls of kings and nobles ; and the most famous epics, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, have been described and the question of their authorship discussed. Their date was probably about 800 B.C. There were many other epics, mostly of a later date, which, being of inferior merit, have not survived ; their authors were known as the Cyclic Poets, because their poems all together covered the whole cycle of the Trojan Legend : however, the Trojan Legend was not the only one treated. One other epic has survived, written in much later times in imitation of the old epic ; this is the *Argonautica*, the adventures of Jason and the Argonauts (see p. 32), written by Apollonius Rhodius the Alexandrian (B.C. 222-181).

Akin to the epic are the 'Hymns' to Apollo and other gods, which were once attributed to Homer ; and there is also a mock epic called the *Battle of the Frogs and Mice*, the date of which is probably rather late.

After epic arose two new styles of poetry, **didactic** and **lyric**. Didactic poetry (*διδάσκειν*, to teach) means 'Instructive Poetry.' There was only one great didactic poet, **Hesiod** (about B.C. 700 probably). What little is known of Hesiod is gathered chiefly from his works; he was born at Ascra in Boeotia, and was unjustly deprived of part of his inheritance by his brother. To this brother he addresses his chief work, the **Works and Days**, which consists partly of moral precepts and partly of directions for farming and managing a household. Other poems attributed to him are the *Theogony* (an account of Greek mythology) and the *Shield of Heracles*, an imitation of the *Shield of Achilles* in Homer. He was followed by several didactic poets whose works were imitated by Virgil in his *Georgics*.

Lyric poetry—i.e. songs written to be sung to the lyre—was of many different kinds: love songs, war songs, political odes, choric songs in honour of gods, or to commemorate national events. Lyric poetry sprang up and flourished mostly in the islands of the Ægean, and lasted from about 700-500 B.C.—that is, during the age of the tyrants, who, as has been mentioned, greatly encouraged literature. Many fragments, and a few more or less complete poems, of the early lyric poets have come down to us.

Archilochus, about 700 B.C., is the earliest lyric poet. He was a native of the island of Paros; he invented the Iambic metre in which he wrote bitter satires against his personal enemies; he wrote other kinds of poetry, and is said to have also invented the Elegiac metre which became such a favourite with the Roman poets.

Alcaeus and the poetess **Sappho** (both about B.C. 600) were natives of Lesbos; they are famous for their passionate love songs, and have given their names to the Alcaic and Sapphic metres adapted with such effect by the Roman Horace. Alcaeus was a noble, and was driven into exile by political dissensions; many of his poems were to encourage

the nobles in their struggle. Sappho, according to one story, threw herself into the sea owing to her love not being returned.

Simonides (B.C. 556-467) was a native of the island of Ceos, but spent most of his life at Athens now rising into a leading city ; he wrote poetry of many kinds, and is said to have been the first poet to take money for his compositions ; he competed at the many poetical competitions held at Athens, and won no less than fifty-six prizes, defeating the tragic poet Aeschylus for an elegy on the Athenians slain at Marathon. He was afterwards invited by Hiero, King of Syracuse, to his court, where he died. His contemporary **Anacreon** (about B.C. 550 to 478) was born at Teos, an Ionian city of Asia Minor ; he lived first at Samos at the court of the tyrant Polycrates, and then at Athens, whither he was invited by the tyrant Hippias. His poems were mostly love or drinking songs, wonderfully polished and graceful, but, as might be expected in a court poet, they lack the natural fire and spirit of Alcaeus and Sappho.

Stesichorus of Himera in Sicily (B.C. 632-560) was the first great poet of choric odes, in which he introduced great improvements. He is said to have been struck blind by Helen, who was supposed to have been deified, for defaming her name in a poem on the Trojan war ; whereupon he wrote a recantation affirming that it was not Helen but a phantom of her that went to Troy.

Another writer of choric odes was **Arion**, a native of Lesbos (about 600 B.C.) ; he lived at the court of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, and on one occasion (according to the story) when returning thither from a voyage to Sicily, was thrown over by the sailors, who coveted his wealth ; but a dolphin took him and carried him safely to land. Arion was the first poet to compose the **Dithyramb**, the origin of which name is unknown. Dithyrambs were songs sung with dancing at festivals in honour of Dionysus by choruses

dressed as Satyrs, the attendants of Dionysus, half men and half goats. They had their origin among the Dorians, especially at the Isthmus at Corinth and Megara.

The long line of lyric poets closes with **Pindar** (B.C. 522-442) a native of Boeotia, its one great poet. He wrote poems of many kinds, but is chiefly famous for his four books of *Epinicia*, or victory songs, choric songs in honour of the victors in the four great games; these alone have come down to us entire; they are very difficult Greek, and full of obscure allusions to legendary history. On the destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great the house of Pindar was spared, perhaps because he had written an ode on a victory of Alexander, who was king of Macedon at the time of the Persian wars.

After the Lyric age came the age of Dramatic Poetry. This was confined to Athens, and consisted of Tragedy and Comedy. Tragedy arose from the *Dithyrambs* (mentioned above in the account of Arion). These Dithyrambic Choruses gradually became more and more dramatic; scenes from the adventures of Dionysus, afterwards also of some other god or hero, being half-acted, half-recited. These performances were called **Tragedies**, or goat-songs (*Τραγῳδία*, from *τράγος* goat, and *ᾠδή* song), either because a goat was sacrificed to Dionysus, or because the Chorus were dressed as Satyrs. Thus the word Tragedy had not originally its modern meaning of a play with a sad ending.

Dithyrambic Choruses were introduced from the Isthmus into Attica, where Dionysus was also worshipped; and competitions were held at his festivals. They were further developed by *Thespis* (about 530 B.C.), who added a reciter in the intervals of the Chorus, and is therefore known as the Father of Tragedy; and by **Phrynichus** (about 500 B.C.), who made the reciter an actor, and so first composed regular plays in which, of course, the Chorus played an

important part. His most famous tragedy was the *Capture of Miletus*, which moved the audience to tears, but for which he was heavily fined.

After Phrynichus came the three great Tragic Poets of immortal fame—**Aeschylus**, **Sophocles**, and **Euripides**, whose united careers just covered the period of the rise and fall of the Athenian Empire. **Aeschylus** (B.C. 525 to 456), greatly developed Tragedy by introducing a second actor, and in his later plays adopted the third actor introduced by Sophocles : thus in his plays we see the action and dialogue growing more important, and the Chorus gradually falling into the background, till a Tragedy became what we should really consider a play. He fought in the three great battles of the Persian wars ; losing a brother at Marathon, where he himself was wounded. After the battle of Salamis he produced a play describing the defeat and death of Xerxes, called *The Persians*, thus following the example of Phrynichus : this is the only Tragedy that has come down to us referring to contemporary events. He exhibited his first play in B.C. 499, but did not win a prize till B.C. 484 ; and in B.C. 468 being defeated by Sophocles, he left Athens in disgust for the court of Hiero at Syracuse ; he afterwards returned to Athens and won another prize in B.C. 458, but died two years later in Sicily. The style of Aeschylus is majestic and solemn, though somewhat rugged ; his plots simple. His favourite theme is the remorseless power of Destiny overruling gods and men, and bringing certain punishment on pride and sin. In politics he belonged to the party of the nobles, and one of his last plays is thought to be a defence of the Areopagus soon after its overthrow by Pericles.

Sophocles (B.C. 495-406), his younger rival, was a poet of a different kind ; he portrays human character and suffering, and, though wanting in the vigour of Aeschylus, he surpasses him in tender grace and beauty. He completed

the development begun by Aeschylus by introducing the third actor as mentioned above. Three was henceforth the established number of actors, the less important characters being divided among the two inferior actors: occasionally however it seems that a fourth actor must have spoken a few words.

The earliest fact known about his life is that he was chosen to lead the chorus of boys who performed the triumphal dance in honour of the victory of Salamis. He was only twenty-eight when he won his first victory over Aeschylus. In B.C. 440 he was sent as general with Pericles to the siege of Samos owing, it is said, to the success of his tragedy *Antigone*. Not long before his death, when he was nearly ninety years old, his son Iophon, who was afraid of being deprived of his inheritance, brought him to trial as being mentally incapable; but his recitation of a chorus from his last play, not yet performed, so impressed the judges that they dismissed the case with a rebuke to the unnatural son.

Euripides (B.C. 480 to 407) was born, according to the story, on the very day of the battle of Salamis: his character as a poet and dramatist has always been the subject of dispute. His plays show great pathos, ingenious plots, and skilful study of character; but he lacks the grandeur of Aeschylus and the moral earnestness of Sophocles; he at times degrades his heroes into ordinary persons; he has a fondness for philosophical discussions, and sometimes his plots are so complicated that he has to bring in a god at the end to set matters straight. But with all his faults he is the most human and pathetic of the tragedians. He exhibited his first play in his own name in B.C. 455, and gained his first prize in B.C. 441; he was a student of philosophy and a friend of Socrates, but his life at Athens was not altogether happy, and in B.C. 408 he left the city and repaired to Macedonia, to the court of the king Archelaus.

There he died the next year, torn to pieces, according to the story, by dogs set on him by some spiteful rivals.

There were other tragic poets, both contemporary with and subsequent to the great three, some of whose names have come down to us, but their works have not survived. As Tragedy rose from the Dithyrambic Choruses at the festivals of Dionysus, so from the coarse jesting which also formed a part of these festivals came another form of drama—a rough farce called **Comedy** (*Κωμῳδία*) either the Revel Song (from *Κῶμος*) or the Village Song (from *Κῶμη*), because this form of entertainment was celebrated in the villages rather than in the towns. Introduced into Attica from the Dorians of the Isthmus, like Tragedy, Comedy was also like Tragedy performed in competitions at the Dionysiac festivals.

Comedy grew with the growth of Athenian democracy; for the first recorded comic victory was won by *Cratinus*, in B.C. 452, a few years after Pericles had risen to the head of affairs. After Cratinus came *Aristophanes*, the only comic poet whose plays have come down to us (B.C. 444-380). They show us that the Comedy of that day, known as the Old Comedy, was one of the most astounding products of the Greek mind, and could hardly have been possible in any other state or period. For the Athenians, so full of life and self-confidence, allowed their comic poets absolute freedom to attack all their institutions, political, social, and even religious, and to assail both public and private citizens openly by name, and placed little restraint on them as regards decency. The result is a series of plays written in the purest Attic, with keen wit and playful humour alternating with coarseness and savage caricature, and varied with choruses occasionally of wonderful poetic beauty. Of Aristophanes' private life nothing is known, but from his plays we see that he was opposed to the democracy and war with Sparta. Among historical person-

ages Cleon, Nicias, Demosthenes (the general), Lamachus, Socrates, Euripides, and Aeschylus are actually brought on the stage. One play (the *Knights*) was specially devoted to an attack on Cleon; another (the *Clouds*) was against Socrates, whose character the poet wholly misunderstood; in a third (the *Frogs*) he attacks Euripides only two years after his death, representing him as being worsted in a poetic contest with Aeschylus in the world below.

But after the end of the Peloponnesian war, when the Athenians were exhausted and their fiery energy gone, this licence began to be restricted, and a modified form of Comedy grew up called the **Middle Comedy**, of which one play of Aristophanes (the *Plutus*, or God of Wealth, produced B.C. 388) is the only example; the Middle Comedy in its turn gave way to the **New Comedy**, the simple Comedy of domestic life without any chorus, which lasted for many centuries, and of which **Menander** (B.C. 342 to 291) is the greatest name. No plays of the New Comedy have survived except in the Latin adaptations of Plautus and Terence.

The splendid outburst of the Tragic and Comic Muse in the days of Athenian greatness was the culminating point of Greek poetic genius. From that time onward no new style of poetry arose, with one exception. **Theocritus**, a native of Syracuse (about B.C. 280), wrote rustic poems called Bucolics (*Βουκόλος*, a herdsman), in imitation of the rough songs common among the Dorian peasants of Sicily. The poems written in the Dorian dialect are of a wonderful charm and beauty, and are additionally interesting as being imitated by Virgil in his *Eclogues*.

While poetry goes back to almost the earliest times of Greece, prose as a literary composition only dates from the sixth century B.C. It was the philosophers first who found it more convenient than poetry for describing their speculations. Then historians began to appear, at first little more than compilers of genealogies. The first real historian

was **Hecataeus** of Miletus (about 500 B.C.), for, as was the case with poetry, the first beginnings of prose came not from the mother-country, but from the more rapidly developed Asiatic colonies. So great was Hecataeus's reputation that, at the time of the Ionic revolt, his countrymen turned to him for advice. His answer was that they should not rebel at all; but if they did they should unite closely and make a common capital. His advice was disregarded, and the revolt as we know failed.

The works of Hecataeus have not survived, and the title of Father of History has fallen to his successor **Herodotus**, a native of Halicarnassus, born about B.C. 484. Herodotus travelled extensively, and then apparently settled at Athens, where he made the acquaintance of Sophocles and other leading Athenian writers; he then went to Thurii which had recently been refounded by the Athenians (see page 154). There he probably wrote his history; he died in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, but whether at Thurii, Athens, or elsewhere is uncertain. His history composed in nine books, which his admirers named after the nine Muses, and written in Ionic Greek, is a chronicle of the Persian wars from the Ionic revolt to the capture of Sestus by the Athenians, B.C. 479 (see page 122); through it runs the idea of a jealous Providence which punishes human pride. But the chief charm of Herodotus consists in the digressions with which from time to time he interrupts his narrative to describe the habits and land of some nation, or to trace its previous history before us in his simple fashion; the varied information he has gathered on his travels—a medley of history, myth, quaint stories and strange marvels, about which even he himself has sometimes to express a doubt.

Very different is the Athenian **Thucydides**, the greatest of all historians. His work, beginning with a sketch of early Greek history in which he attempts to separate fact from legends, is a detailed account of the Peloponnesian

war, written with the strictest impartiality, and full of profound observations on the politics of the day. Thucydides was born B.C. 471 : of his private life little is known. He was a man of wealth, for he possessed gold mines on the island of Thasos and the Thracian coast. He appears once on the stage of his own history, being one of the generals on the Thracian coast in B.C. 424, when Brasidas invaded Chalcidice ; on which occasion, as has been described, by his remissness he allowed Brasidas to take Amphipolis, and was in consequence banished for twenty years. During his exile he travelled widely and collected information for his history, which he did not live to finish : the eighth book, which shows signs of not being revised, ending abruptly in the year B.C. 411.

Thucydides's unfinished work was continued by his fellow-countryman **Xenophon** in a work entitled *Hellenica*, which carries on the history to the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. Little is known of Xenophon before he joined the Ten Thousand ; one story states that his life was saved by Socrates at the battle of Delium, but he describes himself as a young man at the time of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, which would place his birth not much before 430 B.C. His indignation against his fellow-countrymen for the execution of his master Socrates has been mentioned in the course of the history ; he rejoined the Ten Thousand and fought in their ranks under Agesilaus at Coronea, B.C. 394. Being banished from Athens (whether before or after the battle of Coronea, is not certain), he settled in a peaceful country retreat on Spartan territory, where he composed numerous works. According to one account he was recalled by his fellow-countrymen, and died at Athens.

He was a simple pious man, but his aristocratic leanings and the execution of Socrates made him prefer the Spartans to the Athenians. His style is easy, but poor and uninteresting compared with that of Thucydides ; while he is

far inferior to him in fairness, showing the greatest partiality to the Spartans and depreciating their enemies, especially Epaminondas.

Besides the *Hellenica* he wrote an account of the march and retreat of the Ten Thousand, called the *Anabasis*, several works about his master Socrates, a panegyric on his great hero Agesilaus, the *Cyropædia*, or Education of Cyrus the Great (an entirely imaginary sketch giving his ideas on education), and several treatises on politics and sport. There were other historians after Xenophon whose works have not come down to us; and others who wrote after the loss of Greek independence, but their works, though important for their matter, are of little value as specimens of Greek literature.

Another pupil of Socrates was **Plato**, who developed his master's teaching into his own splendid system of philosophy. This he expounded in a series of Dialogues, in which Socrates is introduced, written in the purest and most beautiful Attic Greek that we possess. Plato was born about B.C. 428. After the death of Socrates he went to Megara and afterwards travelled widely; in Sicily he made the acquaintance of the tyrant Dionysius; but they quarrelled, and, according to one story, Dionysius handed him over to the Spartan ambassador, who sold him as a slave. He afterwards returned to Athens, and lectured in the Gymnasium in a grove outside Athens called Academia, after a mythical hero Acadēmus. Hence his school was called the **Academy**. His greatest pupil was the famous philosopher **Aristotle**, who also founded a system of his own, which has had a profound influence on the history of philosophy both ancient and modern: he however made no attempt to imitate his master's beauty of style.

One more form of literature requires mention, namely **Oratory**. About the beginning of the Peloponnesian war

the Sicilian philosopher Gorgias came to Athens and created a great sensation by his brilliant oratory ; he then gave lessons for money in the art of speaking, and thus gave rise to a class of professional orators who made a livelihood as teachers of oratory, or as advocates not speaking themselves but composing speeches to be delivered by litigants in the law courts. Sometimes they also mixed in politics. The orators brought Attic prose to its highest development of grace and clearness.

The first great orator was **Antiphon**, an aristocrat who took a leading part in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, and suffered death in spite of his brilliant defence of himself. **Lysias** was the son of a wealthy metic ; he lost his property during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, during which also his brother was killed ; but after the restoration of the democracy he prosecuted the murderers with such success that he adopted advocacy as a profession. **Isocrates** (B.C. 436 to 338) was a most successful teacher and composer of speeches ; though not really a practical politician he composed treatises in the form of speeches, but never really delivered, in which he urged his favourite project, the union of Athens and Sparta for a grand invasion of Persia.

Isaeus, his contemporary, is chiefly noticeable as having been the instructor of the greatest of Athenian orators **Demosthenes** ; nothing is known of his private life, and there is little of interest in his speeches. His pupil **Demosthenes** (B.C. 385, about, to 322) was the son of a wealthy manufacturer, who died when the future orator was seven years old ; his guardians took advantage of his youth to cheat him out of his property ; but when he grew up, with the aid of Isaeus he prosecuted them successfully (B.C. 364), and obtained such a reputation that he started as a speech-writer, and continued that profession for some years. Finally he came forward as a public speaker in the

Assembly. He had many disadvantages—a weak voice, a mean presence, and a stammer; but he laboured incessantly to train himself, declaiming on the sea-shore, it is said, to accustom himself to the noise of the Assembly, and speaking with a pebble in his mouth to overcome his stammer. Though unsuccessful at first, he persevered, and, in time, became one of the leading politicians of Athens. His public career and speeches, his patriotic but hopeless struggle against the rising might of Macedon, and his sad end, have been sufficiently described in the course of the history, and need not be repeated here.

His rival *Aeschines* (B.C. 389 to 314) was not, strictly speaking, a professional orator. Originally an actor (of inferior parts) he afterwards became a clerk in the public service; his fine presence and good voice led him to come forward as a speaker in the Assembly, where he met with great success, but he lacked the fire and sincerity of Demosthenes.

With Demosthenes and the orators of his generation passed away the last great literary period of free Athens. Henceforward, instead of producing original work, the Greek mind turned itself to the study and imitation of the great masterpieces of former days. At Alexandria, the capital of the Greek kingdom of the Ptolemies, there arose a school of famous critics and grammarians, the greatest of whom was *Aristarchus* (B.C. 150) to whom we chiefly owe the existing arrangement of the Homeric poems. Two poets of these later times, *Theocritus* and *Apollonius Rhodius*, have been mentioned.

Of prose-writers mention is due to *Polybius*, *Arrian*, *Dio Cassius*, historians; *Plutarch*, the great biographer; *Strabo*, the geographer; and *Pausanias*, the traveller; while *Lucian*, in a number of humorous works, including several with satires on the old gods, made an attempt, with considerable success, to revive the true Attic style.

CHAPTER XLV

THE PRIVATE LIFE AT ATHENS

WE know little of the private life in any Greek State except Athens and Sparta. The customs of Sparta were peculiar to itself, being founded on the institutions of Lycurgus, which have been already described at the beginning of this history, and need no further mention. It is at Athens that we see the typical Greek life, though carried to a higher degree of refinement and civilisation than in the other states ; and, fortunately, the comic poets and orators give us many glimpses of the private life of the Athenians.

In picturing Athenian society to ourselves, we must not forget the important fact that each city was a little state in itself. Every one, therefore, of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens was far more closely bound up with the public life of his State than the ordinary Englishman. In the first place, he was a soldier, and liable at any time to be called out to serve either on some distant expedition, or for the defence of his city walls. Then he was as a citizen a member of the Ecclesia, where he could hear the great political orators speak, and might any day have to give his vote on some important point of State policy, perhaps even a question of peace or war ; or he might be on the Boulē, and a member of a Prytany (see p. 140), and have to sit every day to transact public business. Frequently, too, he would be one of the jurymen in the Heliaea, deciding some

knotty point of law. Then there were the great religious festivals from time to time—the Dionysia, in which he would be with all his fellow-citizens in the great open-air theatre under the Acropolis, listening to the competing tragedies or comedies; or the Panathenæa, in which, if a rich man, he would be riding with his fellow knights in the splendid procession. Thus continually it would be brought home to him that he was an Athenian citizen, an active member of what he considered the grandest state in Greece.

Even the ordinary daily life of the Athenian was spent a great deal in public. One great resort was the market-place (*Agōra*)—a large, irregular space, part of which was occupied by the various special markets for fish, meat, slaves, etc., while part formed an open space, originally the meeting-place of the city; round which had grown up temples, colonnades, baths, shops, and other buildings. In more modern towns the whole *Agōra* was a regular building surrounded by a colonnade. Hither the citizen came in the morning to make his purchases for the day, for it was not considered seemly for a woman to market: here also the business men congregated, and the bankers with their tables: here, too, came the man of leisure to meet his friends, discuss the latest news, or to wile away his time in the baths or the shops.

Another place of public resort was the **Gymnasium**. Gymnastics formed a most important feature of Greek life, being regarded in all the states as most important for the proper development of the body: they were, however, a more outdoor form of exercise than our modern gymnastics, consisting chiefly of running, wrestling, boxing, spear and quoit throwing, and the like, and various games generally with the ball. The Gymnasium consisted of a large open space or training-ground, surrounded by a colonnade and rooms: some of these rooms were for

gymnastic purposes, others were for philosophers and rhetoricians who gave their lectures there: baths were also attached to the Gymnasium, and sometimes a practising-ground for athletes preparing for the Games, with walks planted with trees. There were three large gymnasia at Athens, one of which, the Academy, has been already mentioned as the place where Plato taught: there were also many other smaller institutions. In these gymnasia the Athenian spent much of his leisure time, either exercising himself, or watching the exercise of others, and chatting with his friends, or attending the lectures of the philosophers and rhetoricians. Plato in one of his dialogues represents Sôcrates, on his return from serving at the siege of Potidæa, as coming immediately to the Gymnasium to find his friends and to hear the latest news.

Besides the Gymnasium, other relaxations for those inclined more to pleasure than serious business were chariot-driving, hunting, and especially cock-fighting, which was a favourite sport at Athens, quails as well as game-cocks being used. Gambling was indulged in, chiefly with dice; and there were several harmless games, some like our draughts. Banquets at which men only were present were a common form of entertainment; the Greeks reclined at their meals on the left arm, usually two at each table; no wine was drunk during the meal, but when it was over, the drinking-party or *symposium* began. Fresh guests now came in, sometimes uninvited. A 'king' of the revels or 'symposiarch' was chosen by the throw of the dice, and he decided how much wine should be drunk, and in what proportion the wine and water should be mixed; for the wine was strong and heavy, and always drunk mixed with water. Chaplets were handed round to each guest, and after libations to the gods the drinking began. For amusement they had singing, especially drinking-songs and catches, and also games; often dancing women, jugglers,

and flute-players were brought in to enliven the proceedings, which continued to a late hour, and, it must be confessed, sometimes ended in riot and drunkenness.

A great contrast to the life of the Athenian citizen, and also a chief point of difference between Greek life and ours, was the inferior position of the **women at Athens**, a position very different to the state of things in the Homeric age and also at Sparta. The greatest merit of an Athenian woman, according to the words put by Thucydides into Pericles's mouth, was that she should be publicly known neither for good nor evil. As a girl she was brought up absolutely in seclusion at home, and was in no wise allowed to mix with the other sex, only going out in public under strict supervision. Even when married she had but little more freedom : the Athenian husband never made a real companion of his wife, which is not surprising, considering her bringing up : she might never go to the Agōra or Gymnasium, or accompany her husband to an entertainment at a friend's house, or entertain her husband's guests at home. Her duties were simply to bring up her children and to manage her husband's household. At Sparta, on the other hand, as at Rome, the wife was regarded with honour and respect as the mother of future citizens of the State.

Another great difference between Greek and modern life is the institution of **slavery** : the large number of slaves at Athens has been mentioned (see p. 141). Slaves at Athens practically took the place of our lower orders ; they were domestic servants, and worked on the farms, in mines and manufactories, and all public menial occupations ; even the police at Athens were slaves, mostly from Scythia, as were many of the inferior clerks in the public offices. Most of the trade in the shops, too, was carried on by slaves for Athenian masters or by foreigners (metics, see p. 141), for it was considered degrading for a citizen to keep a shop. The poorer citizens seem to have been for the most

part small cultivators ; but both they and the metics sometimes performed slave duties for hire. These slaves were generally Asiatics ; occasionally Greek prisoners of war were sold into slavery, as in case of Olynthus (see p. 293), but it was generally regarded as degrading for a Greek to become a slave, and it became a practice for rich Greeks to ransom poorer fellow-citizens when necessary. As a rule the slaves were fairly well treated ; the Greeks were more humane than the Romans, and the State did not give them the right of putting their slaves to death as it did at Rome : there is little doubt that the position of domestic slaves was, except as regards freedom, as comfortable generally as that of our domestics ; many of them became trusted family servants. They had, however, no rights except through their master, and no slave could give evidence in the court of law except under torture of the rack—a strange and cruel law. They were sold openly in the *Agōra*, the price being from one to ten minæ (£3 to £30, about). The number of slaves kept was a sign of a man's wealth and position ; and it was usual to have two or three slaves, or more, in attendance when going out.

On the birth of an Athenian child it was in the power of the father to decide whether it should be brought up or exposed on the mountains to die. If the child was exposed, which we may believe was not often the case, it was usual to place with it some trinket or other article by which it might be afterwards recognised if rescued and brought up by some stranger, a custom which often formed the plot of Greek comedies. On the tenth day the child was named, and there was a banquet and sacrifice, to which friends and relations were invited. The nursery life of an Athenian child was naturally much the same as our own : it had its toys to play with ; stories of gods and heroes took the place of our fairy tales. At about the age of six the child, if a boy, was taken from the nursery and put under the charge

of a slave, generally an elderly man, called *pædagōgus* (child leader, from *παῖς ἄγω*), whence comes our *pedagogue*; the duty of the Athenian *pædagōgus*, however, was not to teach, but to look after his charge, train him in proper behaviour, and, when he went to school, take him thither and fetch him away.

The education prescribed by the State for an Athenian boy consisted of letters (*i.e.* reading, writing, and arithmetic), gymnastics, and music. The Greeks attached so much importance to bodily training, as already mentioned, that, not content with encouraging it in playtime, as we do, they made it an actual part of the education itself.

Every parent was compelled to send his son to a school, but the schools themselves were private institutions. The schoolmaster had nothing to do with the boy except to teach him, and the profession did not rank very high at Athens. When he was able to read, the boy was instructed in the works of the national poets, long passages of which were learned by heart; the knowledge of Homer especially was considered necessary for an Athenian gentleman. The arithmetic was very simple, most of it being done with the fingers, or by counters on a counting-board. Half the day was probably spent at school, the other half at the *Gymnasium*: the boys seem to have attended the ordinary gymnasia, which, however, were closed to the public while they were being instructed. They were, of course, attended by their *pædagōgus*, and there were public officials, whose business it was to look after them. Their musical education began later, apparently about the age of thirteen: music was closely connected with the national poetry and the national religion, and was regarded as an accomplishment in the highest degree befitting a gentleman. The instrument usually learned was the lyre.

At the age of sixteen the boy became an *Ephēbus* or youth. He now escaped from the supervision of the

pædagōgus ; his hair was cut short, in honour of which a festival was celebrated ; his schooling ceased, but for two years more his gymnastic training was continued as a preparation for military service. At the age of eighteen the Ephēbus was entered on the list of his tribe, presented publicly to his fellow-citizens in the theatre, and took an oath of allegiance to his country ; he was now enrolled in the home-defence army. At the age of twenty he became a full citizen, was enrolled in the ordinary army, and entitled to attend the Ecclesia.

He could, however, if so inclined, continue his education by studying philosophy and oratory under the philosophers and rhetoricians, who taught in the Gymnasium, and charged generally high fees ; but doubtless the majority preferred gymnastics and other more congenial pursuits.

The dress of the Greeks, as was natural in so warm a climate, consisted of few articles of a loose and simple nature, which their natural sense of beauty made very graceful.

The ordinary indoor costume for both men and women was the Chiton, a simple shirt-like garment, either fastened over the shoulders or having holes to put the arms through. It was fastened round the waist with a girdle. There were two kinds of Chiton—the Ionian, which was of linen reaching down to the feet, and with short sleeves ; and the Dorian, of wool, reaching only to the knee, and fastened over the shoulders. At Athens the men gave up the Ionian Chiton for the more convenient Dorian one ; but the women continued to wear the Ionian : the women's Chiton was drawn up through the girdle so as to hang over it in folds, and sometimes so arranged that the upper part was double and hung down as far as the girdle, thus forming a very graceful garment. Slaves and workmen were distinguished by a Chiton fastened over the left shoulder, but leaving the right arm and shoulder quite bare.

Over the Chiton, out of doors, both men and women wore a large square garment called Himation, which was thrown round the body in a similar fashion to the Roman toga; the Himation was also used as a blanket for sleeping. There was also a shorter mantle called Chlamys, which was fastened round the neck by a clasp, and hung down to the knees. This was the distinctive dress of the Ephēbi, and was also used as a military cloak. Both white and coloured costumes were worn; the colours of the men were generally dark, those of the women brighter; but it was not respectable for a woman to wear too bright colours.

Hats, low and broad-brimmed, were worn by travellers, but not usually by persons walking about in the city. In the same way sandals and shoes of various descriptions were worn when necessary to protect the feet, especially in winter, but not in the summer or always out of doors. It is stated as an instance of Socrates's hardihood that he went barefooted at the siege of Potidæa even in the winter.

Though the dress of the Greeks seems so simple, yet they were just as much given to the various arts of self-adornment as modern nations, especially the women. The men after they had passed the age of the Ephēbi wore the hair slightly long; they also wore the beard and moustache till the day of Alexander the Great, who brought shaving into fashion by ordering his soldiers to shave. The women wore their hair arranged in graceful coils on the head.

The poorest feature of Greek life was the private house; it is somewhat surprising to find that Athens was not, as a whole, a fine city. But so it was. It has been mentioned that the Athenian citizen lived much of his time in public, and always felt himself closely bound up with the public life of his state. The result was that all the splendid architecture of Athens was in the public buildings, especially the Acropolis, with its glorious temples, and the Agōra.

The private houses were of a mean appearance, roughly built, and with few windows looking out on the street. The streets themselves were narrow and crooked, a result probably of the haste with which the city was rebuilt after its destruction by the Persians. The general form of the Greek house was not unlike that of the Roman houses discovered at Pompeii ; the street door led through a vestibule into a central hall (Aulē) open to the air, and surrounded with pillars, whence it was also called the Peristyle (περί, around ; στῦλος, a pillar) : in the centre was an altar to Zeus. Round the Aulē were small chambers, lighted chiefly from it, forming the living and sleeping rooms of the men of the household, the sons and men-slaves ; this front part of the house was called the Andronitis (ἀνήρ, man ; genitive, ἀνδρός). Opposite to the street door another door and passage led to the women's apartments at the back, the Gynæconitis or Gynæcēum (γυνή, a woman ; genitive, γυναικός) ; in a large house the Gynæcēum often had a second Aulē. The daughters of the family and the women-servants were confined to the Gynæcēum, and occupied themselves with household work and spinning, under the supervision of the lady of the house ; she was permitted herself to come into the Andronitis, but retired into the Gynæcēum when her husband had friends. Some houses had an upper story, but not usually as large as the ground floor ; this was used for slaves' sleeping-rooms, and occasionally the Gynæcēum was put there.

After the loss of Greek independence, when the citizens began to think less of the greatness of their city, and turned their thoughts more to their private life, the houses began to be larger and handsomer.

CHAPTER XLVI

CONCLUSION

It remains to give a rapid sketch of the course of events by which, amid the great changes that took place in Europe, the modern Greek nation arose from the ruins of the ancient Greece.

The establishment of the Roman Empire improved the lot of the Greeks as it did of the other subjects of Rome. Julius Cæsar had rebuilt the town of Corinth, so ruthlessly destroyed by Mummius. Augustus separated Greece from Macedonia and made it a province by itself, under the name of *Achaia*, with Corinth, now again a busy sea-port, for its capital. Athens and Sparta, in compliment to their great past, were left independent, not being included in the province. In this state Greece led a peaceful existence for many years, living on the memory of her glorious past ; all the old institutions, the Olympic Games, the Festivals, and the Assemblies, were kept up. The Spartans still trained their boys according to the stern old laws of Lycurgus. Athens was still the home of art, literature, and philosophy, whither the Romans came to complete their education, and to live a life of literary ease away from the bustle and turmoil of Rome. The Roman rule spread Greek culture over the West, as the conquests of Alexander the Great had spread it over the East. Greek was now the literary language of the day. In every part of the known world Greeks were to be found

pushing their fortunes. Outside Greece were many great cities almost entirely Greek—Alexandria, Antioch, the Greek colony of Ephesus, and others. But in Greece itself wealth and population were slowly dwindling ; it produced no great men, nothing to rival the great works of its prime.

The first change was the coming of Christianity, which quickly took root among the intelligent and refined Greeks. Then came the division of the Roman Empire by Constantine the Great, and the foundation of the new Eastern capital, Constantinople, at the old Greek colony of Byzantium (A.D. 330). Under the Eastern Empire Greece was heavily taxed, and the freedom it had enjoyed hitherto was lost ; the free city assemblies were abolished, and governments set up which drew their power directly from the Emperor. Thus the old institutions were beginning to die out : in A.D. 393 the Emperor Theodosius **abolished the Olympic Games** ; and in A.D. 529 the great Emperor Justinian **closed the schools of philosophy at Athens**, by refusing to continue the grant of money made to them.

Meanwhile a mighty change had been coming over the world ; the hordes of barbarian Goths from Germany had after many years' vain efforts broken through the frontiers of the Empire ; other tribes, including the fierce Huns from Asia, had followed ; the Western Empire had been overthrown, and a barbarian ruled in Italy.

Greece had suffered, too, from these invasions ; then the Slavs, the ancestors of the modern Russians, driven from their homes by the Bulgars, kinsmen of the Huns, made their way southwards, and sought new settlements south of the Danube ; in the seventh century many of them forced their way into Greece and permanently settled there. Gradually, in course of time, the invaders became united with the old inhabitants, and thus arose the modern Greek nation, half Greek, half Slavonic, speaking a language mainly Greek, not much altered by the admixture of Slavonian. The

Bulgars fought fierce wars against the Eastern Empire, but were at length repulsed, and settled south of the Danube. Other foes were the Saracens of Asia, who conquered Syria and Egypt, and for many years threatened the utter destruction of the Empire, but, weakened by the attacks of the Crusaders in Palestine, they were at length overcome.

In A.D. 1200 adventurers from the West of Europe, who called themselves Crusaders, succeeded in conquering Constantinople, and held it for sixty years; they were ultimately driven out and the Eastern Empire re-established, though much weakened. They at the same time set up Frankish governments in Greece, one of which, the Dukedom of Athens, lasted from A.D. 1205 to 1456.

The Saracens in Asia were succeeded by the fierce Ottoman Turks, who, after conquering all Asia Minor, crossed into Europe, A.D. 1356. The Eastern Empire fought desperately, but inch by inch it lost its territory, till Constantinople alone was left.

In A.D. 1453 the **Turks besieged and stormed Constantinople**, and the Eastern Empire passed away for ever. Greece speedily fell, and, for the first time, found itself under the sway of barbarians. Terrible was the condition to which Greece sank during the next centuries; the land was in the possession of Turkish landowners, who received it as pay for military service on the same principle as the feudal nobles in England; and the Greek farmers had to pay them rent in addition to the heavy taxes, while their strongest and handsomest children were carried off to serve in the Sultan's army.

From the conquest of Constantinople the Turks pushed on to carry the victorious arms of Islam over all Europe. But after two centuries the tide of their success turned, and has ebbed ever since; in A.D. 1683 they were repulsed from the walls of Vienna and gradually driven back into what is known as modern Turkey; and, on the north-east, they

were assailed by the rising Empire of Russia. Encouraged by the growing weakness of their oppressors in A.D. 1821, the Greeks revolted, and a war of horrible ferocity followed. The Turkish fleet was destroyed by English, French, and Russians in the Bay of Navarino (Pylus), 1824, and in 1829 the Turks, worsted in a land war by the Russians, granted Greece its freedom. Thus again Greece became a nation, with Athens, the noblest of all its cities, as its capital. From that day its progress has been great; but, as might be expected, it is still but a poor and struggling kingdom—one of the several little states that have grown up out of the gradual breaking up of the Turkish Empire. The Greeks are doing what they can to introduce Western ideas and Western civilisation into their country; their monarch, King George, chosen by themselves, is a Danish prince, who rules them wisely and well.

INDEX

ABYDUS, 101, 217, 250.
Academy, 366.
Acanthus, 259.
Acarmania, 10, 162, 168, 174.
Achæa, 12, 29, 84, 51, 162, 271, 276, 300, 378.
Achæan League, 338-344.
Acharnæ, 164.
Achelous River, 10.
Achilles, 18, 27.
Acragas, 52.
Acropolis, 63, 110.
Acte, Cape, 12.
Actium, Battle, 345.
Adeimantus, 109, 111.
Ægean Sea, 13.
Ægean, Islands of, 149.
Ægicoreis, 63.
Ægina, 13, 36, 98, 110, 143, 147, 165.
Ægospotami Battle, 225.
Æolis, 36.
Æolians, 5.
Æschines, 294-296, 299, 327, 368.
Æschylus, 20, 360.
Æsculapius, 17.
Æthiopians, 31, 324.
Ætolia, 10, 84, 174.
Ætolian League, 328-343.
Agamemnon, 11, 27.
Agariste, 59.
Agathocles, 351-352.
Agésilas, 243-253, 256, 260, 264, 280-282.
Agesipolis, 247, 260.
Agis II., 211, 227, 243.
Agis III., 326.
Agis IV., 339.
Agora, 30, 370.
Agrigentum, 52, 53, 347, 348.
Ajax, 67.

Alcæus, 357.
Alcibiades, 186-222, 234, 239.
Alcidas, 172, 176.
Alcmæonidæ, 65, 70-76, 136.
(1) Alexander the Great, 4, 300-325.
(2) —, son of (1), 330, 333, 335.
(3) —, king of Macedonia, 116.
(4) —, king of Epirus, 303, 352, 353.
(5) —, tyrant of Phæræ, 275-277.
(1) Alexandria (in Egypt), 313, 368.
(2) — (Furthest), 319.
(3) — (near the Caucasus), 318.
Alphabet, 26.
Alpheus River, 12, 19.
Alyattes, 83.
Amasia, 53.
Ambracia, 53, 162, 168, 174, 342.
Ambracian Gulf, 13.
Ammon, 313.
Amphictyonic Council, 21, 289, 299.
Amphictyony, 20.
Amphipolis, 154, 181-184, 188, 275, 278, 285, 287.
Amphipolis Battle, 182.
Amphissa, 299.
Amyclæ, 38.
(1) Amyntas, 87.
(2) —, father of Philip, 275.
(3) —, grandson of (2), 304.
Anabasis, the, 366.
Anacreon, 358.
Anapus River, 203, 348.
Andromache, 31.
Andronitis, the, 377.
Antalcidas, 254, 255, 267.
—, Peace of, 256.
(1) Antigonus, 331-334.
(2) — Doson, 340.
(3) — Gonatas, 336.
Antioch, 334.

- (1) Antiochus, 335.
 (2) — the Great, 341.
 (3) — (Athenian), 232.
 (1) Antipater, 305, 326, 328, 331.
 (2) —, son of Cassander, 335.
 Antiphon, 367.
 Antonius, 345.
 Apella, 41.
 Aphrodite, 16, 17.
 Apollo, 10, 16, 19, 21, 51.
 Apollonia, 259.
 Apollonius Rhodius, 356.
 Aratus, 339, 340.
 Arbela Battle, 313.
 Arcadia, 11, 12, 17, 34, 44-46, 135, 276, 279.
 Archias, 261.
 (1) Archidamus, king of Sparta, 161, 164, 167.
 (2) —, king of Sparta, son of Agesilaus, 276, 279, 352.
 Archilochus, 357.
 Archon, 64, 76, 132, 139.
 Areopagus, 63, 66, 110, 188, 139.
 Ares, 16.
 Argadeis, 63.
 Arginusæ Battle, 223.
 Argives, 29.
 Argo, 32, 92.
 Argolic Gulf, 12.
 Argolis, 11, 27, 34, 38.
 Argonautica, the, 356.
 Argonauts, 32.
 Argos, 38, 44-47, 59, 103, 135, 145, 150, 162, 186, 245, 256, 258, 271.
 Ariobarzanes, 315.
 Arion, 358.
 Aristagoras, 87-89.
 Aristarchus, 368.
 Aristides, 98, 99, 112, 117, 123-126, 132.
 Aristocracy, 56.
 (1) Aristodemus, 34, 42-45.
 (2) —, 108.
 Aristogeiton, 73-75.
 Aristomenes, 45, 46.
 Aristophanes, 18, 231, 362.
 Aristotle, 366.
 Arrian, 368.
 Artabazus, 114, 119, 120.
 Artaphernes, 88, 89, 92.
 (1) Artaxerxes, 129, 148.
 (2) —, 235.
 Artemis, 16, 17.
 Artemisia, 112.
 Artemisium, 105.
 —, Battles of, 109, 110.
 Aryan, 24.
 Asiatic Greeks, 81, 84, 121, 241, 249, 254-256.
 Asinaria, 205.
 Asinarus River, 204.
 Asopus River, 118.
 Aspendus, 255.
 Assembly of the People, 30.
 Assyria, 25, 81.
 Astyages, 83.
 Astyochus, 209, 210, 215.
 Athene, 16.
 Athens, 2-6, 10, 20, 23, 29, 34-37, 57, 62-305, 327-329, 332, 334.
 —, Dukedom of, 380.
 —, life at, 369.
 Athos, Mount, 12, 92, 100.
 Attalus, 303, 304.
 Attic Dialect, 5.
 Attica, 10.
 Augustus, 378.
 Aule, 377.
 BABYLON, 49, 82, 85, 237, 314, 324, 331.
 Bacchantes, 17.
 Bacchiadæ, 60.
 Bacchus, 17.
 Bactria, 316, 318, 335.
 Barbarians, 5, 29.
 Battle of the Frogs and Mice, 356.
 Bessus, 316, 319.
 Bœotarch, 262.
 Bœotia, 10, 33, 35, 151, 180, 262.
 Bœotians, 21.
 Bosphorus, 86, 216, 254.
 Boule, 30, 69, 76, 140.
 Brasidas, 165, 170, 176, 179-183.

- Briseis, 28.
 Brygi, 92.
 Bucephala, 322.
 Bucephalus, 322.
 Bucolics, 363.
 Bulgars, 357.
 Byzantium, 54, 123, 129, 216-219, 239,
 254, 287, 288, 298, 379.

 CADMEEA, 259, 263, 301, 304.
 Cadmus, 26.
 (1) Callias, Peace of (supposed), 148.
 (2) —, Peace of, 267.
 Callibus, 230.
 Callicratidas, 222, 223.
 Callimachus, 94.
 Callisthenes, 321.
 Callixenus, 224.
 Calypso, 32.
 Cambunian Mountains, 9.
 Cambyzes, 85.
 Canal through Mount Athos, 100.
 Capture of Miletus (play), 360.
 Carthage, 49, 53, 115, 324, 341, 347-
 354.
 Caspian Gates, 316.
 Cassander, 332-335.
 Catana, 192.
 Celts, 24.
 Cephissus River, 10.
 Chabrias, 264-266, 274, 288, 297.
 Chæronea, 151.
 Chæronea Battle, 4, 301.
 Chalcedon, 54, 216-219, 254.
 Chalcideus, 208, 209.
 Chalcidice, 12, 54, 179, 259, 278.
 Chalcis, 13, 51, 52, 78.
 Chares, 238, 298.
 Charidemus, 292.
 Charon, 261.
 Charybdis, 31.
 Chersonese (Thracian), 278, 295, 297.
 Chios Island, 15, 36, 90, 133, 162, 207,
 208, 218, 287, 288.
 Chiton, 375.
 Chlamys, 376.
 Cicero, 355.

 Cilicia, 236.
 Cilician Gates, 236, 310.
 Cimon, 98, 123, 128, 135-138, 146, 148.
 Cinadon, 243.
 Circe, 32.
 Cirrha, 21, 289, 299.
 Cithæron, Mount, 10.
 Citium, 148.
 Clearchus, 236-238.
 (1) Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, 59.
 (2) — (Athenian), 74-77.
 Cleitus, 320, 321.
 Cleombrotus, 263, 265, 270.
 (1) Cleomenes, 74-78.
 (2) —, 339, 340.
 Cleon, 172, 177-183.
 (1) Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, 344.
 (2) —, daughter of Olympias, 303,
 331, 333.
 (3) —, daughter of Attalus, 303,
 304.
 Cleruch, 78, 288.
 Clubs at Athens, 210.
 Cnidus Battle, 249.
 Codrus, 34, 63.
 Colchians, 32.
 Colonies, 48, 49.
 Comedy, 362.
 Companions, 308, 320.
 Confederacy of Delos, 125, 133, 153,
 162, 188, 207.
 —, second Athenian, 264.
 Conon, 222-226, 245-254.
 Constantine the Great, 379.
 Constantinople, 54, 379, 380.
 Constitution of Athens, 139.
 Copais Lake, 10.
 Corcyra Island, 13, 31, 53, 60, 103,
 155, 159, 162, 175, 178, 265, 266.
 Corinth, 11, 17, 34, 52, 60, 79, 143,
 155, 159, 160, 185, 199, 244-258, 271,
 300, 339, 344, 350, 378.
 Corinth, Isthmus of, 11.
 — Battle, 249.
 —, Congress at, 102.
 Corinthian War, 249.
 Coronea, First Battle, 151.

- Coronea, Second Battle, 251.
 Cos Island, 14.
 Cossæi, 324.
 Council, 30.
 —, Athenian, 69, 76, 139.
 —, Spartan, 41.
 Crannon Battle, 328.
 Cratinus, 362.
 Cresphontes, 34.
 Crete Island, 15, 36, 39, 52, 103, 169.
 Crimæus Battle, 351.
 Critalla, 100.
 Critias, 229-232, 239.
 Cræsus, 55, 81-84.
 Croton, 51, 52.
 Crown, Speech on, 327.
 Cryptica, 43, 179.
 Otesiphon, 327.
 Cumæ, 51.
 Cunaxa Battle, 257. *
 Cyclades Islands, 13, 32, 36.
 Cyclic Poets, 356.
 Cyclopean Building, 24.
 Cyclops, 32.
 Cydnus River, 311.
 Cylon, 65.
 Cynoscephalæ Battle, 341.
 Cynossema Battle, 216.
 Cynuria, 11, 46, 47.
 Cyprus Island, 129, 148, 149.
 Cypselus, 60.
 Cyrene, 53.
 Cyropædia, 366.
 (1) Cyrus (the Great), 83-85.
 (2) —, 221-223, 235-238.
 Cythera Island, 13, 178.
 Cyzicus Battle, 217.

 DANAANS, 29.
 Daric, 86.
 (1) Darius, 85-96.
 (2) — Codomannus, 309, 311-316.
 Dascylium, 245.
 Datis, 92.
 Decelea, 195, 206, 214, 218.
 Decelean War, 206.
 Delium Battle, 180.
 Delos Island, 14, 116, 132.
 —, Confederacy of, 125.
 Delphi, 10, 19, 21, 22, 290, 299.
 Delphic Oracle, 39, 44, 46, 49, 66, 74,
 84, 103, 111, 239.
 Demaratus, 78, 106.
 Deme, 75.
 Demeter, 16.
 (1) Demetrius Poliorcetes, 333-336.
 (2) — of Phalerum, 332.
 Demiurgi, 63.
 Democracy, 57.
 (1) Demosthenes (General) 174-180,
 198, 204, 205.
 (2) — (Orator), 292-301, 304, 327,
 329, 367.
 Dercyllidas, 242, 250.
 Deucalion, 23.
 Didactic Poetry, 357.
 Dieklus, 169.
 Dio Cassius, 368.
 Dion, 349, 350.
 Dionysia, 20.
 (1) Dionysius the Tyrant, 348, 349.
 (2) —, son of (1), 349, 350.
 Diopetthes, 298.
 Dis, 17.
 Disunion of the Greeks, 3.
 Dithyramb, the, 359.
 Dodona, 5, 21.
 Dorians, 5, 21, 29, 33, 38.
 Doris, 33, 145.
 Doriscus, 101.
 Draco, 66.
 Drama, the, 359.
 Dress, 375.
 Dryad, 17.

 ECBATANA, 315, 320.
 Ecclesia, 63, 68, 69, 76, 140.
 Education, 374.
 Egæta, 189, 192, 347.
 Egypt, 7, 25, 26, 31, 53, 84, 142, 147-
 149, 282, 309, 313, 331, 334.
 Eion, 128, 133, 182.
 Elam, 83.
 Elatea, 300.

- Eleusinian Mysteries, 20, 191, 220.
 Eleusis, 20, 62, 232.
 Elis, 12, 19, 34, 123, 185, 187, 242, 276.
 Endius, 218.
 Epaminondas, 4, 261, 267-282.
 Ephebus, 374.
 Ephesus, 17, 86, 221, 242-244, 254, 310.
 (1) Ephialtes (Phocian), 107.
 (2) — (Athenian), 135-138.
 Ephor, 42.
 Epic Poetry, 26, 356.
 Epidamnus, 54, 159.
 Epimenides, 66.
 Epinicia, 359.
 Epipolæ, 193, 195, 201, 348.
 Epirus, 9, 53.
 Eretria, 18, 78, 88, 98.
 Erymanthus, Mount, 12.
 Etruscans, 324.
 Euænetus, 104.
 Eubœa Island, 13, 151, 207, 218, 298, 298.
 Eucleides, 233.
 Eudamidas, 259.
 Eumenes, 831-838.
 Eupatridæ, 63.
 Euphrates, 236, 287, 318.
 Euripides, 20, 361.
 Euripus Strait, 13.
 Eurotas River, 11.
 Eurybides, 106, 109-114.
 Eurymedon, 175, 177, 198, 201.
 Eurymedon Battle, 128.
 Eurystheus, 84.
 Euxine, 54.
 Exposure of Children, 373.

 FALSE EMBASSY, Speech on, 296.
 Festivals, 20, 378.
 Fortification of Athens, 128.
 Four Hundred at Athens, 211-213.
 Five Thousand, 211-213.

 GALATIA, 386.
 Games, 18.

 Gauls, 24, 324, 336.
 Gaza, 312.
 Gela, 52, 53, 86.
 Geleontes, 63.
 Gelo, 103, 115.
 Geomori, 63.
 Gerousia, 41.
 Golden Fleece, 32.
 Gordian Knot, 310.
 Gordium, 310.
 Gorgias, 367.
 Græci, 5.
 Granicus Battle, 310.
 Graphe Paranomon, 140, 225, 327.
 Great Harbour of Syracuse Battle, 202.
 Greek (name), 5.
 Gyges, 55.
 Gylippus, 195-205.
 Gymnastics, 370.
 Gymnasium, 370.
 Gynæceum, 377.
 Gynæconitis, 377.

 HALIARTUS BATTLE, 246.
 Halicarnassus, 310.
 Halonnesus Island, 297.
 Halys River, 55, 83, 84.
 Hamilcar, 115.
 (1) Hannibal, 341, 354.
 (2) —, 347.
 Harmodius, 78-75.
 Harmost, 226.
 Harpalus, 316, 323, 327.
 Hecateus, 364.
 Hector, 23, 31.
 Helen, 27.
 Helisea, 69, 138, 140.
 Heliast, 138.
 Helicon, Mount, 10.
 Hellas, 4.
 Hellen, 23.
 Hellenes, 4, 23, 25.
 Hellenica, the, 365.
 Hellespont, 36, 216-226, 228.
 —, Bridge over, 101, 114, 122.
 Helos, 43.

- Helot, 42, 46, 179.
 Helot Revolt, 137, 143, 147.
 Hemlock, 231.
 Hephæstion, 320, 323.
 Hephæstus, 16.
 Hera, 16.
 Heracleidæ, return of, 84.
 Heracles, 17, 18, 34.
 Hermæ, Mutilation of, 190.
 Hermes, 17.
 Hermocrates, 192, 194, 195, 209, 210.
 Herodotus, 864.
 Hesiod, 357.
 Hiero, 853.
 Hieronymus, 334.
 Hill-men, 67, 71.
 Himation, 376.
 Himera, 52, 115, 347, 348.
 — Battle, 115.
 — (River) Battle, 352.
 Himilco, 347, 348.
 Hindoo Koosh Mountains, 818.
 Hipparchus, 72-74.
 Hippias, 72, 78, 92, 96.
 Hippocleides, 59.
 Hippocrates, 180.
 Histæus, 87-89.
 Homer, 26, 73, 356, 374.
 Homeric Hymns, 356.
 Hopletes, 63.
 Hoplite, 94.
 House (Private), 376.
 Hydaspes, 322.
 Hyllus, 33.
 Hymettus, Mount, 10.
 Hypasis River, 322.
 Hyperboreans, 31.
 ILIAD, 26, 67, 356.
 Ilium, 26.
 Illyria, 8, 285.
 Imbros Island, 255.
 Immortals, 107.
 Inarus, 142.
 In dependence, Love of, 3.
 India, 85, 86, 321, 385.
 Indus, 321, 322.
 Inferiors, 41.
 Ionia, 36.
 Ionians, 2, 5, 21, 29, 85, 68, 121.
 Ionian Islands, 13.
 — Revolt, 87.
 Iphicrates, 252-255, 266, 267, 274, 288.
 Ipsus Battle, 334.
 Ira, 45.
 Isæus, 367.
 Isagoras, 75-77.
 Ismenias, 259, 260.
 Isocrates, 302, 367.
 Issus Battle, 311.
 Isthmian Games, 18-20.
 Isthmus of Corinth, 110.
 Italian Greeks, 52, 349-353.
 Italiots, 50.
 Italy, 24, 50.
 Ithaca, 13, 26.
 Ithome, 44, 137, 147.
 JADDUA, 812.
 (1) Jason, 32.
 (2) —, tyrant of Phæræ, 271, 273.
 Jaxartes River, 819.
 Jerusalem, 812.
 Judas Maccabæus, 335.
 Julius Cæsar, 378.
 Justinian, 379.
 KING, 29.
 Kings at Sparta, 42.
 Knights (Athenian), 68.
 LABDALUM, 195, 198.
 Lacedæmon, 11.
 Lacedæmonians. See Sparta.
 Laconia, 11, 34.
 Laconian Gulf, 13.
 Lade Battle, 89, 90.
 Læstrygonians, 32.
 Lamachus, 190-196.
 Lamia, 323.
 Larian War, 323.
 Lampsacus, 225.
 Larissa, 9.

- Laurium, Mount**, 10.
Lechæum, 250, 253, 254.
Lemnos Island, 255.
 (1) **Leonidas**, 105-108.
 (2) —, 339.
Leontiades, 259-262.
Leosthenes, 328.
 (1) **Leotychides**, 116, 121, 130.
 (2) —, 243.
Lesbos, 15, 36, 183, 162, 171-173, 207.
Leuctra Battle, 269.
Lilybæum, 353.
Locri, 350.
Locris, 10, 105, 151, 162, 246, 272, 290, 299.
Long Walls (Athens), 144, 227, 252.
 — — (Argos), 187.
 — — (Corinth), 250, 252.
 — — (Megara), 143.
Lot, 76.
Lotus-eaters, 32.
Lucanians, 50-52, 349-353.
Lucian, 367.
Lycomedes, 272, 275.
 (1) **Lycophron (Tyrant of Corcyra)**, 61.
 (2) — (Tyrant of Phœæ), 291.
 (1) **Lycurgus (Spartan)**, 39.
 (2) — (Athenian), 71, 72.
 —, **Institutions of**, 40, 339, 378.
Lydia, 53, 55, 81-84.
Lyric Poetry, 357.
Lysander, 221, 225-234, 243-246.
Lysias, 367.
Lysimachus, 331, 334, 336.

MACEDONIA, 4, 5, 8, 87, 136, 160, 170, 260, 275, 284-305, 326-343.
Mænad, 17.
Magna Græcia, 52, 349-353.
Magnesia Battle, 341.
Malea, Cape, 11.
Malian Gulf, 12.
Mantineæ, 12, 185, 254, 259, 272, 279-282.
Mantineæ Battle, First, 187.
 — —, **Second**, 281.
Marathon Bay, 73, 94.
Marathon Battle, 94-96.
Mardonius, 91, 113-120.
Massilia (Marseilles), 53.
Medes, 24, 81-83.
Medism, 120, 129.
 (1) **Megacles**, 59.
 (2) —, 65, 71-73.
Megalopolis, 274, 279, 282, 292, 326.
Megara, 11, 54, 66, 143, 152, 162, 165, 170, 179.
Melissa, 61.
Melos Island, 14, 188.
Memnon, 309.
Memphis, 142, 313.
Menander, 363.
Menelaus, 27.
Mercenaries, 236.
Mesopotamia, 25.
Messene (Greece), 274.
 — (Sicily), 52, 193.
Messenia, 11, 34, 43-46, 51, 273-276.
Messenian Gulf, 13.
Methone, 165, 291.
Methymna, 223.
Metic, 141, 231, 372.
Metropolis, 49.
Miletus, 36, 53, 60, 89, 121, 208, 215, 310.
 (1) **Miltiades**, 71, 72.
 (2) —, son of (1), 87, 94, 97.
Mindarus, 216-218.
Mithridates, 344.
Mitylene, 171-173, 208, 223.
Modern Greece, 381.
Monarchy, End of, 56.
Money, 31.
Mora Spartan, 253.
Mummius, 344.
Munychia, 128, 232, 329-334.
Mycale, Cape, 37, 121.
Mycenæ, 11, 27, 38.
Myrmidons, 27.
Myronides, 143.
Mysteries of Eleusis, 20.

NAIAD, 17.
Naucratis, 53.

Naupactus, 147, 162, 169, 174.
Navarino, 13.

(1) Naxos Island, 14, 88, 133.

(2) — (in Sicily), 52, 192.

— Battle, 265.

Nearchus, 322.

Nebuchadnezzar, 49, 82.

Nemean Games, 19.

Nereid, 17.

Nicæa, 322.

Nicias, 177, 182, 186-204.

— Peace of, 183.

Nineveh, 82.

Nine Roads, 133, 154.

Nisæa, 143, 179.

Notium Battle, 222.

OCEANUS, 32.

Ochus, 309.

Octavius, 345.

Odysseus, 13, 26, 81.

Odyssey, 26, 356.

Œkist, 49.

Œnoe, 164.

Œnophyta Battle, 147.

Oligarchy, 56.

Olympia, 19.

— Battle, 279.

Olympiad, First, 19.

Olympias, 303, 331-333.

Olympic Games, 5, 18, 35-37, 59, 65,

104, 171, 186, 279, 302, 349.

Olympus, Mount, 9, 17.

Olynthus, 54, 259, 287, 293.

Onomarchus, 290.

Oracle, 10, 16, 21.

Oratory, 366.

(1) Orchomenus (Bœotia), 151, 250,
265, 272.

(2) — (Arcadia), 272.

Orestes, 46.

Orthogoras, 59.

Ortygia, 193, 348-351.

Ossa, Mount, 9.

Ostracism, 76.

Othryades, 47.

Othrys, Mount, 9.

Oxus River, 319.

PACHES, 172.

Pædagogus, 374.

Pagasæ, 291, 298.

Pagasæan Gulf, 12.

Pallas, 16.

Pallene, Cape, 12.

Pan, 17.

Panathenæa, 20, 73.

Pancratium, 19.

Pangæus, Mount, 133.

Panionium, 87.

Panormus, 347.

Paralus, 212.

Paris, 27.

Parmenio, 303, 312, 313, 320.

Parnassus, Mount, 10, 111.

Parnon, Mount, 11.

Paros Island, 97.

Parthians, 335.

Parysatis, 221, 245.

Pasargadæ, 815.

Patroclus, 28.

(1) Pausanias, 117-120, 123, 129, 130.

(2) —, 230-233, 246, 247.

(3) — (Murderer of Philip), 303.

(4) —, 368.

Peiræus, 98, 128, 170, 212, 255, 263, 332.

(1) Peisander (Athenian), 210-213.

(2) — (Spartan) 245, 248.

Peisistratus, 59, 61, 71-73.

Pelagæi, 24.

Peleus, 27.

Pelion, Mount, 9.

Pelopidas, 260-262, 265, 275-277.

Peloponnesian War, 158-228.

Peloponnesus, 11.

Pelops, 11.

Peltast, 255.

Penelope, 31.

Peneus River (Arcadia), 12.

— (Thessaly), 9.

Pentacosiodemni, 68.

Pentathlum, 19.

(1) Perdicas (King of Macedonia),

160, 170, 179, 188.

- (2) *Perdiccas* (Brother of *Philip*), 278, 285.
 (3) — (General), 325, 331.
Periander, 60.
Pericles, 136, 152, 160-166
Perinthus, 298.
Periæci, 42.
Peristyle, 377.
Persepolis, 315.
Perseus, 343.
Persians, 88-149, 207-226, 235-238, 241-248, 255-256, 302-316.
Persian Gates, 315.
Persians (the play), 360.
Phæaciæns, 31.
Phalæcus, 294, 295.
Phalaris, 59.
Phalanx, 286.
Phalerum, 96.
Pharnabazus, 208, 216, 234, 244-248, 252.
Phayllus, 291, 294.
Pheidippides, 94.
Pheidon, 38.
Pherae, 9, 271, 275, 291.
 (1) *Philip*, King of *Macedonia*, 275, 284-303.
 (2) — *V.*, 340-342.
 (3) — *Arrhidæus*, 330, 333.
 (4) —, son of *Cassander*, 335.
 (5) *Philippus* (Theban), 261.
Philocrates, 294-296.
 —, Peace of, 295.
Philomelus, 290.
Philopœmen, 342.
Philotas, 320.
Phlius, 19.
Phocæa, 53.
Phocion, 292, 304, 328, 332.
Phocis, 10, 102, 110, 145, 151, 162, 246, 251, 266, 272, 290-295.
Phœbidas, 259, 264.
Phœbus, 16.
Phœnicia, 7, 25, 31, 35, 48, 101, 129, 155, 309, 312.
Pholce, 105.
Phormio, 168-170.
Phrynichus, 209-213, 359.
Phya, 72.
Phyle, 232.
Phyllidas, 261.
Pillars of Heracles, 32.
Pindar, 19, 359.
Pindus, Mount, 9.
Piracy, 30.
Pisa, 12, 19, 279.
Pisidia, 235.
Plague at Athens, 165, 174.
Plain-men, 67, 71.
Plataea 10, 33, 77, 94, 102, 111, 163, 173, 258, 262, 267, 272.
Plataea, Battle, 118-120.
 — Siege, 167, 173.
Plato, 239, 249, 366.
Plautus, 363.
Pleistœanæx, 152.
Plemmyrium, 198, 199.
Plutarch, 368.
Polemarch, 64, 76.
Polis, 3.
Polybius, 343, 368.
Polycrates, 59.
Polysperchon, 332.
Population of Athens, 141.
Porus, 322, 335.
Poseidon, 16, 17, 20, 37.
Potidæa, 54, 161, 166, 287.
 —, Siege of, 161, 166.
Priam, 27.
Propontis, 54.
Prytany, 140.
 (1) *Ptolemy* (Regent of *Macedonia*), 275, 278.
 (2) —, King of *Egypt*, 331, 334, 336.
 (3) — *Ceraunus*, 336.
Punic Wars, 353, 354.
Punjaub, 321, 335.
Pydna, 287.
 — Battle, 343.
Pylus Bay, 13, 175-178, 218, 331.
Pyræa, 23.
Pyræus, 336, 337, 353.
Pythian Games, 18, 59, 296.

Pytho, 21.

RANSOM OF HECTOR, 349.

Rhegium, 51, 191.

Rhodes Island, 14, 36, 52, 210, 245, 287, 334.

Rome, 4, 52, 53, 324, 341-345.

Roxana, 319-334.

SACRED BAND, 180, 269, 301.

— War, First, 21, 59.

— —, Second, 290.

— —, Third, 299.

Salæthus, 172.

Salamis Island, 13, 66, 111-113, 170.

— (Cyprus), 334.

— Battle, 111-113.

Salamina, 193.

Samnites, 353.

Samos Island, 14, 36, 121, 133, 155, 208, 212, 229, 278, 288.

Sanscrit, 23.

Sappho, 357.

Sardanapalus, 32.

Sardis, 55, 84, 88, 100, 244, 310.

Sarissa, 236.

Saronic Gulf, 12.

Satrap, 86.

Satyr, 17, 359.

Sculpture, 26.

Scylla, 31.

Scyrus, 255.

Scythians, 31, 83, 324.

Seisactheia, 68.

Seleucia, 334.

Seleucus, 331, 334, 336.

Selinus, 189, 347, 348.

Sellasia Battle, 340.

Sestus, 101, 122, 234.

Shield of Heracles, the, 357.

Shore-men, 67, 91.

Sicani, 50.

Sicels, 50.

Siceliot, 50.

Sicilian Greeks, 175, 178, 189, 346, 355.

Sicily, 50, 115.

Sicyon, 59, 339.

Sidon, 312.

Simonides, 358.

Sinope, 54.

Sirens, 32.

Sitalces, 166, 170.

Sithonian, Cape, 12.

Skytallism, 271.

Slavery, 31, 141, 372.

Slavs, 24, 357.

Smyrna, 36.

Social War, 288.

Socrates, 239, 240.

Sogdiana, 318, 335.

Sogdian Rock, 319.

Solon, 65-71, 83, 84.

Sophocles, 20, 360.

Sparta, 3, 6, 11, 37, 35-47, 51, 57, 67, 74, 83, 92, 94, 104-230, 292, 302, 326, 339, 342.

Spartan boys, 40.

— citizens, 41.

— training, 40.

— women, 41.

Spercheus River, 9.

Sphacteria, 176-178.

Sphodrias, 263, 270.

Sporades Islands, 14, 36.

Statira, 331.

Stesichorus, 358.

Stone Quarries of Syracuse, 205.

Strabo, 368.

Strategus, 76, 139.

Susa, 33, 36, 314.

Sybaris, 51, 52, 154.

Symposiarch, 371.

Symposium, 371.

Syracuse, 52, 53, 108, 175, 193, 195-205, 346-354.

Syracuse, Sieges of, 195-205, 348, 354.

Syria, 331, 335, 344.

TENARUM, CAPE, 11.

Tanagra, Battle, 146.

Tarentum, 51, 352, 353.

Tarshish, 26.

Tarsus, 266, 310.

- Tartessus, 26.
 Taygetus, Mount, 11.
 Tearless Battle, 276.
 Tegea, 12, 46, 279.
 Teleutias, 254, 260.
 Temenus, 84.
 Tempe, 9, 104.
 Ten, the, 252.
 Ten Thousand, the, 235-239, 242
 Terence, 868.
 Teutons, 24.
 'Thalatta,' 288.
 Thapsacus, 287, 318.
 Thasos Island, 15, 183, 181.
 Theagenes, 65.
 Thebes, 4, 6, 10, 77, 92, 108, 105, 119,
 145, 152, 162, 185, 199, 227, 280, 244,
 258-305.
 Themistocles, 98, 104-114, 127-181.
 Theocritus, 868.
 Theodosius, 879.
 Theogony, the, 357.
 Thera Island, 53.
 Theramenes, 212, 224, 227-231.
 Therma, 102.
 Thermopylæ, 9, 21, 104-108, 251, 290-
 297, 841.
 Theseus, 68.
 Thesmothetæ, 64.
 Thespiæ, 33, 102, 105, 108, 110, 262,
 272.
 Thespiæ, 350.
 Thessaly, 9, 21, 33, 104, 148, 162, 276,
 291.
 Thetes, 27, 68, 141.
 Thimbron, 242, 254.
 Thirty Tyrants, 229-233.
 — Years' Peace, 158.
 Thrace, 8, 17, 304, 831.
 (1) Thrasybulus (Athenian), 212, 215-
 218, 224, 280-283, 254.
 (2) — (of Miletus), 60.
 Thrasyllus, 215-219, 224.
 (1) Thucydides (Historian), 181, 364.
 (2) — (son of Milesias), 153.
 Thuriæ, 154.
 Thyrea, 178.
 Timocracy, 69.
 Timoleon, 350.
 Timoleonæum, 351.
 Timotheus, 264-266, 278, 288.
 Tolmides, 151.
 Torone, 182.
 Trachis, 106.
 Tragedy, 359.
 Trapezus (Trebizond), 54, 238.
 Trireme, 97.
 Troezen, 110.
 Troy, 26.
 Tyrant, 58.
 Tyre, 25, 49, 312.
 Tyrtæus, 45.

 ULYSSES, 13, 26.

 VERRES, 355.
 Virgil, 363.

 WHITE FORT, 142, 148.
 Women (position of), 372.
 Wooden Horse, 28.
 Works and Days, 357.

 XANTHIPPIUS, 97.
 Xenophon, 236-240, 365.
 Xerxes, 96-114, 129.

 YEAR OF ANARCHY, 233.

 ZACYNTHUS, 266.
 Zama Battle, 341, 354.
 Zancle, 52.
 Zeugitæ, 68.
 Zeus, 16, 19, 313.



